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1. Introduction
“Well, the problem with QE is that it works in
practice, but it doesn’t work in theory.”
— Ben Bernanke (2014)
1.1. Motivation and Objectives
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-09 caused a sharp contraction in inﬂation and economic acti-
vity in almost any advanced economy.As a consequence, central banks around the globe
adjusted their operating frameworks and initiated a series of aggressive interest rate
cuts, but the scope for further conventional stimuli was soon exhausted by the eﬀective
lower bound on short-term nominal rates. Then, in September 2008, as the crisis inten-
siﬁed after the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers, central banks
started to expand their balance sheets at an unprecedented scale – either through large-
scale asset purchases (QE), or through ample liquidity provisions against a broad set of
collateral.
Interestingly, however, the eﬀective use of central bank balance sheets stands in stark
contrast to the pre-crisis consensus about the relevance of suchmeasures. By abstracting
from ﬁnancial frictions, standard macroeconomic models predict that, even at the zero
lower bound of the nominal policy rate, outright purchases of long-term government
bonds have no direct impact on term premia (Woodford, 2010; Cúrdia and Woodford,
2011). In fact, since the 1980s, the scientiﬁc breakthrough of rational expectations mo-
dels associatedwithNewClassicalMacroeconomics has resulted in quasi complete neglect
of balance sheet eﬀects. Instead, the management of expectations took the center stage in
the scientiﬁc debate (Woodford, 2005a; cf. Woodford, 2005b). With respect to monetary
economics, the widely adoptedNew Keynesian model (NKM) led to an exclusive focus on
the short-term policy rate, while the ability of monetary policy to aﬀect aggregate ex-
penditure rested on the premise to inﬂuence market expectations about the future path
of that rate.
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Against this background, ﬁnancial market imperfections and the role of balance sheet
eﬀects were neglected by most macroeconomic benchmark models, which included
such curious assumptions as Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974),Wallace neutrality (Wal-
lace, 1981; Eggertsson andWoodford, 2003) or theModigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958).
Under the guise of these neutrality assumptions, the respective models challenged
earlier insights from economic theory, which had emphasized the role of market im-
perfections for the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. However, even more astonishing
seems the fact that contemporaneous advances inmicroeconomic theory, which demon-
strated various imperfections due to principal agent problems, were largely ignored in
macroeconomicmodels. Based on these drawbacks, Hahn and Solow criticized theNew
Classical paradigm already in 1995 by noting that “[i]n a decade that has seen vast pro-
gress in our study of asymmetric information, ’missing markets,’ contracts, strategic
interaction, and much else precisely because those aspects are regarded as real pheno-
mena that require analysis, macroeconomics has ignored them all” (Hahn and Solow,
1995, p. 2; cf. Turner, 2014).
Thus, one aim of this thesis is to elaborate on the theoretical foundations for the ef-
fectiveness of unconventionalmonetary policies. This is done by contrasting the pre-crisis
consensus with more recent advances in macroeconomic theory. Secondly, I investigate
the various transmission channels of QE and show that asset purchases, conditional on
the state of the ﬁnancial system, can have large eﬀects on ﬁnancial market prices. Thi-
rdly, I assess the empirical evidence concerning the ﬁnancial and macroeconomic ef-
fectiveness of unconventional monetary policies. In this context, the evidence suggests
that the macroeconomic eﬀects are generally smaller than their ﬁnancial market eﬀects,
even though unconventional policies may also have negative repercussions on ﬁnan-
cial stability – especially if a protracted period of low interest rates triggers excessive
risk-taking by leveraged investors. Nevertheless, and despite those potentially negative
consequences, the theoretical premises about the eﬀectiveness of unconventional poli-
cies stand up to empirical scrutiny. Thus, by referring to Bernanke, a central message of
this thesis can be summarized as: QE works in practice, but it alsoworks in theory!
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The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-09 can be divided into a ’pre-Lehman’ and a ’post-Lehman’
episode. The ’pre-Lehman’ episode lasted from August 2007 to September 2008 and
was largely conﬁned to distressed European and US money markets. In comparison,
the ’post-Lehman’ episode was characterized by a global economic slump, deﬂationary
risks, and policy rates at the eﬀective lower bound in most advanced and many emer-
ging economies. Accordingly, part I of this thesis starts with the monetary policy re-
sponse to the ’pre-Lehman’ turmoil on interbank markets, while part II addresses un-
conventional monetary policies at the zero lower bound. Finally, part III provides a the-
oretical and empirical assessment of their macroeconomic consequences. Beyond that,
it also includes a short discussion on potential exit strategies from unconventional mo-
netary policies.
Part I After a preliminary discussion of the way monetary policy is implemented in
normal times, chapter 2 presents a simple corridor model of the reserve market. Sub-
sequently, this model is used to describe some crisis-driven innovations in monetary
policy frameworks. The key result of this chapter is that by replacing large parts of
the malfunctioning interbank market with central bank intermediation, the Fed and the
ECB succeeded in preventing an ’adverse spiral’ that may have easily unfolded from
the heightened uncertainty among money market participants.
As monetary policy in the ’post-Lehman’ era increasingly turned towards lowering
the term-premium component of longer-term rates, chapter 3 highlights that the pre-
crisis workhorse model of monetary policy analysis – the baseline New Keynesian mo-
del (NKM) – is inappropriate to capture such eﬀects. The reason is that the NKM as-
sumes rational expectations, perfectly ﬂexible ﬁnancial markets, and the existence of
the pure expectations theory of the term structure, which altogether oﬀer the rationale
for the Wallace neutrality of central bank open market operations (Wallace, 1981). Ac-
cordingly, the chapter ends with the conclusion that most standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibriummodels (DSGE) lack the conditions conducive for central bank asset
purchases to have a direct eﬀect on either nominal or real economic variables.
Part II The second part starts with a basic classiﬁcation of unconventional monetary
policies. Those are: (i) forward guidance, (ii) quantitative vs. qualitative easing, and, (iii)
negative policy rates. In a next step, I construct a preferred-habitat model of the term
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structure, which provides the theoretical foundation for the portfolio balance channel of
central bank asset purchases (see chapter 4.2.)
Chapter 5 sheds further light on the transmission channels of unconventional policies.
In this context, the predictions of economic theory are cross-checked with the empiri-
cal evidence for the US, the UK, and the euro area. Since the focus of this thesis lies on
the euro area, in chapter 6, I follow Altavilla et al. (2015) and conduct an event study
on the ECB’s asset purchase program (APP). In contrast to previous studies, I investi-
gate the set of all oﬃcial ECB announcements related to the APP over the period from
2014 to 2016. Moreover, I do not conﬁne the analysis to sovereign and corporate bond
yields and, thus, provide a more comprehensive perspective on the impact of QE in the
euro area. Beyond bond yields, I assess the impact on the European stock markets, on
inﬂation expectations, and on various euro exchange rates. Consistent with the credit
risk augmented preferred-habitat theory of chapter 4.2, I ﬁnd that the APP signiﬁcantly
reduced Italian and Spanish government bond yields, while the eﬀects on German and
French yields were much less pronounced. This points to a portfolio balance eﬀect that
runs primarily through country-speciﬁc risk premia.
Beyond its impact on sovereign bonds, the APP also signiﬁcantly lowered the yields
on euro area corporate bonds (both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial). While the announce-
ments led to a signiﬁcant depreciation of the euro against the US dollar, I do not observe
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on expected inﬂation and interbank swap rates. Hence, the signaling
channel and the inﬂation reanchoring channel seem to be less important in the euro area
than in the US (see e.g. Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014).
Part III Although the immediate impact on ﬁnancial markets might be a necessary
precondition for the eﬀectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, its ultimate goal
is to stabilize inﬂation and stimulate economic activity. In turn, part III deals with the
macroeconomic eﬀects of central bank asset purchases. In this context, ﬁrstly, the im-
pact of QE on the banking system is addressed. By taking a closer look at the empirical
evidence for the credit channel in the UK, the euro area and the US, I reach the conclu-
sion that with the ongoing deterioration in bank capital and the persistent economic
slump that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, the positive impact of additional
liquidity increasingly receded. Instead, in the ’post-Lehman’ era, any stimulating eﬀect
of monetary policy on bank lending acted mainly through the bank capital channel.
Given the prevalence of the portfolio balance eﬀect, chapter 8 provides a detailed
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discussion within a modern DSGE set-up.1 By drawing on earlier insights from the
preferred-habitat theory, this chapter highlights the macroeconomic implications of
market segmentation and limits to arbitrage for the eﬀectiveness of central bank asset
purchases.
In chapter 8.4, I follow Harrison (2012) and extend the portfolio balance model by
including ﬁnancial intermediaries and the zero lower bound on the short-term policy
rate. Thereby, I am able to explicitly account for two separate policy instruments at the
disposal of the central bank: conventional interest rate policy and central bank balance
sheet operations. This enables me to simulate the impulse response functions of central
bank asset purchases in case of a binding and non-binding zero lower bound. Conse-
quently, the simulation exercise underlines the important result that asset purchases are
particularly powerful in stabilizing the macroeconomy at the zero lower bound of the
short-term policy rate.
However, the DSGE simulations provide only a qualitative validation for the theore-
tical predictions about the portfolio balance eﬀect. Therefore, in chapter 9, I conduct a
meta study on the existing empirical evidence concerning the macroeconomic eﬀecti-
veness of unconventional monetary policies in the US, the UK, and the euro area. And
while there is a great dispersion among the individual estimates, it seems evident that
themacroeconomic impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programwas substantially smal-
ler than those of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.
Finally, chapter 10 outlines some broad principles with respect to exiting unconven-
tional monetary policies. A key ﬁnding of this chapter is that a successful exit stra-
tegy should likely involve the following steps: ﬁrst, forward guidance concerning the
expected path of future interest rates; second, the application of temporary reserve
drainage operations and/or reserve requirements; third, stopping the reinvestment of
maturing assets on the central bank’s balance sheet and, ultimately, the use of asset sa-
les. Furthermore, I argue that potential central bank losses should not pose a serious
constraint on plausible exit scenarios. Chapter 11 concludes.
1The model in this chapter is based on Andrés et al. (2004).
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Part I.
Monetary Policy and Interbank Markets
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2. Monetary Policy Implementation
“Too often macroeconomic models describe
monetary policy as a stockM whose time path
is chosen autonomously by a central authority,
without clearly describing the operations that
implement that policy.”
— James Tobin (1982, p. 172)
2.1. Key Terms and Concepts
Theoretical and empirical domains of monetary policy implementation have been sub-
ject to various misconceptions due to imprecise or even contradicting deﬁnitions of im-
portant key terms. To avoid such misunderstandings, this section lays out some con-
ceptual foundations with respect to the monetary policy process. Following Bindseil
(2014), ﬁrstly this will be done by contrasting monetary macroeconomics with monetary
policy implementation.
Monetary Macroeconomics The main task of central banks’ economics departments
is to identify the right monetary policy stance to meet their ultimate target, which, un-
der the pre-crisis consensus, meant safeguarding price stability.1 While the monetary
dimension increasingly took the backseat in most central bank operating frameworks,
the monetary policy stance is usually expressed in some short-term policy rate. To ﬁnd
the right level of the policy rate, central banks apply macroeconomic models that rely
to a great extent on monetary theory.
1The experiences of the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis brought the pre-crisis consensus increasingly under scru-
tiny (Bean et al., 2010). Claims to modify the monetary policy framework included, amongst others:
raising the inﬂation target; switching to a price level target; or assigning monetary policy with an expli-
cit mandate for ﬁnancial stability. On the other hand, the opponents of such amodiﬁcation argue that the
crisis occurred precisely because policymakers deviated from this framework (Taylor, 2010). Those cri-
tics therefore conclude that monetary policy should return to its pre-crisis framework once the economy
has suﬃciently recovered.
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Monetary Policy Implementation Once the adequate stance is identiﬁed, the main
task of monetary policy implementation is to steer the operational target – usually some
short-term money market rate – close to the policy rate. Therefore, implementation de-
partments (in the ECB this department is called ’Market Operations’) use theirmonetary
policy instruments in order to inﬂuence the conditions on themarket for central bank re-
serves.2 In fact, the salient point for the power of monetary policy is that central banks
serve as the monopolistic supplier of reserves in modern ﬁat money systems. Hence,
“the special feature of central banks, then, is simply that they are entities the liabilities
of which [reserves] happen to be used to deﬁne the unit of account in a wide range of
contracts that other people exchange with one another” (Woodford, 2001, p. 347). Evi-
dently, this makes the market for central bank reserves the natural starting point for the
implementation of monetary policy.
Separation Principle In normal times, the separation between monetary macroeco-
nomics and monetary implementation, i.e. the separation between the determination
of the monetary policy stance and its implementation through liquidity operations, is
well deﬁned. In times of ﬁnancial crisis, however, when the transmission mechanism is
impaired, the separation becomes less clear-cut and the way monetary policy is imple-
mented can have direct eﬀects on the monetary policy stance.
This could happen, for instance, when during a crisis funding constraints become
binding, which may cause a breakdown of the usual arbitrage relationship between
short- and long-term interest rates. Since this implies that the short-term policy rate
loses its property as a suﬃcient operational target for monetary policy, central banks
often respond by adopting unconventional measures to directly impact upon diﬀerent
elements of the transmission mechanism. Of course, this is exactly what happened du-
ring the recent ﬁnancial crisis, when central banks around the globe tried to directly
control longer-term rates, widened their collateral frameworks, or enlarged the set of
counterparties eligible for central bank reﬁnancing operations. As some of these mea-
sures fall in the realm of monetary policy implementation, it seems justiﬁed to devote
some thoughts to this topic.
2Loosely deﬁned, reserves are funds that commercial banks hold in their deposits (’current accounts’)
with the central bank. Most central banks oblige commercial banks to hold a certain amount of their lia-
bilities as required reserves, but even if no reserve requirements are imposed, commercial banks generally
hold some positive reserve levels due to market frictions or transaction costs.
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2.1.1. Monetary Policy Targets
The collapse of the BreĴon-Woods-System of ﬁxed exchange rates in 1973 allowed the
policymakers of advanced economies to shift their focus from external to internal tar-
gets of monetary policy. And while the 1970s were characterized by high and volatile
inﬂation episodes, by the end of the decade the consensus had been achieved thatmone-
tary policy should be geared towards price stability (Goodfriend, 2007). However, this
does not mean that monetary policymakers focus solely on price stability. Additional
goals may include a high level of output and employment, ﬁnancial stability, or a stable
exchange rate.
Eurosystem The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) consists of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the EUMember States. As
the national central banks of EUMember States who do not use the euro as legal tender
retain their autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy, the term NCBs throughout
this dissertation will refer to central banks whose currency is the euro. The ECB and
those NCBs whose currency is the euro constitute the Eurosystem.3
The relevant legal basis for the monetary policy activities of the European System
of Central Banks constitutes the ’Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ as
well as the ’Statute of the ESCB’. According to Article 127(1) of the Treaty, the primary
objective of the ECB is tomaintain price stability,which theGoverningCouncil speciﬁed
as “maintain inﬂation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term”.4 Without
prejudice to the ﬁrst principle of price stability, the Eurosystem shall also support the
general economic policies in the Union. In particular, it should strive for a high level of
employment and a balanced development of economic activities in the euro area.
Federal Reserve Compared to the Eurosystem, the US government has a bigger and
more direct impact on the Fed’s monetary policy targets. In fact, the ’Humphrey-
Hawkins Full Employment Act’ of 1978 not only mandated the Fed to promote full
employment and low inﬂation, but also speciﬁed the numerical targets for this so-called
dual mandate to be 4% for full employment and 3%CPI inﬂation for price stability (Judd
and Rudebusch, 1999). As a consequence, the members of the Federal Open Market
CommiĴee (FOMC), i.e. the decision making body of the Federal Reserve, are left to
decide upon the means and measures they think are best to pursue those prespeciﬁed
3In the following, the terms ECB and Eurosystem are used interchangeably.
4The ECB’s deﬁnition of price stability as of March 2014 is available on
hĴps://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html.
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goals. Compared to the euro area, where there is no directly responsible national par-
liament above the ECB and the monetary policy targets being ﬁxed in an essentially
inviolable Treaty, the Fed is relatively less independent than the Eurosystem – at least
from an institutional perspective. However, this comparative advantage in central bank
independence should not conceal the various shortcomings that are linked to the ECB’s
role as a supranational central bank of a non-optimal currency area.
Additional Targets In fact, the experience gained during the ﬁnancial crisis raised
some new issues concerning the Eurosystem’s mandate and governance structure. The
crisis proved the existing institutional organization of the euro area, where supervision
of ﬁnancial institutions was carried out primarily on the national level, insuﬃcient to
appropriately address themaĴers of systemic risk and ﬁnancial stability. As a response,
the European Parliament, on 12 September 2013, adopted the European Commission’s
proposal to create the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which will confer speci-
ﬁc regulatory and supervisory tasks to the ECB. After the implementation of the SSM,
the ECB will have essentially two arms - a supervisory and a monetary policy arm. The
laĴer will still be conﬁned to safeguard price stability. Although the ECB’s new super-
visory task and its coordination with monetary policy is part of an ongoing debate in
academia (cf. Beck and Gros (2012)), this thesis will limit the discussion to the classic
monetary policy perspective. In this respect, Article 127(2) of the Treaty in conjunction
with Article 3(3.1) of the Statute of the ESCB lays out the basic tasks themonetary policy
branch of the Eurosystem should pursue. Those are (i) to deﬁne and implement the mo-
netary policy of the Union; (ii) to conduct foreign-exchange operations; (iii) to hold and
manage the oﬃcial reserves of theMember States; (iv) to promote the smooth operation
of the payment system.
2.1.1.1. Intermediate Targets
Although the importance of intermediate targets declined constantly since the end of the
1980s, they have a prominent, though not very successful, track record in the history
of monetary policy. The Bundesbank, for instance, adopted a growth rate for base mo-
ney as an intermediate target from 1975 until 1988.5 Arguments in favor of intermediate
targets usually presume that they can be controlled with a certain degree of precision
and that they show a stable relation to the ﬁnal target. Since both presumptions were
5Due to the high and volatile currency ratio contained in the monetary base, the Bundesbank changed its
intermediate target to M3 in 1987.
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constantly refuted by practical experience, intermediate targets were downgraded to be
mere indicator variables. An indicator variable is supposed to contain valuable informa-
tion with respect to the ﬁnal target but does not necessarily imply that the operational
target has to react in a systematic fashion.
A crucial determinant of successful monetary policy making is a good model of the
transmissionmechanism. That is, policymakers have to knowhow the short-termopera-
tional target, indicator variables, intermediate targets, exogenous shocks, and ultimate
targets are dynamically linked. Fig. 2.1 shows the diﬀerent levels of monetary policy
which are part of this process. The central task of monetary macroeconomics is then to
Instrumental
level
Operational
level
Indicator-/
Intermediate
level
Final
level
Figure 2.1.:Monetary policy levels
uncover the causal relations between these diﬀerent levels and to extract the optimal
response of the policy rate. This might become particularly diﬃcult during crisis times,
when established correlations break down.
2.1.2. Monetary Policy Strategy
How the operational target is employed to optimally achieve the ultimate target is a
maĴer of monetary policy strategy. It deﬁnes how the central bank adjusts the operatio-
nal target in response to shocks and how it communicates with the public. Monetary
policy strategies can be quite simple or rather complex. A rather simple strategy is an
instrument rule like the Taylor-Rule, which tells the central bank how to set the short-
termnominal interest rate for a given state of the economy (see equation ⟨8.75⟩ in section
3.1).
An example of a more complex monetary policy strategy is the ECB’s so-called two-
pillar approach, which consists of the economic analysis and the monetary analysis. The
former aims at assessing the short tomedium-termdeterminants of price developments,
focusing mainly on real activity and cost push factors over that horizon. Amongst the
variables of interest are developments in overall output, aggregate demand and ﬁscal
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policy; a broad range of price indicators; capital and labor market conditions; develop-
ments in the exchange rate and the balance of payments as well as ﬁnancial markets and
the balance sheet positions of euro area sectors (ECB, 2011).
On the other hand, the monetary analysis focuses on a medium to longer-term hori-
zon. It aims at exploiting the robust relationship betweenmonetary growth and inﬂation
over the medium to long run. Therefore, the ECB tracks a reference value for the gro-
wth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3, although it does not react mechanically
to deviations fromM3 from its reference value. Hence, the ECB notes that “the lags with
which protracted deviations of monetary dynamics from historical norms lead to risks
to price stability can be long and varying” (ECB, 2011, p. 80). Therefore, the ECB de facto
downplayed the role of money in its monetary strategy along a number of dimensions.
As a consequence, market participants also ceased to aĴach much weight on the ECB’s
monetary pillar (Geraats et al., 2008) – at least prior to the ﬁnancial crisis. More recently,
however, it has been stressed that the monetary pillar should be revived in order to in-
corporate systematic information about the state of ﬁnancial markets into the monetary
policy process (Galí, 2010; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014b).
Information set
Economic
analysis
Monetary
analysis
cross-checking
Monetary policy decision
Primary objective of price stability
Figure 2.2.:Monetary policy strategy of the ECB
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2.1.3. Monetary Policy Instruments
To implement the operational target, central banks are equippedwithmonetary policy in-
struments. These days, central banks predominantly employ three kinds of instruments:
reserve requirements, open market operations, and standing facilities. The optimal applica-
tion of these monetary policy instruments, i.e. managing the terms and conditions on
the market for reserves in such a way that the operational target is made eﬀective, is
also called central bank liquidity management.
Reserve Requirements Central banks use required reserves and – in case of non-
required reserve regimes – may provide incentives for banks to hold voluntary reserves.
One function of commercial banks holding reserve accounts with the central bank is to
create demand for central bank liabilities in order to facilitate central bank forecasts of
base money demand. This is sometimes called the connectivity function of reserves (e.g.
Goergens et al., 2014, p. 112). Moreover, if a reserve regime with averaging is applied,
this can help to stabilize the volatility of the interbank rate (sometimes called the stabi-
lization, or buﬀer function of reserves).
Open Market Operations In normal times, open market operations serve as the primary
tool to supply/absorb reserves to/from the banking system. They are conducted at the
central bank’s initiative and are used to steer the interbank rate towards its operatio-
nal target. Generally, two types of open market operations can be distinguished: ﬁrstly,
outright purchases or sales of assets (usually public debt securities); secondly, tempo-
rary lending operations (usually in the form of repurchase agreements), which are con-
ducted through diﬀerent types of tender procedures (variable or ﬁxed-rate tender pro-
cedures).6
Standing Facilities Finally, central banks employ standing facilities. These are in fact the
oldest of allmonetary policy instruments. Contrary to openmarket operations, standing
facilities are permanently available during business hours and can be tapped at discre-
tion of eligible counterparties. This is especially relevant at the end of business days
when the interbank market has already closed. In practice, there exist three kinds of
standing facilities:
i. Discount Facility: The discount facility was the predominant monetary po-
licy instrument until the middle of the twentieth century. In classical dis-
6For details, see e.g. Bindseil (2014, Chapter 7).
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counting, eligible counterparties could at any time place some kind of short-
term commercial paper (or ’real bill’) in a special account with the central
bank. The central bank then set the discount rate in this operation by dis-
counting the bill’s face value based on risk characteristics andmonetary po-
licy objectives. At maturity, the bill had to be redeemed by the ﬁnal borro-
wer. Today, advanced central banks do not use this type of discount any-
more. Nevertheless, some central banks, like the Federal reserve, use the
name discount facility for their borrowing facility.
ii. Borrowing Facility: contrary to classical discount borrowing, recourse to a
modern borrowing facility (also called Lombard or advance facility) means ta-
king out a loan from the central bank at given rates and for standardizedma-
turities. In principle, eligible counterparties can borrow unlimited amounts
during business hours given that they provide suﬃcient collateral. The bor-
rowing facility is thus economically similar to the discount facility, in the
sense that both are liquidity providing facilities, although the technical de-
tails of both facilities diﬀer rather substantially. Most importantly, access
to a borrowing facility is granted only at a surcharge above the prevailing
market rate (penalty rate system). Furthermore, modern borrowing facili-
ties are cost eﬃcient and allow for broader collateral frameworks, since the
maturity of the credit operation is no longer tied to the residual maturity of
the discounted bill. As a consequence,modern central banks predominantly
provide collateralized credit facilities and do not employ classical discoun-
ting anymore.
iii. Deposit Facility: this is the only liquidity absorbing standing facility avai-
lable to monetary policy implementation. Eligible counterparties can place
funds in special accounts with the central bank. Whereas other central bank
accounts normally pay no interest, funds placed in the deposit facility get
remunerated at the deposit rate. Banks with excess reserves thus face the
alternatives of depositing with the central bank or lending in the interbank
market.
Misconceptions Regarding the Fed’s Discount Window Unfortunately, the Fed still
calls its borrowing facility ’discount window’. This misnomer can be thought of as a
historical relict which is incorrect for certain reasons: ﬁrstly, already since the late 1960s,
virtually all funds that ﬂowed through the Fed’s discount window took the form of
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collateralized credit (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1974, p. 71).
Secondly, the Fed signiﬁcantly revised its discount policy in 2003 and set the discount
facility’s interest rate above the federal funds target rate (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 2005, p. 47). Therefore, the Fed’s discount window is ﬁnally
equivalent to a standard borrowing facility at penalty rates. Nevertheless, at least so
far, the Fed has not changed its name accordingly.7
Misconceptions Regarding the Poole Model With respect to the optimal choice of the
monetary policy instrument, the inﬂuential article of Poole (1970) caused widespread
confusion and lead to an ambiguous understanding of the term. Poole (1970) showed in
an IS-LM framework that monetary policy should adopt diﬀerent ’instruments’ accor-
ding to the nature of the stochastic shock that hits the economy. In his model, when the
economy is subject to a money demand shock, the optimal monetary policy response is
to ﬁx the nominal interest rate and let the money supply adjust endogenously.
If the economy is hit by a real shock, instead, the money supply should be ﬁxed in a
way that the nominal rate can stabilize output accordingly. Very importantly, however,
the ’M’ in the IS-LM model stands for the money stock, not for base money! This is
problematic insofar as Poole referred to the alternative between interest rate andmoney
stock targeting as the ’optimal choice ofmonetary policy instruments’. Themoney stock,
however, includes commercial bank liabilities which ultimately result from the credit
decisions of banks and the non-bank public. Thus, if the central bank wants to inﬂuence
broader monetary aggregates, it can do so only indirectly by aﬀecting the opportunity
costs of banks’ credit supply.
Since, in reality, the central bank can exert direct control only over the base money
supply, the Poole model must implicitly assume a stable money multiplier. This, ho-
wever, does not hold in practice. Another factor is that modern central banks typically
supply base money endogenously in order to facilitate a smooth functioning of inter-
bank markets. Overall, this implies that Poole’s alleged instrument choice problem is
not really a choice. The problem is rather that it blurs the distinction between the instru-
mental, operational, and intermediate level ofmonetary policy implementation (see Fig.
2.1) and this mistake is based on the “apparent lack of distinction between base money
7To be precise, the Fed’s discount window comprises four types of credit: primary credit, secondary cre-
dit, seasonal credit, and emergency credit. Eligibility criteria and interest rates diﬀer for each credit type.
But since most depository institutions qualify for primary credit - secondary credit is available at a pre-
mium to the primary rate for those institutions that do not qualify for primary credit - and because pri-
mary credit is the main discount window program, the terms primary rate and discount rate are often
used interchangeably.
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and the money supply, deriving from the combined behaviour of the central bank and
commercial banks” (Papadia, 2005, p. 54).
2.1.3.1. Interest Rates as Operational Targets
According to Bindseil (2011), for a variable to qualify as operational target it has to fulﬁll
at least the following four conditions: ﬁrstly, it has to be tractable, i.e. the central bank
must have suﬃcient control over it; secondly, it has to be relevant in terms of eﬀecti-
vely aﬀecting the ultimate monetary policy target; thirdly, it has to eﬀectively signal
the stance of monetary policy to the public; and fourthly, it has to provide guidance to
monetary policy implementation on how to make the operational target eﬀective in the
market.
Over time, the overnight interbank rate turned out to be the most adequate to meet
these criteria, such that prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis, basically all western cen-
tral banks targeted some kind of short-term nominal interest rate. Despite this conver-
gence, however, the implementation of interest targeting slightly diﬀered among central
banks.8
Overnight interbank rates were targeted directly, among others, by the Fed, the Bank
of Canada (BoC), the Bank of England (BoE), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ).9 In those
countries, the policy rate in eﬀect equaled the target rate implying that tender rates on
central banks’ reﬁnancing operations played no independent signaling role.10 At least
until the crisis, the ECB followed a slightly diﬀerent approach. It explicitly targeted
the minimum bid rate in its variable rate tender operations, instead of an interbank
overnight rate. Implicitly, however, the ECB also targeted an overnight interbank rate,
namely the euro overnight index average (EONIA) rate (Amstad and Martin, 2011).
A notable exception with respect to the maturity of the operational target is given by
the Swiss National Bank (SNB). Among the central banks considered, the SNB is the
only one using a range for a longer-term rate (the three-month Libor) as its operational
target. Other diﬀerences amount to targeting collateralized (BoC, BoE, ECB) or uncolla-
teralized (BoJ, Fed, SNB) reﬁnancing rates. These institutional diﬀerences in monetary
policy frameworks - although important from a technical perspective - played no sig-
8See Borio (1997b) for a survey on implementation practices in the late 1990s orMarkets CommiĴee (2009)
and Amstad and Martin (2011) for more recent studies.
9On April 4, 2013 the BoJ ceased to target the overnight call rate and adopted a monetary base target
instead.
10Generally, the policy rate is the interest rate which best captures the central bank’s policy intentions.
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niﬁcant role for the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy implementation, at least prior to
the ﬁnancial crisis. In fact, all major central banks coped rather well with the diﬃcult
task of minimizing the spread between the market and the policy target rate, especially
when they implemented it bymeans of a corridor system (see section 2.2 and Figure 2.5,
respectively).
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Historical Excursus: The Debate over ’Rates vs. Quantities’
Probably the ﬁrst advocate of interest rates as operational targets was Thornton,
who wrote already at the beginning of the 19th century: “[The Bank of England]
might, undoubtedly, at all seasons, suﬃciently limit its paper by means of the price
at which it lends, if the legislature did not interpose an obstacle to the constant
adoption of this principle of restriction” (Thornton, 1807, p. 242).
In its ﬁrst years of existence, however, the Bank of England (BoE) neither set its
discount rate to prevent an over-issue of notes, nor did it employ price incentives
to control for macroeconomic stability. It rather granted credit to the royal court,
as the bank charter and the right to issue notes was coupled with the expectation
that the Bank would help to ﬁnance the court’s substantial debt at preferential rates
(Homer, 1977).
That the Bank did not use its discount rate as an active monetary policy tool
can also be inferred from the fact that the rate was kept at ﬁve percent for almost
the whole 18th century, whereas the rates on state bonds fell considerably. The re-
sulting, very persistent inverse term structure contributed to private sector borro-
wing and stimulated investment. Besides the positive growth eﬀect – and although
probably unintentionally – this policy may have also stabilized the money market,
as the Bank simultaneously limited its note issue but stood ready to act as a lender
of last resort in times of crisis.
In contrast to modern ﬁat monetary systems, however, the BoE’s early experien-
ces with monetary policy implementation were characterized by the binding re-
strictions of the gold standard. The dominant concern of monetary policy during
the gold standard was the availability of suﬃcient gold reserves to maintain the
convertibility between national currencies and gold at the legal parity. With regard
to monetary policy implementation, however, the BoE learned to distinguish be-
tween internal and external drains of gold (Spahn, 2001). The former were seen as
reﬂecting what modern central banks would consider autonomous liquidity fac-
tors, such that gold ﬂows were accepted without triggering an automatic reaction
in the Bank rate. In contrast, persistent external drains due to trade or interest rate
diﬀerentials were seen as a threat to convertibility and were thus answered by tig-
htening the monetary policy stance, i.e. by an increase in the Bank rate.
As a consequence, money market liquidity was depending on the BoE’s discount
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window and hence its ’Bank rate’ policy already before the nineteenth century
(King, 1945). Hence, the BoE followed Thornton’s dictum and deliberately chose
a short-term rate as operational target at quite an early stage. Finally, in the high
times of the gold standard (1870-1914), the BoE succeeded in making the Bank rate
eﬀective by implementing a structural liquidity deﬁcit vis-à-vis the central bank
and systematically exploiting the interplay between open market operations and
the discount facility. In doing so, reserves were supplied endogenously and quan-
titative restrictions – much in line with contemporary practice in monetary policy
implementation – were of minor relevance. Referring to the slope of the reserve
supply function, Moore (1988) called this the ‘horizontalist’ approach to monetary
policy implementation.
Somewhat surprisingly, the theoretical insights of Thornton as well as the practi-
cal experience of the BoE seemed to be discarded by the Federal Reserve, which
began to conduct monetary policy in 1914 relying primarily on quantitative tar-
gets (Meulendyke, 1998; Melĵer, 2003). Moreover, with the rise of the monetarist
paradigm in the 1960, the role of quantity targets for monetary policy was further
emphasized (Cagan, 1956; Friedman and Schwarĵ, 1963). As a result, the consen-
sus to choose ’rates over quantities’ emerged rather slowly over the course of the
twentieth century.
2.1.4. Monetary Policy Transmission
The monetary policy stance is necessarily a relative concept and crucially dependent on
economic circumstances. Whether monetary policy is perceived as loose or tight can-
not be answered irrespective of some neutral benchmark or natural rate of interest. Con-
temporary standard Neo-Wicksellian macroeconomic models in the spirit of Woodford
(2003) deﬁne a neutral stance of monetary policy as a situation where the central bank
keeps the short-term nominal interest rate - the bank rate inWicksellian parlance - in line
with the natural rate. The natural or real rate of interest is determined by fundamental
forces and is thus derived in the the real sphere of the economy. Only if this condition is
warranted do prices remain in stable equilibrium. As Wicksell noted already in 1898:
“There is a certain rate of interest on loanswhich is neutral in respect to com-
modity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessa-
rily the same as the rate of interest which would be determined by supply
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and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were eﬀected in
the form of real capital goods. It comes to much the same thing to describe
it as the current value of the natural rate of interest” (Wicksell, 1936, p. 102).
The basic idea of a natural rate of interest with stable prices is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
It shows a two-good-two-period economy with relative prices. Consider the real good
P1
Wheat
today
1 + r 1 + i
Euro
today
P2
Wheat
tomorrow
P2∗
Euro
tomorrow
Figure 2.3.:Wicksellian arbitrage diagram ⋄ Source: Richter (1990, p. 55)
as a bundle of wheat and the nominal good as currency (Euro). Today, the real good
(wheat) is sold for a price P1 in money units and costs P2 on the future market. To-
morrow, the real good costs P2∗ in money units. If we abstain from consuming wheat
today but instead sow the seeds in order to consume tomorrow, we will be able to har-
vest (1 + r) units of wheat tomorrow. In this simple example, one can think of the real
rate as determined by nature only. In reality, however, this rate is equal to the marginal
productivity of capital, thus depending on the economy’s production function deter-
mined by numerous factors subject to shocks. Abstracting from shocks, intertemporal
arbitrage ensures that in equilibrium, the following condition must hold:
1 + r = P1/P2 = P1(1 + i)/P2∗ ⟨2.1⟩
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If gross inﬂation is deﬁned as P2∗/P1 = 1 + pi, equation 2.1 can be transformed into
the well-known Fisher equation
1 + r = (1 + i)/(1 + pi) ⟨2.2⟩
This illustrates nicely the important implications for monetary policy presented above.
Whenever the central bank sets its operational target equal to natural rate of interest
(i = r), it follows from equation ⟨2.2⟩ that net inﬂation must be zero.
If, however, i < r and inﬂation expectations were constant, then arbitrageurs would
borrow today at the nominal rate to invest in real goods and sell them tomorrow. For a
given production level, this will lead to rising goods prices today until the arbitrage op-
portunity vanishes and equilibrium is restored. Consequently, monetary policy is able
to inﬂuence the evolution of prices - at least temporarily - whenever it drives a wedge
between the nominal and the natural rate of interest (theWicksellian interest rate gap). Of
course, this arbitrage logic is a very simplifying example of the basic intuition behind
the interest rate policy actually pursued by modern central banks. In reality, ﬁnding
the right monetary policy stance is a complicated and resource-intensive analytical task
mainly performed in central banks’ economics departments.
2.2. Simple Corridor Model of the Reserve Market
In recent years, many central banks moved away from implementing monetary policy
mainly through open-market operations. Instead, they designed their monetary policy
frameworks to work more automatically by making greater use of standing facilities.
This kind of system is called a corridor or channel system of the reservemarket. Versions of
corridor systems are now, amongst others, implemented by the European Central Bank,
the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada,
the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Bernhardsen and
Kloster, 2010). To illustrate its basicmechanisms, the following section presents a simple
corridor model of the reserve market.11
Preliminaries There are n banks in the model, each holding a reserve account with
the central bank. Banks use their reserve accounts to seĴle transactions arising from the
11Themodel of this section builds on Sheedy (2014) with many insights coming from Bindseil (2000, 2004);
Heller and Lengwiler (2003); Whitesell (2006); Berentsen and Monnet (2008).
23
2. Monetary Policy Implementation
interbank payment system. This could arise, for example, when a customer of bank A
makes a deposit transfer to the customer of bank B. Therefore, banks borrow reserves
from one another on the interbank market. This interbank borrowing is usually very
short-term and uncollateralized, which makes it potentially risky from a lender’s per-
spective. Importantly, however, due to the stochastic nature of their customers tran-
sactions, banks do not know with certainty how much reserves they will need at the
point they participate in the interbank market.
As an alternative to the interbank market, banks can borrow reserves on the repo
market. In a repo agreement, the seller of a bond (e.g. a government bond) agrees to
repurchase that same bond at a slightly higher price in the future, where the diﬀe-
rence between today’s price and the predetermined higher future repurchase price is
the so-called repo rate (reﬂecting the borrowing rate in this transaction). Thus, a repo
agreement eﬀectively equals a collateralized loan, making it risk-free in the case of good
collateral.
For simplicity, we assume that all repo agreements are risk-free and that the central
bank is the only lender on the repo market. Moreover, we assume that banks typically
do not default on their interbank obligations, so these loans are also perceived to be
risk-free. In other words, the repo rate equals the interbank rate, which seems to be a
reasonable presumption for normal times. Furthermore, we abstract from reserve requi-
rements.
2.2.1. Symmetric Corridor System
In the absence of period-average reserve requirements, a corridor system can be repre-
sented by a one-day model (Whitesell, 2006). Thus, with RHj as the initial reserve hol-
dings of bank j; Ij as net interbank borrowing (negative for lending); RPj as net repo
lending; Tj as uncertain net transfers to other banks; and Rj as the reserve balance of
bank j’s central bank account, the ﬂow budget constraint is given as
Rj = RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj . ⟨2.3⟩
At the end of the day, the central bank pays the deposit rate id on positive balances
in banks’ reserve account, while it charges a borrowing rate ib on negative balances. In
practice, banks can borrowunlimited amounts through the borrowing facility given that
they have suﬃcient collateral. Here, we assume that banks have enough collateral, so no
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quantity constraint occurs.12 With i as the uniform interest rate on repo and interbank
loans, the central bank sets the rate on the standing facilities such that id < i < ib.
If Rj ≥ 0, the reserve balance of bank j at the beginning of the next period, i.e. after
interbank, repo and the deposit facility are seĴled, is given by
RH ′j = Rj − (1 + i)(Ij +RPj) + idRj . ⟨2.4⟩
On the other hand, if Rj < 0, banks have to turn to the borrowing facility such that
the reserve position at the beginning of the next period equals
RH ′j = Rj − (1 + i)(Ij +RPj) + ibRj . ⟨2.5⟩
Ultimately, whether banks have a positive or negative reserve balance at the end of the
period depends on the realization of Tj . Thus, substituting equation ⟨2.3⟩ into ⟨2.4⟩ and
⟨2.5⟩ yields
RH ′j = RHj − i(Ij +RPj)− Tj + id(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj) ⟨2.6⟩
and
RH ′j = RHj − i(Ij +RPj)− Tj + ib(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj) ⟨2.7⟩
respectively. Importantly, we assume that the realization of Tj happens after the inter-
bank and repo market has closed. Consequently, banks aim to maximize expected next
period reserve balance, E[RH ′j ], by choosing Ij and RPj subject to the density function
f(Tj). The objective function of bank j thus reads
E[RH ′j ] = RH ′j − i(Ij +RPj) + id
∫ RHj+Ij+RPj
Tj→−∞
(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj)f(Tj)dTj
+ ib
∫ Tj→∞
Tj=RHj+Ij+RPj
(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj)f(Tj)dTj . ⟨2.8⟩
12This seems justiﬁed, because central banks typically either widen their collateral frameworks or lower
their eligibility criteria when collateral becomes scarce or its quality deteriorates.
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Since the two ﬁrst-order conditions,
∂E[RH ′j ]
∂Ij
= 0 and
∂E[RH ′j ]
∂RPj
= 0, ⟨2.9⟩
lead to the same equation, we only have to consider one. As shown in the Appendix B.1,
calculating the ﬁrst-order condition yields
(ib − i)(1− F (RHj + Ij +RPj)) = (i− id)F (RHj + Ij +RPj), ⟨2.10⟩
where F (.) denotes the distribution function of the interbank reserve shock f(.). This
equation states that bank j chooses the optimal amount of interbank and repo borrowing
(resp. lending) in such a way that it minimizes two types of costs: the opportunity costs
of having to borrow from the central bank rather than from themarket, given by (ib− i),
and the opportunity costs of holding a positive end-of-day balance in the deposit facility,
relative to lending those funds in themarket, given by (i−id). Similarly, equation ⟨2.10⟩
can be wriĴen as
F (RHj + Ij +RPj) =
ib − i
ib − id ⟨2.11⟩
Since we know that 0 ≤ F (RHj + Ij + RPj) ≤ 1, the optimality condition implies that
the repo rate i is always bounded by the corridor of ib and id, because money market
participants would never agree to trade at an interest rate that lies outside this corri-
dor.13 Furthermore, since the initial reserve holdings RHj are predetermined and the
reserve supply through the repo market is determined by the central bank, the optima-
lity condition also implies that banks with a high value of RHj are likely to become net
lenders on the interbankmarket and/or the repomarket for reserves (i.e. Ij+RPj < 0)
Market Clearing Summing over all n banks gives the aggregate beginning-of-day re-
serve balances,RH =∑nj=1RHj , and the aggregate end-of-day balances,R =∑nj=1Rj .
Since transfers between banks and interbank payments cancel each other out in the ag-
gregate, we get ∑nj=1 Tj = 0, and equivalently, ∑nj=1 Ij = 0. Further, all repo market
transactions net out to the central bank’s open-market operations, i.e.,∑nj=1RPj = RP ,
13In practice, however, money market rates occasionally lie outside this corridor. This can often be explai-
ned by institutional factors relating to a particular operating framework. In the US, for instance, some
big players on the federal funds market (e.g. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) have no access to the Fed’s
deposit facility, which can explain why US short-term rates occasionally dropped below the deposit rate
when the reserve supply was massively increased during the ﬁnancial crisis.
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where RP are the central bank’s repurchase agreements. From
Rj = RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj ⟨2.12⟩
it thus follows that
R = RH +RP ⟨2.13⟩
such that RP is the net injection of reserves by the central bank. And since Rj = RHj +
Ij +RPj − Tj is the same for all banks, it holds that
RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj = R
n
. ⟨2.14⟩
As a consequence, the equilibrium interbank interest rate as well as the repo rate i are
determined by the equation
F
(
R
n
)
= ib − i
ib − id ⟨2.15⟩
where the central bank directly sets both ib and id as well as the net reserve supply RP .
Thereby, the central bank indirectly determines not only the total reserves at the end of
the period, i.e. R = RH +RP , but also the equilibrium interbank and repo rate i∗.
It should also be noticed that equation ⟨2.15⟩ implies a negative relation between the
aggregate end-of-day reserve balances R and the repo or interbank rate i. Thus, the
reserve demand schedule in Figure 2.4 displays a negative slope. Given that net reser-
ves are supplied at the central bank’s discretion, the graph depicts a vertical, interest-
inelastic reserve supply schedule RS . A net increase (decrease) in the reserve supply
will lead to a lower (higher) equilibrium interbank rate i∗.
If, however, net interbank transfers Tj have a symmetric probability distribution –
which we can reasonably assume for large numbers of banks due to the central limit
theorem – then targeting a zero reserve balance (R = 0) implies that the equilibrium
rate will be exactly in the midpoint between the central bank’s lending and deposit rate.
Advantages of Symmetric Corridor Systems In fact, a symmetric corridor system has
considerable advantages over traditional reserve systems. In traditional, non-symmetric
reserve systems, changing interest rates require a carefully calibrated open-market ope-
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Figure 2.4.: Symmetric corridor system
ration forwhich the policymaker has to have good knowledge about themoney demand
function. This is unnecessary if the central bank operates a symmetric corridor system.
Changing the target interest rate only requires a parallel shift of the standing facility
rates.
To see this, imagine that the policymaker wants to increase its policy rate target by x
basis points, i.e. i′ = i + x. If the two standing facility rates are increased by the same
amount, the optimality condition ⟨2.15⟩ implies
i′b − i′
i′b − i′d
= (ib + x)− (i+ x)(ib + x)− (id + x) =
ib − i
ib − id = F
(
R
n
)
⟨2.16⟩
showing that no open-market operation is required to increase the target rate (R′ = R).
The reason is that the reserve demand depends on the interbank rate relative to the stan-
ding facilities in a corridor system. Another advantage over traditional reserve systems
can also be inferred from the lower volatility of moneymarket rates. This becomes most
evident by comparing the volatilities of the respective money market rates in the US
(traditional system) and Australia (corridor system) in upper two panels of Figure 2.5.
Notice that during this period the Fed set the rate on its discount window below the fed
funds target rate.
The Fed changed this procedure in January 2003 when it introduced its discount win-
dow for primary credit which traded 100 basis above the target rate. It seems that this
change in the Fed’s implementation framework contributed to the successful steering
of money market rates until the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis (see the lower left panel in
Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2.5.: Implementation systems ⋄ Source: Federal Reserve Bank of the
United States, Federal Reserve Bank of Australia, ECB, Datastream
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Finally, as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the US Congress
granted the Fed the authority to pay interest on excess reserves (IOER) that depository
institutions (’banks’) heldwith the Federal Reserve System. Interestingly, however, non-
depository institutions (such as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)), which tra-
ditionally represent important players on the USmoneymarket, were authorized to hold
overnight balances at the Fed, but were not legally eligible to receive interest on those ba-
lances. Hence, this institutional discrimination across market participants created a seg-
mented reservemarket, which, in conjunctionwith unexploited arbitrage opportunities,
has driven the eﬀective federal funds rate consistently below the IOER rate (sometimes
as much as 20 basis points).14 This ’slippage’ in the eﬀective federal funds rate contrasts
with the experience concerning the Eurosystem. As the laĴer grants access to its depo-
sit facility to a very wide range of counterparties, its IOER rate puts an eﬀective lower
bound on short-term funding rates (compare the lower panels in Figure 2.5).
Optimal Corridor Width When choosing the optimal width of a corridor system, poli-
cymakers face an inherent trade-oﬀ between stabilizing money market rates and main-
taining an active interbank market. On the one hand, a relatively wide corridor provi-
des a strong incentive for banks to trade on the interbank market rather than relying
on central bank standing facilities, which is socially desirable for various reasons. For
instance, in the case of asymmetric information and excessive risk-taking on the part of
borrowers, private markets could induce market discipline and simultaneously, by mi-
nimizing the use of standing facilities, shield the central bank from taking on too much
credit risk (Allen, 2002; Repullo, 2005; Hoerova andMonnet, 2016). On the other, if there
are aggregate liquidity shocks, a wide corridor would result in relatively strong ﬂuctua-
tions of short-term funding rates. Thus, if the central bankwants to control market rates,
this would principally call for seĴing the corridor width to zero. Section 2.2.4 provides
a more detailed discussion of such an operating framework.
Reserve Demand Shocks and Fine-Tuning Operations Importantly, a corridor sy-
stem does not mean that the central bank can abstain from any reserve intervention. If,
for example, the uncertainty about interbank payments changes, the cumulative distri-
bution function F
(
R
n
)
changes as well, which will lead to a shift in the reserve demand
14A straightforward interpretation for this spread is that banks face transaction costs when they borrow
funds from the GSEs. Another reason is that banks face balance sheet costs when they borrow in the
federal funds market and invest the proceeds in their reserve accounts with the Fed (e.g. higher capital
costs or higher deposit insurance costs associatedwith higher reserve holdings). For a detailed discussion
on these issues, see chapter 10 as well as Bowman et al., 2010; Bech and Klee, 2011 andMartin et al., 2013.
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Figure 2.6.: Reserve demand shock with ﬁne-tuning
schedule. One possibility is that bank customers inject reserves by substituting cash for
bank deposits. As this will increase the probability of having excess reserves at the end
of the period, banks’ reserve demand shifts downwards, causing a fall in the interbank
target rate (see Figure 2.6). To keep the target rate in the midpoint of the corridor, the
central bank would have to conduct a contractionary ﬁne-tuning operation, depicted by
the leftward shift of the reserve supply in Figure 2.6.
2.2.2. Reserve Requirements
As noted above, reserve requirements are deposits that banks have to hold with the
central bank. The amount of required reserves is typically measured as a percentage of
certain bank liabilities – usually non-bank deposits. If the central bank imposes a reserve
ratio r, required reserves become
RR = rD ⟨2.17⟩
where D depicts the deposit base. Now this aﬀects the reserve demand in our corridor
framework, becausewhenever a bank’s actual reserve holdings fall belowRR at the end
of the day, it has to borrow the diﬀerence at the penalty rate ib. The probability of being
short of reserves is thus given by 1 − F
(
R
n −RR
)
. Similarly, if we assume that only
reserves above the RR threshold receive the deposit rate id, the corresponding proba-
bility of having to place excess reserves in the deposit facility is given by F
(
R
n −RR
)
.
Accordingly, banks’ optimality condition under reserve requirements changes to
F
(
R
n
−RR
)
= ib − i
ib − id , ⟨2.18⟩
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Figure 2.7.: Reserve requirements
implying that any increase in reserve requirements causes a rightward shift of the re-
serve demand schedule such that the higher demand for reserves is reﬂected in a higher
market price for reserves (i2 > i1 in Figure 2.7).
In principal, this means that central banks could implement monetary policy through
changes in reserve ratios. Ultimately, however, using changes in reserve requirements
as amonetary policy tool rests on the presumption that central banks can, via themoney
multiplier, aﬀect credit andmonetary aggregates (Keynes, 1930). Butwith the increasing
instability of the money multiplier since the 1980s, reserve requirements no longer play
such a role.
Another argument for minimum reserve requirements is to use them as ’built-in sta-
bilizers’ to make the monetary system less harmful to exogenous shocks (Richter, 1968;
Baltensperger, 1982; Bindseil, 2014). This should facilitate monetary targeting and thus
reduce the volatility of interest rates. However, Brunner and Lown (1993) have shown
that lowering reserve requirements froma low level (as currently prevailing inmost cen-
tral banks) to zerowould have no substantial eﬀect onmoneymarket volatility.Whether
reserve requirements are really useful to achieve the ultimate target of price stability is
also questioned (Siegel, 1981; Baltensperger, 1982). Furthermore, as non-remunerated
reserve requirements act as tax on the banking system, they lead to increasing credit
costs. Based on these facts, most advanced central banks therefore abstain from using
non-remunerated reserve requirements as a ’built-in stabilizer’.
Indeed, reserve requirements are nowadays mostly used to create a structural liqui-
dity shortage and increase the reﬁnancing needs of the banking system vis-à-vis the cen-
tral bank. In addition, banks usually have to fulﬁll their reserve requirements not daily,
but on average over a given maintenance period. This averaging implies that any diver-
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gence from reserve requirements during the maintenance period has no eﬀect on over-
night rates as long as banks expect it to be reversed before the end of the maintenance
period. Thereby, reserve requirements with averaging act as a liquidity cushion against
exogenous shocks to banks’ liquidity needs, which increases the interest-elasticity of
the reserve demand, such that changes in supply have a smaller eﬀect on interest rates.
This buﬀer function thus stabilizes the volatility of money market rates and enables the
central bank to adopt a ’non-interventionist’ stance in the money market even under a
symmetric corridor regime (Bundesbank, 1995).
It should be noticed, however, that the higher interest-elasticity of the reserve demand
depends on the remaining number of days in the maintenance period. In fact, reserve
demand might become extremely inelastic at the last day of the maintenance period,
as banks cannot trade more (or less) reserves today for less (or more) reserves tomor-
row (see, e.g., Whitesell, 2006; Bernhardsen and Kloster, 2010). Therefore, many central
banks have introduced measures to prevent large interest rate ﬂuctuations at the last
days of a reserve maintenance period (e.g. they conduct regular ﬁne-tuning operations
or they allowbanks to shift limited reserve surpluses or deﬁcit into the nextmaintenance
period).
2.2.3. Stigma Effect
A potential obstacle to a well-functioning corridor system arises if there is a stigma cost
associated with the central bank’s borrowing facility. Based on the existence of asym-
metric information, such stigma can occur as an equilibrium phenomenon if market
participants infer ﬁnancial conditions from banks’ recourse to the borrowing facility
(Philippon and Skreta, 2012; Ennis and Weinberg, 2013). This might be especially pro-
blematic during crisis times, since informational frictions tend to move in a procyclical
fashion.
In fact, despite several measures enacted by the Fed to encourage lending through the
borrowing facility, banks scarcely accessed the borrowing facility during the 2007-2008
ﬁnancial crisis (Armantier et al., 2015). The reason is that banks were concerned that if
their recourse to the borrowing facility became known, market participants might have
interpreted this as a sign of ﬁnancial weakness, which would have them cut oﬀ from
private funding sources.15 In line with this argument, Armantier et al. (2015) ﬁnd that
15Although most central banks oﬀer an anonymous access to their borrowing facilities, information about
the borrowers’ identities have been leaked by the media on several occasions. Market agents can also
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Figure 2.8.: Stigma eﬀect
in theUS the stigma premium relative to alternative funding sources amounted to about
44 basis points between December 2007 and September 2008. Hence, the stigma eﬀect
imposed substantial costs on US banks, thereby eﬀectively inhibiting the Fed’s role as a
lender of last resort for the banking system.
Importantly, this also negatively aﬀectsmonetary policy implementation under a cor-
ridor framework, because the upper bound of the corridor becomes “leaky” if banks are
willing to pay a stigma premium on interbank rates (Kahn, 2010). To see this, consider
Figure 2.8: if we assume that the stigma costs s are proportional to the amounts obtained
through the borrowing facility, then the perceived costs of borrowing from the central
bank become ib + s. If we further assume that interbank borrowing is not subject to this
stigma, then the interbank rate is still i. As a corollary, the optimality condition ⟨2.15⟩
becomes:
F
(
R
n
)
= ib + s− i
ib + s− id . ⟨2.19⟩
This implies that the upper bound of the corridor shifts upwards, stretching the reserve
demand curve from above, and yielding a higher equilibrium interbank rate i∗2. Now, in
principle, two options are feasible to restore symmetry. Either the central bank increases
the aggregate reserve supply via expansionary open-market operations, or it mitigates
the stigma by ensuring absolute anonymity in its borrowing facility.
make educated guesses about the use of the borrowing facility based on a bank’s interbank market acti-
vity. That means that, even though central banks do not disclose the identities of their borrowers, the
suﬃcient condition for a stigma eﬀect seems to hold in practice.
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The Fed’s Term Auction Facility In December 2007, the Fed established the so-called
Term Auction Facility (TAF). Under this facility, the Fed temporarily auctioned collatera-
lized loanswithmaturities of 28 and 84 days against the same collateral as eligible under
the discount window. Besides directly accommodating the elevated funding pressures
in the US money market, a major objective of the programwas to eliminate any percep-
tion of stigma associated with the Fed’s discount window.16 To achieve this, the TAF’s
borrowing rates were set through a competitive auction format subject to a minimum
bid rate, rather than just posting a ﬁxed rate (as in the discount window). Moreover,
while discount window loans are credited at the same day, funds obtained through the
TAF were only credited with a delay of three days. In addition, the Fed capped the total
amount of reserves that it supplied via TAF, but also limited the maximum allotment to
any individual bank to 10%of the total. Thereby, the Fed ensured that an oversubscribed
TAF auction would have at least ten winners (Armantier et al., 2008).
Hence, the way TAFwas implemented meant that banks approached the Fed collecti-
vely, rather than individually, and funds were allocated at a competitive rate with a
delay of three days, rather than immediately at a penalty rate set by the Fed. All these
features contributed to the success of the TAF in mitigating potential stigma eﬀects (Ar-
mantier et al., 2015). Thus,most empirical evidence suggests that TAFhad a strong eﬀect
in unsecured money markets, primarily through relieving banks’ short-term funding
concerns (Wu, 2008).
2.2.4. Floor System
The Fed, the ECB andmany othermajor central banks are de facto operating ﬂoor systems
since the end of 2008.17 In a ﬂoor system the standing facility rates ib and id are still in
place, but the money market is saturated with reserves.
This is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.9. The reserve supply RS has to shift so far
to the right that it intersects with the horizontal part of the reserve demand schedule
RD (see, e.g., Goodfriend, 2002; Keister et al., 2008). Consequently, the interbank rate
drops to the deposit rate id, such that the opportunity costs of excess reserves holdings
vanish. Similarly, the policy rate equals the central bank’s deposit rate (i∗2 = id), while
reserve demand shocks cease to have an eﬀect on interest rates. Therefore, the central
16As noted above, the Fed calls its marginal borrowing facility ’discount window’.
17Oﬃcially, however, only a few central banks acknowledged this change in their policy frameworks.
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bank is perfectly able to control money market rates without the need of ﬁne-tuning
operations.
However, probably the main advantage of a ﬂoor system is that open-market operati-
ons and interest on reserves become two independentmonetary policy tools. This arises
because the central bank can increase the reserve supply without pushing the money
market rate below its policy rate. In times of ﬁnancial stress, for instance, the central
bank might want to increase the reserve supply, either as an intended policy or as the
byproduct of diﬀerent kinds of asset purchases, but without conﬂicting its goal of steer-
ing themoneymarket rate close to the policy rate. Hence, in a ﬂoor system, central banks
canmaintain clarity about their monetary policy stance even in an environment of large
excess reserves (Bernhardsen and Kloster, 2010).18
Recently, Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) have shown that if there are ineﬃciencies in
the ﬁnancial intermediation process that give rise to a positive reserve demand, then this
ineﬃciency should be erased by implementing a ﬂoor system. However, such beneﬁcial
eﬀects must be weighted against the potential disadvantages that may arise when the
central bank assumes the role of the interbank market.
As argued by Berentsen et al. (2013), a ﬂoor system is not optimal if the central bank
is running a deﬁcit, because then the interest on reserves have to be ﬁnanced by distor-
tionary taxation levied upon the household sector. Under such conditions, the central
bank should instead implement a symmetric corridor system in order to earn a positive
interest ratemargin and to reduce the costs of taxation. Those policy implications can be
18While largely irrelevant at the zero lower bound of the policy rate, the ability to pay interest on reserves
becomes an important tool when the central bank wants to tighten its stance in an environment of large
excess reserves. By paying interest on reserves, tightening can be achieved without draining all excess
reserves from the banking system. For a more detailed discussion of exit options, see chapter 10.2.
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questioned, however. First, it seems questionablewhether the comparatively smallmar-
gins that central banks earn under standard corridor systems are relevant from a ﬁscal
perspective. Second, it seems likely that banks would pass the higher reﬁnancing costs
resulting from corridor systems on to households. Thus, from a welfare perspective,
one would have to compare the negative eﬀects of higher taxation under a ﬂoor system
with the higher intermediation costs under a corridor system. As Berentsen et al. (2013)
abstract from this analysis, their conclusion appears to be highly model-dependent.
A more convincing argument against a ﬂoor system is that it discourages private in-
terbank trading. This might be welfare-decreasing, because high interbank trading can
improve ﬁnancial stability through active monitoring of interbank risks (see, e.g., Ro-
chet and Tirole, 1996; Furﬁne, 2001; Hoerova and Monnet, 2016).19 Given information
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, a bank will lend unsecured only if it is
convinced that the borrower is safe. Therefore, potential borrowers must accept that
they are monitored by lenders. In theory, this will lead to sounder business models and
a banking system that is more resilient to ﬁnancial crises. To that end, there seems to be
some signiﬁcant beneﬁts from implementing a relativelywide corridor and having a de-
centralized unsecured interbank market as a means to allocate liquidity in the banking
system (Bräuning and Fecht, 2012).
In practice, however, one has to acknowledge that interbank trading takes place at
the very short end of the yield curve (mostly overnight). Thus, the only concern of an
interbank lender is that its counterparty will not default during the next couple of days.
Then, however, is seems questionable whether lenders really have an incentive to put
enough eﬀort in monitoring their borrowers’ long-term solvency, at least in such a way
that ﬁnancial stability improves suﬃciently. Although existing empirical evidence sug-
gests that interbankmarkets do serve as a discipline device against excessive risk taking
(King, 2008), the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09 should be a reminder not to overstate thisme-
chanism.
Finally, the fact that central banks made positive experiences with ﬂoor systems in
stressed conditions does not necessarily imply that they should adhere to this system
under normal conditions. Therefore, the beneﬁts of an active interbank market must be
weighted against the costs of more volatile money market rates. As the laĴer was not
really an issue in pre-crisis times, at least for the major central banks, it seems plausible
to return to a positive corridor system in normal times.
19This result rests on the assumption that decentralized markets have an advantage in monitoring (credit)
risks compared to centralized ones (Malamud and Rostek, 2012).
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2.3. Monetary Policy Implementation in the Financial Crisis
2.3.1. The Euro Money Market Since August 2007
On the 9th of August 2007, when the French commercial bank PNB Paribas blocked
the withdrawals of three hedge funds due to what it called “a complete evaporation
of liquidity” (EllioĴ, 2012), the tensions that originated in the US subprime mortgage
market ﬁnally reached Europe. The stress on euro money markets intensiﬁed in the fol-
lowingweeks as rumors about substantial exposures of European banks towards ’toxic’
subprime loans aﬀected their ability to obtain liquidity in the US dollar market, which
subsequently led to a sharp increase in euro money market rates.20 The main reasons
why banks refused to lend especially in the unsecured interbank market were liqui-
dity and solvency concerns that resulted from asymmetric information and heightened
uncertainty (see, e.g., Eisenschmidt and Tapking, 2009; Frutos et al., 2016.)
This is also reﬂected in the spread between the unsecured euro interbank deposit rate
(Euribor) and the euro overnight indexed swap rate (OIS) of the same maturity. Since
the OIS rate represents the ﬁxed rate that banks are willing to pay in exchange for re-
ceiving the average overnight rate for the duration of the swap contract, it reﬂects the
same credit and liquidity risk premia as the overnight rate. But as swap partners only
exchange net interest diﬀerentials at maturity but not the principal, OIS contracts carry
negligible default and liquidity premia. Thus, Euribor-OIS spread serves as an indica-
tion for credit and funding risks in the European interbank market.
By using this spread, one can clearly identify some periods of severe stress on the
European money market (see Figure 2.10). First, the emergence of the initial interbank
turbulence is displayed as a level shift in the Euribor-OIS spread from around 5 basis
points to more than 60 basis points in August 2007. And although the spread stood at
more than 90 basis points by the end of that year, money market conditions broadly
stabilized at this level until September 2008.
Second, on September 15, 2008, the failure of Lehman Brothers caused major distur-
bances on ﬁnancial markets, which ultimately also aﬀected the real economy.While the
Euribor-OIS spread spiked at almost 200 basis points in October 2008, GDP, inﬂation,
and asset prices contracted sharply throughout the following year (see Figures 2.10 and
2.11, respectively). To counter those developments, the ECB aggressively changed its li-
20The model of the interbank market by Heider et al. (2015) provides a very insightful analysis of the
developments in global interbank markets prior to and during the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis. The remarks
of this section, however, are mainly based on ECB (2009) and Bundesbank (2011).
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Figure 2.10.: 3-month Euribor-OIS spread ⋄ Source: European Banking Fede-
ration, Datastream
quidity management and initiated a series of substantial policy rate cuts (see the lower
right panel in Figure 2.5). Thereby, the ECB avoided a complete stall of liquidity for the
banking system. In fact, since this time the ECB has assumed the role of the interbank
market and fully satisﬁed the liquidity demand of the banking sector.
Following themild recovery that had started in the second half of 2009, tensions began
to re-emerge during the course of 2010,whenmarkets started to question the solvency of
some euro area periphery countries. The elevated risk premia on euro area government
bonds (see the lower left panel in Figure 2.11) aswell as the sharp deterioration inmarket
liquidity prompted the ECB to introduce its Securities Markets Program (SMP) in May
2010. The aim of this program was to address the alleged malfunctioning of security
markets and to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism (ECB,
2010). Nevertheless, the Euribor-OIS spread widened again as the sovereign debt crisis
intensiﬁed in the second half of 2011. This time, the ECB responded by providing two
supplementary long-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) with amaximummaturity of
three years. A more detailed analysis of these measures is given in section 2.3.3. Before
that, however, the next section sheds further light on the ECB’s response to the pre-
Lehman turmoil.
2.3.2. Pre-Lehman Policy Measures
In response to the tensions that arose in euro money markets in August 2007, the ECB
changed the allotment paĴern in its main reﬁnancing operations. Prior to the crisis, the
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Figure 2.11.: Selected euro area macro variables during the crisis ⋄ 1The 5y/5y
inﬂation swap rate in the upper left panel measures the market expectation
of the average ﬁve year inﬂation in ﬁve years ⋄ 210-year government bond
spreads in the lower left panel depict the yield diﬀerences with respect to 10y
German government bonds ⋄ Source: Eurostat, Datastream
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ECB in its weekly main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) had alloĴed a ﬁxed amount of
reserves using a variable rate tender procedure subject to a minimum bid rate. This
paĴern had proven to be quite successful in steering the money market rate close to the
minimum bid rate (see the lower right panel in Figure 2.5), and it allowed the banking
system to smoothly fulﬁll its reserve requirements over the course of the maintenance
period.
Frontloading of Reserves Requirements Starting in August 2007, however, the rising
uncertainty on interbankmarkets induced a higher andmore volatile demand for liqui-
dity from the banking sector. In particular, banks tried to fulﬁll their reserve require-
ments at an early stage, because they were uncertain whether they would still be able
to access the money market at the end of the period. Hence, the ECB adapted to these
changingmoneymarket conditions by providingmore ample liquidity at the beginning
of each maintenance period, while the liquidity supply was decreased towards the end
(such that the average net liquidity remained unchanged, see also Figure 2.12).21 Ne-
vertheless, the resulting ’frontloading’ of reserves provided the banks with additional
security and helped the ECB to contain the average spread between the EONIA and the
minimum bid rate at about 0.7 basis points in the pre-Lehman phase (7 August 2009 to
12 September 2008).22
Supplementary LTROs As a second measure, in August 2007 the ECB began to con-
duct supplementary liquidity-providing LTROswith amaturity of threemonths, which
were complemented by additional six month LTROs in March 2008. Through the regu-
lar provision of those LTROs, the Eurosystem had provided more than e620 billion of
reserves to the banking system by the end of 2008. Since the banks increasingly substi-
tuted the MROs with the LTROs, the average maturity of the Eurosystem’s reﬁnancing
operations rose substantially, but the aggregate liquidity supply did not increase until
September 2008.
US Dollar Swap Lines In December 2007, the ECB and the Federal Reserve (in com-
bination with the Fed’s Term Auction Facility) established a dollar swap line to address
the diﬃculties faced by euro area banks to access theUS fundingmarket (Kwan, 2009).23
21During this episode, the ECB also conducted various ﬁne-tuning operations.
22At the same time, however, the spread’s volatility increased substantially (its standard deviation doubled
to 12 basis points compared to the previous year). This reﬂected the ECB’s increasing diﬃculties in
estimating the precise liquidity needs of the banking system.
23Subsequently, the dollar swap lines were extended to the following central banks: the Swiss National
Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Bank of Canada, Danmarks Natio-
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Figure 2.12.: Liquidity providing asset components of the ECB’s balance sheet
⋄ The dashed vertical line depicts the beginning of themoneymarket tensions
in August 2007 ⋄ The solid vertical line depicts the last trading day before the
failure of Lehman Brothers (12 September 2008) Source: ECB
Through this swap line, the outstanding amount of US dollars provided by the Eurosy-
stem peaked at around $300 billion by the end of 2008, which proved to be very success-
ful in accommodating the need for dollar reﬁnancing of the euro area banking sector.
2.3.3. Post-Lehman Policy Measures
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, global money markets
experienced a complete gridlock, when banks – due to mounting counterparty risks –
started to hoard liquidity instead of lending it out on the interbankmarket (Heider et al.,
2015). Apart from the peaking Euribor-OIS spread (see Figure 2.10), this sudden short-
fall of funding liquidity on the moneymarket is also mirrored in the rising interest rates
that banks were willing to pay in the Eurosystem’s reﬁnancing operations (left panel of
Figure 2.13) as well as the rising number of banks that participated in these operations
(right panel of Figure 2.13). Collectively, the monetary policy measures in response to
the failure of Lehman Brothers are sometimes referred to as the ECB’s enhanced credit
support (Trichet, 2009). The following paragraph reviews some of its key measures.
nalbank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank.
The Eurosystem’s average share accounted for about 50% of these swap lines. All arrangementswere ter-
minated on February 1, 2010. For further details, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(2017).
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Figure 2.13.: Bidding activity in ECB liquidity operations ⋄ The left panel de-
picts the spread between the marginal rate and the minimum bid rate until
the introduction of FRFA ⋄ The right panel depicts the number of participants
in the Eurosystem’s main reﬁnancing operations ⋄ Source: ECB, Datastream
Fixed Rate Full Allotment (FRFA) Against this background, the ECB announced on
8 October 2008 that it was going to switch the allotment procedure in its MROs to a
ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment. This meant that all bids were fully satisﬁed at the
ﬁxed MRO rate, such that any previously observed tender spreads were eliminated.24
In addition, the ECB embarked on a series of aggressive policy rate cuts. Starting in
mid-October 2008, it reduced its key policy rate from 4,25% to 1% as of May 2009. Si-
multaneously, the ECB reduced the standing facilities corridor from 200 to 100 basis
points around the interest rate on the main reﬁnancing operations.25
Expansion of Collateral As a second measure, the Governing Council decided on 15
October 2008 to expand the list of assets eligible as collateral in its reﬁnancing operati-
ons. Speciﬁcally, thiswas done by lowering the rating threshold formarketable andnon-
marketable securities fromA- to BBB- (except for ABS, for which the A- rating remained
unchanged). The aim of this measure was to ensure that the availability of collateral did
not become a binding constraint after the introduction of the ﬁxed-rate full allotment
procedure. And although haircuts were increased conditional on the asset quality, the
ECB estimates that about 7% of the total amount of marketable assets and a ’signiﬁ-
cant amount of non-marketable assets’ became eligible when the credit standards were
lowered to the investment grade threshold (ECB, 2009). In this context, Hilberg andHol-
24Subsequently, the FRFA procedure was also applied to the regularly and supplementary LTROs, as well
as to the swap operations in US dollars.
25As of January 2009, the corridor was widened again to 200 basis points, but only to be gradually lowered
to 50 basis points in the subsequent years. Since March 2016, the corridor has now been standing at 75
basis points, i.e. 125 basis points below its pre-crisis average.
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lmayr (2013) show in aNew-Keynesianmodelwith a heterogeneous banking sector that
if the interbank market is drying up, decreasing the haircut on central bank collateral is
a suitable tool to boost interbank lending and output, especially when the conventional
policy rate is already close to zero (see also Ashcraft et al., 2011).
Further Foreign Exchange Swap Lines Based on the positive experience with the US
dollar swap line that had been implemented in December 2007, the Eurosystem in Octo-
ber 2008 established a similar agreement with the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to counter
the upward pressure on Swiss money market rates and to address the funding needs of
euro area banks in Swiss francs.
Further LTROs and CBPP In line with the supplementary 6-month LTROs that had
been implemented already in the pre-Lehman episode, the ECB in June 2009 decided to
conduct a series of additional 12-month LTROs. In contrast to the 6-month LTROs, ho-
wever, the 12-month LTROswere conducted as ﬁxed rate tenders with full allotment. In
addition, the ECB initiated the so-called Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) to stabi-
lize themarket for those securities.26 The primary goal of thosemeasureswas to support
banks’ funding conditions in order to promote their contracting credit supply.
In terms of liquidity provision, however, these measures were marginalized by the
two 3-year LTROs that were implemented in December 2011 and February 2012, re-
spectively (again as ﬁxed rate tenders with full allotment; cf. ECB, 2011). With both
3-year LTROs, the ECB injected about e520 billion of net reserves (see Figure 2.12).27
Given this massive amount of excess liquidity in the ﬁnancial system, money market
rates approached the ECB’s deposit rate, and the Euribor-OIS spread ultimately stabi-
lized at about 12 basis points, i.e. slightly above its pre-crisis level (see Figure 2.10). It
thus seems that the 3-year LTROs, by compressing the Euribor-OIS spread, have succee-
ded in reducing the elevated counterparty risks that had re-emerged due to the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis, and thereby signiﬁcantly eased banks’ funding conditions
(Darracq-Paries and De Santis, 2013).
On the other hand, the massive recourse to the ECB’s deposit facility displayed in Fi-
gure 2.14 indicates that the banks in the euro area rather hoarded the liquidity rather
26With this ﬁrst CBPP (CBPP1), the ECB purchased euro area covered bonds for a nominal value of e60
billion over the course of one year. InNovember 2011, it initiated CBPP2 for a total amount ofe40 billion,
which was followed by CBPP3 in October 2014 with an intended term of two years.
27The total size of the two 3-year LTROs reached about e1 trillion, whereby e489 billion were alloĴed
to 523 bidders in the ﬁrst LTRO and e530 billion to 800 bidders in the second LTRO. However, the net
liquidity injection reached ’only’ about e520 billion, as the other half was used to reﬁnance maturing
short-term credit.
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than increasing their lending to the private sector. This is also reﬂected in the fact that
the massive expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet did not suﬃciently cushion the drop
in the money multiplier, also because the credit demand of ﬁrms and households in the
euro area remained subdued due to the ongoing deleveraging process in the distressed
peripheral countries. Figures 2.12 and 2.14 also show that banks used the option to re-
pay the 3-year LTROs after one year, which thus withdrew some of the excess market
liquidity. Finally, however, massive liquidity has been injected again through the ECB’s
public sector asset purchase program (PSPP), the eﬀects of which are examined in Part
II of this thesis.
Figure 2.14.: Excess liquidity in the euro area ⋄ Excess liquidity is deﬁned
as MFIs recourse to the deposit facility net of marginal lending facility plus
current account holdings net of reserve requirements ⋄ Source: ECB
Risks Associated with the 3-year LTROs Acharya and Steﬀen (2015) argue that the
3-year LTROs created an incentive for European banks to ’borrow low-for-long’ and to
invest the proceeds into high yielding euro area peripheral bonds of the same maturity.
The operations thus constituted the ’greatest’ carry trade ever and arguably a subtleway
of monetary ﬁnancing of government debt in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. In
this respect, Figure 2.15 shows that the periphery countries’ share in the Eurosystem’s
reﬁnancing operations has in fact signiﬁcantly increased during the second half of 2010.
In turn, shortly after the announcement of the 3-y LTROs, Spain managed to place
e6 billion in government debt even though only e3.5 billion were envisaged ex-ante.
Furthermore, Acharya and Steﬀen (2015) show that especially risky banks, i.e. big and
undercapitalized institutions with high short-term leverage and high loan-to-asset va-
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Figure 2.15.: Periphery countries’ share in Eurosystem’s lending operations
(MRO & LTRO) ⋄ Source: Bruegel Dataset of Eurosystem Lending Operations
lues, had an incentive to shift into this carry trade because regulation aĴached zero risk
weights to government bonds. In that way, the ECB’s LTROs supported a proﬁtable
carry trade likely to have helped bank recapitalization. Accordingly, Italian and Spa-
nish banks increased their holdings of national government bondswithmaturities up to
three years by e28.6 billion and e6 billion, respectively, while core-European banks si-
multaneously decreased their holdings of peripheral sovereign bonds in absolute terms.
In this way, the two 3-year LTROs led to an increasing home bias of European banks and
further contributed to the interconnectedness of the banking sector with national so-
vereign debt markets, which may seriously undermine ﬁnancial stability (Shambaugh,
2012).
Examining the yield curves for euro area government bonds broadly conﬁrms this
picture. On the one hand, the 3-year LTROs induced a downward shift of the yield cur-
ves for both high-rated as well as lower-rated sovereigns. On the other hand, the posi-
tive impact was especially pronounced for the laĴer. In addition to the level eﬀect, the
yield curves of those sovereigns experienced a substantial drop in the 3-year maturity
spectrum (see the right panel of Figure 2.16).
2.3.4. Concluding Remarks
Up to this point, it can be noted that the ECB’s monetary policy framework, and, after
some modiﬁcations, also the Fed’s framework proved eﬀective in containing the recur-
ring money market stress since August 2007. In the aftermath of the Lehman collapse,
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Figure 2.16.: Euro area government yield curves ⋄ The left panel includes Ger-
many, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Netherlands ⋄ The right panel inclu-
des all euro area countries ⋄ Source: Eurostat, ECB
this was mainly achieved by replacing large parts of the malfunctioning interbank mar-
ket with central bank intermediation. In this sense, monetary policy’s enhanced liqui-
dity provision has contributed to the interruption of an ’adverse spiral’ that may have
easily unfolded from the ﬁnancial market tensions. Moreover, since the liquidity mana-
gement measures enabled distressed banks to cover their short-term funding gaps, they
mitigated the banks’ immediate pressure to cut down on lending (see also section 7 of
this thesis). Thus, Rajan argues that “[b]y lending long term without asking too many
questions of the collateral they received, by buying assets beyond usual limits, and by
focusing on repairing markets, [central bankers] restored liquidity to a world ﬁnancial
system that would otherwise have been insolvent based on prevailing asset prices. In
this maĴer, central bankers are deservedly heroes in a world that has precious few of
them” (Rajan, 2013, p. 5).
In the longer run, however, these positive eﬀects of unconventional monetary opera-
tions might increasingly dissipate – especially if the enhanced credit support measures
contribute to the postponement of necessary structural reforms in the banking sector.
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3. Conventional Monetary Policy in the New
Keynesian Model
3.1. Baseline New Keynesian Model
The New Keynesian model (NKM) serves as the standard workhorse model in today’s
monetary policy analysis. It belongs to the class of Dynamic General Equilibriummodels
(DSGE) with a strong emphasis on the role of microfoundations. More speciﬁcally, the
NK model includes intertemporally optimizing agents with rational expectations who
adjust their consumption and employment paths to a sequence of stochastic shocks.
With these features, theNK framework resembles the classicalReal Business Cyclemodel
(RBC),1 but it relaxes the assumption of perfect competition and ﬂexible prices. Besides
the assumption of sticky prices – which has the important implication that monetary
policy becomes able to inﬂuence real variables through the interest rate channel – the
baseline NK model in essence assumes perfectly ﬂexible ﬁnancial markets.
In fact, monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate rule for the very short-end
of the yield curve, while moneymarkets and ﬁnancial institutions are typically not even
modeled.2 Therefore, long-term interest rates have no eﬀect on the macroeconomy, nor
do asset prices or risk premia. As will be discussed later, this is the reasonwhy the base-
line NKmodel cannot account for most of the transmission channels of unconventional
monetary policies. Before that, however, the next paragraph brieﬂy illustrates the struc-
ture of the baseline NKmodel. Later on, this framework will be enlarged to incorporate
ﬁnancial frictions, which also introduces a role for unconventional monetary policy.
1The seminal papers in the RBC literature include Kydland and PrescoĴ (1982); Black (1982); Long and
Plosser (1983); and PrescoĴ (1986).
2Recently, the baseline NKmodel has been enlarged to include ﬁnancial markets subject to various fricti-
ons; see, amongst others, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007); Canzoneri et al. (2008); Cúrdia and Wood-
ford (2010); and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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3.1.1. Households
In the NK baseline speciﬁcation, the representative household maximizes expected uti-
lity from consumption, Ct, over disutility from hours worked, Nt. With the standard
Cobb-Douglas utility function,
U(Ct, NT ) =
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1 + φ , ⟨3.1⟩
the households maximization problem reads
max
Ct,Nt,Bt,
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) ⟨3.2⟩
subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
∫ 1
0
PitCitdi+QtBt ≤ Bt−1 +WtNt + Tt ⟨3.3⟩
where Bt denotes a one-period zero-coupon bond with price Qt = 11+it , Wt the nomi-
nal hourly wage, and Tt are net transfers.3 Speciﬁcally, the household can choose to
consume from a continuum of imperfect substitutes where the consumption basket is
given by the so-called Dixit-Stigliĵ Aggregator,
Ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
C
ϵ−1
ϵ
it di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, ⟨3.4⟩
where Cit denotes the quantity of a good i consumed in period t and the parameter ϵ
measures the elasticity of substitution between goods. In other words, for ϵ = 0 (ϵ =∞)
goods are complements (perfect substitutes), whereas for ϵ ∈ (0,∞) households have a
love for variety.
Thus, in a ﬁrst step, the household has to choose a consumption bundle that maxi-
mizes total consumption subject to a given expenditure constraint Z¯t. As shown in the
3The exposition of the baseline NKmodel in this section relies heavily on Clarida et al. (1999); Galí (2008);
and Bergholt (2012), but can also be found in other publications.
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appendix B.2, this implies that the demand function for each good i takes the form of
Cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ϵ
Ct ∀i, j ⟨3.5⟩
where the aggregate price index given by
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit di
) 1
1−ϵ
. ⟨3.6⟩
In a second step, for given Pit, Pt and the respective consumption proﬁles, the house-
hold has to derive the optimal allocation of consumption and labor. Assuming zero net
transfers, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problem ⟨3.2⟩ are given by:
∂L
∂Ct
= C−σt − λtPt = 0 ⟨3.7⟩
∂L
∂Nt
= Nφt − λtWt = 0 ⟨3.8⟩
∂L
∂Bt
= −λtQt + βEt{λt+1} = 0 ⟨3.9⟩
Combining ⟨B.16⟩ and ⟨B.17⟩ yields the intratemporal allocation of consumption and
labor as
Wt
Pt
= Cσt N
φ
t . ⟨3.10⟩
It indicates how to optimally allocate consumption and hours worked within a given
period. The intuition is that the marginal disutility from labor has to be rewarded with
a higher real wage such that perfect compensation can be achieved through a marginal
increase in consumption.
Similarly, combining ⟨B.16⟩ with ⟨B.18⟩ while exploiting the fact that Et{λt+1} =
Et
{
C−σt+1
Pt+1
}
(which follows from forward iteration of ⟨B.16⟩), gives
C−σt
Pt
= βEt{λt+1}
Qt
= β
Qt
Et
{
C−σt+1
Pt+1
}
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⇔ C−σt =
βEt{C−σt+1}
Qt
Pt
Et{Pt+1} = βEt{C
−σ
t+1}(1 + it)
(
Et{Pt+1}
Pt
)−1
. ⟨3.11⟩
This intertemporal optimality condition is also known as the Euler equation. It indica-
tes that the marginal disutility from sacriﬁcing one unit of consumption today has to
be exactly compensated by the marginal expected utility from increasing consumption
tomorrow, where the laĴer has to be corrected for the time preference and expected
inﬂation.
Equations ⟨3.10⟩ and ⟨B.19⟩ can be log-linearized to get
wt − pt = σct + φnt. ⟨3.12⟩
and
ct = Et{ct+1} − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − ρ) , ⟨3.13⟩
respectively. The log-linearized version of the Euler equation further highlights some key
implications of theNKmodel. Firstly, current consumption ct depends positively on ex-
pected consumption Et{ct+1} due to the household’s consumption smoothing motive;
if households expect consumption to rise, they will increase consumption in the current
period in order to maintain a smooth consumption proﬁle.
Secondly, current consumption is negatively related to the diﬀerence between the Fis-
her relation for the real rate, rt = it + Et{pit+1}, and the household’s time preference
rate ρ, determining the natural rate in these class of models (ρ = rn). Hence, if the real
rate equals the time preference rate (rt = ρ), the household’s consumption proﬁle will
be ﬂat (ct = ct+1). Conversely, if the real rate is lower than the time preference rate,
the household will increase current consumption at the expense of future consumption
(ct > ct+1), and vice versa. Notice that the strength of this eﬀect is governed by the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution, 1σ , which equals the inverse of the household’s risk
aversion σ. If agents are more risk averse, they dislike volatility in consumption more
strongly and are therefore less willing to perform intertemporal substitution.
3.1.2. Firms
Aggregate Inflation There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and each ﬁrm
produces a diﬀerentiated good Y (j). Firms solely use labor as an input factor (a pure
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service economy) and they all employ the identical production technology
Yt(j) = ZtNt(j)1−α ⟨3.14⟩
where Zt is a common technology shock exogenously evolving according to an univa-
riate ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, Nt(j) are the hours of labor ﬁrm j hires from
the household sector, and (1−α) is the elasticity of labor with respect to output. Hence,
aggregate output is deﬁned as
Yt =
 1∫
0
Yt(j)
ϵ−1
ϵ dj

ϵ
ϵ−1
. ⟨3.15⟩
As noted above, the parameter ϵ represents the elasticity of substitution between the dif-
ferentiated consumption goods in the eyes of the household. Since ﬁrms are assumed
to operate under monopolistic competition, ϵ is bounded between 1 < ϵ < ∞. That is,
the value of ϵ implicitly determines the mark-up over marginal costs that ﬁrms charge
in the goods market. In addition to monopolistic competition, ﬁrms are subject to stag-
gered Calvo Pricing. In this context, it is assumed that a stochastic fraction θ of all ﬁrms
is stuck with the previous period’s price, while the remaining fraction (1− θ) is able to
re-optimize. The dynamics for the aggregate price level are therefore
Pt =
[
θP 1−ϵt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ϵ
] 1
1−ϵ ⟨3.16⟩
which can be log-linearized to
pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1). ⟨3.17⟩
Aggregate inﬂation emerges if ﬁrms that re-optimize in period t choose a price that
diﬀers from the last period’s average price level pt−1. The next step is therefore to derive
the representative ﬁrm’s optimal price seĴing behavior.
Optimal Price Setting Under the Calvo-pricing assumption, a representative ﬁrm fa-
cing the probability to re-adjust its price will choose the optimal price level P ∗t such that
the market value of expected proﬁts becomes maximized as long as the price remains
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eﬀective. With θk as the probability that the ﬁrm has to stick to its price for the next t+k
periods to come, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem reads
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
k=0
θk
[
Qt+k(P ∗t Yt+k|t −Ψt+k(Yt+k|t))
]
⟨3.18⟩
subject to the demand constraint
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k ⟨3.19⟩
where Qt+k ≡ βk(Ct+kCt )−σ( PtPt+k ) is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs
and Ψt+k(Yt+k|t) denotes the ﬁrm’s nominal cost function associated with the pro-
duction level Yt+k|t if prices have last been reset in period t. As shown in the appendix
B.2, the ﬁrm’s optimal price seĴing rule takes the form
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt+kCt+k
(
P ∗t −
ϵ
ϵ− 1ψt+k|t
)]
= 0, ⟨3.20⟩
where ψt+k|t = Ψ
′
t+k(Yt+k|t) denotes nominal marginal costs, while ϵ1−ϵ is the desi-
red or ﬂexible price mark-up (if θ = 0). By inserting Qt+k ≡ βk(Ct+kCt )−σ( PtPt+k ) and
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k, equation ⟨3.20⟩ can be rearranged to express the optimal price
as a weighted average of future real marginal costs
P ∗t =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ
t+kMC
r
t+k|t
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ−1
t+k
⟨3.21⟩
where real marginal costs are denoted by MCrt+k|t =
ψt+k|t
Pt+k
. Again, it should be noted
that without sticky prices (θ = 0), ⟨3.18⟩ collapses to a one period problem (k = 0) and
the ﬁrm’s optimal price becomes the frictionless mark-up times nominal marginal costs,
i.e. P ∗t = ϵϵ−1ψt+k|t
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Log-Linearization In a zero steady-state inﬂation, it must hold that
Πt =
P ∗t
Pt−1
= P
∗
t
Pt
= P
∗
t
Pt+k
= 1 ⟨3.22⟩
Yt+k|t = Y = C ⟨3.23⟩
Qt+k = βk ⟨3.24⟩
MCrt+k|t =
ψt|t
Pt
= ϵ− 1
ϵ
≡MCr. ⟨3.25⟩
Inserting this information and performing a log-linearization of ⟨3.21⟩ by using a ﬁrst-
order Taylor approximation around the steady-state ﬁnally delivers4
p∗t = µ+ (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβk[mcrt+k|t + pt+k]. ⟨3.26⟩
This equation nicely illustrates that price seĴing ﬁrms will choose an optimal price p∗t
which equals the steady-state desired mark-up µ plus the weighted average of current
and expected nominalmarginal costs,5where theweights imposed on future periods are
proportional to (i) the discount factor βk and (ii) the probability of the price remaining
eﬀective for k periods, i.e. θk.
3.1.3. Equilibrium Analysis
Goods Market Market clearing on the goods market implies that Yt = Ct. The Euler
equation ⟨3.13⟩ can thus be wriĴen as
yt = Et{yt+1} − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − ρ) . ⟨3.27⟩
which gives one of the key equations: the New Keynesian IS Curve.
To derive the second key equation, i.e. the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), the
next objective is to express the optimal price ⟨3.26⟩ in terms of output instead ofmarginal
4For a thorough derivation of the log-linearization steps, see Bergholt (2012).
5Notice that µ = −mcr which follows from equation ⟨3.25⟩ and −mcr = − ln ϵ−1
ϵ
= ln ϵ
ϵ−1 =
ln
(
1 + ϵ−(ϵ−1)
ϵ−1
)
≈ 1
ϵ−1 =
ϵ
ϵ−1 − 1 ≡ µ.
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costs. Second, the evolution of total prices must be expressed as a combination of the
optimal price seĴing and the price seĴing of ﬁrms that are unable to adjust their prices in
the current period. Since average real marginal costs are given by the diﬀerence between
the real wage and the marginal product of labor, it holds that
mcrt = (wt − pt)−mpnt ⟨3.28⟩
wherempnt denotes the (log of) the marginal product of labor, given by
mpnt = ln
(
∂Yt
∂Nt
)
= ln
(
(1− α)ZtN−αt
)
= ln(1− α) + zt − αnt. ⟨3.29⟩
Inserting ⟨3.29⟩ into ⟨3.28⟩ yields an expression for the real marginal costs of a single
ﬁrm i that sets its optimal price in t:
mcrt+k|t = mcrt+k −
αϵ
1− α(p
∗
t − pt+k). ⟨3.30⟩
If the production function is characterized by constant returns to scale (α = 0) such that
marginal costs are independent from output, individual marginal costs will be equal to
averagemarginal costs. Substituting ⟨3.30⟩ into the optimal price seĴing equation ⟨3.26⟩
yields6
pit = βEt{pit+1}+ λ¯m̂crt ⟨3.31⟩
with λ¯ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ
1−α
1−α+αϵ strictly decreasing in θ, ϵ, and α, while m̂c
r
t denotes the log
deviation of real marginal costs from their steady-state value.7 Then, substituting ⟨3.12⟩
and nt = yt−zt1−α (which follows from the log-linearized production function ⟨3.14⟩) into
⟨3.28⟩, gives the real marginal costs independent of the nature of price seĴing,
mcrt =
(
σ + φ+ α1− α
)
yt − 1 + φ1− αzt − ln(1− α). ⟨3.32⟩
6See appendix B.2 for the detailed derivation steps
7Throughout this dissertation, small variables with a hat stand for log-linearized variables around their
steady-state values.
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As the steady-state marginal costs are likewise given by
mcr =
(
σ + φ+ α1− α
)
ynt −
1 + φ
1− αzt − ln(1− α) ⟨3.33⟩
where yn denotes the natural level of output under ﬂexible prices, subtracting ⟨3.33⟩
from ⟨3.32⟩ yields
m̂crt = mcrt −mcr =
(
σ + φ+ α1− α
)
yˆt ⟨3.34⟩
with yˆt = yt − ynt as the output gap. Finally, inserting ⟨3.34⟩ into ⟨3.31⟩ yields the stan-
dard notation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, i.e.
pit = βEt{pit+1}+ κyˆt ⟨3.35⟩
with κ = λ¯
(
σ + φ+α1−α
)
. In the same vein, the IS curve ⟨3.27⟩ can be wriĴen in output gap
notation. As, by deﬁnition, shocks are absent in the steady-state, the natural output is
given by
ynt = Et{ynt+1} −
1
σ
(rnt − ρ) ⟨3.36⟩
which can be subtracted from ⟨3.27⟩ to get
yˆt ≡ yt − ynt =
[
Et{yt+1} − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − ρ)
]
−
[
Et{ynt+1} −
1
σ
(rnt − ρ)
]
⇔ yˆt = Et{yˆt+1} − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − rnt ) . ⟨3.37⟩
Besides being positively related to its own lead, the current output gap is negatively
dependent on the diﬀerence between the market real rate and the natural rate, where
the laĴer is deﬁned as
rnt ≡ ρ+ σ
1 + φ
σ(1− α) + φ+ αEt{∆zt+1}. ⟨3.38⟩
Hence, the natural real rate is a function of the household’s discount rate ρ and expected
technology shocks. Note that this implies that in the steady-state, i.e. excluding any
(technology) shocks, the natural rate equals the discount rate.
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Monetary Policy and Dynamic Stability In order to close the model, the New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve and the New Keynesian IS Curve have to be supplemented with an
interest rate rule, determining howmonetary policy reactswhen output and/or inﬂation
deviates from their steady-state values. A simple example of such an ad-hoc interest rate
rule is Taylor rule of the form
it = rnt + ϕpipit + ϕyyˆt + νt ⟨3.39⟩
where the intercept equals the natural rate, ϕpi and ϕy are the weights aĴached to the
respective policy goals, and νt denotes a discretionary monetary policy shock.
Substituting the Taylor rule in the IS equation ⟨3.37⟩ and plugging the resulting ex-
pression in the NKPC ⟨3.35⟩ reduces the model to a two equation system consisting of
two forward-looking diﬀerence equations for pit and yˆt. The system thus reads
[
yˆt
pit
]
= AT
[
Et{yˆt+1}
Et{pit+1}
]
+BT (rˆnt − νt) ⟨3.40⟩
where AT is a 2 × 2 coeﬃcient matrix including both policy and non-policy variables
that indicates how expectations drive current output and inﬂation. Similarly, BT is a
non-policy coeﬃcient matrix that determines the eﬀects of technology and/or monetary
policy shocks. Speciﬁcally, it holds that
AT ≡ Ω
[
σ 1− βϕpi
σκ κ+ β(σ + ϕy)
]
⟨3.41⟩
BT ≡ Ω
[
1
κ
]
⟨3.42⟩
Ω ≡ 1
σ + ϕy + κϕpi
⟨3.43⟩
For this system to be dynamically stable, theBlanchard-Kahn-Condition requires that both
eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix AT have to be smaller than unity. One can show
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that this condition is fulﬁlled if
κ(ϕpi − 1) + (1− β)ϕy > 0. ⟨3.44⟩
This will always hold if the central bank obeys to the so-called Taylor Principle (ϕpi > 1),
i.e. if policy rate it reacts overproportionally to deviations of inﬂation from its steady-
state value (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003; Galí, 2008).
Financial Markets As noted above, the baseline New Keynesian model assumes per-
fect ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, it is consistent to consider only one ﬁnancial asset – the
risk-less government bond Bt – while risky assets would have to be priced against this
risk-less benchmark using the risk-adjusted stochastic discount factor (for a more de-
tailed discussion, see section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively). In this context, it is important
to notice that the price of the risk-less government, Qt = 11+it , and hence the nominal
interest it is controlled by the central bank. However, the Euler equation implies that the
representative household is always indiﬀerent between the option ’consume today’ and
’save in order to consume tomorrow’. As a consequence, aggregate savings are always
zero. In other words, the ﬁnancial market is characterized by a no-trade equilibrium, i.e.
Bt = 0.
3.2. Pricing Kernel and Risk Premia
In the previous section it has been shown that monetary policy aﬀects output and inﬂa-
tion in the baseline NK model only via its inﬂuence on the evolution of the short-term
nominal interest rate. As Woodford (2003, p. 31) demonstrates, this even holds for the
“cashless-limit” – a hypothetical reference point where no monetary frictions whatsoe-
ver exist – such that base money ceases to play any role in determining the policy rate.
With perfect ﬁnancial markets, money is not needed as a medium of exchange, which
makes it theoretically implausible to model liquidity premia in the baseline NK model.
Conventional interest rate policy in the baseline NKmodel is thus based on the Pure Ex-
pectations Hypothesis of the term structure (PEH). The PEH relies on the proposition
that only expectations about future short-term rates – irrespective of any risk premia –
aﬀect the current level of long-term rates. Initial contributions to this theory trace back
to the work of Irving Fisher, who wrote already in 1896 that
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“[...] interest realized on a very long bond, say 50 years is often lower [!] than
on a 25 years’ bond. This is explainable by the prevailing opinion that interest
tends to fall, so that if the 50 years’ investment were in two successive bonds
of 25 years each, the interest realized in the second would be lower than in
the ﬁrst. The “actuarial average” of the two is equal to the interest realized
in the 50 years’ bond.” (Fisher, 1896, p. 29)8
Fisher’s ideas on the expectation hypothesis were taken up by Keynes (1930) and Hicks
(1946), although both saw the reasons for the existence of term premium on longer-
dated assets. Hicks explained the necessity of a positive term premiumwith a structural
weakness on the demand side of the capital market, asserting that
“[i]f no extra return is oﬀered for long lending, most people (and institu-
tions) would prefer to hold their money on deposit in some way or other.
But this situation would leave large excess demand to borrow long which
would not be met. Borrowers would thus tend to oﬀer beĴer terms in order
to persuade lenders to switch over into the long market.” (Hicks, 1946, p.
146)
However, those early analyses generally emanated from partial market models, whe-
reas modern treatments of the expectations hypothesis rely critically on the concepts
of general equilibrium and no-arbitrage. Hence, the next paragraph sheds light on the
expectations hypothesis against the background of the popular consumption-based ca-
pital asset-pricingmodel (CCAPM).9 Subsequently, the implications of the expectations
hypothesis will be enlarged to a general equilibrium perspective in order to discuss its
relevance for the portfolio balance eﬀect.
3.2.1. Risk Premia in the CCAPM
Essentially all macro-ﬁnance models depart from the single fundamental asset pricing
equation,
Pi,t = Et [Mt+1Xi,t+1] , ⟨3.45⟩
8Interestingly, this statement reveals that Fisher projected a secular decline in future interest rates which
corresponds to an inverse term structure, a ﬁnding which is generally rejected by empirical studies of
the term structure. In contrast, empirical studies generally identify an upward sloping yield curve (a
normal term structure).
9The discussion of the CCAPM is mainly based on Cochrane (2001).
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that equates the price of an asset i at time t with the expected product of the stochastic
discount factor (SDF),Mt+1, and the asset’s expected payoﬀ, Xi,t+1. With uncertainty
about future asset payoﬀs and interest rates, the SDF maps future payoﬀs back to pre-
sent. The concept of the SDF is closely related to the law of one price (LOOP): Two assets
having identical payoﬀ streams in every state smust trade at the same price. Otherwise,
arbitrage opportunities would arise. Cochrane (2001, p. 64) thus shows that the LOOP
necessarily implies the existence of a single SDFwhen agents value assets as perfect sub-
stitutes. Moreover, the existence of a positive SDF establishes a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for markets to be arbitrage-free (Irle, 2003, p. 114). If there are s = 1, . . . , S
discrete states of the world, complete markets imply that for each state a security exists
that costs p(s) today and pays one unit in state s and zero otherwise. Thus, if there are
i = 1, . . . , N assets in the economy, the price of an asset i is given by
P (i) =
S∑
s=1
pc(s)X(si). ⟨3.46⟩
This can be rewriĴen by replacing the sum over state prices with the respective proba-
bilities pi(s) of the states. Therefore, the state-density function is deﬁned as
M(s) = pc(s)
pi(s) ⟨3.47⟩
which can be used in equation ⟨3.46⟩ to obtain
P (i) =
S∑
s=1
pi(s)M(s)X(s) = E[MX]. ⟨3.48⟩
This illustrates that a unique SDF exists only in case of complete ﬁnancial markets. If
markets are incomplete, multiple stochastic discount factors may exist (Campbell et al.,
1997).
It is common to express equation ⟨3.46⟩ not in terms of asset prices but in terms of
(gross) returns. For complete markets, this can be done by dividing equation ⟨3.46⟩
throughP (i) and deﬁningX(si)/P (i) = r(i) to be the gross return of asset i. This results
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in
1 = E [Mr(i)] . ⟨3.49⟩
The same approach is applied to price risk-free assets. An asset is called risk-free if it
delivers a constant, state-independent payoﬀ, i.e.X(s) = X¯ . Applying the above pricing
equations to a risk-free asset gives the risk-free asset price as
P (f) = X¯
S∑
s=1
pc(s)
= X¯
S∑
s=1
pi(s)M(s)
= X¯E [M] ,
⟨3.50⟩
implying that the no-arbitrage condition is fulﬁlled. If the risk-free asset is deﬁned as a
zero-coupon bond paying unity in each state of the world, i.e. with X¯ = 1, the above
equation collapses to
P (f) = E[M]. ⟨3.51⟩
This can be transformed to gross returns such that the SDF equals the inverse of the real
risk-free interest rate (Cochrane, 2001, p. 13):
1 = E[M]
P (f) = r
fE[M]
⇔ 1
rf
= E[M]. ⟨3.52⟩
The above deliberations can also be applied to macroeconomic DSGE models with
utility-maximizing agents. As outlined in section 3.1.1, the household’s optimization
calculus in the baseline NK model implies that the nominal SDF has to equal the ratio
of marginal utilities times the subjective discount factor β
Et [Mt+1] = βEt U
′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)pit+1
. ⟨3.53⟩
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The basic idea of the nominal SDF in any DSGE model with a representative agent
is that the equilibrium asset price has to be such that the agent is indiﬀerent between
sacriﬁcing marginal consumption today and consuming the asset’s payoﬀ tomorrow.
Hence, the price of any asset imust be
Pi,t = Et
[
β
U ′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)pit+1
Xi,t+1
]
. ⟨3.54⟩
Since the gross return ri,t+1 of any asset i equals the ratioXi,t+1/Pi,t, dividing the above
equation through Pi,t, yields10
1 = Et
[
β
U ′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)pit+1
Xi,t+1
Pi,t
]
= Et[Mt+1ri,t+1]. ⟨3.55⟩
Notice that for independent random variables X,Y , it holds that Et[XY ] =
Et[X]Et[Y ] − covt(X,Y ) with covt(X,Y ) = Et(X − EtX)(Y − EtY ), such that equa-
tion ⟨3.55⟩ can be rearranged to11
1 = Et[Mt+1ri,t+1] = Et[Mt+1]Et[ri,t+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk-neutral component
+ covt(Mt+1, ri,t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk-adjustment
⟨3.56⟩
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation ⟨3.56⟩ captures the mean return for
an asset that investors would require if they were indiﬀerent towards risk. The second
term – the covariance between the SDF and the return of asset i – is the risk correction
required by risk-averse investors. By establishing a link between asset returns and the
consumption process, it explains why an asset whose return covaries positively with
consumption must yield an expected excess return over the risk-neutral benchmark.
Remember from equation ⟨3.53⟩ that the nominal SDF is high when the marginal uti-
lity of consumption in period t+ 1 is high. However, this corresponds to a low level of
consumption in t + 1 and high consumption in t. The economic intuition is as follows:
risk-averse investors dislike volatility in consumption. To be willing to buy an asset
that delivers low payoﬀs in states of the world where the level of consumption is alre-
ady low, potential investors demand a risk premium, or, which amounts to the same
10This valuation formula for uncertain payoﬀ streams in discrete time goes back to Rubinstein (1976).
11Cf. Wooldridge (2006)
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thing, are only willing to buy this asset at a discounted price. Conversely, an asset that
covaries negatively with consumption (i.e. positively with marginal utility) serves like
an insurance contract. It delivers a positive payoﬀ exactly in those states of the world
where the level of consumption is low (the bad state). An asset with such payoﬀ streams
contributes positively to consumption smoothing and will thus be demanded even if its
expected payoﬀ is negative (the classic insurance example).
A risk-free security, on the other hand, delivers certain payoﬀs in each state of the
world. Its covariance with the pricing kernel equals zero (covt(Mt+1, rt+1) = 0) and
equation ⟨3.56⟩ simpliﬁes to
rft =
1
Et [Mt+1] . ⟨3.57⟩
Plugging this expression for the risk-free rate into equation ⟨3.56⟩ yields the expected
excess return (the risk premium) of any risky asset i as
Et[ri,t+1] = rft (1− covt(Mt+1, ri,t+1))
⇔ Et[ri,t+1 − rft ] = −rft covt(Mt+1, rt+1). ⟨3.58⟩
This equation indicates that the risk premium is inversely proportional to the covariance
of its state-contingent return and the stochastic discount factor. It implies that an asset
that has a high return in good times when aggregate consumption is high, but fails to
pay out in bad times when aggregate consumption is low, has a negative return paĴern
in the eyes of the representative investor. In order for the investor to be willing to hold
such an asset, it must pay an expected return in excess of the risk-free rate, i.e. it must
oﬀer a positive risk premium.
The quintessence of the CCAPM can be conﬁrmed by the stylized facts of asset pri-
ces and the business cycle. Stock andWatson (1999, 2003), for instance, ﬁnd pro-cyclical
eﬀects on macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices. As both asset returns and con-
sumption tend to be low during recessions, investors do require relatively higher risk
premia in recessions than in booms. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) also show that risk
premia are higher in recessions than in boom phases, and they explain this paĴern by
a higher level of macroeconomic uncertainty during recessions periods. All in all, the
empirical evidence suggests that risk premia vary counter-cyclically with the business
cycle.12
12See Pesando (1975); Fama (1984); Tzavalis and Wickens (1997); Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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However, the high variation in risk premia that can be observed in the data are dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with the standard CCAPM. Especially the recent ﬁnancial crisis has
(re-)raised the question on why risk premia vary over time – and understanding this
variation has been nominated to be “the central organizing question of current asset-
pricing research” (Cochrane, 2011). In this context, the role of ﬁnancial frictions and
asset market segmentation seems to provide an interesting avenue of future research.
In fact, the existing models in this ﬁeld oﬀer a much beĴer ﬁt to risk premia dynamics
than the standard asset pricing model, where risk premia are solely a function of the
representative agent’s ﬂuctuation in aggregate consumption.13 In the following, I will
brieﬂy present the role of risk premia in the New Keynesian model before I turn to the
more general caveats of incorporating risk premia into standard DSGE models.
3.2.2. Pitfalls of the NK Model
To quote Sargent (2010), “the New Keynesian IS curve is nothing more than an asset
pricing equation.” Therefore, consumption-based asset pricing theories should be able
to explain the risk pricing and themain transmission channels of conventionalmonetary
policy in the baseline NK model.
Interestingly, however, there are no risky assets in the baseline NK model. The sole
asset with which households can transfer wealth over time is a one period government
bond, which carries neither default risk nor liquidity risk.14 Moreover, since the policy
rate is assumed to be the same as the government bond rate, government bonds carry
no interest rate risk either. Consequently, neither do term premia nor any other form of
risk premia appear in the baseline NK model. Evidently, this represents an oversim-
plifying conjecture. By extending the model to include (default-free) long-term govern-
ment bonds subject to interest rate risk, at least a positive term premium between short-
and long-term government bonds should arise: If the future path of short-term interest
rates is uncertain, interest rate risk emerges as rising discount rates cause a capital loss
to investors whenever their desired investment period diverges from the maturity pro-
ﬁle of the bond. By virtue of the Taylor-rule ⟨8.75⟩, short-term rates are indeed uncertain
in the NK model, as they inherit the stochastic shocks to output, inﬂation, and mone-
tary policy. Therefore, unless utility is linear in consumption, i.e. whenEt U
′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)pit+1 = 1,
13SeeHe andKrishnamurthy (2013); Adrian et al. (2014); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014a); Muir (2016).
14At least for an industrialized country with a highly liquid sovereign bond market and an independent
central bank (acting as lender of last resort in sovereign bond markets), discarding default and liquidity
risk is a generally accepted conjecture.
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leading the covariance term to vanish in equation ⟨3.58⟩, interest rate risk provokes risk-
averse households to demand a positive term premium that increases with the maturity
of the bond.15
In general, the representative household is assumed to be risk-averse (σ > 0) leading
to a convexutility function and toEt U
′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)pit+1 ̸= 1. As a consequence, if long-termbonds
are included in the baseline NK model, one should expect the yield on the risky long-
term bond to carry a positive term premium over the risk-less short-term bond (section
8.1 presents an example of a baseline NKmodel including long-term bonds). However,
this is not the case. Long-term rates carry no term premium and the pure expectations
theory of the term structure still holds (cf. equation ⟨8.17⟩). Note that this stands in stark
contrast to the implications of the no-arbitrage asset pricing equation presented above
(equation ⟨3.58⟩). The fact that no term premium appears in the conventional reduced
form equations of any basic microfounded DSGE model rests on purely mathematical
grounds. It is the result of the standard procedure of log-linearizing the structural mo-
del around the steady state. The linearization process eliminates the term premium en-
tirely, because the stochastic discount factor is identical to the risk-free rate up to a ﬁrst
order approximation, which is a manifestation of the certainty equivalence property of
linearized models (Rudebusch et al., 2007).
To remedy this shortcomings and to allow for a more meaningful role of risk, Hör-
dahl et al. (2007) use amore complicated second-order perturbationmethod. This rather
complex approach, however, is only slightly more successful, because it yields only a
constant term premium. Besides increasing in maturity, the term premium shows no
reaction to other macro-variables of the model. The reason is that second-order approx-
imations involve only the squared prediction error terms with constant expectations (a
weighted sum of the respective shock variances). This is unsatisfying, as general equi-
librium models that derive the term structure from the behaviour of optimizing agents
should principally explain interest rate dynamics by the volatility of a wide range of
macroeconomic variables.
Thus, modeling time-varying term premia in microfounded DSGE-models requires
complex third-order approximation methods as done in the analysis of Rudebusch and
Swanson (2008) and Ravenna and Seppälä (2006), for instance. However, these models’
term premia show only a very weak empirical ﬁt. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) try to
improve the ﬁt by extending a standard DSGE model to incorporate large and persis-
15Note that this kind of interest rate risk is not present for the short-term government bond only because
its yield happens to equal the policy rate.
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tent external habits, a strategy proposed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) to explain
the equity premium puzzle in a consumption-based asset pricing model. In addition,
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) add various forms of labor market frictions (labor ad-
justment costs, real wage rigidities, staggered nominal wage seĴing), but even though
none of this helps to signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt of the term premium, it causes a trade-
oﬀ: For the term premium to be in line with the data, these studies have to assume either
implausibly high labor market frictions, or a very strong degree of risk aversion. Both,
however, come at the cost of distorting the ﬁt of the implied macroeconomic moments.
Hence, Hördahl (2009) and Ravenna and Seppälä (2006) pursue another strategy: They
try to increase the model ﬁt by increasing the size and persistence of shocks. But of
course, increasing the shock volatility also increases the volatility of output and other
macroeconomic variables. Thereby, these studies exhibit a similar trade-oﬀ as in Rude-
busch and Swanson (2008).
In conclusion, the failure of conventional DSGE-models – most notably of the stan-
dard workhorse New Keynesian Model – to simultaneously replicate the stylized facts
of asset prices andmacroeconomic variablesmay suggest the necessity of amodiﬁcation
of the underlying utility framework.
3.2.3. Alternative Utility Specifications: Epstein-Zin Preferences
As already noted by Lucas (1978, p. 1441), a drawback of the standard power utility
function is that it jointly determines the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion togetherwith
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (both are just reciprocals of one another).
This, however, seems overly restrictive since it mingles two rather distinct economic
concepts (Lengwiler, 2004, p. 202): Risk aversion mirrors an agent’s sensitivity towards
risk bymeasuring thewillingness to substitute consumption across states. Intertemporal
elasticity on the other hand measures the willingness to substitute consumption across
time.
Epstein and Zin (1989) thus tried to disentangle these two aspects of preferences
within the more general class of recursive utility functions, but without sacriﬁcing too
many features of the standard time-separable power utility framework.16 Most impor-
tantly, Epstein-Zin preferences avoid the drawback of the standard time-separable po-
wer utility model that agents are indiﬀerent to the temporal distribution of risk (Piaz-
16To be precise, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) build on the original contribution by Kreps and
Porteus (1978), who provided the original theoretical framework for this kind of preferences.
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zesi and Schneider, 2007b). This idea can be clariﬁed by the following example: consider
three hypothetical consumption plans –A,B andC – where consumption over an inter-
val [0;T ] is contingent on a fair coin toss. In every program, the level of consumption is
high (low), if the toss is heads (tail). However, the consumption stream of plan A is de-
termined by a once and for all coin toss in period t = 1. Thus, scenarioA delivers a highly
persistent consumption path. In contrast, consumption payoﬀs under B are generated
by periodically repeated tosses whereas the results are known at time t = 1 already. Fi-
nally, the consumption plan C is similar to B except for the fact that the t-th coin toss is
not revealed before time t.
Intuitively, if an agent dislikes the high shock persistence,B should dominateA, since
in the laĴer consumption is high if and only if it is high from the beginning (and low
otherwise). In contrast, due to the serially independent tosses, consumption is more di-
versiﬁed under scenarioB. Thus, a risk averse agentwould choose consumption planB.
Note, however, although the resolution of uncertainty diﬀers between scenarios B and
C, this does not maĴer under time-separable utility. In other words, any agent characte-
rized by a standard time-separable power utility function would be indiﬀerent between
the consumption path generated by option B and C. However, this result is invalid if
we impose recursive Epstein-Zin preferences. Given that the parameter governing risk
aversion is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, agents strictly pre-
fer option B over C and A (Duﬃe and Epstein, 1992). This represents the fundamental
diﬀerence to the power utility framework. It implies that if an agent’s degree of risk
aversion is higher than its subjective time preference, the agent prefers an early resolu-
tion of uncertainty about future consumption.17
Moreover, with respect to asset pricing, Epstein-Zin preferences allow to nest the pre-
dictions of the intertemporal consumption-based CAPM with the static CAPM (Duﬃe
and Epstein, 1991). According to the ﬁrst, it is the asset payoﬀ’s covariance with con-
sumption growth that maĴers for asset speciﬁc risk premia whereas in the static CAPM
it is the covariance of the asset return with the market portfolio that determines its ris-
kiness. The key point with Epstein-Zin preferences is now that both components maĴer
for an asset’s excess return (Epstein and Zin, 1991). As shown in Campbell et al. (1997),
for a log-normal representation this also oﬀers the convenient property that a high risk
aversion coeﬃcient does not necessarily imply a low risk-free rate, since the elasticity
17In case risk aversion is lower than intertemporal elasticity of substitution, agents prefer high consump-
tion persistence, i.e. they prefer option A over B.
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of intertemporal substitution (which governs the risk-free rate) may well diverge from
the value of the risk coeﬃcient.
Finally, by disentangling the coeﬃcient for risk aversion from the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, risk aversion can be ampliﬁedwhile all othermodel parameters re-
main constant. This should enable a positive term premium along the yield curve. Thus,
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) incorporate Epstein-Zin preferences into an otherwise
standard DSGEmodel and they succeed in improving the ﬁt of the model-implied term
premium even without considerably compromising the ﬁt to macroeconomic data (a
problem they encountered in an earlier study where they adopted long-lasting external
habits (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008)). Unfortunately, however, the technical ﬂaw of
basic microfoundedDSGEmodels whereupon time-variant term premia can be accoun-
ted for only up to a third-order approximation cannot be resolved when Epstein-Zin
preferences are used.
3.3. Wallace Neutrality
TheWallace neutrality is an economic proposition going back to a seminal article by Neil
Wallace (1981).With this article,Wallace provided the theoretical argument proving that
QE is ineﬀective under certain market conditions. In Wallace’s model, when the central
bank issues reserves to purchase an asset, this aﬀects neither the asset’s price, nor its
yield, nor does it have any eﬀect on output and inﬂation. More importantly, this even
holds for conventional open-market operations at positive levels of the short-termpolicy
rate. Actually, at ﬁrst sight this might seem like a counterintuitive result; but while the
mathematics of theWallacemodel are quite complicated, its economic intuition is rather
simple.18
Key Aspects of Wallace’s Model Themodel assumes an endowment economywhere
representative agents with perfect foresight live for two periods. In order to smooth
consumption, young generations want to save parts of the single consumption good
C. In order to do so, they can either invest in a storage technology with the return x,
or they can buy (or sell) state-contingent contracts that deliver C in a particular state
next period. However, these state-contingent contracts are ultimately backed only by
the storage of C, i.e. the no-arbitrage condition requires that both options face the same
expected return.
18Sargent (1987, pp. 305-324) oﬀers a very useful representation of the Wallace model.
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Now, when the central bank conducts open-market operations, it prints money to
purchase parts of the single consumption good, which it then stores at the same rate
as the private sector. After one period, this transaction will be reversed. That is, the
central bank returns the consumption good plus the one period return in exchange for
the previously issued money. In the no-arbitrage equilibrium, this necessarily implies
that the return from storing via the central bank has to equal the return from the private
storage technology. Now, a crucial result is that, if the central bank increases its amount
of storage by engaging in an open-market operation, private storing falls by exactly
the same amount. Thereby, the reduced private storage exactly oﬀsets the eﬀects of the
central bank’s trade.
Note also that ’money’ in the Wallace model is similar to one-period zero-coupon
bonds. In other words, there is no transaction motive for positive money holdings. As
a result of the aforementioned aspects, it is clear that open-market operations have to
be ineﬀective in Wallace’s model: they do not lead to changes in inﬂation, nor do they
change people’s intertemporal consumption proﬁle.
Recently, the insight of Wallace’s irrelevance proposition has been famously reitera-
ted byWoodford (2012), who stressed that in modern representative household theory,
“the market price of any asset should be determined by the present value of the random
returns towhich it is a claim,where the present value is calculated using an asset pricing
kernel (stochastic discount factor) derived from the representative household’s margi-
nal utility of income in diﬀerent states of the world (Woodford, 2012, p. 61).” While a
similar point has been discussed in section 3.2.1,Woodford continues by noting that “in-
sofar as a mere re-shuﬄing of assets between the central bank and private sector should
not change the real quantity of resources available for consumption in each state of the
world, the representative household’s marginal utility of income in diﬀerent states of
the world should not change. Hence the pricing kernel should not change, and the mar-
ket price of one unit of a given asset should not change, either, assuming that the risky
returns to which the asset represents a claim have not changed (Woodford, 2012, p.
62).”
Interestingly, this statement implies that even central bank purchases of risky assets
have no impact in those class of models. The reason is that if households swap risky
bonds for essentially risk-less central bank reserves, total risk has only seemingly vanis-
hed from the private sector’s balance sheet. In case the risk materializes as risky bonds
default when they sit on the central bank’s balance sheet, any resulting losses will im-
ply lower (or even negative) remiĴances to the Treasury. This, in turn, will result in
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higher taxes (or lower government spending) in the future. Thus, from a general equi-
librium perspective, the household’s after tax income will be just as dependent on the
risky bonds’ payoﬀs as before the central bank’s open-market operation (for a formal
representation of this point in the context of a representative household model, see Eg-
gertsson and Woodford, 2003).19
Against this background, it can be concluded that for the Wallace neutrality to hold,
only two assumptions must be fulﬁlled. Firstly, assets must be valued only for their
pecuniary returns, i.e. all non-pecuniary factors that could explain why certain assets
are demanded (like transaction services) are disregarded. Secondly, investors must be
able to purchase arbitrary quantities of assets at identical market prices, without credit
constraints other than their overall budget constraint (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011).
Based on these assumptions, the following three ’dogmas’ emerged as the pre-crisis
consensus of monetary policy making: ﬁrst, open market operations in government
bond markets (or any other asset market) do not aﬀect relative prices (a corollary of
this view is that public debt management can be separated from monetary policy). Se-
cond, the short-term policy rate is the only relevant monetary policy tool. In particular,
the inﬂuence of balance sheet policies on credit or term premia is completely discarded.
Third, the liquidity status of the commercial banking sector is seen as irrelevant. The
idea is that as long as adequate capital standards are in place, any temporary liquidity
need can be readily met on perfectly functioning interbank markets (Turner, 2014).
However, in the same manner as other irrelevance theorems of economic theory – as
for instance the irrelevance of the capital structure for the value of a ﬁrm (Modigliani-
Miller Theorem) or the irrelevance of government ﬁnancing via taxes or deﬁcits (Barro-
Ricardo Theorem) – theWallace neutrality represents a benchmark concept in frictionless
monetary models with optimizing agents.20 In this vein, it should serve as a theoretical
starting point for discussions about why things might behave diﬀerently in the real
world.
19In contrast to Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Benigno and Nisticò (2017) take a general-equilibrium
perspective to assess underwhich conditions risky open-market operationsmight be non-neutral because
of the potential losses that they imply for the central bank’s balance sheet. Their most intuitive result is
that open-market operations will be non-neutral if the treasury is unable or unwilling to levy taxes in
order to cover the losses made by the central bank. In that case, the materialization of risk does remain
in the hands of the whole government (Treasury and/or central bank), which is concomitant to a wealth
transfer to the private sector. Hence, this monetary/ﬁsal policy regime – which essentially represents a
form of helicopter money – ultimately leads to rising inﬂation.
20The respective sources for the two irrelevance theorems are Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Barro
(1974), while the basic Ricardian concept is contained in Ricardo (1951, vol. 1, pp. 244-249). A critical
review of the Barro-Ricardo Theorem is provided by Buchanan (1976).
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Model Extensions The Wallace model is often criticized because it abstracts from a
liquidity premium on money, implying that money and short-term government bonds
are perfect substitutes – even for positive levels of the short-term interest rate. As men-
tioned above, the reason is that money only serves as a store of value, but plays no role
facilitating transactions. From amonetary policy perspective, this implies that even con-
ventional open-market operations have no eﬀect in seĴing the short-term policy rate.
Of course, this is a rather strong claim, since practical experience proved that monetary
policy does implement the short-term policy rate with the use of open-market operati-
ons.
As a consequence, Wallace’s irrelevance proposition is supposed to be of liĴle practi-
cal relevance, at least for conventional monetary policy operations. To rectify this shor-
tcoming, Eggertsson andWoodford (2003) introduce a liquidity premium onmoney by
incorporating real money balances into the representative household’s utility function.
As a result, open-market operations in short-term government bonds are only eﬀective
as long as money holdings yield a positive liquidity premium (i.e. as long as the short-
term interest rate is positive). When the demand of real money balances becomes sati-
ated, however, additional money balances provide no further liquidity service and the
short-term interest rate drops to zero. Since this coincides with the perfect substituta-
bility of money and short-term bonds, further conventional open-market operations in
short-term bonds become ineﬀective at the zero lower bound.21
It has to be noted that the irrelevance proposition at the zero lower bound does not
only hold for central bank purchases of short-term bonds, but also purchases of long-
term bonds – even if interest rates on long-term bonds are still positive. The reason is
that Eggertsson andWoodford (2003) assume frictionless ﬁnancialmarkets that give rise
to perfectly integrated bond markets, while both short- and long-term bonds are only
valued for their pecuniary returns. Thus, apart from the diﬀerent degrees of interest rate
risks, short-term bonds represent perfect substitutes for long-term bonds, implying that
the yield curve is connected through the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.
Model Critique The heavy use of large-scale asset purchases since 2008 has sparked
oﬀ an intense debate on the implications of Wallace’s irrelevance theorem for practical
monetary policy (see Cohen-SeĴon andMonnet, 2012 and the references therein). In this
21Once again, note the diﬀerence between the proposition of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and the
original irrelevance proposition of Wallace (1981): Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that open-
market operations are irrelevant only at the zero lower bound, whereas Wallace (1981) claims that they
are irrelevant irrespective of the level of the short-term rate.
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context, a widespread critique against Wallace is based on his assumption of perfectly
ﬂexible ﬁnancial markets and rational arbitrageurs not subject to any borrowing con-
straint. In particular, if binding constraints on participation in certain markets exist, this
could invalidate the irrelevance result, because the neutralization of asset purchases à la
Wallacemight be distorted. To see this, consider the following scenario: suppose the cen-
tral bank engages in quantitative easing by purchasing long-term government bonds.
For those purchases to be neutralized, rational investors must realize the arbitrage op-
portunity and short-sell government bonds by the same amount. Yet if arbitrageurs are
credit constraint – or if they refuse to short-sell the entire amount because that would
imply a heavily undiversiﬁed portfolio – monetary policy will succeed in pushing bond
prices above their fundamental value. In fact, given the unlimited funds of the central
bank, even deep-pocket investors will at some point run against their budget constraint.
Thus, if limits to arbitrage exist, the resulting market segmentation gives monetary po-
licy the power to inﬂuence asset prices through the so-called portfolio balance eﬀect.22
Another argument is that if unconventional monetary policies contribute to the sta-
bilization of distressed banks, or, more generally, if they relax credit market frictions
by expanding reserves (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011), this also generates non-neutral
results. Finally, in the Wallace model there is absolute certainty that QE by the central
bank will be ultimately reversed. In the real world, however, agents cannot be hundred
percent surewhether QEwill be completely reversed in the future. In otherwords, there
are numerous reasons that may invalidate the Wallace neutrality in the real world.
3.4. Concluding Remarks
In summary, the above observations cast a rather pessimistic light on the ability of struc-
tural DSGE models to simultaneously ﬁt the term premium and macroeconomic vari-
ables. The fundamental theoretical reason is that agents can insure themselves against
consumption ﬂuctuations either by adjusting labor supply, or, if this self-insurance me-
chanism is vitiated through labormarket frictions, by purchasing state-contingent secu-
rities on complete ﬁnancial markets. Since both insurance strategies deliver a relatively
ﬂat intertemporal consumption proﬁle, the role for the term premium remains negligi-
ble.
22The theoretical and empirical foundations of the portfolio balance eﬀect will be analyzed in Part II of
this thesis.
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Consequently, standard DSGE models like the baseline NK model lack the conditi-
ons conducive for central bank asset purchases to have any eﬀect on asset prices and
yields – which entails that such operations do not even change inﬂation. Instead, most
monetary DSGE models include a Taylor rule that abstracts from open-market opera-
tions but assumes that the central bank sets the interest rate outright. Ultimately, this
prompts the conclusion that DSGE models call for ﬁnancial frictions in order to simul-
taneously generate term premia, a good ﬁt of macroeconomic variables, and a role for
non-neutral (unconventional) open-market operations. Amodel that incorporates these
features will be laid out in chapter 8.
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Monetary Policies
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4. Unconventional Monetary Policy – How Does it
Work?
4.1. Key Terms and Concepts
Since the recent economic and ﬁnancial crisis quantitative easing has become the buzz
word for various unconventional monetary policies involving the central bank balance
sheet. Given the speciﬁc channels and eﬀects of individual operations, this very broad
deﬁnition disguises important aspects of the existing measures. A ﬁrst step towards
a reasonable characterization should distinguish between forward guidance, quantitative
easing, and qualitative easing.
4.1.1. Forward Guidance
Theoretical Concept In normal times, monetary authorities provide enough informa-
tion for private market participants to be able to anticipate near-term policy rates by
explaining the various factors underlying a given policy decision. Nevertheless, central
banks have occasionally used more direct signals about future policy rates already be-
fore the ﬁnancial crisis. However, in those episodes, the use of forward guidance was
mainly conﬁned tomitigate the impact of an imminent policy decision on ﬁnancial mar-
kets (European Central Bank, 2014a).1 This approach changed with the onset of the ﬁ-
nancial crisis. Since then, forward guidance constitutes an additional monetary policy
tool that is used to provide the necessary monetary stimulus in the face of a liquidity
trap (see Fig. 4.1).
1For evidence on forward guidance prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, see e.g. Gürkaynak et al. (2005).
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Figure 4.1.: Transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy
4.1. Key Terms and Concepts
In this regard, the concept of forward guidance goes beyond the classical ’manage-
ment of expectations’, which has long been recognized as an important part of central
bank communication (Svensson, 2004; Woodford, 2005a).2
Ideally, eﬀective forward guidance lowers future policy rates and thereby also longer-
term rates even if currentpolicy rates are stuck at their zero lower bound.3 Consequently,
if the real rate falls below the households’ time preference rate, the laĴer increase their
current consumption at the expense of future consumption. Evidently, this is the stan-
dard result of an expansionary monetary policy shock in any DSGE model (see, for
instance, BhaĴarai et al., 2015).
Another reason why central banks might oﬀer forward guidance is that they want to
prevent excessive interest rate volatility from aﬀecting their monetary policy stance in a
way that hampers the transmission of an existing amount of accommodation. Therefore,
most central banks combine their asset purchase programs with some form of forward
guidance.
Forms of Forward Guidance Principally, forward guidance can be discerned along
two dimensions. Firstly, it can be related to monetary policymakers’ expectations about
the economic outlook. Since this type of guidance relies on a forecast, it is referred to
as Delphic forward guidance. A decisive feature of Delphic forward guidance is that it
does not constitute a commitment on the part of the central bank. Instead, it only gi-
ves guidance on the expected path of future policy rates, conditional on the economic
outlook.
Alternatively, if forward guidance contains a commitment to maintain low policy ra-
tes for longer than economic conditions would warrant, this is called Odyssean forward
guidance. In this second form of forward guidance, the central bank ’ties its hands’, i.e.
commits to keep policy rates unchanged even when the inﬂation outlook rises (just like
Odysseus tied himself to the pole to withstand the sirens).
Technically (and less mythical), practical forward guidance thus either relates to a gi-
ven time period (calendar-based), or is conditional on certain economic conditions (state-
contingent). Moreover, it might include speciﬁc numerical values (quantitative), or be ex-
2Clearly, with its emphasis on the expectations channel, forward guidance is closely related to the ’ma-
nagement of expectations’ view. Adherents are also referred to as “expectationalists” in the literature
(Morris and Shin, 2008).
3While Keynes envisioned the money market to be in a liquidity trap at some positive level of interest
rates, in modern macroeconomics it refers to a situation in which the the short-term policy rate is zero
(Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Eggertsson, 2006).
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pressed in vaguer terms (qualitative).4 In the following, I will try to categorize the Fed’s
and the ECB’s forward guidance along those dimensions.
The Fed’s Forward Guidance Over time, the Fed’s formulation of forward guidance
has included all of the above dimensions. In December 2008, the FOMC began with
qualitative guidance indicating that “the CommiĴee anticipates that weak economic con-
ditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some
time” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008). Then, in August 2011,
the FOMC switched to qualitative calendar-based forward guidance by stating that it ex-
pected exceptionally low levels of the fed funds rate “at least throughmid-2013” (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011).5 After a series of minor modiﬁca-
tions to this date-based guidance, the FOMC in December 2012 ﬁnally decided to pro-
vide quantitative state-contingent forward guidance conditional on the evolution of the
employment and inﬂation rate. In particular, the CommiĴee said that it would keep
the fed funds rate at the current target range of 0-0.25 percent at least as long as the
unemployment rate remained above 6.5 percent, subject to the condition that inﬂation
between one and two years ahead was projected to be no more than half percentage
point above the CommiĴee’s long-run goal of 2 percent, and long-run inﬂation expec-
tations remained well anchored (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
2012).
A year later, when the US unemployment rate had almost decreased to the previously
deﬁned 6.5 percent threshold, the FOMC announced that it would consider additional
information besides just current unemployment and inﬂation ﬁgures, i.e. indicators of
inﬂation pressures and inﬂation expectations, as well as readings on ﬁnancial develop-
ments. Based on these indicators, the FOMC then decided that the target range for the
fed funds rate would remain at its current level “well past the time that the unemploy-
ment rate declines below 6.5 percent” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sy-
stem, 2013a).6
4This classiﬁcation is based on Borio and Zabai (2016).
5This date was later changed to late 2014, and then to mid-2015. See also Mester (2014) for a discussion
on the evolution of the Fed’s forward guidance.
6Very interestingly, in a speech given in September 2016, the Fed’s Chairwomen Janet Yellen mentioned
hysteresis eﬀects as an important factor that could explain why monetary policy should stay more ac-
commodative during recoveries than would be called for by a standard Taylor rule (Yellen, 2016). With
regard to the US experience, the study by Reifschneider et al. (2015) estimates that potential output by
2016 was 7 percent belowwhat could have been expected based on its pre-crisis trajectory. Furthermore,
the study suggests thatmuch of this decline is aĴributable to factors that occurred as a result of the severe
recession and sluggish recovery.
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The ECB’s Forward Guidance The Fed was of course not the only major central bank
that adopted explicit forward guidance in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. The Eu-
ropean Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Canada, the
Bank of New Zealand, and the Swedish Riksbank have all used some form of forward
guidance about the likely path of their future policy rates. And similar to the Fed, all of
these central banks changed the formulation of their forward guidance over time.
For instance, the ECB introduced forward guidance in July 2013 against the backdrop
of increased volatility in money markets, which caused an undesired tightening of its
monetary policy stance and an eﬀectivewithdrawal of previously introduced accommo-
dative policy measures. Therefore, the Governing Council announced that it expected
“the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of
time” (EuropeanCentral Bank, 2013). By relating the length of expansionary policy rates
to the outlook for inﬂation and real economic activity, the ECB pursued an open-ended
but qualitative state-contingent forward guidance.7 In March 2014, the Governing Coun-
cil then qualiﬁed this previous formulation somewhat, when it clariﬁed that, despite an
improvement in the outlook for inﬂation and economic activity, monetary policy rates
would remain low as long as there was a “high degree of unutilised capacity” in the
euro area economy (European Central Bank, 2014b).8
In contrast to the Fed, however, the ECB always abstained from giving an explicit
end-date or numerical threshold in its forward guidance communication. That is, the
ECB’s forward guidance has always been a Delphic form of forward guidance. Even
in March 2016, when the ECB expanded its monthly asset purchases from e60 to e80
billion, the Governing Council announced that it expected “the key ECB interest rates
to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the
horizon of our net asset purchases” (ECB, 2016c). By the time of writing, the APP is
“intended to run until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any
case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inﬂation
consistent with its inﬂation aim” (European Central Bank, 2017). However, given that
forward Eonia rates for the ECB meeting in December 2017 stood about 8 basis points
above the Eonia spot rate of minus 0.35 percent in March 2017, money markets seem
7Noteworthy, the ECB began to implement forward guidance even before it exhausted the room for con-
ventional interest rate cuts. This contrasts with the usual practice of using forward guidance as a sup-
plement to further monetary easing at the zero lower bound.
8In fact, the high ﬂexibility that comes with the term “unitilised capacity” provides some kind of escape
clause that enables the ECB to keep its key policy rates at low levels despite an increase in inﬂation and
economic activity. Similar to the Fed’s experience, the rationale for this strategy can be traced back to
potential hysteresis eﬀects that may result from excessive slack in the economy.
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to expect the deposit rate to have been slightly increased by December 2017 (Reuters,
2017).
Empirical Facts Ultimately, the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance would have to be
assessed against the adjustments which are made to the economy by changes in mar-
ket prices. Due to a missing counterfactual, however, such an assessment is diﬃcult to
realize in practice. Therefore, most empirical studies focus on market reactions around
announcement dates. In this context, Table 4.1 displays an overview of the empirical es-
timates of forward guidance in the US and the euro area.9 Overall, these studies prove
that forward guidance had a statistically signiﬁcant but economically modest impact on
the selected economic variables in both jurisdictions.
Time-Inconsistency Issues A drawback of forward guidance under inﬂation targe-
ting is that the policy is subject to a time-inconsistency problem. The laĴer arises be-
cause eﬀective forward guidance requires that the central bank allows the inﬂation rate
to overshoot once the economy has recovered from the liquidity trap. This entails that
the central bank must accept a lower future policy rate than a standard forward-looking
Taylor rule based on the usual stabilization objectives would suggest. In other words:
the central bank must “promise to be irresponsible” (Krugman, 1998, p. 139); unfortu-
nately, rational households understand that a central bank with an inﬂation target lacks
a motive ex post to be as expansionary as it wanted them to expect ex ante and therefore
the stimulative eﬀects from pure ’open mouth policies’ are likely to be small.
Commitment Strategies One way to resolve the time-inconsistency problem is that
instead of a purely forward-looking inﬂation target, monetary policy pursues a price level
target (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Woodford, 2012). The crucial diﬀerence bet-
ween both strategies is that in response to a price level shock, a central bank with an
inﬂation target stabilizes the inﬂation rate, but accepts a drift in the price level. By con-
trast, under price level targeting, the central bank corrects the eﬀects of the shock on the
target path of the price level (cf. Figure 4.2). In case of an adverse price shock, howe-
ver, this means that the inﬂation rate must temporarily overshoot the envisioned trend
inﬂation (and vice versa for a positive price shock). Thereby, monetary policy becomes
history-dependent (Bundesbank, 2010). In terms of credible forward guidance, this might
contribute to the successful implementation of a lower future policy rate, because it ma-
9For empirical evidence on Sweden, see inter alia Rosenberg (2007); for New Zealand McDermoĴ (2016);
for the UK Hofmann and Filardo (2014); and for Japan Shirai (2013).
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Study Method Form of FG Key results
U.S.
Campbell
et al. (2012)
Time series regressions
on asset prices
Open-ended and
calendar-based
Large inﬂuence on 2- and 5-year Tre-
asury yields; strongest impact on 10-
year yield
Woodford
(2012)
OIS rates around an-
nouncements
Calender-based FlaĴening of OIS rates after “mid-
2013” and “mid-2014” announce-
ments
Raskin (2013) Time series regression on
option implied interest
rate distributions
Calender-based Percentiles out to 3-years became
unresponsive after “mid-2013” an-
nouncement
Swanson
and Williams
(2014)
Evidence from survey of
forecasters; time-series
regression on Treasury
and Eurodollar future
yields
Open-ended and
calendar-based
FG aﬀected beliefs about ZLB length
Hofmann and
Filardo (2014)
Event study and evi-
dence from futures-
implied volatility of
interest rates
Open-ended,
calendar-based,
quantitative
state-contingent
Futures rates and long-term yields
declined on most announcements,
volatility of interest rate futures fell
at short horizons
Giannone
et al. (2015)
Panel regression on pri-
vate interest rate fore-
casts
Calender-based FG announcements lower short-
term rates 4 quarters ahead by
15 bp, long-term rates by 20 bp,
raising 1 year GDP and inﬂation
expectations by 0.3 percentage
points
Swanson
(2015)
Time series regression Open-ended,
calendar-based,
quantitative
state-contingent
FG decreases Treasury yields as far
out as 10 years; boom in stock mar-
ket and depreciation of the dollar
EA
European
Central Bank
(2014a)
Event study on forward
interest rates and option-
implied interest rate dis-
tributions
Open-ended,
state-contingent
FG in July 2013 decreased forward
rates by 5 basis points at maturities
over six months. Dispersion of short
rate expectations declined with the
introduction of FG
Hofmann and
Filardo (2014)
Event study and evi-
dence from futures-
implied volatility of
interest rates
Open-ended,
state-contingent
FG in July 2013 decreased futures ra-
tes at the one- and two-year horizon
by 7 and 8 basis points, respectively
Picault (2017) Event study and time se-
ries regression on EO-
NIA OIS swaps
Open-ended,
state-contingent
FG lowered OIS rates for maturities
within 10 months and 3 years
Table 4.1.: Impact of Forward Guidance on Selected Variables
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Figure 4.2.: Inﬂation and price level targeting in response to a price shock
kes the necessary overshooting of the future inﬂation rate consistent with the monetary
policy rule.
An alternative approach to resolve the time-inconsistency issue of forward guidance
is to accompany the announcement of a lower future policy rate with an increase in du-
ration risk on the central bank balance sheet (see also section 5.2.1). The laĴer can be
achieved either through outright purchases of longer-term securities (quantitative ea-
sing), or through swapping short-term against long-term securities on the central bank’s
balance sheet (qualitative easing). Both measures could thus enhance the credibility of
the signal to keep policy rates lower for longer, since reneging on this promise would
cause a loss for the central bank (Clouse et al., 2003).10
Drawbacks and Criticism Even if the time-inconsistency problem could be resolved,
practical forward guidance might face other challenges: a widespread criticism is based
on the assumption of frictionless ﬁnancial markets and the permanent income hypothe-
sis. A somewhat related criticism casts doubt on whether the heavy dependence on the
expectations channel, i.e. promises that far future interest rates will have substantial ef-
fects on current economic conditions, do actually work in practice. Ultimately, forward
guidance will stimulate economic activity only if it changes private sector beliefs about
the central bank’s reaction function. If, however, private market participants think the
central bank has superior information about the true state of the economy, then a more
expansionary policy stance could even have adverse eﬀects, because it can lead to a
signiﬁcant deterioration in the economic outlook.11
10A valid objection to this strategy is that it is not immediately obvious why a central bank with the power
to print money should be overly concerned about balance sheet losses (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004).
11For forward guidance to have such unintended consequences, one has to assume rather strong informa-
tion asymmetries between the private sector and the central bank. Therefore, Woodford (2005a, 2012)
holds a rather sceptical view on whether such adverse eﬀects occur in practice.
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Thus, especially during crisis times – when uncertainty and credit constraints are ty-
pically on the rise – those conjectures may result in an overly optimistic view on the
stimulative eﬀects of forward guidance (McKay et al., 2016).
4.1.2. Quantitative vs. Qualitative Easing
While forward guidance rests primarily on shaping expectations, both quantitative and
qualitative easing also involve the manipulation of asset quantities available to private
agents (see Fig. 4.1). Since every quantitative operation is accounted for on the cen-
tral bank’s balance sheet, the textbook view (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Goodfriend,
2011) diﬀerentiates quantitative from qualitative easing by the respective eﬀect on the
central bank’s balance sheet (see Fig. 4.3).
Quantitative Easing Pure quantitative easing focuses on the quantity of bank reserves,
i.e. on the liability side of the central bank balance sheet. Therefore, the composition of
loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet is only inciden-
tal (Bernanke, 2009). Pure QE is thus characterized by an expansion of the monetary
base which, as a byproduct, leads to an increase in the conventional asset holdings on
the central bank balance sheet (see Fig. 4.3 left panel).12 The expansion in the monetary
base is mainly driven by commercial banks’ accumulation of excess reserves, since the
supply of banknotes is always endogenously determined by the currency demand of
the private sector. From a monetarist perspective, large excess reserves in the banking
system should trigger an increase in overall bank lending, in nominal income, and broa-
der monetary aggregates. However, such a money multiplier view on the transmission
mechanism of quantitative easing seems unconvincing, since broader monetary aggre-
gates like M3 have largely decoupled from the massive base money expansion since
2008. Instead, it seems more convincing that quantitative easing has acted through sta-
bilizing crisis-elevated spreads in distressed ﬁnancial markets, rather than through the
envisioned quantity eﬀects in terms of the money supply (Lenza et al., 2010).
Qualitative Easing Pure qualitative easing on the other hand focuses on the asset com-
position but leaves the size of the balance sheet untouched (see Fig. 4.3 right panel).
Since the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank’s ba-
lance sheet is the crucial feature of qualitative easing, it is sometimes also called credit
12In this context, “conventional assets” denote the typical assets held by the central bank in normal times.
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Figure 4.3.: Textbook view on quantitative vs. qualitative Easing ⋄ Source:
Own illustration based on Lenza et al. (2010)
policy in the literature. A typical operation involves a swap of low-risk short-term go-
vernments bonds (conventional assets) against risky private securities (unconventional
assets). The main goal is to reduce risk premia in private asset markets. Therefore, oﬃ-
cial credit policies are especially eﬀective if private credit markets are severely impaired
(and risk spreads elevated). A more detailed analysis of the ﬁnancial market and ma-
croeconomic eﬀects of both quantitative and qualitative easing is given in chapters 5, 8
and 9, respectively.
4.1.3. Taxonomy of Recent Monetary Policy Measures
Examples of Qualitative Easing A recent example for pure qualitative easing is the
Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) of December 2007. Although the eﬀects on total liqui-
dity were sterilized (i.e. the Fed’s balance sheet size remained constant, cf. left Panel of
Figure 4.4), TAF enabled the Fed to provide term funding to a broader range of counter-
parties and against a broader range of collateral thanwhat it accepted in its openmarket
operations (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010). From a qualitative
perspective, this is fairly similar to the Fed’sMaturity Extension Program (MEP) of 2011.
During this program, the Fed swapped short-term government bonds for long-term go-
vernment bonds. Overall, theMEP had a size of $400 billion andwas intended to reduce
longer-term yields.
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Figure 4.4.: Central bank asset positions (Fed vs. ECB) ⋄ Source: Fed, ECB,
Bloomberg
Another example of qualitative easing is the ECB’s Securities Market Program (SMP).
With this program, the ECB purchased euro area government bonds for a total amount
of e218 billion, but sterilized the resulting liquidity impact with speciﬁc ﬁne-tuning
operations. Since the purchases under the SMP were skewed towards the bonds of dis-
tressed euro area countries – about 50% of the SMP holdings are Italian bonds, followed
by Spanish and Greek bonds (20% resp. 16%) – the SMP constituted a form of credit ea-
sing for those countries.
Examples of Quantitative Easing As the ﬁnancial crisis intensiﬁed after the bankrup-
tcy of Lehman Brothers, the Fed decided to support credit markets more broadly and
initiated its ﬁrst large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) program in November 2008. By the
end of the program, the Fed had purchased assets worth of $1.75 trillion, whereof hou-
sing GSE debt and MBS accounted for more than 80 percent.13 The intention was to
“reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which
in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in ﬁnancial
markets more generally” (FOMC, 2008). Since the liquidity impact of the program was
not sterilized, it roughly doubled the size of the Fed’s balance sheet – which is why it is
commonly referred to asQE1 in the literature. This notion is misleading, however, since
the program’s priority to housing assets diﬀerentiates it from pure quantitative easing
as deﬁned above. Instead of pure quantitative easing – which the Bank of Japan pur-
sued from 2001 to 2006 by seĴing a target for current account balances on its liability
13The Fed enlarged its ﬁrst LSAP program in March 2009. The purchases ended in March 2010.
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side (Shiratsuka, 2010) – QE1 mingled features of qualitative easing (the composition
eﬀect) with quantitative easing (the size eﬀect).14
With respect to the euro area, the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) which
started in 2015 represents the clearest case of quantitative easing, although some of the
ECB’s earlier measures have already embodied similar features. For instance, a main
element of the ECB’s enhanced credit supportwas to switch its regular reﬁnancing opera-
tions from variable rate tenders with ﬁxed allotment to ﬁxed rate tenders with full allot-
ment (FRFA). As this resulted in an immediate expansion of excess reserves, this policy
had a similar eﬀect as pure quantitative easing. In this sense, the two 3-year LTROs of
2011 and 2012, which resulted in a net liquidity increase of about e520 billion as well
as a signiﬁcant increase in the ECB’s maturity structure, also resembled some form of
quantitative easing.
In summary it can be ascertained that during the pre-Lehman turmoil, unconventio-
nal operations represented variations on qualitative easing which were mainly geared
towards the liquidity conditions of ﬁnancial intermediaries.15 This changed in the post-
Lehman period. In the face of dramatically deteriorating economic conditions and with
no further scope for cuts in policy rates, central banks around the globe initiated unpre-
cedented expansions of their balance sheets (see Figure 4.5). The laĴer involved both
qualitative and quantitative easing in order to boost the eﬀectiveness in a situation of
extrememarket stress. Hence, Shiratsuka (2010, p. 83) concedes that the termQE should
be understood as a package of policy measures that make use of both the asset and the
liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet (broadly deﬁned quantitative easing).
4.1.4. Negative Policy Rates
Negative policy rates are the most recent addition to the unconventional monetary po-
licymeasures. Starting inmid-2014, the ECB, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), Danmarks
Nationalbank (DN) and the Swedish Riksbank have introduced negative policy rates
either by lowering the target for the overnight rate to below zero (SNB, Riksbank) or by
charging negative rates for the deposits at the central bank (SNB, DB, Riksbank, ECB).16
Moving the marginal policy rate into negative territory can serve multiple goals. It can
14In fact, Bernanke stressed that the Fed’s LSAPs should be best understood as a form of credit easing
(Bernanke, 2009).
15Bini Smaghi (2009) calls the ECB’s FRFA policy “endogenous credit easing” because the liquidity sup-
ply was passively accommodated to ﬁnancial intermediaries demand with the explicit aim to revive an
impaired European interbank market.
16In February 2016, the Bank of Japan also lowered the rate on its deposit facility to minus 10 basis points.
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Figure 4.5.: Central bank balance sheets as percentage of GDP ⋄ Measured
using quarterly data for nominal GDP ⋄ Source: Fed Fred, ECB, BOJ, Bloom-
berg
help accommodative monetary policy to reduce the real rate to levels consistent with
stable inﬂation and full employment, or oﬀset appreciation pressures on the exchange
rate. In fact, the motivation for negative policy rates diﬀered across the jurisdictions in
which they were implemented. While the SNB and the DB used negative rates prima-
rily to defend their exchange rates, the ECB, the Riksbank and the BoJ implemented
negative marginal rates mainly to achieve their inﬂation targets.
In principle, central banks can set interest rates on reserves at any arbitrary level, be-
cause there is nothing the banking system can do to avoid holding them (Borio, 1997a;
Borio andDisyatat, 2010). Consequently, central banks can even set negative rates for re-
serves. As commercial banks seek to avoid the costs of such reserve holdings, arbitrage
activities will transmit the negative rates also to other rates in the economy. Ultimately,
however, the capacity of central banks to implement negative rates is bounded by the
ability of private market participants to transfer their reserve holdings into cash. Then,
the direct costs associated with private cash holdings constitute the physical lower bound
for negative policy rates (McAndrews, 2015; Rognlie, 2016). Where exactly this physical
lower bound is depends on institutional factors like storage and insurance costs, which
might vary internationally. Contrary to the pre-crisis consensus, however, recent ex-
perience has shown that negative policy rates have eﬀectively removed the zero lower
bound on short-term nominal rates. In fact, rough estimates suggest that the physical
lower bound could go up to minus two percent, although this ﬁgure is subject to consi-
derable uncertainty (Jackson, 2015; Schmiedel et al., 2012).
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Figure 4.6.: Eﬀects of negative policy rates ⋄Marginal policy rates: certiﬁcate
of deposit rate for Denmark, repo rate for Sweden, deposit facility rate for the
euro area, and themidpoint of the target range for the 3-month Libor for Swit-
zerland ⋄Money market rates are the 3-month cash deposit rates ⋄Mortgage
rates are for ﬁxed rate loans with maturities between 5-10 years ⋄ Source:Na-
tional central banks, European Mortgage Federation, Datastream.
As displayed in Figure 4.6, modestly negative rates appear to have been transmiĴed
to money market and capital market interest rates largely in the same way as positive
rates – whereas the transmission to bank lending and deposit rates has only been par-
tial (Jensen and Spange, 2015). The reason is that most banks are still reluctant to charge
negative rates on retail deposits – presumably because they fear that retail depositors
are more inclined to shift into cash, which would squeeze an important funding source
for banks.17 This leaves the exchange rate as one of the main variables through which
negative policy rates might aﬀect the economy. Actually, it seems that the negative ra-
tes contributed to the stabilization of the Swiss franc, when the SNB, in January 2015,
17This relative stickiness of retail deposits can be explained as follows: ﬁrstly, households and small bu-
sinesses usually have lower excess liquidity and thus face lower storage and insurance costs than big
corporations. Secondly, zero nominal rates might constitute a psychological threshold for retail deposi-
tors (Alsterlind et al., 2015).
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abandoned the lower bound of its currency (which previously had been pegged at 1.20
CHF/EUR to curb an excessive appreciation of the franc). Given the complementary un-
conventional monetary policy measures, it is, however, very diﬃcult to disentangle the
precise impact of negative policy rates on ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables.
Potential Concerns about Negative Policy Rates Across all major advanced econo-
mies, the secular decline in both nominal and real long-term interest rates since the 1990s
has put a structural strain on the traditional proﬁts from ﬁnancial intermediation (Sum-
mers, 2015; Eggertsson andMehrotra, 2014). And while the average net interest income
of euro area households has been largely unaﬀected by the ECB’s accommodative po-
licy since 2008, as the lower interest payments havemainly redistributed resources from
net savers to net borrowers (ECB, 2016h), the downward rigidity of deposit rates may
further accelerate the concerns about bank proﬁtability – especially in an environment
of negative rates.
Thus, theremight be an eﬀective lower bound, where further rate cuts due to negative ef-
fects on bank proﬁtability risk to reverse the expansionary monetary policy stance. This
eﬀective lower bound could thus impose an earlier binding constraint for monetary po-
licy than the physical one associated with the opportunity costs of holding cash (Coeuré,
2016). Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) call this the reversal rate of interest. It constitutes a
threshold where bank proﬁtability starts to decline, thereby reducing capital accumula-
tion through retained earnings,whichmight trigger banks to eventually restrict lending.
Indeed, proﬁtability concerns seem to have induced Swiss, Danish and Swedish banks
to actually increase their mortgage market rates once the policy rates fell into negative
territory (see lower left panel in Figure 4.6).
This illustrates that, to the extent that banks cannot fully pass on negative rates to
depositors, diminishing bank returns can actually reduce the availability of credit. The-
refore, the real economic impact of lowering policy rates (further) into negative territory
is likely to bemoremodest than a similar-sized change in the positive sphere. Generally,
however, the extent to which bank proﬁtability declines is determined by the degree to
which banks’ funding costs also fall. Hence, the central bank could mitigate the costs
that drag on bank proﬁtability by raising the threshold at which the negative deposit
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rate applies.18 Albeit such reserve tiering enables further cuts into negative territory, it
also reduces the transmission of negative deposit rates to market rates.
Irrespective of any tiered reserve remuneration, however, bankswhose funding struc-
ture consists largely of retail deposits will suﬀer comparatively more from negative ra-
tes than those who focus on corporate banking. To compensate for such disadvantages,
classical retail banks might change their business strategies and oﬀer more fee-based
services or try to substitute retail deposits with cheaper but less stable wholesale fun-
ding. In doing so, however, they may undermine ﬁnancial stability.
Another frequently cited concern is that persistent low rates pose serious challenges
for pension and insurance funds, which would be exacerbated by negative rates. As
declining long-term yields tend to widen the negative duration gap between the assets
and liabilities of these institutions, the laĴer will be inclined to take on inappropriately
high risks (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Caballero et al., 2008; Becker and Ivashina, 2015). In
addition, any aĴempt to increase the duration of their asset positions will cause a furt-
her downward pressure on long-term interest rates (Domanski et al., 2015). Overall, this
points to the limits of negative policy rates over the long term. At some point, the policy-
makers’ concerns about shrinking bank proﬁts and ﬁnancial instability may outweigh
the beneﬁts from higher asset values and stronger aggregate demand.
Experience with Negative Interest Rates in the Euro Area Since the ECB, in June
2014, has begun to charge negative rates on its deposit facility, no signiﬁcant increase
in euro area cash hoardings can be observed. In addition, the positive eﬀects of lower
funding costs and higher asset values seem to outweigh the adverse eﬀects of reduced
interest rate margins on banks’ portfolios. That means so far that both the physical as
well as the eﬀective lower bound are beyond the current rate of the deposit facility (-0.4
percent).
With respect to credit availability, the ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS) reveals that
negative policy rates have led to a general increase in lending to households and non-
ﬁnancial corporations. In particular, negative rates are estimated to have contributed
about one percentage point to the pick-up in corporate lending growth since June 2014
(Rostagno et al., 2016). Moreover, the ECB’s Survey on Access to Finance for Enterpri-
ses (SAFE) documents an improvement in credit conditions for euro area small and
18In the Eurosystem, for instance, the e116 billion of required reserves are currently (June 2017) remune-
rated at the MRO rate of 0 percent, while aboute542 billion of excess reserves are subject to the negative
deposit rate of -0.4 percent. The SNB and the Riksbank also apply some kind of reserve tiering. For a
detailed overview, see Jobst and Lin (2016) and Bech and Malkhozov (2016), respectively.
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medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that started shortly after the introduction of negative
rates. Although this is of course a desirable eﬀect of monetary policy accommodation,
lending to smaller ﬁrms typically also entails a higher risk-taking for banks. In the ag-
gregate, however, the ECB does not see excessive risk taking to be caused by its negative
policy rate (Coeuré, 2016). Instead, at least two important factors have beneﬁted euro
area banks.
Firstly, the positive impact of negative rates on economic activity mitigated default
risks and reduced the debt servicing costs of borrowers. Since this improves banks’ cre-
dit quality, it facilitates lower risk provisioning. Secondly, lower interest rates lead to
capital gains on banks’ bondportfolios. Andﬁnally, the negative policy rates, by reinfor-
cing the ECB’s forward guidance and strengthening the portfolio rebalancing process,
supported the eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s asset purchase program (Heider et al., 2017).
Therefore, the ECB’s negative deposit rate has so far proven to be eﬀective in stabilizing
inﬂation and mitigating the overall level of risk in the euro area economy. If, however,
the period of negative rates persists much longer, the negative side eﬀects of diminis-
hing bank proﬁtability could eventually prevail.
4.2. Theoretical Foundations
The theoretical foundations for the eﬀectiveness of large-scale asset purchases by the
central bank critically deviate from the traditional ﬁnance viewwith its emphasis on the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure. More importantly, models involving the
portfolio balance eﬀect drop the assumption of perfectly ﬂexible, frictionless ﬁnancial
markets and allow LSAPs to have a direct impact on the risk premia of ﬁnancial assets.
Recently, the literature on limited participation and preferred habitat hasmade valuable
contributions in this ﬁeld. In particular, the seminal paper of Vayanos and Vila (2009)
oﬀers a rigorous formal model of the portfolio balance eﬀect that entails a mechanism
by which supply and demand factors may have an eﬀect on yields.
To illustrate the basic mechanisms, we will thus present a simpliﬁed, discrete-time
version of the Vayanos-Vila model, drawing in large parts on Altavilla et al. (2015), Ha-
yashi (2016), and Hamilton and Wu (2012).
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4.2.1. Preferred-Habitat Theory
In order to show that LSAPs can have an eﬀect on longer-term rates beyond the pure
expectations hypothesis of the term structure, Vayanos and Vila’s reformulation of the
old preferred-habitat theory departs from the standard assumptions of no-arbitrage as-
set pricing.19 Thus, the model includes two types of agents: risk-averse arbitrageurs and
preferred-habitat investors. The laĴer could be regarded as preferring particular maturi-
ties or having a special demand for safety.20 Yet if only preferred-habitat investors exis-
ted, asset markets would exhibit extreme market segmentation. Consequently, the role
of risk-averse mean-variance arbitrageurs is to bridge the segmented markets, thereby
rendering the term structure and asset markets essentially arbitrage-free.
Thus, with z(n)t as the nominal share of n-period zero-coupon bonds that arbitrageurs
choose to hold (relative to their net wealth), the risky per-period return on the bond
portfolio is given by
Rpf,t+1 ≡
N∑
n=1
R
(n)
t+1z
(n)
t =
N∑
n=1
P
(n−1)
t+1 − P (n)t
P
(n)
t
z
(n)
t
=
N∑
n=1
[
exp
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
− 1
]
z
(n)
t
⟨4.1⟩
where R(n)t+1 is the one-period return on a n-period zero-coupon bond, purchased for
the (log) price p(n)t at time t and sold at t + 1 for the (log) price p
(n−1)
t+1 . To account for
the diﬀerent risk characteristics of euro area government bonds, Altavilla et al. (2015)
extend the Vayanos-Vila framework by assuming that bonds, beyond interest rate risk,
are subject to time-variant credit risk, ψt,
ψt = γ′ft, ⟨4.2⟩
which itself is a function of the macroeconomic risk factors ft. Since the laĴer follow an
19The preferred-habitat theory goes back to the seminal work of Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and
Sutch (1966).
20In practice, pension funds may serve as an example for preferred-habitat investors, as they try to match
their structurally long-term liabilities with safe assets of equal duration.
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AR(1)-process of the form
ft = c+Φft−1 + ϵt, ϵt ∼ N(0,Ω), ⟨4.3⟩
and since all bond prices are an exponentially aﬃne function of these risk factors,
p
(n)
t = a¯n + b¯′nft, ⟨4.4⟩
optimization calculus of the marginal bond market investor yields (see Appendix B.3
for the detailed derivations)
φt = σ
N∑
n=1
(
z
(n)
t (b¯n−1 + γ)
)
. ⟨4.5⟩
This expression depicts the market price of risk. It is determined by arbitrageurs’ risk
aversion, σ, and by arbitrageurs’ bond holdings at diﬀerentmaturities, z(n)t , weighted by
the sensitivity of the bond price to macroeconomic risk factors, (b¯n−1 + γ). The crucial
diﬀerence between this speciﬁcation and most standard aﬃne term structure models
is that in the laĴer the risk price is taken as exogenous, whereas it is endogenously
determined according to equation ⟨4.5⟩.
If the short rate process represents the only risk factor, then long-term bond holdings
get a relatively larger weight in equation ⟨4.4⟩ than comparable short-term bonds, be-
cause the prices of long-term bonds react more strongly to ﬂuctuations of the short rate
than the prices of short-term bonds. Thus, the risk premium collapses to the standard
term premium reﬂecting solely interest rate risk. It is shown in the appendix B.3 that, in
this case, the term premium required by risk-averse investors to hold long-term bonds
equals
rp
(n)
t = R
(n)
t+1 − rt = b¯′n−1Ωσ
N∑
n=1
(
z
(n)
t (b¯n−1 + γ)
)
= b¯′n−1Ωφt, ⟨4.6⟩
which itself is a function of the market price of risk, φt. The intuition is that bonds with
a lower creditworthiness, i.e. with a high value of γ, command a higher compensation
per unit of risk, because these bonds show a higher sensitivity to changes in themacroe-
conomic risk factors, ft, and thus to the associated changes in the market-price of risk,
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φt. To gain further intuition, we follow Gai and Vause (2006, p. 169) and decompose the
factors determining the risk premium as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Quantity of Risk (b¯′n−1Ω) Price of Risk (φt)
Risk Premium / Term Premium
Macro Risk (Ωt)Risk Aversion (σ)
Risk Appetite
(
φ−1t
)
Figure 4.7.: Risk premium decomposition
At ﬁrst sight, it appears that variations in risk premia can occur for several reasons.
Risk aversion, however, is a deep parameter stemming from arbitrageurs’ preferences
over uncertain outcomes, which should be rather stable over time. If the quantity of
asset-speciﬁc risk does not vary either, ﬂuctuations in risk premia must reﬂect changes
in macroeconomic uncertainty, its associated changes in the risk appetite and, eventu-
ally, its eﬀect on the market price of risk. This is the central implication of equation
⟨4.6⟩: it states that the risk premium required by arbitrageurs equals the quantity of risk
(b¯′n−1Ω) times the market price of risk (φt).
On the other hand, the asset speciﬁc demand of preferred-habitat investors is given
by
ξ
(n)
t = α(n)
(
y
(n)
t − β(n)
)
⟨4.7⟩
with β(n) as the intercept of the demand schedule, y(n)t as the yield of a zero coupon bond
withmaturity n, and α(n) as a positive function of n. Speciﬁcally, α(n) denotes the price
elasticity of preferred-habitat investors, which exceeds that of risk-averse arbitrageurs
for bonds with particular maturities and/or certain risk proﬁles. Moreover, since the
bond market clearing condition requires that the supply of bonds S(n)t is met by the
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demand of preferred-habitat investors and arbitrageurs, it must hold that
S
(n)
t = ξ
(n)
t + z
(n)
t . ⟨4.8⟩
Rearranging ⟨4.8⟩ and substituting z(n)t in equation ⟨4.5⟩ yields
φt = σ
N∑
n=1
(
S
(n)
t − ξ(n)t
)
(b¯n−1 + γ). ⟨4.9⟩
Other things equal, this expression for the general market price of risk indicates that
central bank bond purchases, by reducing the supply of bonds on ﬁnancial markets,
compress required risk premia (cf. equation ⟨4.6⟩) and thereby also longer-term rates,
and this eﬀect increases with the bonds’ sensitivity to the macroeconomic risk factors.
Importantly, it also shows that the market price of risk is negatively dependent on
the demand of preferred-habitat investors. That is, the higher the price-inelasticity of
preferred-habitat investors for a particular bond, the higher will be the price increase
when the central bank buys that particular bond.
Since we discuss the eﬀectiveness of the APP with respect to yields, it is useful to ex-
press the arbitrageur’s optimality condition in terms of bond yields rather than required
risk premia. Hence, rewriting equation ⟨4.6⟩ in terms of the current bond yield, gives
y
(n)
t =
1
n
Et (rt + rt+1 + . . .) +
1
n
Et
(
γ′(c+Φft) + γ′(c+Φft+1) + . . .
)
+ 1
n
Et
(
(b¯′n−1 + γ′)Ωφt + (b¯′n−2 + γ′)Ωφt+1 + . . .
)
.
⟨4.10⟩
4.2.2. Related Transmission Channels
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation ⟨4.10⟩ depicts the signaling channel
of unconventional bond purchases, which can be inferred from the expected path of
future short-term rates. The second component reﬂects the portfolio balance channel, i.e.,
more precisely, the credit premium of bonds, as evident from the parameter γ. Notably,
a positive risk premium would also be required by risk-neutral investors, because of
the smaller expected payoﬀs of bonds with a low degree of creditworthiness. Finally,
97
4. Unconventional Monetary Policy – How Does it Work?
the third component reﬂects the premium that is required by risk-averse investors as a
compensation for a bond’s uncertain payoﬀ prior to maturity.
In this context, it should be seen that without the credit risk component (γ = 0), the
second component drops out and the portfolio balance channel collapses to the classic
duration risk channel. In other words, the general risk premium depicted in equation
⟨4.10⟩ can be understood as a compensation for the bond price ﬂuctuations that emanate
from the stochastic ﬂuctuations in the macro factors (credit risk and interest rate risk).
In this sense, the credit risk channel acts as an ampliﬁer to the duration risk channel.
Yield Curve Effects In order to gain further insight on how central bank asset pur-
chases aﬀect interest rates in this model, it is useful to distinguish two polar cases with
respect to arbitrageurs’ risk appetite. In the ﬁrst case, consider a very low level of ma-
croeconomic uncertainty, a high risk appetite of arbitrageurs, and, according to equation
⟨4.9⟩, a low general market price of risk in the economy. In this set-up, arbitrageurs acti-
vely trade bondswith diﬀerent risk proﬁles. If, for example, interest rate risk is assumed
to be the only risk factor for government bonds, long-term government bond yields are
determined by a term that can be interpreted as the average duration of arbitrageurs’
portfolios. This implies that central bank asset purchases of bonds with speciﬁc matu-
rities have an impact on the entire term structure, including maturities that are distant
from the speciﬁc sector hit by the shock. This is the so-called duration risk channel of
LSAPs, whose stylized eﬀect on the yield curve is displayed in Figure 4.8. As the credit
risk channel acts as an ampliﬁer to the duration risk channel, it generates the same stylized
yield curve eﬀects.21
In the other extreme, when heightened ﬁnancial market stress leads to excessive risk
prices, for instance because arbitrageurs face binding capital constraints, then arbitrage
activity becomes eﬀectively inhibited.22 Consequently, shocks to a particular maturity
remain local to that segment of the yield curve and do not change the term structure in
general. This is the local supply channel as outlined in Figure 4.9. Due to the preferred-
habitat demand for long-term bonds, the yield curve exhibits a humped-shaped form
as depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4.9.
In this respect, it has to be noted that the stylized term structure reactions of the dura-
21Given the stochastic nature of the credit risk component, the probability of a credit event increases with
the time to maturity. Of course, in a more realistic framework, the credit-risk intensity of government
bonds should be related to economic fundamentals (like the public debt ratio, for example).
22In a more realistic model, one could interpret arbitrageurs as banks. Then, arbitrage activity could be
modeled as a function of bank capital, for instance. For a DSGEmodel of the portfolio balance eﬀect that
incorporates banks, see section 8.4 or Gertler and Karadi (2011).
98
4.2. Theoretical Foundations
Figure 4.8.: Stylized eﬀect of the duration/credit risk channel ⋄ Own illustra-
tion based on Cochrane (2008) and Altavilla et al. (2015)
tion/credit and local supply channel are the two polar cases with respect to the arbitrage
activity of the marginal bond market investor. For more realistic intermediate realizati-
ons of arbitrage activities, however, central bank bond purchases will result in a convex
combination of those two eﬀects.
Figure 4.9.: Stylized eﬀect of the local supply channel ⋄Own illustration based
on Cochrane (2008) and Altavilla et al. (2015)
4.2.3. Concluding Remarks
The preferred-habitat model of the previous section can be viewed as a modern incar-
nation of the portfolio balance channel that Tobin has formulated already in 1969. The-
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reby, it combines important aspects of the Keynesian liquidity premium theory and
the market segmentation theory, while it maintains useful features of the now standard
arbitrage-free term structuremodels of Vasicek (1977) and Cox et al. (1985).23 An advan-
tage of the laĴer is that they can explain the continuous yield curve that is typical for
modern ﬁnancial markets, but which is at odds with the old preferred-habitat assump-
tion of totally disconnected bondmarkets (Li andWei, 2013). Furthermore,modern term
structure models include a unique stochastic discount factor that prices duration risk
consistently across the yield curve: since risk-averse investors require excess returns for
bearing duration risk, those models can explain why longer-term rates regularly exceed
the average future short rate. However, a shortcoming of arbitrage-free term structure
models, the CCAPM, and most workhorse DSGE models is that any change in the sup-
ply of bonds that is unrelated to economic fundamentals has no eﬀect on bond yields.24
This is precisely the crucial innovation of the limited participationmodel of Vayanos and
Vila (2009): although equilibrium spot yields can still be expressed as aﬃne functions
of common risk factors, changes in asset quantities do have an eﬀect on bond yields.
Policy Implications The limited participation assumption embedded in the preferred-
habitat theory of the term structure entails a risk premium that is a function of the risk
bearing capacity of the marginal bond market investor. Consequently, shocks to availa-
ble asset quantities aﬀect the term structure and constitute a determinant of bond yields
in addition to current and future short rates. This generates a rich set of implications for
the transmission of monetary policy. Most importantly, it provides the opportunity for
central bank purchases to aﬀect long-term yields through a direct impact on risk premia.
Whether and how these channels contributed to the eﬀectiveness of recent unconventi-
onal monetary policy measures will be the subject of the following chapters.
23See also Issing (2007, p. 135).
24Piazzesi and Schneider (2007a) examine quantity eﬀects in an otherwise standard CCAPM, whereby
changes in the relative supply of diﬀerent assets aﬀect households’ consumption and optimal portfolio
decisions. However, they ﬁnd only very weak quantity eﬀects on asset prices in this framework.
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5.1. Portfolio Balance Channels
One of the key implications of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure is that
monetary policy leaves risk premia completely untouched and aﬀects long rates solely
through its inﬂuence on short rates. This hypothesis contrasts with the portfolio balance
channel, which is regularly referred to by central bankers to be the main theoretical jus-
tiﬁcation for LSAPs. For instance, Bernanke in his speech given at the 2010 JacksonHole
Symposium, stated:
“I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases
work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance eﬀect. . . Speciﬁcally,
the Fed’s strategy relies on the presumption that diﬀerent ﬁnancial assets
are not perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, so that changes in the net
supply of an asset available to investors aﬀect its yield and those of broadly
similar assets (Bernanke, 2010, p. 9, italics added).”
The mechanism behind that channel can be described as follows: If the central bank
purchases a particular security, it reduces the amount of that security in the portfolios
of the private sector while simultaneously increasing the level of reserves. If private
portfolios were in equilibrium before the transaction, the central bank has to oﬀer a
higher price for the purchased security in order for private investors to be willing to sell
it. Put diﬀerently, central bank asset purchases bid up the price of an asset and lower
its yield. Subsequently, as investors try to re-balance their portfolios, they transmit the
yield eﬀect towards assets that are imperfect substitutes.1
1For empirical evidence on the portfolio balance eﬀect of LSAPs, see e.g. Gagnon et al. (2011b); Hamilton
and Wu (2012); Joyce and Tong (2012); D’Amico et al. (2012); Greenwood and Vayanos (2014).
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5.1.1. Duration Risk Channel
Duration Concept In order to explain the duration risk channel of central bank LSAPs,
ﬁrst it is necessary to understand the concept of duration more generally. As the basic
bond pricing equation ⟨5.1⟩ reveals, lower spot rates lead to higher bond prices. Simulta-
neously, however, lower spot rates decrease the ﬁnal value of the principal investment,
since the reinvestment rates of future coupon payments have deteriorated. The duration
of a bond thus signals the date when the present value eﬀect equals the income eﬀect of a
given interest rate change (Spahn, 2012).
To see this more clearly, recall that a coupon-bearing bond can be regarded as a port-
folio of zero-coupon bonds, where each coupon (cj) represents the face value of a zero-
coupon whose maturity corresponds to the time of the respective coupon payment,
while the ﬁnal zero-coupon with maturity n includes the principal (F ) of the coupon-
bearing bond. Then, the price of a coupon-bearing bond with n periods equals the port-
folio price, and the basic bond pricing equation ⟨5.38⟩ can be rewriĴen as
P
(n)
t =
n−1∑
j=1
cj
(1 + ij,t)j
+ cn + F(1 + in,t)n
=
n−1∑
j=1
cj(
1 + y(n)t
)j + cn + F(1 + y(n)t )n
⟨5.1⟩
where in the last row the potentially time-varying spot rates, ij,t, were substituted by the
bond yield y(n)t . This is a valid manipulation, if the coupons can be reinvested at a rate
equal to the constant yield to maturity. Then, the yield to maturity of a coupon-bearing
bond with maturity n is the constant interest rate that, when applied to all cash ﬂows,
justiﬁes the quoted price of a bond (Cochrane, 2001, p. 348). The sensitivity of bond
prices with respect to marginal changes in interest rates can be calculated by taking the
derivative of bond pricing equation, i.e.
∂P
(n)
t
∂y
(n)
t
= − 1
1 + y(n)t
n∑
j=1
j cj(
1 + y(n)t
)j ⟨5.2⟩
where it is assumed that the principal payment is included in the ﬁnal coupon payment.
Multiplying the above equation by minus one gives the general deﬁnition of duration:
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D = −∂P
(n)
t
∂y
(n)
t
= 1
1 + y(n)t
n∑
j=1
j cj(
1 + y(n)t
)j . ⟨5.3⟩
Note that in this deﬁnition of duration, discounting is donewith the constant bond yield
rate of interest – and not with potentially time-varying spot rates – yet the bond yield is
of course a function of the time-varying spot rates.
For zero-coupon bonds, time to maturity is an adequate measure for the length of
time a bondholder has invested money. For coupon-bearing bonds, however, maturity
is an imperfect measure of that length of time because coupon payments occur prior to
maturity. To remedy this deﬁciency, one can use the Macaulay duration.2 Using ⟨5.3⟩,
it can be calculated as
Dmac = D
(
1 + y(n)t
)
P
(n)
t
=
n∑
j=1
j cj(
1+y(n)t
)j
P
(n)
t
. ⟨5.4⟩
Keeping in mind that a coupon bond can be constructed as a portfolio of zero-coupon
bonds, Macaulay’s duration should be understood as the weighted average of the ma-
turities of the underlying zero-coupon bonds, where the weight on each maturity is the
present value of the corresponding zero-coupon bond using the yield of the coupon-
bearing bond as the discount rate. (Campbell et al., 1997, p. 403). To calculate an average,
this expression is then divided by the sum of the weights (which equals the bond price).
As a consequence, Macaulay’s duration is the only type of durationwhose units areme-
asured in time periods (usually years). This implies for zero-coupon bonds (c = 0) that
Macaulay’s duration equals maturity. For coupon-bearing bonds (c > 0), however, the
duration is less thanmaturity, because the investor receives payments prior tomaturity.
The inverse relation between duration and coupon rates might not be readily apparent
from equation ⟨5.4⟩, but can be easily inferred from basic economic reasoning: Macau-
lay’s durationmeasures the number of years required to recover the investment costs of
a bond. This time span declines with the coupon rate, because the more cash-ﬂows are
received in the short-term (due to higher coupon payments), the faster the investment
costs of the bond will be recovered. In other words, duration declines with the coupon
rate.
2After Macaulay (1938).
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Two other important properties of duration can be highlighted by plugging the
middle term of ⟨5.3⟩ into ⟨5.4⟩. This yields
Dmac = −∂P
(n)
t
∂y
(n)
t
(
1 + y(n)t
)
P
(n)
t
⟨5.5⟩
which expressesMacaulay’s duration as the negative elasticity of a coupon bond’s price
with respect to its yield (Campbell et al., 1997, p. 405). It underscores, ﬁrstly, that the
duration of a bond, for constant coupons, is inversely related to its yield. And secondly,
that for longer durations, marginal changes in yields generate stronger price eﬀects. To
sum up, duration risk comprises the following principles:
i. Duration is positively related to maturity: As maturity increases, bond pri-
ces become more sensitive to interest rate changes.
ii. Duration is negatively related to coupon rates: As coupon rates increase,
bond prices become less sensitive to interest rate changes.
iii. Duration is negatively related to interest rates. As interest rates rise, bond
prices become less sensitive to further interest rate changes.
Duration Risk and Asset Purchase Programs What has duration risk to do with the
portfolio balance channel of central bank asset purchases? This might be best explai-
ned by considering a monetary policy operation that shortens the average maturity of
the supply of bonds, but does not change the overall stock of bonds in the hands of
the public.3 In terms of the preferred-habitat model presented above, it shall be furt-
her assumed that arbitrageurs’ risk bearing capacity is high, implying a low degree of
asset market segmentation. Given these premises, the impact of such an operation on
the yield curve is illustrated in Figure 4.8. Following Cochrane (2008), the solid line in
Figure 4.8 depicts the change in the bond supply engineered by the central bank (S(n)t
in equation ⟨4.9⟩): it shows a reduction in the supply of longer-term bonds against an
equal increase in the supply of short-termbonds. As can be inferred from equations ⟨4.4⟩
and ⟨5.5⟩, respectively, long-term bonds are more prone to interest rate risk than short-
term bonds. Therefore, changes in the relative supply of long-term bonds aﬀect bond
3Evidently, this resembles the Maturity Extension Program carried out by the Fed between 2011 and
2012, where the Fed reduced the supply of long-term Treasuries against an equal increase in the supply
of short-term Treasury bills (see also section 4.1.3 – Examples of Qualitative Easing).
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yields and expected returns by altering the amount of aggregate duration risk borne by
arbitrageurs (see equation ⟨4.10⟩).
Interestingly, as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 4.8, the yields of allmaturities
decline, including the ones of short-term bonds, whose supply actually increases. The
reason for this downward shift of the yield curve is that local supply eﬀects are made
global through the trading activities of arbitrageurswho integrate the diﬀerentmaturity
markets. On the other hand, the ﬂaĴening of the yield curve results from the fact that
longer-term bonds carrymore duration risk than short-term bonds. Hence, reducing the
supply of longer-term bonds causes the price of that risk to decrease, which, according
to equation ⟨4.9⟩ and ⟨4.10⟩, leads to a decline in the term premium and hence a drop in
yields that increaseswith time tomaturity. It should be noticed, however, that Figure 4.8
simulates the duration channel only qualitatively. Consequently, quantitative empirical
evidence for this channel is reviewed in the subsequent paragraph.
5.1.1.1. Empirical Evidence for the US
Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) build on the preferred-habitat model of Vayanos and
Vila (2009) but formulate all of their hypotheses in terms of the low-risk-aversion case
of arbitrageurs. Thereby, they implicitly focus on the duration channel of bond supply
variations.4 In particular, they regress the spread of the 20-year Treasury yield to the 1-
year yield on the ratio of publicly available Treasurieswith remainingmaturities greater
than ten years. The laĴer is deﬁned as a maturity-weighted debt to GDP measure, but
SOMAholdings are not subtracted from their bond supply variable. Over a period from
1952-2007, Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) thus ﬁnd that a decrease of one standard
deviation in the share of Treasuries with maturities above ten years decreases the 20-
year yield spread by about 40 basis points.
Because of the diﬀerences in empirical methodologies and samples across studies, it
is diﬃcult to compare these results with other estimates in the literature. Nonetheless,
the estimates of Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) predict a signiﬁcantly smaller eﬀect of
recent LSAPs than most other studies in this ﬁeld.
Effects of US LSAPs The Fed, during its ﬁrst two rounds of QE, acquired $900 billion5
in Treasury bonds with an average maturity of approximately 6.5 years (see Table 1
4Other papers that found an eﬀect of Treasury supply factors on bond yields are, e.g., Dai and Philippon
(2006); KuĴner (2006); Garbade and Rutherford (2007); Greenwood and Vayanos (2010).
5$300 billion under LSAP1 and $600 billion under LSAP2
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in D’Amico and King, 2013, p. 429). Taking the corresponding duration to be 5 years
and GDP to be $14 trillion, the estimates of Greenwood and Vayanos suggest that those
operations lowered 20-year Treasury yields by about 13 basis points.6
While Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) use aggregate data on the amount of outstan-
ding Treasury debt, D’Amico et al. (2012) run a time-series regression using security
speciﬁc data, which enables them to subtract SOMA holdings from total public debt.
Moreover, their reﬁned data set allows them to infer detailed observations about both
the supply and duration channel of LSAPs. Based on a sample from December 2002 to
October 2008, they estimate that the duration eﬀect of the Fed’s ﬁrst two LSAPs lowe-
red the yields on 10-year Treasury bonds by about 22 basis points. More precisely, they
ﬁnd that the duration eﬀect of LSAP1 (which totaled $300 billion) lowered the 10-year
Treasury yield by 12 basis points, whereas LSAP2 (which totaled $600 billion) lowered
this yield by only 10 basis points.
At ﬁrst sight, it seems puzzling that the second program, despite being twice as large
than the ﬁrst, had a smaller impact on long-term yields – especially since the share of
Treasuries held by private investors exhibited a noticeably larger decline during the
second program (displayed in the top panel of Figure 5.1), while both programs had
a comparatively weak impact on average duration (see the lower panel of Figure 5.1).
One reason for this seemingly unintuitive result could be that arbitrageurs’ risk bearing
capacitywas unduly lowduring the ﬁrst program,which, consistent with the preferred-
habitat theory, would explain the diﬀerences in the relative eﬀectiveness across both
operations.
The time-series results of D’Amico et al. (2012) for the duration eﬀect of LSAP1 are
broadly in line with those of Gagnon et al. (2011b). Over a period from January 1985 to
June 2008, the laĴer run a monthly time-series regression and ﬁnd, after controlling for
business cycle factors and uncertainty about economic fundamentals, that the $300 bil-
lion in Treasury purchases lowered 10-year Treasury yields by about 12 basis points.7
6The bond purchases of $900 billion imply a reduction in the average duration of outstanding Treasury
debt of about 0.9× 514 ≈ 0.32 years (see Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014, p. 685). Since a reduction of one
standard deviation amounts to a reduction in average duration of about 1 year (and a corresponding
decline in 20-year Treasury yields of about 40 basis points), the programs’ impact on 20-year Treasury
yields equals 0.32× 40 ≈ 13 basis points.
7Gagnon et al. (2011b) document that LSAP1’s total volume of $1,725 trillion (including $1,25 trillion in
agency MBS and $175 billion in agency debt) equaled approximately $850 billion in terms of ’10-year
equivalents’ (or roughly 6 percent of 2009:Q4 nominal GDP). The concept of ’10-year equivalents’ is the
par amount of 10-year Treasury bonds that would have the same duration as the actual portfolio of
assets purchased. Mathematically, ’10-year equivalents’ are calculated as follows: 10-year equivalents =
par value of portfolio × average portfolio duration / duration of 10-year Treasury note. Since the $300
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Figure 5.1.: Privately-held nominal US Treasuries and average duration ⋄
The shaded areas indicate the ﬁrst two LSAPs programs in the US. ⋄ Source:
D’Amico et al. (2012, p. 431).
Besides their time-series study, Gagnon et al. (2011b) also use an event-study appro-
ach to evaluate LSAP1.With a one-daywindow around eight event dates (fromNovem-
ber 25, 2008 to November 4, 2009), they ﬁnd that the 10-year Treasury yield declined by
91 basis points. Scaled to the $300 billion in Treasury purchases, this implies a reduction
of 16 basis points.8 These ﬁgures are largely conﬁrmed by the event-study estimates of
Cahill et al. (2013), who, depending on the parameter speciﬁcation, quantify the du-
ration eﬀect of LSAP1 to lie between 11 and 23 basis points (when interpreted as an
billion of Treasury purchases roughly correspond to a $169 billion shock in terms of privately held 10-
year equivalents (or roughly 1.2 percent of 2009:Q4 nominal GDP; see Li and Wei, 2013, p. 28), the OLS
estimates of Gagnon et al. (2011b) imply that 10-year yields declined by about 12 basis points.
8Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), by using a subset of the event dates of Gagnon et al.
(2011b), ﬁnd only minor evidence for the duration channel of LSAP1. However, they ﬁnd positive evi-
dence for the prepayment risk channel of agency MBS purchases, which is essentially a sub-channel of
the duration risk channel.
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unexpected $300 billion purchase program), and that of LSAP2 between 1 and 14 basis
points.
The tendency that time-series estimates based on pre-crisis data generally lie below
the estimates obtained in event-studies, suggests that the former consistently underesti-
mate arbitrageurs’ risk aversion, and thus also underestimate the potential eﬀectiveness
of central bank asset purchases – especially during the heydays of a ﬁnancial crisis.
In order to prevent some caveats of time-series regressions – such as endogeneity
issues or small sample biases – Li and Wei (2013) estimate an arbitrage-free term struc-
ture model to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of US LSAPs. Using a sample fromMarch 1994
to July 2007 on the private holdings of Treasury securities and agency MBS, they ﬁnd
that the total $1,725 trillion asset purchases lowered 10-year Treasury yields by 99 ba-
sis points. Accordingly, the $300 billion Treasury purchases contributed with about 17
basis points to this decline in yields.9 It is notable that, in spite of the diﬀerent methodo-
logy and sample period of Li andWei (2013), their aﬃne term structuremodel generates
estimates that are in the same ballpark asmost event-study estimates (e.g. Gagnon et al.,
2011b; Cahill et al., 2013), yet diﬀer considerably from the evidence found in the time-
series literature (e.g. D’Amico et al., 2012; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014). This may
lend further support to the hypothesis that time-series studies understate the eﬀective-
ness of LSAPs during times of ﬁnancial strains.
Effects of US Maturity Extension Programs (MEPs) On September 21, 2011, the
FOMC announced its intention to extend the average maturity of its bond portfolio by
25 months to about 100 months by the end of 2012.10 To achieve this goal, the FOMC
purchased $400 billion of Treasury securitieswith remainingmaturities between six and
thirty years. In contrast to previous programs, however, the Fed did not issue reserve
to ﬁnance the purchases. Instead, the FOMC sold an equal amount of Treasury securi-
ties with remaining maturities between three months to three years, such that the MEP
changed only the composition, but not the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. In this regard
MEP was actually a new version of Operation Twist which had been implemented in
the early 1960s (a thorough review of this episode is given in the following paragraph).
Figure 5.2 depicts some preliminary descriptive evidence for the eﬀectiveness of MEP.
The white squares show the US Treasury yield curve one day before and the black
9If LSAPs are interpreted as a sequence of supply shocks, Li andWei (2013) ﬁnd somewhat smaller eﬀects
of LSAP1 (about 60 basis points for 10-year Treasury yields.)
10see the FOMC (2011a) press release.
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Figure 5.2.: US Treasury yield curves around MEP announcement date ⋄
Source: US Department of the Treasury
diamonds one day after the MEP announcement. As expected, yields of longer maturi-
ties experienced a downward shift, while the yields of shorter maturities did not move
signiﬁcantly in response to MEP. Indeed, the fact that yields up to three years show
almost no reaction to changes in the supply of bonds with corresponding maturities,
may reﬂect the close substitutability between short-term bonds and reserves at the zero
lower bound of the nominal interest rate.11
On June 20, 2012, the FOMCdecided to continue the initialMEP through the end of the
year at the same pace resulting in the purchase, as well as sale and redemption, of about
$267 billion of Treasury securities (see FOMC, 2012). The purchases, generally referred
to as MEP2 in the literature, were distributed across ﬁve maturity buckets using the
same approximate weights as that of the previous program (see Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, 2012).
Coupon-Bearing Treasury Securities by Remaining Maturity TIPS
6 – 8 Years 8 – 10 Years 10 – 20 Years 20 – 30 Years 6 – 30 Years
32% 32% 4% 29% 3%
Table 5.1.:Maturity distribution of US treasury purchases under MEP ⋄ The
10-year Treasury note is included in the 8 – 10 year sector. ⋄ TIPS weights
are based on unadjusted par amounts. ⋄ Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
11A very close inspection of Figure 5.2 in fact reveals that yields up to 3 years increased slightly, while
yields above 3 years decreased in response to the MEP announcement. This eﬀect might be driven by
the increase in the supply of bonds with maturities between 3 months and 3 years.
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Regarding MEP1, Hamilton and Wu (2012) ﬁnd that the program would have lowe-
red 10-year Treasury yields by 14 basis points while raising the 6-month yield by an
equal amount. These countervailing eﬀects on short- and long-term interest rates occur
only if short-term rates are away from the zero lower bound, however. Thus, in normal
times, by selling short-term bonds and purchasing long-term bonds, monetary policy
may succeed in ﬂaĴening the yield curve, but it has notmuchpotential in bringing down
the overall level of interest rates. This may change if short-term rates are at the zero lo-
wer bound, because selling short-term bonds has negligible eﬀects on yields in such an
environment. Accordingly, at the zero lower bound, Hamilton and Wu (2012) estimate
that purchasing $400 billion of long-term Treasury securities against an equal amount
of short-term securities (or reserves) could reduce 10-year rates by about 13 basis points
without raising short-term yields.
Indeed, when the Fed conducted the MEPs (2011–2012), the short-term policy rate
was at its zero lower bound. In addition, even at the start of the program, privatemarket
participants had liĴle reason to expect a rate increase in the near future, as the Fed on
August 7, 2011, i.e. one month before the announcement of MEP1, had warranted to
keep “exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013”
(FOMC, 2011b). That short-term rates reacted liĴle to the Fed’s MEP is veriﬁed by Li
and Wei (2013), who document that yields with maturities less than two years showed
no reaction, while 10-year Treasury yields declined by 25 basis points. The estimates
of Cahill et al. (2013) with respect to the duration eﬀect of MEP1 and MEP2 lie in a
range between 22 − 35 basis points and 4 − 18 basis points, respectively. Overall, the
empirical evidence seems to support the MEP’s eﬀectiveness in reducing longer-term
interest rates through the duration channel.Moreover, in terms of dollars spent, it seems
that MEP was equally eﬀective as LSAP1 and more eﬀective than LSAP2.
Effects of US Operation Twist in the 1960s The ’Operation Twist’ of the 1960s serves
as another natural experiment for the duration channel sketched out in Figure 4.8. In
1960-61, the US, as part of the BreĴon-Woods System of ﬁxed exchange rates, was facing
both a recession and a balance of payments deﬁcit. This constellation confronted the Fed
with a fundamental trade-oﬀ; from an internal perspective, the recession called for a
lowering of the short-term policy rate; externally, however, a lower US short-term rate
would have accelerated the capital outﬂow – especially since most European interest
rates were already higher than the concurrent US rates.
As a consequence, the incoming Kennedy administration persuaded the Fed to im-
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plement what came to be known as ’Operation Twist’. Besides its name, however, the
operation had nothing to do with the popular twist dance of the time. It was rather es-
tablished as a concerted action between the Fed and the US Treasury with the goal to
ﬂaĴen (to ’twist’) the yield curve. The idea was that domestic demand was primarily
determined by longer-term rates, whereas the balance of payments and international
gold ﬂows was driven by cross-country diﬀerentials in short-term rates.
Hence, the Fed began to sell oﬀ short-term notes and purchased longer-term govern-
ment bonds (see Figure 5.3), while the Treasury increasingly shortened the average du-
ration of newly issued government debt. Together, both policies shortened the average
Figure 5.3.: Fed holdings of US government securities ⋄ Dashed vertical li-
nes depict the period of Operation Twist. ⋄ Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Annual Reports, various years.
duration of government bonds in the hands of the public, which, according to the dura-
tion channel, should have lowered longer-term rates relative to short-term rates.12 And
indeed, the spread between long- and short-term yields declined moderately throug-
hout the course of the program (see Figure 5.4).
However, the empirical investigations by Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967) ﬁnd no
evidence that the changes in the maturity structure of government debt had any sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on long-term interest rates. Instead, Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967)
aĴribute the decline in the yield spread to the successive increases in ceilings on US
time deposits (Regulation Q). Since the lifting of interest rates under Regulation Q –
consistent with the preferred-habitat hypothesis – implied a relaxation of arbitrage con-
straints, it should have reduced the eﬀectiveness of Operation Twist on long-term inte-
12During the course of the program (from 1961-63), the Fed ultimately purchased about $8.8 billion of
longer-term bonds, while its short-term positions were reduced by about $7.4 billion (see Figure 5.3 as
well as Table 2 in Meulendyke, 1998, p. 40).
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Figure 5.4.:US government bond yields ⋄Dashed vertical lines depict the pe-
riod of Operation Twist. ⋄ Source: Federal Reserve, Datastream.
rest rates.13 Additionally, the declining yield spread could simply reﬂect the behavior
of the short-term rate, which was raised in line with the economic recovery that started
in April 1961 (compare the upward trend of the doĴed line in Figure 5.4).
Moreover, Solow and Tobin (1987) stress that the average maturity of outstanding
Treasury debt rose substantially right after the termination of Operation Twist. Thus,
debt management by the Treasury potentially undercut any eﬀects that could have fol-
lowed the relatively small intervention of the Fed. A similar argument is made by Tobin
(1974, pp. 32-33) and Bernanke et al. (2004), who claim that Operation Twist was too im-
persistent to have generated a signiﬁcant impact on longer-term rates. Based on this
evidence, the conventional view today is that Operation Twist was a rather unsuccess-
ful experiment of US economic policy.
In contrast to the conventional view, however, new research by Swanson (2011) sug-
gests that Operation Twist was more eﬀective than initially thought. Swanson argues
that low-frequency regressions – like the quarterly regression model of Modigliani and
Sutch (1966, 1967) – are not suitable for detecting interest rate movements based on
maturity manipulations of outstanding government bonds.14 Using a higher-frequency
event study approach, Swanson ﬁnds that Operation Twist had a statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on longer-term rates; concerning 10-year US Treasury yields, he estimates
that Operation Twist cumulatively lowered them by about 15 basis points. Nonethe-
13The pessimistic conclusions of Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967) were questioned by other studies, ho-
wever; see for example Wallace (1967) or Holland (1969).
14This suggestion is underscored by Holland (1969) who uses a higher-frequency (monthly) regression
model and ﬁnds a positive impact of Operation Twist on long-term US interest rates.
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less, Swanson agrees with the conventional view that Operation Twist had at best only
very moderate eﬀects on the activity of the US economy.
5.1.1.2. Empirical Evidence for the UK
Unconventional asset purchases in the UK diﬀered from the US LSAPs in various ways.
In January 2009, the Treasury Department authorized the BoE to set up an Asset Pur-
chase Facility (APF) to buy high-quality private sector instruments. Until July 2009, the
APF had thus purchased commercial papers, corporate bonds and asset-backed securi-
ties for about £3 billion (Bank of England, 2015). To shield the BoE balance sheet against
possible losses emanating from these securities, the APF was established as a separate
legal entity with comprehensive indemnity from the UK Treasury. This kind of explicit
ﬁscal backing is rather unique compared to other jurisdictions: neither the Fed nor the
ECB receives comparable insurance from ﬁscal authorities.
The aim of the APF was to promote credit creation and to increase liquidity in dis-
turbed ﬁnancial market segments. Initially, the purchases of private sector instruments
were ﬁnanced by issuing Treasury bills, that is, qualitative easing. Even at the outset, ho-
wever, the Treasury indicated the possibility that the facility could turn into an explicit
monetary policy instrument, namely by ﬁnancing purchases with reserves instead of
Treasury bills. On March 5, 2009, the MPC decided to use this option and announced a
reserve-based purchase program of £75 billion of UK Treasury bonds (gilts). In doing
so, the BoE eﬀectively moved from qualitative easing to quantitative easing.
Since then, gilt purchases have been gradually expanded over time: the ﬁrst asset pur-
chase program (APF1) ﬁnally amounted to £200 billion,while a second program (APF2),
which was conducted from October 2011 to July 2012, added another £175 billion. Then
in August 2016, amid uncertainty over the ’Brexit’ process and concerns about inﬂation
and economic growth, the MPC decided to reactivate its gilt purchases by £60 billion
and to purchase corporate bonds up to £10 billion (Bank of England, 2016). Hence, the
BoE’s total stock of gilts sums up to £435 billion, representing approximately 25% of the
free ﬂoat of gilts (as of July 2016).
Effects of APF Due to the forward-looking nature of ﬁnancialmarkets,most of the im-
pact of asset purchases on yields is likely to occur when expectations are formed, rather
than when the purchases are actually made. Therefore, the BoE’s repeated recourse to
the asset purchase facility since 2009 casts doubt on the applicability of event-studies, at
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least for later announcements of this monetary policy tool. The reason is that once mar-
ket participants learned how the BoE used asset purchases conditional on the state of
the economy and the outlook for inﬂation, they began to expect upcoming operations
ahead of the formal announcements. As a consequence, if asset purchases are widely
anticipated, event-studies that conﬁne the assessment around formal announcements
risk to underestimate the overall impact of such programs.
Arguably, however, the initial asset purchase announcements contained enoughnews
to justify an event-study approach. In this respect, the movement of the UK gilt yield
curve aroundMarch 05, 2009 is quite striking (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6). Within a two-day
Figure 5.5.: 10-year gilt yield ⋄ Source: Datastream, Bank of England.
Figure 5.6.: Gilt spot yield curves around APF1 (March 05, 2009). ⋄ Source:
Datastream, Bank of England.
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window around the announcement date, medium- and long-term yields fell between 40
and 90 basis points (see also Meier, 2009). These observations are broadly in line with
other empirical estimates of the BoE’s asset purchase scheme. Joyce and Tong (2012),
for example, conducted an event-study around the six announcements for APF1 listed
in Table 5.2.
Date Event Description
Feb. 11, 2009 MPC InﬂationReport: strong indication of an upcoming asset purchase program (MPC,
2009d).
Mar. 05, 2009 MPC statement: announcement to purchase £75 billion in gilts with remaining maturi-
ties between 5 and 25 years ﬁnanced by reserve creation. Additional announcement to
lower the policy rate from 1% to 0.5% (MPC, 2009e,a).
May 07, 2009 MPC statement: announcement to extend asset purchases facility by £50 billion to $125
billion (MPC, 2009f).
Aug. 06, 2009 MPC statement: announcement to extend asset purchase facility by another £50 billion
and extension of eligible maturities to a minimum residual maturity of 3 years (MPC,
2009b).
Nov. 05, 2009 MPC statement: announcement to extend asset purchase facility to £200 billion (MPC,
2009c).
Feb. 04, 2010 MPC statement: announcement to maintain the amount of the asset purchase facility
at £200 billion. If conditions warrant, indication of possible further extensions (MPC,
2010).
Table 5.2.: Event dates for APF1 ⋄ Source: Joyce and Tong (2012).
Using intraday data on the whole cross-section of gilts,15 they ﬁnd that medium- and
long-term yields on average declined by about 98 basis points.16 As shown in Table 5.3,
while the impact of asset purchases declined over time, longer-term yields generally
declined more than short-term yields. Other things equal, this appears to be positive
evidence for the duration risk channel, which operates when the decline in yields is
monotonically increasing with maturity. On the other hand, Table 5.3 also reveals that
the bulk of the yield reaction is skewed towards giltswith remainingmaturities between
15 and 20 years (-119 resp. -116 basis points), whereas yields with maturities above 25
years declined by only 84 basis points. Given that the BoE acquired a relatively big share
of gilts in the maturity segment of 15 and 20 years, this points to a more signiﬁcant
impact of the local supply channel. Based on the dataset of Joyce and Tong (2012), the
following simple cross-sectional regression aĴempts to shed further light on the relevant
15Joyce and Tong (2012) compile a dataset using gilt price quotations from Tradeweb (an online trading
platform for ﬁxed income securities) with a frequency of ﬁve minutes.
16Calculated as the average sum of the last row in Table 5.3, excluding securities with remainingmaturities
below ﬁve years (the second column).
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UKT, 5% UKT, 4.75% UKT, 4.75% UKT, 5% UKT, 4.75% UKT, 4.5%
Date 2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2042
Feb. 11, 2009 -35 -34 -30 -17 -17 -15
Mar. 05, 2009 5 -47 -45 -77 -74 -44
May 07, 2009 -4 -10 -7 -10 -9 -6
Aug. 06, 2009 -4 -12 -14 -27 -28 -28
Nov. 05, 2009 7 10 10 7 6 5
Feb. 04, 2010 4 5 6 5 5 4
Sum of dates -26 -88 -81 -119 -116 -84
Table 5.3.: Yield changes around APF1 event dates (basis points) ⋄ The win-
dows around the respective event dates comprise timeperiods between 1 hour
and one day. ⋄ Source: Tradeweb; Joyce and Tong (2012, p. 362), Table 3.
transmission channels of APF1
∆y(gilti) =
3∑
j=1
βjLSi,j + β4DURi. ⟨5.6⟩
Following Joyce and Tong (2012), LSi,j is a three-dimensional vector capturing the local
supply channel, whereas the variable,DURi, tries tomeasure the duration risk channel.
The ﬁrst variable measuring the local supply channel is an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if a speciﬁc gilt is included in the purchase range and zero otherwise. Since
the inclusion of a gilt into the purchase range is expected to lower its yield, the regression
coeﬃcient should carry a negative sign. The second variable takes the value of 1 if a gilt
was added to the purchase range in the latest policy announcement, -1 if itwas excluded,
and zero otherwise. Since gilts that have been newly added to the purchase range are
expected to experience a relative strong decline in yields, its coeﬃcient should carry a
negative sign. The third variable, the duration gap, is the diﬀerence in years between the
duration of a gilt that is not included in the purchase range and the gilt with the closest
duration that is included in the purchase range. Under the premise that the duration gap
is a proxy for substitutability across gilts, yields should decrease with the duration gap.
Finally, if the duration risk channel maĴers, changes in yields will increase in duration,
that is, the coeﬃcient β4 in regression ⟨5.6⟩ is expected to carry a positive sign.
Table 5.4 summarizes the regression results, andwhile all signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have
the expected sign, the estimates further suggest that the local supply channel was more
important than the duration channel for the BoE’s ﬁrst asset purchase program. The
relatively strong impact of the more narrow local supply channel is conceivable at le-
ast on two grounds. Firstly, at this early stage of the ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁnancial markets
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Change in yields (bp) Feb. 11, 2009 Mar. 05, 2009 Aug. 6, 2010
Constant -19.8*** -18.1** -3.1
Purchase range† (β1) -14.1*** -14.8** -8.7**
Newly eligible (β2) n/a -19.4*** -5.0***
Duration gap (β3) 0.3 3.1** -0.3
Duration (β4) -0.1 -2.0*** -0.7***
Number of obs. 30 32 35
Adj. R2 0.91 0.96 0.85
Table 5.4.:Regression estimates for key announcements ofAPF1 (basis points)
⋄ Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and
*10 percent level ⋄ †In the case of the February announcement, this denotes the
expected purchase range. ⋄ Source: Bank of England, Joyce and Tong (2012, p.
367).
were still heavily impaired. Secondly, the BoE, during the course of APF1, acquired ap-
proximately 30% of the free ﬂoat of gilts (see also Table 5.5). In other words, limits to
arbitrage and the sheer size of the asset purchase scheme are likely to have contributed
to the relative importance of scarcity-related channels.
Maturity range 3-10 years 10-25 years above 25 years
40% 50% 15%
Table 5.5.:APF1 size relative to the free ﬂoat of gilts ⋄ Source: UK Debt Mana-
gement Oﬃce, Bank of England
Although the methodological issues render it diﬃcult to come up with a robust es-
timate for the relevant transmission channels, the study by McLaren et al. (2014) aĴri-
butes between 42–62% of the total variation in gilt yields to the local supply channel.
Since the duration risk channel in turn accounts for about 32–38%, they conclude that
the duration channel played only a subordinate role during APF1.17
In addition, McLaren et al. (2014) also assess the BoE’s subsequent asset purchase
facility (APF2). For the announcement on February 09, 2012, they document that the
duration channel actually led to a rise in longer maturity gilt yields. According to the
logic of the duration channel, this means that the BoE acquired less aggregate duration
risk than market participants had previously expected.
17Breedon et al. (2012) conﬁrm this result by showing that even though the BoE acquired long duration
assets, the maturity of outstanding debt rose, as the DMO was issuing an even larger proportion of
longer-term gilts.
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5.1.1.3. Empirical Evidence for the Euro Area
A detailed event study assessing the eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s asset purchase program
is given in chapter 6. There, we ﬁrstly ﬁnd that the large-scale asset purchases substanti-
ally lowered the government bond yields of various euro area countries, while showing
signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerences. Secondly, the program involved rather strong spil-
lover eﬀects to other asset classes. Overall, this leads to the conclusion that the duration
and credit risk channel were amongst the dominant transmission channels of QE in the
euro area.
5.1.1.4. Policy Implications
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, central banks around the globe have acquired long-
duration assets by issuing central bank reserves. Other things equal, this should have
lowered the amount of aggregate duration risk in the hands of the public. With less dura-
tion risk to be held in the aggregate, market participants in turn should require a lower
premium to hold that risk, causing bond prices to rise and yields to fall. Moreover, the
duration channel predicts that oﬃcial asset purchases lead to a downward shift of the
entire yield curve, even if the central bank accompanies the decrease in the supply of
long-term bonds with an equivalent increase in the supply of short-term bonds (see Fi-
gure 4.8). Since in this event the amount of aggregate duration in the market also decrea-
ses, the yields of all bonds decline, including the ones of short-termbonds,whose supply
increases. Nevertheless, with long-term bonds being more exposed to duration risk than
short-term bonds, central bank asset purchases should lead to a larger reduction of the
yields on long-term bonds, thereby shrinking the term spread. Put diﬀerently, when the
central bank removes a given amount of duration risk by purchasing ten-year bonds, it
could achieve the same eﬀect by purchasing a smaller amount of thirty-year bonds.
Another important issue is whether the duration channel is conﬁned to a particular
asset class (e.g. sovereign bonds), or if its yield impact spills over to other ﬁxed-income
markets (e.g. corporate bonds). Based on the preferred-habitat theory laid out in section
4.2, the answer critically relies on the behavior of the marginal bond market investor.
In principle, if the demand of preferred-habitat investors is limited to sovereign bonds,
then sovereigns should experience a stronger price eﬀect than corporates. If, however,
limits to arbitrage are not prohibitively high, marginal bond market investors will acti-
vely respond to the relative yield changes and actively re-balance their portfolios. Con-
sequently, LSAPs of even a few speciﬁc bonds aﬀect the risk pricing and termpremia for
118
5.1. Portfolio Balance Channels
a wide range of securities. If no other frictions exists, i.e. investors have no special pre-
ferences for any particular type of assets, then the duration channel implies that ﬁxed-
income securities with identical risk-proﬁles should all be equally aﬀected by central
bank LSAPs.
This statement has to be qualiﬁed somewhat with respect to LSAPs in the euro area.
Here, the signiﬁcant heterogeneity across euro area sovereign bonds with the samema-
turity is likely to be explained by the diﬀerent degrees of credit risk (see Table 6.3). In
principal, this implies that, in order to maximize the APP’s overall eﬀectiveness, asset
purchases in the euro area should be geared towards the jurisdictions with the lowest
credit quality. However, since this would fall in the realm of monetary ﬁnancing of
Member States, the share of purchases is determined by the ECB’s capital key.18 Nota-
bly, this analysis oﬀers the following lessons for the implementation of LSAPs:
i. LSAPs have a stronger eﬀect on yields of longer durations.
ii. LSAPs aﬀect the yields of all nominal assets, including sovereign bonds,
corporate bonds, and asset-backed securities.
iii. The heterogeneous eﬀects of the LSAPs on euro area sovereign yields are
largely driven by the credit risk channel.
5.1.2. Local Supply Channel
Conceptually, it is possible to separate the duration channel from the local supply chan-
nel by means of the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs. While an important feature of
both channels is the assumption of imperfect asset substitutability, for the local supply
channel to work, market segmentation must be suﬃciently high. Under such circum-
stances, an asset purchase program that shortens the maturity structure of potentially
risk-free bonds generates a relatively large drop in the yields of the targeted maturity
segment (or asset class), because the central bank must pay a high excess bond price for
preferred-habitat investors to be willing to sell them. The stylized eﬀect of such a local
supply channel is displayed in Figure 4.9.
Although longer-term yields do decline considerably, in contrast to the duration risk
channel (cf. Figure 4.8), short-term yields actually increase as a result of the larger sup-
18With respect to the four countries considered above, this means that approximately 26% of the monthly
purchases are geared towards German bonds, 20% towards French bonds, 17% towards Italian bonds,
and 13% towards Spanish bonds (ECB, 2017).
119
5. Transmission Channels of Unconventional Monetary Policies
ply in private markets.19 Hence, the local supply channel does not necessarily focus on
maturity-dependent risk, but deals with instrument-speciﬁc, idiosyncratic risk premia
that reﬂect supply and demand imbalances for a particular security. This can be further
illustrated by decomposing the long-term bond yield y(n)t into
y
(n)
t = y
(n)
rn,t + tp
(n)
t
= y(n)rn,t + tp
(n)
risk,t + tp
(n)
instr,t.
⟨5.7⟩
In general, the n-period yield of a default-free government bond consists of the average
future short-term rate, y(n)rn,t, and the term premium, tp
(n)
t . Aswill be discussed in section
5.2.1 in more detail, the evolution of y(n)rn,t is associated with the signaling channel of
LSAPs. The term premium, however, can be further speciﬁed by decomposing it into
a maturity-speciﬁc term premium, tp(n)risk,t, and an instrument-speciﬁc term premium,
tp
(n)
instr,t. The ﬁrst component is related to interest rate risk and captures the duration risk
channel. The laĴer, by measuring supply and demand imbalances for a particular secu-
rity, reﬂects the local supply channel of LSAPs.
For example, if some investors have a special demand for long-term, essentially
default-free government bonds, then these investors view government bonds as imper-
fect substitutes for alternative bondswith similar duration. Ceteris paribus, government
bond purchase programs thus create a shortage of safe bonds in private markets. As a con-
sequence, the prices of safe bonds soar and the risk spread to defaultable bonds moves
in excess of the risk premium implied by the standard capital asset pricing model. This
paĴern, which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) coined the safety channel of
LSAPs, is illustrated in Figure 5.7.
The straight dashed line shows the bond price according to the consumption based
asset pricingmodel (see section 3.2 for a detailed explanation of the pricing kernel in the
C-CAPM). It depicts an inverse relation between the bond price and the underlying de-
fault probability. The distance between the C-CAPM-line and the lower curve reﬂects
the safety premium that originates from clientele’s demand for bonds with marginal
default risk. Following the empirical ﬁnding of Longstaﬀ et al. (2005), the cutoﬀ for
safe bonds is assumed to lie at the investment-grade threshold (BBB rating in the S&P
classiﬁcation,meaning at least Credit Quality Step 3 in the Eurosystem’s harmonised ra-
19Note however that the increase in short-term yields should be subdued if at the zero lower bound, short-
term bonds andmoney became close substitutes. For amore detailed discussion on this point, see section
8.4.
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Figure 5.7.: Price impact of the safety channel
ting scale (CommiĴee of European Banking Supervisors, 2017)).20 When a central bank
engages in a LSAP program, it reduces the supply of long-term safe assets remaining
in the market. Therefore, private investors face an aggregate shortage of safe assets and
their willingness to pay for a unit of safety increases. As a result, the safety premium on
government bonds shifts upwards. The laĴer is depicted by the upper doĴed curve in
Figure 5.7.
In principle, such local supply eﬀects can occur for a variety of reasons. For instance,
if investors have strong preferences for speciﬁc maturities (e.g. pension funds with a
speciﬁc demand for long-term bonds), then LSAPs lower the yields on that part of the
yield curve above and beyond the eﬀect implied by standard asset pricing models. In
such an event, an asset purchase program that shortens the supply of bondswith speciﬁc
maturities cause the yield curve to exhibit a hump-shaped form as depicted in Figure
4.9. Once again, this should clarify the distinction between the duration channel and the
local supply channel. The duration channel operates independently of preferred-habitat
investors, as the total quantity of duration risk is a common risk factor even if asset
prices are determined solely by arbitrageurs. In otherwords, the ﬁnding that asset prices
20Notably, the investment-grade threshold also represents the minimum credit quality for assets eligible
as collateral in the ECB’s credit operations. The ECB has lowered this credit threshold from A- to BBB-
in October 2008 (ECB, 2008). With the exception of ABS, the investment-grade threshold also applies to
the securities acquired under the corporate sector purchase program (ECB, 2015a).
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depend on supply shocks does not suﬃce to prove the preferred-habitat hypothesis. A
beĴer test for the preferred-habitat hypothesis is whether persistent local supply eﬀects
exist. Economic theory would predict that a persistent local supply eﬀect can exist only
within distressed ﬁnancial markets, as these states are typically characterized by a low
risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs. The following sections try to assess whether this
hypothesis is valid by reviewing the empirical evidence in the US, the UK, and the euro
area.
5.1.2.1. Empirical Evidence for the US
Using US-Treasury data from 1926-2008, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
show that a one-standard-deviation reduction in Treasury supply from its historical
mean lowers the yields on long-term Treasuries relative to Baa-corporate bonds by 77
basis points. In a subsequent study, the authors then assess to what extent the safety
channel contributed to the yield eﬀect within the Fed’s ﬁrst and second LSAP program,
using both an event study and a time-series approach (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011).
Event Studies In the event study approach, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011) assess the impact of LSAP1 and LSAP2 around the following event dates:21
Program Date Event Description
LSAP1 Nov. 25, 2008 FOMC statement: ﬁrst announcement of the intention to buy $500 billion
agency MBS and $100 billion of agency debt (FOMC, 2008).
Dec. 01, 2008 Bernanke speech: indication that the Fed could buy Treasuries and provide
a liquidity backstop for certain ﬁnancial markets (Bernanke, 2008).
Dec. 16, 2008 FOMC statement: decision to lower the target range for the federal funds
rate to 0-0.25 percent. In addition, announcement that the Fed stands re-
ady to expand ongoing asset purchases, considers purchasing longer-term
Treasuries, and implements the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Faci-
lity to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses
(FOMC, 2008).
21As already argued elsewhere, in the event study literature, there is an inherent trade-oﬀ with respect
to the window size. SeĴing it too short involves the risk of missing lagged asset price reactions; set-
ting it too long can distort the results by measuring asset price eﬀects that are unrelated to the policy
event. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) choose a two-day window size. One reason for this
relatively long window is that they consider low-liquidity assets, such as agency MBS. Another reason
is motivated by the idea that, at least during LSAP1, ﬁnancial markets were severely impaired, which
should cause a delay in the yield response that is larger than in normal times.
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Jan. 28, 2009 FOMC statement: 75 basis point decrease in the discount rate plus rene-
wed emphasis that the Fed stands ready to further expand its balance sheet
(FOMC, 2009a).
Mar, 18, 2009 FOMC statement: increase in the size of LSAP1 to a total of $1.25 trillion
for agency MBS, $200 billion for agency debt, and decision to include $300
billion of longer-term Treasuries (FOMC, 2009b).
LSAP2 Aug. 10, 2010 FOMC statement: ﬁrst announcement indicating that LSAP2 will focus on
longer-term Treasuries instead of agency bonds and agency MBS as in
LSAP1. In addition, commitment that the Fed maintains its balance sheet
size by reinvesting the principal payments from agency debt and agency
MBS into Treasuries (FOMC, 2010a).
Sep. 21, 2010 FOMC statement: announcement that Fed is “prepared to provide addi-
tional accommodation if needed to support economic recovery” (FOMC,
2010b, emphasis added).
Table 5.6.: Identiﬁed policy events for LSAP1 and LSAP2.
Concerning LSAP2, especially the September announcement was interpreted by
manymarket participants as an indication of further large-scale purchases of long-term
government bonds. For example, a survey on private sector economists conducted by
the Wall Street Journal in early October 2010 found that the Fed was expected to buy
$750 billion in Treasury bonds (Hilsenrath and Cheng, 2010). Those expectations were
then largely met when the Fed, on November 3, 2010, decided to purchase an additio-
nal amount of $600 billion in longer-term Treasury bonds.22 Table 5.7 summarizes the
overall yield changes of Treasury bonds, GSE agency bonds, and agency MBS for both
programs.
Since Treasury and agency debt bonds are both ultimately backed by taxpayer mo-
ney, they carry essentially no default risk (i.e. they are equally safe). Therefore, any
yield diﬀerentials between Treasuries and agency bonds that have the same maturity
must be due to the securities’ diﬀerent liquidity characteristics. The reason is that LSAP
programs ﬁnanced by reserves reduce the liquidity premium that Treasuries command
over agency bonds. That is, the liquidity eﬀect rises the yield on Treasury bonds relative
to agency bonds, which runs counter to the yield eﬀect of the safety channel. As a con-
sequence, agency bonds experience the strongest yield eﬀect in table 5.7 (in the case of
10-year agency bonds, 200 basis points for LSAP1, and 29 basis points for LSAP2). In ad-
22The November announcement is thus excluded from the event study, since its results were already ex-
pected by market participants, i.e. it did not entail any ’news’ about the monetary policy stance.
123
5. Transmission Channels of Unconventional Monetary Policies
Treasury yields Agency debt yields Agency MBS
(constant maturity) (Fannie Mae) yields
Date 30-yr 10-yr 5-yr 30-yr 10-yr 5-yr 30-yr 15-yr
LSAP1 Nov. 25, 2008 -24 -36 -23 -57 -76 -57 -72 -88
Dec. 1, 2008 -27 -25 -28 -52 -67 -50 -14 12
Dec. 16, 2008 -32 -33 -15 -37 -39 -26 -26 -16
Jan. 28, 2009 31 28 28 33 28 27 31 20
Mar. 18, 2009 -21 -41 -36 -31 -45 -44 -27 -16
Sum of dates -73* -107** -74 -144** -200*** -150*** -107* -88
LSAP2 Aug. 10, 2010 -8 -14 -10 -8 -13 -9 -4 -8
Sep. 21, 2010 -13 -16 -10 -14 -16 -10 -4 -5
Sum of dates -21*** -30*** -20*** -22*** -29*** -20*** -8 -13**
Table 5.7.: Two-day yield changes around LSAP1 and LSAP2 event dates ⋄
Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and
*10 percent level ⋄ Source: Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
dition, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) estimate that the signaling channel
had a maximum impact of −40 basis points for LSAP1 and −11 basis points for LSAP2
(for a further explanation on the signaling channel, see section 5.2.1).23
Furthermore, compelling evidence for the duration risk channel is found neither for
LSAP1, nor for LSAP2. Hence, for the ﬁrst program, the safety channel accounts for a
reduction in 10-year agency yields of about 200−40 = 160 basis points, and 107−40 = 67
basis points for 10-year Treasuries.
Interestingly, for reasons discussed below, the eﬀects of LSAP2 on yields are consis-
tently below the eﬀects of LSAP1. Despite the lower overall eﬀectiveness of the second
program, however, Table 5.7 reveals that the safety channel was also among the primary
channels within LSAP2. With a signaling eﬀect of 11 basis points and only minor evi-
dence for the liquidity channel (as there is essentially no diﬀerence between Treasury
and agency bonds of the same maturity), the safety premium accounts for a decline in
10-year agency bonds of about 29− 11 = 18 basis points, and 30− 11 = 19 basis points
for 10-year Treasury, respectively.
Time-Series Regressions As noted above, especially in times of heightened uncer-
tainty in ﬁnancialmarkets, the forecast precision ofmarket participants about the outco-
mes of LSAP announcements might be severely impeded. Nevertheless, the traditional
23The estimates are based on the evaluation of federal funds future contracts. Unfortunately, data on fe-
deral funds future contracts exist only up to two years. To estimate the signaling eﬀect for longer ho-
rizons, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) extrapolate the two year eﬀect, and they found a
maximum impact for the 10 year horizon. This constitutes an upper bound on the signaling eﬀect, since
market expectations for longer horizons should anticipate a normalization of current short-term rates.
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event study of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) rests upon the assumption
that market participants are fully capable to interpret central bank announcements –
implying that actual asset purchases are rendered irrelevant for determining the prices
and yields of ﬁnancial assets. Given these caveats, the quantitative results from the tra-
ditional event study of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) should be treated
with caution.
As a robustness check, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) therefore com-
pare their event study estimates with estimates from a time-series regression. Based
on the intuition presented in Figure 5.7, they regress the Baa-Treasury spread on a
maturity-based measure of the Treasury supply. The measure for the Treasury supply
is denoted by LONG-SUPPLY and includes all Treasury bonds with a remaining ma-
turity of 2 years or more.24 The regression equation, estimated using annual data from
1949 to 2008, is thus given by
Yield Spreadt = controlst + β (LONG-SUPPLYt/GDPt) + ϵt. ⟨5.8⟩
The yield spread between Treasury bonds with marginal default probability and Baa-
rated corporate bonds includes both a default risk premium and a safety premium.
While the ﬁrst is driven by the standard arguments for idiosyncratic risk compensa-
tion, the laĴer is due to the demand of preferred-habitat investors for particularly safe
assets. To disentangle the default risk premium from the safety premium, the regres-
sion thus includes as default control variables a measure for stock market volatility (the
standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the preceding year) and, as a proxy
for the yield curve, the diﬀerence between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month
money market yield.25
The estimated β coeﬃcient equals−0.83, indicating that as expected a decrease in the
supply of safe assets results in an increase in the Baa-Treasury spread.26 In terms of 10-
year equivalents, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) document that LSAP1
has removed $169 billion of Treasury bonds, $72 billion of agency bonds, and $573
24For the regression to be comparable across diﬀerent purchase programs, the measure LONG-SUPPLY
is computed in “10-year equivalents”. The concept of 10-year equivalents for evaluating LSAP was ﬁrst
introduced by Gagnon et al. (2011a). For further details on the calculation method, see the explanations
given in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).
25To address a potential endogeneity problem, LONG-SUPPLY in equation ⟨5.8⟩ is instrumented by the to-
tal supply of government debt. The instrument’s relevance is conﬁrmed by a simple regression showing
a highly signiﬁcant relation between total debt and the measure of long-term debt (see Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, for details on the instrumental variable estimation).
26The corresponding t-value equals −5.83.
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of agency MBS. Since, however, agency MBS carry prepayment risk, only Treasuries
and agency bonds are counted as safe bonds. Given the information that the pre-LSAP1
supply of 10-year equivalent safe bonds stood at $1,983 billion and GDP at $14,292 bil-
lion, LSAP1 has decreased the LONG-SUPPLY/GDP measure to 1,742/14,292. It thus
follows that LSAP1 through the safety channel led to a −0.11 basis points decrease in
the Treasury-Baa spread.
LSAP2 was implemented under diﬀerent conditions. Firstly, once the Fed had ter-
minated LSAP1, expansive ﬁscal measures led to a signiﬁcant re-rise in the amount of
privately held Treasury debt (see the upper panel in Figure 5.1). Since, in addition, the
average duration of outstanding Treasury bonds increased (see also the lower panel
in Figure 5.1), the supply measure for 10-year equivalent safe bonds at the beginning of
LSAP2 stood at $4,181 billion. Secondly, however, during LSAP2 the Fed removedmore
safe bonds from the market than with LSAP1 ($511 vs. $241 billion). According to this
metric, the LONG-SUPPLY/GDPmeasure for LSAP2 thus equals 3,670/15,230, implying
that the Treasury-Baa spread fell by −20 basis points.
Comparing the event study and time-series results for the safety channel, it is striking
to note that for LSAP1 the regression estimates are signiﬁcantly below the event study
estimates (11 vs. 67 basis points), whereas for LSAP2 they are almost identical (20 vs.
19 basis points). A possible explanation could be that the regression model is estima-
ted using annual pre-crisis data (1949 to 2008), i.e. for an average demand for safety,
whereas LSAP1 was conducted at times when the demand for safety was extraordina-
rily high (2008-2009). In contrast, the LSAP2 was implemented under more normalized
market conditions (2010, see also Figure 6.1). Therefore, the time-series estimates for
LSAP1 are likely to understate the program’s true eﬀectiveness, while the estimates for
LSAP2 seem to be more appropriate to measure the safety channel.
Panel Regressions Beyond the structural problems illustrated above, time-series re-
gressions on the yield eﬀects of LSAPs suﬀer from various other problems. Firstly, they
are likely to suﬀer from endogeneity problems that are typical for any estimation of
the relation between prices and quantities. Secondly, most studies in this ﬁeld regress
constant-maturity yields on aggregate data of Treasury debt. By relying on aggregate
data, however, most of these studies ignore that supply eﬀects can vary across diﬀe-
rent types of securities. Finally, time-series regressions based on the aggregate level of
outstanding Treasury debt have diﬃculties separating the local supply channel from
alternative channels through which Treasury purchases may aﬀect yields. To address
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those caveats, D’Amico and King (2013) propose a panel-regression using security-level
data instead of aggregate data and constant-maturity yields. This more granular appro-
ach allows them to analyze local supply eﬀects conditional on security-speciﬁc charac-
teristics such as maturity or liquidity. The general regression speciﬁcation is given by
R
(n)
i = γ0qi,0 +
J∑
j=1
γjqi,j + ϕ(n) + ϵi ⟨5.9⟩
whereRi denotes the gross return on any individual Treasury iwith a remainingmatu-
rity ofn. The variable qi,0 represents the quantity of security ipurchased under the LSAP
program, while qi,j represents its nearby substitutes. The parameter γ0 thus measures
the own-price elasticity of Treasury i, while the parameters γj , . . . , γJ reﬂect the cross-
price elasticities with respect to potential substitutes. Furthermore, ϕ(n) is a smooth
function of n and captures both the signaling channel as well as the duration channel
of LSAP. To address potential endogeneity problems, D’Amico and King (2013) run a
cross section two-stage least square estimation. In the ﬁrst state, they instrument the
level of purchases using pre-LSAP information. In doing so, they account for the pos-
sibility that the Fed might have preferred to purchase undervalued securities during
the LSAP program, which would have caused biased estimation results. In the second-
stage regression, they thus use the instrumented purchases from the ﬁrst stage as the
exogenous variables and the cumulative change in a security i’s gross return as the en-
dogenous variable. The second-stage regression is thus given by
R
(n)
i = γ0qˆi,0 + γ1qˆi,1 + ϕ0 + ϕ1ni + ϕ2n2i + ϵi ⟨5.10⟩
where hats indicate instrumented variables and n is the remainingmaturity as ofMarch
17, 2009. Furthermore, only the quantity of near substitutes, qˆi,1, i.e. Treasuries having
a remaining maturity within two years of the security i’s maturity, are included.
Concerning the $300 billion of Treasury purchases under LSAP1, D’Amico and King
(2013) estimate that the local supply eﬀect had an average eﬀect on Treasury yields of
about −30 basis points, with its main impact at intermediate maturities (as much as
50 basis points for bonds with remaining maturities between 10-15 years). This disper-
sion of yields across maturities is relatively large compared to historical regularities.
Regarding the transmission process of LSAP1, the observation that intermediate yields
declined more than long-term yields supports the view that the local supply channel
was more important than the duration channel.
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This conjecture may be conﬁrmed by the results of Meaning and Zhu (2011), who
adopt the methodology of D’Amico and King (2013) to both the Fed’s second round of
QE and to its ﬁrst maturity extension program of 2011-2012. For LSAP2 (MEP1), they
ﬁnd that average yields due to the local supply channel decreased by about 21 (22) ba-
sis points. Given that the Fed purchased double the amount of Treasuries under LSAP2,
this underscores the conjecture that LSAP1 was relatively more eﬃcient than LSAP2.27
Once more, this empirical result supports the theoretical predictions of the preferred-
habitat theory: since LSAP2 and MEP1 were conducted during times of improved risk
bearing capacity by arbitrageurs (less market segmentation), its yield impact must have
been lower compared to LSAP1. Finally, it should be noticed that although the quan-
titative estimates on the local supply channel vary to some extent conditional on the
econometric methodology, all the qualitative evidence seems to be largely consistent
with the insights from economic theory.
5.1.2.2. Empirical Evidence for the UK
Concerning the BoE’s ﬁrst asset purchase program (APF1), probably the clearest evi-
dence for the local supply channel is documented by Joyce et al. (2011a). Following equa-
tion ⟨5.7⟩, they deconstruct the term premium of a n-period government bond into
tp(gilt)(n)t = tp(gilt)
(n)
risk,t + tp(gilt)
(n)
instr,t, ⟨5.11⟩
where the ﬁrst component, tp(gilt)(n)risk,t, captures the duration risk of gilts, while
tp(gilt)(n)instr,t captures instrument speciﬁc supply and demand imbalances (the local sup-
ply channel).28Additionally, to isolate the signaling channel of LSAP, they use interest rate
data on overnight index swaps (OIS) based on the average overnight rate for unsecured
transactions in the Sterling market (SONIA).29 Under the assumption that OIS rates, as
27In fact, the $600 billion in Treasury purchases may understate the real size of LSAP2, as the Fed also rein-
vested the principal payments it received from previous programs. Taking those payments into account,
the Fed purchased approximately $750 billion in long-term Treasury debt during the course of LSAP2.
28In principle, the instrument-speciﬁc component of the term premium also involves the liquidity pre-
mium. But Joyce et al. (2011a) ﬁnd no material relationship between APF1 and the liquidity channel.
29In an OIS contract, swap partners exchange ﬁxed interest rate payments for variable rate payments over
the life of the contract. The variable rate is usually derived from the interbank overnight rate of the OIS
currency. Thus, OIS yields reﬂect market expectations about the future course of the short-term interest
rate. At maturity, the swap is seĴled by computing the diﬀerence between ﬁxed rate payments and the
average of the variable rate payments on the notional swap principal. Since swap partners only exchange
net interest diﬀerentials at maturity but no principal, OIS contracts carry neither default nor liquidity
risk.
128
5.1. Portfolio Balance Channels
derivatives contracts, are not aﬀected by supply constraints in the government bond
market, i.e. tp(OIS)(n)instr,t = 0, the yield on a maturity-matched n-period OIS contract is
given by
y(OIS)(n)t = y
(n)
rn,t + tp(OIS)
(n)
risk,t ⟨5.12⟩
where the average future short-term rate, y(n)rn,t, akin to equation ⟨5.7⟩, captures the
signaling channel of LSAP. This includes that the term premium component of the
gilt yield reﬂecting duration risk is the same as in the maturity-matched OIS-rate, i.e.
tp(gilt)(n)risk,t = tp(OIS)
(n)
risk,t, such that subtracting equation ⟨5.12⟩ from ⟨5.7⟩ yields
y(gilt)(n)t − y(OIS)(n)t = tp(gilt)(n)instr,t. ⟨5.13⟩
The gilt-OIS spread thus represents a proxy for the local supply channel associated with
instrument-speciﬁc supply and demand imbalances in the gilts market.
Figure 5.8 depicts the cumulative one-day changes in Gilt-OIS spreads for the four
signiﬁcant event dates listed in Table 5.2 (Mar. 05, May 07, Aug. 06, and Nov. 05, 2010).
What seems to be remarkable here is the relatively strong and persistent decline in bond
yields with residual maturities between 5 and 25 years (highlighted by the gray area in
Figure 5.8). In fact, this eﬀect has prevailed even after the theMPC statement of Aug. 06,
2010, where the maturity range for gilt purchases was extended to a minimum residual
maturity of 3 years. The resulting hump-shaped yield curve suggests limited arbitrage
and market segmentation in this maturity range, which in fact resembles preĴy well
the stylized local supply channel depicted in Figure 4.9. At the same time, however, the
yield curve on Nov. 06, 2010 seems to suggest that over the course of APF1, arbitrage in
the gilt has gradually recovered over time.30 Irrespective of this gradual recovery, Joyce
et al. (2011a) estimate that the local supply eﬀect of APF1 has reduced 10-year gilt yields
by about 55 basis points.
Compared to other studies, the estimates by Joyce et al. (2011a) constitute the up-
per bound. The cross-sectional study of Meaning and Zhu (2011) for example ﬁnds an
average downward eﬀect on 10-year gilt yields of about 27 basis points, while McLaren
et al. (2014) estimate an intermediate eﬀect of 48 basis points.31 Given this high disper-
30A supporting factor for the pick-up in arbitrage activity could be the BoE’s gilt lending program. Initia-
ted in August 2009 in cooperation with the UK Debt Management Oﬃce (DMO), this program allowed
private market participants to obtain gilts from the APF’s portfolio in return for a fee and the placement
of alternative gilts as collateral. Hence, the overall level of the APF’s gilt holdings remained unaﬀected.
It seems that the lending facility relieved frictions in the gilt market that arose because the APF’s gilt
purchases had led to a shortage of certain gilts in the the open market (Bank of England, 2010).
31Using changes in the auction maturity sectors in BoE’s subsequent rounds of asset purchases, McLaren
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Figure 5.8.: Cumulative changes in Gilt-OIS spreads since February 10, 2009.
⋄ Source: Joyce et al. (2011a, p. 132).
sion of estimates, it is hard to come up with conclusive evidence about the relative eﬃ-
ciency of the various purchase programs. However, the fact that the BoE, during APF1,
acquired approximately 32% of the free ﬂoat of gilts, while the treasury purchases of
LSAP1 and LSAP2 accounted only for about 5%, respectively 7% of total privately held
government debt, suggests that APF1 was less eﬀective in lowering yields than the two
Fed programs. This relative eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent programs with respect to the
local supply eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 5.9.
5.1.2.3. Empirical Evidence for the Euro Area
Arguably, the main impacts of QE in the euro area came from duration and credit risk ef-
fects, while the local supply channel played only a marginal role (see also section 5.1.1.3).
To further test this conjecture, the timing of events in the ECB press conference on Janu-
ary 22, 2015, oﬀers an interesting case study.32 At 14:40 ECT, Mario Draghi announced
that the existing private sector asset purchase program (including ABSPP and CBPP2)
would be expanded by a large-scale asset purchase program for public sector bonds
(PSPP). And while the combined average monthly purchases were speciﬁed at e60 bil-
et al. (2014) argue that the local supply channel can explain about one half of the total impact of the BoE’s
APF on gilt yields. Moreover, their result seems to suggest that the impact of the local supply eﬀect did
not decrease during the later rounds of recent LSAPs.
32Initially, this exercise has been proposed by Altavilla et al. (2015).
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Figure 5.9.: Eﬀectiveness of local supply channel across US andUK ⋄ Program
sizes are calculated as the purchase volume of sovereign bonds relative to
the free ﬂoat of sovereigns at the beginning of each program. ⋄ Source: Cited
studies, Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Department of the Treasury (2016),
Table OFS-2, United Kingdom Debt Management Oﬃce (2016).
lion, the programwas intended to run until September 2016.33 Under this premise, mar-
kets should have inferred from the announcement that the ECBwas going to buy public
sector bonds for about e893 billion (i.e. e47 billion per month).34 Given that previous
market expectations hovered arounde500 toe600 billion (Kennedy and Speciale, 2014;
Reuters, 2015), the January PSPP announcement clearly came as a positive size shock to
market participants.
A similar observation can be made with respect to the PSPP’s expected maturity
range. Here, survey data suggests that prior to the announcement market participants
33To be precise, the length and therefore also ultimate purchase volume of the program was made con-
ditional on the evolution of the euro area inﬂation rate. At the outset, I assume that the program was
expected to be terminated in September 2016.
34With respect to the breakdown of themonthly purchases between public and private sector assets, Mario
Draghimentioned that “What you could look at is basically the past behavior [of purchases under CBPP3
and ABSPP] as inference for the future behavior of our purchases” (see ECB, 2015d). Since the average
monthly purchases under ABSPP and CBPP3 equaled aboute13 billion, markets should have perceived
that the ECB would buy public sector assets for about (60− 13)× 19 = 893 billion.
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expected the ECB to buy euro area government bonds with residual maturities of 2-
10 years.35 That means when Mario Draghi, during the press conference on January
22, 2015, announced at 15:10 ECT that the ECB was going to buy bonds with residual
maturities of 2-30 years, this represented a positive maturity shock for bond market in-
vestors. By using high-frequency data on German sovereign yields, Figure 5.10 tries to
disentangle these two eﬀects of the PSPP announcement.
Figure 5.10.: High-frequency response of German sovereign yields to PSPP
announcement (January 22, 2015). ⋄ The white squares (black triangles) de-
note the yield response to the size (maturity) shock. ⋄ Source: Datastream.
Interestingly, the high-frequency reaction of German sovereign yields, in contrast to
the reaction of British gilt yields depicted in Figure 5.8, is generally inconsistent with the
predictions from the local supply channel. Firstly, according to the narrow predictions
of the local supply channel, bond yields above 10 years should not have reacted to the
size shock of the policy announcement, as investors had no reason to believe that the
ECB would buy bonds with remaining maturities above that threshold. Instead, howe-
ver, as shown by the white squares in Figure 5.10, yields above 10 years fell broadly in
line with those of 10 year maturity bonds. Secondly, the maturity shock at 15:10 ECT
should have led to an increase in yields below 10 years, because it meant that less bonds
would be purchased in this maturity range. Instead, what can be observed by the black
triangles in Figure 5.10 is that yields below 10 years either did not move signiﬁcantly, or
35In particular, Altavilla et al. (2015, p. 33) document a survey conducted among money market partici-
pants in December 2014, which gives the following results for the expectedmaturity buckets of the PSPP:
2-10 years for J.P. Morgen; 5-10 years for Goldman Sachs, and 3-10 years for Nomura.
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even slightly decreased relative to the white squares.36 In fact, the entire German yield
curve experienced a downward shift in response to the PSPP announcement – and this
eﬀect increased with time to maturity – which is precisely the reaction predicted by the
duration channel (see Figure 4.8). Hence, this supports the view that the local supply
channel did not play a dominant part for German sovereign bonds. At ﬁrst, this might
seem surprising, given that German sovereign bonds are highly safe and thus relatively
scarce compared to other euro area bonds. Yet if the local supply channel is negligible
for German bonds, one can fairly assume that is close to irrelevant for QE as a whole.
5.1.2.4. Policy Implications
The empirical evidence for the local supply channel is clearly consistent with the
preferred-habitat theory presented above. The laĴer states that if arbitrage is limited
and investors have an instrument-speciﬁc demand for a given asset, then central bank
purchases of that asset will cause a local price eﬀect.37 But although limits to arbitrage
increase this local price eﬀect, they also eﬀectively decrease potential spillover eﬀects to
alternative assets.38 Under such conditions, monetary policy should thus not only buy
assets in distressedmarkets, but include awide range of securities in order to ease overall
lending rates. Moreover, the predictions of the local supply channel might be relevant
for the unwinding of LSAPs. Given its counter-cyclical eﬀectiveness, selling-oﬀ assets
should have a relatively lower impact on yields when market conditions normalize.
5.1.3. Reserve Channel
The seminal model of Vayanos-Vila presented in section 5.1 contains neither a banking
sector nor does it include any special role for reserves.39 Instead, central bank asset pur-
chases are conceived as exogenous variations in the supply of long-termassets. Yetwhen
a central bank conducts LSAPs in practice, it pays for the acquired assets by issuing re-
serves – and this reserve expansion per se can be an integral part in the transmission
process of LSAPs.
36Also inconsistent with the local supply channel is the relatively large drop in yields of bonds with re-
maining maturities below 2 years, as these bonds were not eligible under the PSPP.
37The same holds true of course for investor-speciﬁc maturity demands.
38Consistently, this channel had a signiﬁcant impact on early rounds of QE – especially in the US and the
UK – but played only a miniscule part in the euro area.
39In this respect, the Vayanos-Vila model resembles Woodford’s cashless economy (see Woodford, 2003,
ch. 3.2).
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The Model A model that accounts for such a reserve-induced liquidity eﬀect on pri-
vate sector balance sheets is presented by Christensen and Krogstrup (2016a). The aut-
hors built a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a central bank and splits the
private sector into non-banks and banks. Thereby, the authors shed light on the role
of reserves in the transmission process of LSAPs to bond yields. Critically, the model
assumes that only banks have access to reserve accounts with the central bank, which
gives rise to two distinct portfolio balance eﬀects: at ﬁrst, there is a classical supply-
induced portfolio balance eﬀect resulting from the reduced supply of the purchased assets
to the private sector.40 The second, the so-called reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect,
runs through banks’ reactions to the reserve expansion but is independent of the assets
purchased.
Bond Market Another critical assumption of the model is that long-term bonds and
reserves are imperfect substitutes, while reserves and deposits are regarded are per-
fectly substitutable. With a notional value of one, those assumptions generate a term
premium for long-term bonds given by
tp = 1− PL. ⟨5.14⟩
In the model, this term premium arises because selling long-term bonds prior to matu-
rity involves uncertainty about the achievable price. As this is not the case for deposits
which can be readily transferred into money whenever needed, investors demand a
term premium for holding long-term bonds.41
Central Bank To mirror current LSAPs, it is assumed that the central bank buys (and
holds) only long-term bonds (BCBL ).42 The balance sheet identity of the central bank is
thus given by
PLB
CB
L = ECB +R. ⟨5.15⟩
40This can be either the duration or local-supply channel as presented in the previous sections.
41Besides this term premium, long-term bonds carry neither a liquidity premium nor a credit premium.
If long-term bonds carried a liquidity premium, as they do in the model of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), for instance, increasing the supply of reserves would reduce the liquidity premium
on long-term bonds. Allowing for such a liquidity premium would thus reduce the term premium in
equation ⟨5.14⟩ accordingly.
42This reduced formmodel is meant to highlight the reserve-induced portfolio channel on long-term bond
yields. A more realistic version of the model, in which the central bank holds also short-term securities,
is laid out in the Appendix B.4. As will be shown, however, the reserve-induced portfolio channel might
also work if LSAPs comprise only short-term bonds.
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where the central bank’s liabilities consist of equity (ECB) and reserves (R). As the cen-
tral bank ﬁnances its bond purchases by issuing reserves, it follows that dR = PLdBCBL .
Therefore, the change in the central bank’s equity position is given by
dECB = dPLBCBL + PLdBCBL − dR ⟨5.16⟩
meaning that changes in ECB are only driven by changes in the bond price:
dECB = dPLBCBL . ⟨5.17⟩
This implies that LSAPs expose the central bank to interest rate risk.43
Non-Banks By assumption, the balance sheet size of the non-bank sector (pension
funds, money market mutual funds, hedge funds etc.) is predetermined by a given
amount of equity,ENB ; and while non-banks do not issue any kind of debt, they hold a
combination of bonds (BNBL ) and deposits (DNB) as assets. Furthermore, deposits (and
reserves) pay no interest in the model, which can be justiﬁed on the ground that LSAPs
are typically conducted when short-term rates are zero. Thus, the balance sheet identity
of the aggregate non-bank sector equals
PLB
NB
L +DNB = ENB. ⟨5.18⟩
Consequently, changes in non-bank equity are the residual of the ﬂowbudget constraint
dENB = dPLBNBL + PLdBNBL + dDNB. ⟨5.19⟩
Note that non-banks do not hold reserves directly. Instead, they hold deposits with the
banking sector that represent readily available (indirect) claims on central bank reserves.
Another important assumption of this model is that non-banks cannot issue neither
new debt nor equity, which implies that the sole possibility for a non-bank to get new
deposits is to sell bonds. Therefore,
dDNB = −PLdBNBL , ⟨5.20⟩
43Indeed, interest rate risk can be an important risk factor for central banks. The Bundesbank, for example,
in 2016 increased its risk provisioning by e1.75 billion. Besides exchange rate and credit risk, this was
mainly due to higher interest rate risk associated with its large-scale asset purchases (Weidmann, 2017).
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and in analogy to equation ⟨5.17⟩ for the central bank, changes in the equity position of
non-banks are solely due to changes in the bond price,
dENB = dPLBNBL . ⟨5.21⟩
Importantly, non-banks demand a certain portfolio composition between bonds and de-
posits, which give rise to a portfolio balance eﬀect. The non-banks bond demand is thus
a function of its price and the equity position of non-banks. With standard preferences,
this demand function fNB(PL, ENB) is inversely related to the bond price
∂fNB(PL, ENB)
∂PL
< 0 ⟨5.22⟩
while it is further assumed that non-banks do not immediately adjust their bond hol-
dings in response to equity value changes, such that
∂fNB(PL, ENB)
∂ENB
= 0. ⟨5.23⟩
The laĴer condition ensures that non-banks bond demand is only determined by varia-
tions in the bond price, i.e.
dBNBL =
∂fNB(PL, ENB)
∂PL
dPL, ⟨5.24⟩
which can be substituted into equation ⟨5.20⟩ to yield
dDNB = −PL∂f
NB(PL, ENB)
∂PL
dPL. ⟨5.25⟩
This equation establishes a positive relation between changes in bond prices and non-
banks demand for deposits. Given standard preferences for bonds, non-banks will sell
bonds when their prices rise and hold the proceeds in their deposit accounts.
Banks At ﬁrst, notice once again that the model is built to focus on the bond market
eﬀects of LSAPs. Therefore, it is assumed that banks do not immediately adjust their
credit portfolios to changes in funding conditions, which is the reason why loans are
normalized to zero in the model. Hence, the balance sheet of the aggregate banking
sector can be wriĴen as
R+ PLBBL = EB +DB ⟨5.26⟩
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where the funding of banks is simply44
FB = EB +DB. ⟨5.27⟩
A related assumption is that in this model ’loans don’t create deposits’, which implies
that the stock of deposits is ultimately determined by the behavior of non-banks. This
assumption is not meant to discard the modern view whereupon deposits are endoge-
nously supplied by the credit creation of banks (see McLeay et al., 2014). Instead, it is
meant to highlight the implications of the reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect with
respect to long-term bond yields. As a result, banks’ reserves exogenously increase with
their deposits and decrease with long-term bonds,
dR = dDB − PLdBBL , ⟨5.28⟩
while similar to non-banks, the bond demand function decreases in the bond price
∂fB(PL, FB)
∂PL
< 0. ⟨5.29⟩
Finally, for the reserve-induced portfolio balance channel to aﬀect long-term bond
yields, it must hold that
0 < ∂f
B(PL, FB)
∂FB
< 1. ⟨5.30⟩
This condition, which establishes a positive link between banks’ funding condition and
its bond demand, is necessary for the reserve-induced portfolio channel. That is, if banks
held any additional deposit funding solely in reserves, such that ∂f
B(PL,FB)
∂FB
= 0, then
the bond demand would be decoupled from any reserve-induced deposit expansion
and LSAPs would only work through the classical supply-induced portfolio balance
eﬀect. Taking further into account that over the short horizon of the model, changes in
banks’ equity valuations do not aﬀect their bond demand, i.e.45
∂fB(PL, EB +DB)
∂FB
dEB = ∂f
B(PL, FB)
∂FB
dEB = 0 ⟨5.31⟩
44As noted above, non-banks are tied to banks via their deposit holdings (DNB = DB).
45An alternative interpretation could be that equity valuation changes are paid out as dividends and are
therefore not available to fund bond purchases.
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means that the ﬂow of banks’ bond demand is equal to
dBBL =
∂fB(PL, FB)
∂PL
dPL +
∂fB(PL, FB)
∂FB
dDB. ⟨5.32⟩
Transmission Process of LSAPs Given the bond market equilibrium condition and
the assumption that overall bond issuance does not react to the increase in bonddemand
caused by the central bank, LSAPs increase the reserve supply without changing the
total supply of bonds (dBL = 0).46 As a consequence, LSAPs that increase the central
bank’s bond holdings are oﬀset by the bond holdings of non-banks and banks, that is
dBCBL = −dBNBL − dBBL ⟨5.33⟩
To analyze the eﬀects of central bank bond purchases and the resulting increase in re-
serves on the price of bonds, non-banks’ bond demand ⟨5.24⟩ and banks’ bond demand
⟨5.32⟩ are plugged into equation ⟨5.33⟩ to get47
dBCBL = −
∂fNB
∂PL
dPL − ∂f
B
∂PL
dPL − ∂f
B
∂FB
dDB. ⟨5.34⟩
Now, inserting the non-banks deposit response ⟨5.25⟩ into ⟨5.34⟩ and solving for the
bond price reaction to central bank bond purchases, yields
dPL
dBCBL
= −1
∂fNB
∂PL
+ ∂fB∂PL − PL
∂fNB
∂PL
∂fB
∂FB
> 0. ⟨5.35⟩
Here, the ﬁrst two terms in the denominator represent the standard supply-induced port-
folio balance eﬀects, which, as described in the previous section, arise from the decrease
in the supply of bonds available to the private sector. The third term in the denomina-
tor, however, captures the reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect, which is the focus of this
section.48Note that this channel is not operating if the price sensitivity of non-banks’ de-
mand for bonds is zero, i.e. if ∂fNB∂PL = 0, because then the central bank would buy bonds
only from banks, whichwould have no eﬀect on the amount of deposits in the economy.
46This is of course another simplifying assumption which might not hold true in practice. Since the year
2008, Greenwood et al. (2014) show that the US Treasury has extended both the total supply as well
as the average duration of outstanding Treasury debt while at the same time the Fed tried to shorten
the average duration of outstanding Treasury debt. Thereby, Treasury debt management and the Fed’s
LSAPs pulled the consolidated government balance sheet in opposite directions.
47In the following, the arguments of the respective demand functions are dropped for notational simplicity.
48Notice that the positivity of equation ⟨5.35⟩ follows from 0 < PL < 1 and 0 < ∂fB∂FB < 1, which makes
the whole denominator negative, although its last term is positive.
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Alternatively, the reserve-induced portfolio balance channel shuts down if banks do not
react to a change in their deposit base by changing their demand for long-term bonds,
i.e. if ∂fB
∂FB
= 0.
In other words, the reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect reinforces the supply-
induced portfolio balance eﬀect only if non-banks are on the selling side of central bank
LSAPs. Only then do the bond sales cause an autonomous creation of bank deposits,
which will, according to equation ⟨5.30⟩, induce banks to reallocate some of their new
funding towards long-term bonds. The fact that this additional bond demand has to be
met by the supply of non-banks is captured by PL ∂f
NB
∂PL
in the last term in the denomi-
nator of equation ⟨5.35⟩.
Model Extensions In a more realistic version of the model, market participants can
also trade short-term bonds (BS). If in this framework the central bank implements
LSAPs by buying short-term bonds only, i.e. if dBCBS > 0 while dBCBL = 0, the prices
of long-term bonds will react nevertheless. As shown in the Appendix B.4, if short-term
bonds are purchased from non-banks but not from banks, i.e. if ∂f
NB
S
∂PS
→∞ and ∂fBS∂PS = 0,
then it holds that
dPL
dBCBS
=
−PS ∂f
B
L
FB
∂fNBL
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PL
− PL ∂f
B
L
FB
∂fNBL
∂PL
> 0. ⟨5.36⟩
The above expression shows that long-term bond prices still increase even though the
central bank buys solely short-term bonds. Furthermore, since the right hand side only
depends on the sensitivity of the long-term bond demand with respect to its own price,
there is no supply-induced portfolio balance eﬀect in this case. In other words, if the central
bank buys short-term bonds, any eﬀect on the prices of long-term bonds can be aĴribu-
ted to the reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect.
As stressed above, a necessary condition for the reserve-induced portfolio balance
eﬀect is that the central bank purchases the short-term bonds mainly from non-banks.
The bold arrows in Figure 5.11 illustrate this for the polar case when the central bank
buys short-term bonds only from non-banks.
Because non-banks cannot receive reserves directly, the central bank credits them
through the non-banks’ deposit accounts with the banking sector.49 As a result, banks
are confronted with an exogenous improvement in stable deposit funding. Under the
49Given that short-term bonds and deposits are perfectly substitutable, non-banks have no incentive to
engage in supply-induced portfolio adjustments.
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Central Bank
Short bonds ↑ ⇑ Equity
Long bonds Reserves ↑ ⇑
Non-Banks
Deposits ⇑ Equity
Short bonds ⇓
Long bonds
Banks
Reserves ↑ ⇑ Equity
Short bonds ↓ Deposits ⇑
Long bonds
Figure 5.11.: Reserve-induced portfolio channel ⋄Operation 1:Asset purchase
from banks (↑). Operation 2: Asset purchase from non-banks (⇑). ⋄ Source:
Christensen and Krogstrup (2016b), own illustration.
assumption that banks viewed their previous portfolio composition as optimal, they
will try to sell reserves against longer-term bonds. However, in the aggregate, the ban-
king sector cannot get rid of reserves – and with reserves as the numéraire, their price
cannot adjust. In the model, that means the prices of long-term bonds will have to rise
for banks to be willing to hold a greater amount of reserves relative to bonds. If, howe-
ver, for whatever reason, banks are content with their increased reserve holdings, they
will not engage in asset substitution and the reserve-induced portfolio balance channel
shuts down. In a sense, banks perform the same role as arbitrageurs in the Vayanos-Vila
model. One reasonwhy banks could not try to substitute out of reserves iswhen they are
capital-constrained. Banks could become capital-constrained because the balance sheet
expansion cause the banks’ unweighted capital ratio to decline.
Note that the reserve-induced portfolio balance channel also shuts down if the central
bank buys short-term bonds directly from banks. As depicted by the thin arrows in
Figure 5.11, this would only amount to an asset swap of two perfectly substitutable
assets on banks’ balance sheets. Since in reality it is almost impossible to discernwhether
banks or non-banks are on the selling side of a LSAP program, identifying a reserve-
induced portfolio balance eﬀect is ultimately an empirical question.
Empirical Evidence Asmost LSAP programswere biased towards longer-term bonds,
it is almost impossible for empirical studies to disentangle the reserve channel from any
supply-induced channels. A notable exception are three unique operations conducted
by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in August 2011. During this episode, the SNB de-
cided to expand reserves from CHF 30 billion to CHF 200 billion (i.e. 30 percent of
Swiss GDP) by purchasing only short-term government bonds. The goal was to incre-
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ase the liquidity supply in the Swiss money market to counter the strong appreciation
of the Swiss franc.50 After controlling for potential signalling eﬀects, Christensen and
Krogstrup (2016b) conclude that the reserve-induced portfolio balance eﬀect caused the
yields of Swiss long-term government bonds to fall by 28 basis points.
A few related studies found supporting evidence for the reserve-induced portfolio ba-
lance eﬀect in other jurisdictions. Carpenter et al. (2015) analyze US ﬂow of funds data
related to the Fed’s LSAP1 (fromNovember 2008 to June 2010); LSAP2 (fromNovember
2010 to June 2011); and the reinvestment program for proceeds of the Fed’s maturing
MBS holdings (from August 2010 to December 2012).51 Although the direct counterpar-
ties of the Fed’s open-market operations are the primary dealers (a subset of banks),
Carpenter et al. (2015) uncover that the ultimate counterparts of the Fed’s treasury pur-
chases were households (including hedge funds), and to a lesser extend broker-dealers
and insurance companies, suggesting that the primary dealers actedmainly as conduits
between the Fed and the ultimate seller of the asset. This is an important ﬁnding, as it
indicates that the Fed purchased mainly from non-banks, which, as outlined above, is a
crucial condition for the eﬀectiveness of the reserve channel.
5.2. Expectational Channels
5.2.1. Signaling Channel
Theoretical Concept In a frictionless benchmark world populated by Ricardian
agents, the Wallace neutrality posits that at the zero lower bound outright purchases
of government bonds aﬀect long-term bond yields only if they convey new information
about the expected path of future short-term rates (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003;
BhaĴarai et al., 2015).52 To further illustrate this point, consider the yield of a default-
free government with maturity n, given by
y
(n)
t = y
(n)
rn,t + tp
(n)
t . ⟨5.37⟩
50Interestingly, despite a constrained policy rate and serious deﬂationary pressures, the SNB stated no
intention to lower longer-term rates with these measures (see the SNB, 2011 press release).
51The study does not account for LSAP3, as this program was still active when the paper was ﬁrst publis-
hed.
52As a corollary, open market operations are also neutral with respect to inﬂation and real economic acti-
vity. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see section 3.3 .
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The long-term yield, y(n)t , can be decomposed into a risk-neutral component, y
(n)
rn,t, and
a term premium, tp(n)t . The risk-neutral component equals the expected average short-
term policy rate over the lifetime of the bond, while the term premium represents a
policy-invariant variable that is determined by the risk characteristic of a bond and the
risk aversion of the representative investor.53 With the current policy rate at the zero
lower bound, the only leveragemonetary policy has to aﬀect longer-term rates is thus to
signal a lower path of future policy rates; only thenwill market participants revise down
their expectations for future short-term rates, i.e. lengthen the expected period of zero
policy rates. This mechanism after which asset purchases are used to steer interest rate
expectations is usually referred to as the signaling channel of unconventional monetary
policy.
Time-Inconsistency If the signaling channel rests upon investors’ expectations about
the path of future short-term rates, the question arises why a central bank in a liquidity
trap does not simply communicate a lower path of future policy rates? In this respect,
the arguments for the signaling channel parallel those of forward guidance (see section
4.1.1). The problem is that if monetary policy follows a Taylor rule based on a purely
forward-looking inﬂation target, the central bank has an incentive to renege on its pro-
mise to keep policy rates ’lower for longer’ as soon as the inﬂation rate exceeds its target
value. Therefore, a policy that only communicates a lower path of future policy rates
thus suﬀers from a classical time-inconsistency problem (Barro and Gordon, 1983).
In principle, the central bank can mitigate this problem by buying assets with longer
durations. The reason is that increasing the duration of assets held by an independent
central bank provides an incentive for the central bank to keep the policy rate low in
the future in order to avoid balance sheet losses. Central bank asset purchases can thus
generate inﬂationary expectations and lower long-term interest rates, which, in turn,
stimulates economic activity and reduces the risk of a deﬂationary spiral, because the
asset purchases act as a signal to the public aﬃrming the central bank’s commitment to
its interest rate guidance (see inter alia Woodford, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014;
BhaĴarai et al., 2015).
Asset Horizon and Maturity Range Since the signaling channel is based on the expec-
tations theory of the term structure, it should principally aﬀect a wide range of diﬀerent
53The theoretical rationale for the policy-invariant term premium is given by the no-arbitrage condition of
the expectations theory of the term structure. The laĴer requires that there are no risk-free proﬁts to be
made by trading bonds of diﬀerent maturities.
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asset classes. In contrast to ’narrow channels’, signaling eﬀects from a particular asset
purchase program can thus be expected to spill over to all other ﬁxed-income and secu-
rities markets.
A more subtle question is how the signaling channel impacts the cross-section of ma-
turities. To shed light on this issue, consider once again the basic bond pricing equation,
P
(n)
t =
n∑
j=1
CFj
(1 + ij,t)j
, ⟨5.38⟩
which reveals an inverse relation between bond prices and interest rates (where it is as-
sumed that the ﬁnal cash ﬂow,CFn, includes the bond’s principal payment). If eﬀective
signaling leads to a reduction in the average discount factor, bond prices soar and yields
decline. As can be seen from ⟨5.38⟩, the size of this eﬀect depends on time to maturity,
n, as well as on the length of the downward revision of policy rates. The laĴer predicts
that intermediate bonds might experience the strongest price eﬀect, because in the long
run, when the economy (hopefully) recovers, monetary policy will be induced to sell
the accumulated assets, thereby causing an upward shift in future discount rates. This
upward revision in future spot rates causes long-term bond yields to raise relative to
intermediate maturities.
As a simple example, consider three ﬁxed-coupon bonds with maturities of two, ﬁve
and ten years. Each bond has a face value of 100 and pays a coupon of 0.25% p.a. Now
assume that in t, when the level of the short-term rate (it) equals 0.25%, the central bank
credibly signals that it will lower the short-term rate to 0%. After ﬁve years, it is assu-
med that the short-term rate re-rises to its initial level. Immediately after the announ-
cement, the present value of the two-period bond thus increases to 100.5; the one of the
ﬁve-period bond to 101.25; and the one of ten-year bond to around 100.009. This sim-
ple example illustrates that for reasonable scenarios of the signaling channel, i.e. when
the policy rate is lowered for limited time periods, it can be expected that intermediate
yields decrease relative to longer-term yields (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2011).
Empirical Evidence In reality, if the central bank is able to eﬀectively signal to mar-
ket participants its intended path of future policy rates, this might cause a series of
interactions with other transmission channels of monetary policy. Very importantly, it
dampens interest rate risk, which generates a countervailing impact on the duration
risk channel of long-term asset purchases (see section 5.1.1). Additionally, the signaling
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channel might contribute to a reanchoring of previously unhinged inﬂation expectati-
ons (see section 5.2.2), which should raise real rates compared to a no-policy scenario.
Given these repercussions and contingencies as well as the missing counterfactual, it is
rather diﬃcult to provide sound empirical evidence for the signaling channel of uncon-
ventional policies.
Accordingly, the existing empirical work on the signaling channel comprises a rela-
tively wide range of estimates. In fact, a large part of the literature ﬁnds that uncon-
ventional policies signiﬁcantly lowered the term premium on long-term bond yields,
and since such a reaction is usually associated with the portfolio balance channel, this
is often presented as negative evidence against the signaling channel (see e.g. Meier,
2009; Gagnon et al., 2011b; D’Amico et al., 2012; Altavilla et al., 2015). For a number of
reasons, however, jumping to this conclusion might be too hasty.
Firstly, as credible guidance of the policy-rate path reduces the uncertainty about the
evolution of future interest rates, the signaling channel has a negative eﬀect on the term
premium as well (see also Woodford, 2012, p. 79). AĴributing changes in term premia
entirely to the portfolio balance channel therefore tends to underestimate the impact of
the signaling channel.
Secondly, if expansionary policy announcements produce a more favorable econo-
mic outlook, this should marginally increase policy-rate expectations in the long-run,
which should partly oﬀset the lower policy path signaled by the central bank. And ﬁ-
nally, a more technical argument is that conventional arbitrate-free term structure mo-
dels (DTSM) – like the Kim and Wright (2005) model – include biased estimators that
cause the model-implied forecasts for longer horizons to be too close to their uncondi-
tional mean. Since this results in an implausibly stable process for the risk-free rate, too
much variation in long-term rates is aĴributed to the term premium component, which
in turn overestimates the portfolio balance eﬀect (see e.g. Bauer et al., 2012a; Duﬀee and
Stanton, 2012; Kim and Orphanidis, 2012).
As a consequence, Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) develop a modiﬁed DTSM with un-
biased estimators generating a short-rate process that reverts much more slowly to its
unconditional mean. Their model speciﬁcation thus predicts a larger contribution of the
expectations component to changes in long-term yields and thus also a larger impact of
the signaling channel than conventional DTSMs. Hence, while Gagnon et al. (2011b),
who use a standard DTSM, estimate that the signaling channel accounted for about 22
percent of the cumulative decrease in 10-year Treasury yields in LSAP1, the unbiased
estimates of Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) suggest that it contributed around 40-50 per-
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Study Method Program Key results
U.S.
Gagnon et al.
(2011b)
Event study
with DTSM
LSAP1 Primary impact through the duration risk chan-
nel; no signiﬁcant impact through the signaling
channel
Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011)
Model-free
event study
LSAP1
& LSAP2
Signaling channel with important role in LSAP1
(20-40 bp of total 107 bp decrease in 10-year Trea-
sury yield). Signaling channel with primary role
in LSAP2 (11-16 bp of total 18 bp decrease in 10-
year Treasury yield)
Bauer and Rude-
busch (2014)
Event study
with modiﬁed
DTSM
LSAP1 Signiﬁcant eﬀect from signaling channel in
LSAP1 (29-53 bp of total 94 bp decrease in 10-
year Treasury yield)
Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012)
Event study
with modiﬁed
DTSM
LSAP1 Signaling channel with largest impact in LSAP1
(53 bp of total 89 bp decrease in 10-year Treasury
yield)
UK
Joyce et al. (2011a) Model-free
event study
and VAR ana-
lysis
APF1 In all speciﬁcations large impact through port-
folio balance channel; no signiﬁcant impact
through the signaling channel
Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012)
Event study
with modiﬁed
DTSM
APF1 Primary impact through the portfolio balance
channel; no signiﬁcant impact through the sig-
naling channel
Euro Area
Altavilla et al.
(2015)
Event study
with dummy
regression
APP Signaling channel with only modest impact
(maximum impact of around 10 bp at a 2-year
horizon)
Table 5.8.: Empirical evidence for the signaling channel
cent.54 In line with these results, Bauer and Neely (2014) show that similar conclusions
hold for LSAP2 and LSAP3. Controlling for a number of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations,
they estimate that the expectations component on average contributed between 45 and
90 percent to the total decline in long-term interest rates over the Fed’s three rounds of
quantitative easing.
Interestingly, however, as displayed in Table 5.8, the signaling channel seems to mat-
ter less for the UK and the euro area. Possible explanations for this diverging contribu-
tion are internationally distinct bond market structures or diﬀerent central bank com-
munication policies (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012). Overall, however, it should be
noticed that the empirical inference is quite sensitive to the respective model choice.
54With restricted risk prices, this entails that LSAP1, through the expectation of lower policy rates, lowered
10-year yields between 29 and 53 basis points (see Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014, p. 261, Table 5.).
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5.2.2. Inflation Reanchoring Channel
Theoretical Concept The so-called inﬂation reanchoring channel (Andrade et al., 2016b)
is closely related to the signaling channel presented above. Both channels emphasize
the eﬀect of central bank asset purchases on the expected path of future policy rates. In
contrast to the signaling channel, however, “the reanchoring channel focuses on the in-
formation conveyed by the introduction of a quantitative easing program [or any other
unconventional monetary policy measure] about the inﬂation objective of the central
bank” (Andrade et al., 2016b, p. 3). If a prolonged period of subdued inﬂation dyna-
mics deanchors the inﬂation expectations of private market participants, QE can help to
reanchor them in line with the central banks inﬂation target. Besides lowering the real
interest rate, such a reanchoring of inﬂation expectations also leads to a lower policy
rate in the short- and medium term, because achieving the higher inﬂation objective
requires an easier monetary policy stance. At the same time, it raises interest rate expec-
tations in the long term because the policy intervention causes market agents to update
their beliefs about the central bank’s inﬂation objective. This contrasts with the signaling
channel, where the inﬂation objective is not questioned, such that the signaling channel
predicts no eﬀect on long-term inﬂation expectations.
Empirical Evidence The obvious empirical strategy to identify the existence of the
reanchoring channel is to estimate whether expansionary monetary policy announce-
ments do contribute to increasing inﬂation expectations. By allowing for such a rean-
choring of inﬂation expectations in the DSGE framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011),
the simulations of Andrade et al. (2016b) suggest that the APP as announced by the
ECB in January 2015 caused inﬂation to be 40 basis points and output to be 1.1 percent
higher compared to a no-policy scenario. This simulation exercise is cross-checked with
a high frequency event study that examines the reaction of survey-based measures of
inﬂation expectations. It suggests that a 10 basis points decrease in the 5-year German
Bund yield caused by the APP is accompanied by an increase of around 5 basis points
in the 5-year-ahead inﬂation expectations.
Another event study by the German Bundesbank shows that expansionary mone-
tary policy announcements between October 2009 and July 2011 signiﬁcantly increased
(decreased) inﬂation (deﬂation) probabilities as measured by inﬂation options.55 Albeit
55Inﬂation options come either as ’inﬂation caps’ or ’inﬂation ﬂoors’. The owner of an inﬂation cap receives
a payment if the inﬂation rate at the maturity date of the option exceeds a predeﬁned threshold (vice
versa for an inﬂation ﬂoor).
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this exercise fails to identify a signiﬁcant eﬀect of monetary policy surprises on option-
implied inﬂation expectations between August 2011 and December 2013, it does sug-
gest that policy reactions in 2014 contributed to a substantial reduction in deﬂationary
risks.56 In September 2014, the outright asset purchases began with the announcement
that the ECB would purchase asset-backed securities and covered bonds. The program
was then scaled up in January 2015with the announcement of the public sector purchase
program. Together, these purchases contributed to a reanchoring of inﬂation expecta-
tions in line with the ECB’s medium-term objective of 2 percent. Moreover, it has been
instrumental in reversing the rise in real rates that could have been observed since the
beginning of 2015. The euro area 5-year real rate had risen by about 60 basis points bet-
ween September 2014 and January 2015, but it then fell by about 85 basis points between
mid-January and April 2015 (Draghi, 2015a).
Empirical studies that use alternativemarket-basedmeasures of inﬂation expectations
largely conﬁrm this result. For instance, the event study of Altavilla et al. (2015) relying
on inﬂation swap rates suggests that the ECB’s asset purchase program increased 5-year
inﬂation expectations by between 14 and 24 basis points.57 Using a similar approach
for the Fed’s ﬁrst two rounds of QE, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) ﬁnd
that 10-year inﬂation expectations in the US rose by around 96 basis points and 5 basis
points, respectively.58 Overall, this empirical evidence generally supports the view that
QE is an eﬀective policy tool to stabilize inﬂation expectations – particularly at times of
heightened uncertainty concerning a central bank’s inﬂation objective.
5.2.3. Market Functioning Channel
Asset Pricing and Liquidity Risk Asset pricing models that account for liquidity risk
demonstrate a negative correlation between asset returns and the liquidity (or marke-
tability) of an asset (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Acharya and Pederson, 2005).59 As
56See also Scharnagl and Stapf (2014).
57An inﬂation swap is a ﬁnancial derivative used to hedge against inﬂation risk by an exchange of net cash
ﬂows. In an inﬂation swap, the ﬁxed-rate payer pays a predeﬁned rate on some notional amount, while
the other party pays a ﬂoating rate linked to the evolution of the consumer price index over the life of
the swap. Since the ﬁxed-rate payment is agreed upon the initiation of the swap, it reﬂects the expected
inﬂation rate over the maturity of the contract.
58These ﬁgures are largely conﬁrmed by alternativemeasures of inﬂation expectations, like the break-even
inﬂation rate (BEIR), for instance. The BEIR is equal to the diﬀerence between the yield on inﬂation-
indexed government bonds and the yield of an otherwise identical nominal government bond. For the
pros and cons of diﬀerent market-basedmeasures of inﬂation expectations, see e.g. Bundesbank (2015a).
59Consistent with the economic literature, the terms ’liquidity’ and ’market functioning’ are used inter-
changeably in this section.
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investors value liquidity particularly during times of heightened market uncertainty,
liquidity premia tend to move in a countercyclical fashion (Duﬃe et al., 2003; Longstaﬀ
et al., 2005). In turn, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) document a liquidity premium for
US Treasuries, while Beber et al. (2009) show that diﬀerent degrees of liquidity risks are
a dominant factor determining the yield spreads between euro area sovereign bonds.
Market Functioning and UMP The largest issuers of mortgage-backed securities
are the three US government-sponsored agencies (GSEs); Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Ginnie Mae. These institutions assemble loans made by individual lenders into a
pool and then issue MBS which represent a claim on the principal and interest of the
mortgage loans in the pool. Thereby, the GSEs guarantee the timely payment of princi-
pal and interest of the MBS, even if the underlying mortgages default. Collectively, the
MBS backed by these institutions are known as agencyMBS. Since the GSEs themselves
enjoy an implicit guarantee of theUS Federal government, agencyMBS carry essentially
zero default risk (Passmore, 2005).
Given the size and depth of the US mortgage market, agency MBS represent highly
liquid securities with relatively low risk. With the failure of Lehman Brothers, however,
the market for agency MBS essentially froze, which caused a spike in the spread bet-
ween agency MBS and US Treasury yields.60 Since the government guarantee implies
that both types of securities carry essentially no credit risk, the spreads largely reﬂected
liquidity risk premiums on MBS (see Figure 5.12).61
Besides the secondaryMBS spread and the holdings ofMBS as accounted on the Fed’s
balance sheet, the dashed vertical lines in Figure 5.12 display the announcement dates of
the three rounds of asset purchases that included security purchases of housing GSEs.
LSAP1 was announced in November 2008 and involved $1.25 trillion of agency MBS
and $172 billion of debt securities issued by the housing GSEs. The second round of
purchases was announced in September 2011 through the reinvesting of principal pay-
ments from the Fed’s agency MBS and debt holdings. Finally, in September 2012, the
60In normal times, there is a small positive spread between agency MBS and US Treasury yields, which
can be aĴributed to the higher convexity risk in MBS. The higher convexity risk arises because most US
mortgages can be prepaid at any time during the life of the mortgage. That is, when interest rates fall,
borrowers choose to prepay their existingmortgage and reﬁnance into a newmortgage with lower rates.
This prepayment option thus poses a risk toMBS holders, as they get more prepaid principal which they
have to reinvest at lower yields.
61Another explanation for the high yield spread is that most banks at that time were severely capital-
constraint. This puts agency-related debt at a disadvantage relative to Treasury bonds, since agency
bonds carry a 20 percent risk weight, while Treasury bonds have a weight of 0 (Gagnon et al., 2011b;
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013).
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Figure 5.12.: Secondary mortgage spread (lhs) and Federal Reserve MBS hol-
dings (rhs) ⋄ The secondary MBS spread is the yield spread between the Fan-
nie Mae 30-year current-coupon MBS and the 10-year US Treasury yield. The
maturity diﬀerence between both series captures the fact that most 30-year
MBS are typically paid oﬀ or reﬁnanced before their maturity date. ⋄ Source:
Bloomberg, Datastream
Fed announced that it would purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion
per month and continue to reinvest principal payments in GSE MBS.
It is now widely acknowledged that the Fed’s initial MBS purchases program from
2009-2010 was an important component in the restoration of the agency MBS market
(see e.g.Hancock andPassmore, 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011b; Krishnamurthy andVissing-
Jorgensen, 2011). As the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases provided an ongoing source of
demand for principally illiquidMBS, it jump-started private trading activity. Moreover,
since private investors could reasonably expect to sell their assets to the Fed, the secon-
dary MBS spread seĴled even below its pre-crisis level with the completion of LSAP1
in March 2010. The market functioning channel thus works by reassuring market par-
ticipants that there is reliable deep-pocket investor who stands ready to purchase the
distressed securities at any price and under all market conditions.
Empirical Evidence Consequently, Hancock and Passmore (2011) estimate that the
Fed’s ﬁrst announcement of MBS purchases in November 2008 reduced US mortgage
rates by about 100 basis points. In particular, they ﬁnd that about half of this decline
resulted from improved market functioning, while the other half came from portfolio
rebalancing. Since theMBSmarket was functioningmore normally after the completion
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of LSAP1, subsequent MBS purchase programs had a much lesser impact. This state-
dependent impact of the Fed’s MBS purchases is in line with other statistical ﬁndings.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), for instance, estimate that agency 10-year
MBSyields in the course of LSAP1declined by 107 basis points,while they fell by only 13
basis points during LSAP2. Furthermore, Gagnon et al. (2011b) ﬁnd that 30-year agency
MBS yields declined by a total of 113 basis points throughout LSAP1.62
In this context, a common perception is that central bank interventions in a particular
market could also exert a negative impact on market functioning, for instance by crow-
ding out private market activity. In 2013, this was also acknowledged by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, which noted that “one potential cost of conducting
additional [large-scale asset purchases] is that the operations could lead to a deteriora-
tion in market functioning or liquidity in markets where the Federal Reserve is engaged
in purchasing.More speciﬁcally, if the Federal Reserve becomes too dominant a buyer in
a certainmarket, trading among private participants could decrease enough thatmarket
liquidity and price discovery become impaired.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 2013b). Albeit the eﬀectiveness of MBS purchases indeed decreased over
time, at least no clear-cut negative eﬀects can be identiﬁed for the Fed’s subsequentMBS
purchases (Kandrac, 2014).
With respect to the euro area, Ejsing et al. (2012) demonstrate that liquidity risks
played an important role in driving the yield spread between French and German go-
vernment bonds during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/2009. The spread between both so-
vereigns increased from quasi zero before July 2007 to around 50 basis points in Ja-
nuary 2009, and to more than 70 basis points in the midst of the European sovereign
debt crisis in 2011/2012. If the spread only reﬂected higher credit risk associated with
the French government, a similar spread should have opened up between the yields
on government-guaranteed agencies of both countries. However, the spread between
French and German agency bonds remained comparably low during 2008/2009, while
they increased considerably during 2011/2012. This paĴern – a wide sovereign spread
together with a tight agency spread – suggests that increased liquidity risk and not in-
creased credit risk was responsible for the yield diﬀerentials between both countries in
the early stages of the ﬁnancial crisis. However, this seems to have changed during the
sovereign debt crisis. As French agency bonds began to trade at premium compared to
German agency bonds, it seems that the cross-country spreads at this stage were dri-
62Another factor contributing to the relatively large impact of LSAP1 could be that markets viewed the
ﬁrst program as a credible signal that fostered the implicit government guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (Stroebel and Taylor, 2012).
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ven to a large extent by diﬀerent degrees of credit risk. With the introduction of OMT
and the subsequent large-scale public sector purchase program, however, these spreads
started to vanish. Given that a wide array of measures had already been implemented
by the ECB before the announcement of OMT and PSPP, it is almost impossible to es-
timate whether the market functioning channel was an important component of these
measures. However, tentative evidence suggests that it played at least some part for the
periphery countries (see, for example, Altavilla et al., 2016; Falagiarda et al., 2015.)63
5.3. Spillover Effects
In the previous theoretical analysis, it has been emphasized that whether one can expect
unconventional asset purchases to have signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects to other asset prices
depends critically on the prevalence of certain transmission channels. Speciﬁcally, while
portfolio rebalancing to risky assets should be comparatively low in times of heighte-
ned market uncertainty (local supply channel/safety channel), spillover eﬀects can be
expected to be more pronounced during normal times (duration channel).
In the following, I will therefore brieﬂy review the existing empirical evidence on the
domestic as well as international spillover eﬀects of unconventional measures in the US
and the UK, before I will turn to a more thorough analysis of the spillover eﬀects of the
ECB’s extended asset purchase program in section 6.2.1.
5.3.1. Domestic Spillover Effects
Conceptually, the only real diﬀerence between domestic and international portfolio ba-
lance channels is the need to compare asset returns in a common currency. Despite the
similarity in the transmission mechanism, however, far more studies exist that assess
the domestic spillover eﬀects from unconventional monetary policies. Accordingly, for
both the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, a series of studies document sig-
niﬁcant and economically substantial yield declines beyond those securities targeted for
purchase.
For example, Gagnon et al. (2011b) estimate that the Federal Reserve’s ﬁrst asset pur-
chase program – which included Treasury bonds, agency debt and agency MBS – lo-
wered US Baa corporate bond yields by around 67 basis points. Since 10-year Treasury
63Joyce and Tong (2012) ﬁnd positive evidence for the market functioning channel within the UK.
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yields fell by ’only’ 91 basis points, this points to widespread domestic spillover eﬀect
from LSAP1. Moreover, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) document that
both LSAP1 andLSAP2 caused a substantial decline in Baa long-term corporate yields.64
In addition, they ﬁnd that 10-year CDS rates on Baa corporate bonds decreased conside-
rably throughout LSAP1 – suggesting that the reduction in private borrowing costs for
domestic non-ﬁnancial corporations acted mainly through a mitigation of default risk
(see also Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013).
Finally, the event study by Haldane et al. (2016) documents a relatively large cross-
country heterogeneity in domestic spillover eﬀects. While domestic corporate bond
yields experienced a substantial decline in the UK and the US, private borrowing costs
exhibited only a moderate decline following the QE announcements in Japan and the
euro area.65
Interestingly, cross-country diﬀerences exist also in the reaction of equity markets.
As depicted in Figure 5.13, the positive reaction of equity indices to QE announcements
seem to increase with the size of the program, although this paĴern is far from uniform.
In fact, at some dates policy announcements might have even disappointed market ex-
pectations, which could explain the fall in equity prices at those events. Alternatively,
the variation in domestic spillover eﬀects over time and across countries could depend
on diﬀerent states of ﬁnancial markets. In turn, Georgiadis and Gräb (2016) show that
the boost in euro area equities following the ECB’s APP announcement has beenmainly
driven by the conﬁdence and signaling channel, while euro area equities during earlier
measures (especially OMT and SMP) seem to have beneﬁted through the portfolio re-
balancing channel. Irrespective of the speciﬁc transmission channels at work, however,
the overall empirical evidence supports the notion that central bank asset purchases are
generally associated with positive spillover eﬀects to non-targeted asset classes.
64Besides a smaller event sample, the results of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) reﬂect two-
day changes, whereas Gagnon et al. (2011b) estimate one-day changes.
65Haldane considers the following eight event dates for the BoE: March 5, 2009; May 7, 2009; August 6,
2009; November 5, 2009; October 6, 2011; February 9, 2012; July 5, 2012; August 4, 2016. Five events for the
Federal Reserve: November 25, 2008; March 18, 2009; November 3, 2010; September 13, 2012; December
12, 2012. Four events for the ECB: September 4, 2014; January 22, 2015; December 3, 2015; March 10,
2016; and two events for the BoJ: April 4, 2013; October 31, 2014. The estimations are measured as two-
day changes around the respective event dates.
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Figure 5.13.: Change in equity indices around QE announcements ⋄ Equity
indices are FTSE All Share (UK), S&P 500 (US), Euro Stoxx 300 (Euro Zone),
and Topix (Japan) ⋄ Changes measured over two-day windows around QE
events ⋄ Source: Haldane et al. (2016, p. 16)
5.3.2. International Spillover Effects
Depending on the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign assets,
LSAPs might have large international eﬀects. More precisely, if investors regard fo-
reign securities as closer substitutes for domestic securities than reserves, they might
rebalance their portfolios towards these foreign securities following reserve-ﬁnanced
asset purchases by the central bank (Neely, 2015). As a consequence, the prices of fo-
reign securities rise while the home currency depreciates. Importantly, such internatio-
nal spillover eﬀects can be expected to increase with the amount of foreign sellers in an
asset purchase program, as the laĴer are more likely to invest the additional reserves
in foreign rather than domestic assets (Benford et al., 2009). Firstly, however, investors
abroad need to exchange the domestic reserves for foreign currency in order to buy the
foreign securities – which causes the home currency to depreciate. Therefore, this me-
chanism is usually referred to as the exchange rate channel of unconventional policies.
Accordingly, Haldane et al. (2016) show that most asset purchase announcements led
to a depreciation of the respective country’s nominal eﬀective exchange rate (see Figure
5.14). This broad ﬁnding is validated by a series of alternative studies. Neely (2015),
for instance, documents that the Fed’s unconventional policy measures of 2008-2009
decreased both international bond yields as well as the value of the US dollar vis-à-vis
itsmain tradingpartners. Additionally, the analysis reveals thatmost of this reaction can
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Figure 5.14.: Eﬀective exchange rates around QE announcements ⋄ Negative
values denote a depreciation of the respective currency ⋄ Changes measured
over two-daywindows aroundQE events ⋄ Source:Haldane et al. (2016, p. 15)
be aĴributed to an international portfolio rebalancing eﬀect, which wasmainly directed
towards developed countries.66
For the ECB’s unconventional monetary policymeasures (excluding the APP), Rogers
et al. (2014) ﬁnd that they had much smaller international eﬀects than those in the US.
Consistently, Fraĵscher et al. (2016a) show that OMT, SMP as well as the ECB’s non-
standard supplementary LTROs – albeit boosting global equity markets and lowering
credit risk among G20 banks and sovereigns – did not lead to large international portfo-
lio rebalancing across assets and countries.67 Interestingly, however, this stands in stark
contrast to the APP, which did have large international eﬀects; by supporting investor
conﬁdence and reducing the risk of a persistent stagnation in the euro area, it caused
a broad-based depreciation of the euro and boosted security prices around the world
(Georgiadis and Gräb, 2016; Altavilla et al., 2015).
Overall, these results imply that central banks around the globe should coordinate
66In a reﬁned study assessing in more detail the determinants of the international spillover eﬀects of the
Fed’s three LSAPs, Bauer and Neely (2014) ﬁnd a more heterogeneous response across countries. While
large international spillover eﬀects can be observed for all countries under consideration, the signaling
channel seems to be dominant for theUS andCanada. ForGermany andAustralia, however, the portfolio
balance channel appear to have played a relatively larger role, while being the only channel for Japanese
yields.
67Falagiarda et al. (2015) focus on the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy spillovers to non-euro area
countries from Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania). While
they ﬁnd that SMP announcements had large spillover eﬀects, OMT and PSPP announcements seemed
to have had signiﬁcantly lesser eﬀects on those countries.
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their policies in order to avoid either contractionary exchange rate movements abroad
or overly stimulative eﬀects at home.
International Spillover Effects and Financial Stability The global spillover eﬀects
from advanced economies’ unconventional monetary policies were not welcomed by
all of its recipients. Policy makers particularly of emerging market economies (EMEs)
complained rather forcefully against the large and potentially destabilizing swings in
international capital ﬂows. For instance, in November 2010, when Ben Bernanke an-
nounced the second round of LSAPs in the US, the Brazilian ﬁnance minister Guido
Mantega accused the Fed of waging a currency war. Against this backdrop, emerging
market policymakers criticized themajor central banks for having created excessive glo-
bal liquidity, which spurred asset price bubbles and an unsustainable credit expansion.
This so-called global currency channel is particularly pronounced in the case of the US
dollar. In fact, recent data published by the Bank of International SeĴlements shows
that the outstanding stock of US dollar-denominated credit to non-bank borrowers out-
side the United States – a key indicator of global liquidity conditions – peaked at $10.5
trillion by the end of 2016 (BIS, 2017).
Up to this point, US dollar credit to non-bank EME borrowers almost doubled bet-
ween 2008 and 2016, reaching $3.6 trillion at the end of that period. This strong external
role of the dollar implies that changes in the US monetary policy stance can have sub-
stantial spillovers to ﬁnancial conditions elsewhere. In the following, I will thus brieﬂy
address the concerns related to ﬁnancial stability. Given the pre-eminent role of the US
dollar as the key currency that underpins the global banking system, the discussionwill
focus on the international dimension of the Fed’s unconventional policies.
While the Fed’s ﬁrst QE program of 2008-2009 triggered a repatriation of foreign port-
folio investments into US equity markets, the capital ﬂows reversed during QE2 and
QE3 (Fraĵscher et al., 2016b). In this way, US policy measures actually increased the
pro-cyclicality of capital ﬂows for emerging market economies. And since these results
suggest a link between themacro conditions inmajor ﬁnancial centers and the transmis-
sion of portfolio ﬂows to periphery countries, it could be seen as positive evidence for
the risk-taking channel of unconventional monetary policies (Rey, 2013; Bruno and Shin,
2015).
Another aspect that is often cited in the context of ﬁnancial spillovers from uncon-
ventional monetary policies is the so-called taper tantrum of 2013. It refers to an episode
when the Fed’s intimations to slow down itsmonthly asset purchases in the light of a ro-
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bust economic recovery caused great turbulence on global ﬁnancial markets. Given the
substantial dollar borrowings of emerging market ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial corpora-
tions, the sudden reversal of capital ﬂows out of emerging market economies increased
the ﬁnancial stability risks in those countries signiﬁcantly.
Despite those ﬁnancial spillovers, the debate whether the expansionary monetary po-
licies of the advanced economies are indeed responsible for the increased fragility of
emerging market economies has not been seĴled yet. In fact, the hypothesis is challen-
ged by academics and policy makers alike. Bernanke (2016), for instance, argues that
in order to get a complete picture of the international eﬀects of the Fed’s unconventio-
nal policies, one has to compare the expenditure-augmenting eﬀects of these policies (ad-
ding to global aggregate demand through higher domestic income)with the expenditure-
switching eﬀects (adding to domestic demand through a weaker currency and higher
exports at the expense of others).
Actually, in 2008-2009, net exports did cushion the contraction in real GDP following
the failure of Lehman Brothers, since the recession led US imports to shrink more than
its exports (see Figure 5.15). Interestingly, however, net exports in this period impro-
ved even though the dollar experienced a sharp appreciation, as global investors rushed
for the safety of US dollar assets (see Figure 5.16). Moreover, during the episode of the
Fed’s alleged currency war from 2010-2014 the contribution of net exports to US GDP
was negligible. And while the US dollar, after the announcement of LSAP2 in late 2010,
in fact depreciated against many emerging market currencies, it started a persistent re-
covery since mid-2011.
Figure 5.15.: Contribution of net exports to annual US real GDP growth ⋄
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 5.16.: Trade-weighted US foreign exchange rate ⋄ The ’Broad Index’
is a weighted average of ’Major Currencies’ (euro area, Canada, Japan, UK,
Swiĵerland, Australia, and Sweden) and ’Other Important Partners’ (Mex-
ico, China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand,
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Saudia Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela,
Chile, and Colombia) ⋄ ’Other Important Partners’ thus constitute a reasona-
ble proxy for emerging market economies (EMEs) ⋄ Source: Fed Fred.
Thus, one can conclude that the recent recovery of the US economy was certainly
not driven by net exports. Instead, the expenditure-switching and the expenditure-
augmenting eﬀects of the Fed’s unconventional policy operations seem to have essen-
tially oﬀset each other (Ammer et al., 2016). Thus, the accusations that the Fed waged a
currency war do not hold in practice.
Rather, the concerns of emerging market policymakers about currency wars can be
explained in the context of the classical policy trilemma (Bernanke, 2016). The main rea-
son is that emerging market central banks, beyond their internal objectives of price and
output stability, often pursue additional exchange rate objectives, as export promotion
through undervaluation has become a linchpin in the growth strategies for many of
these countries. As a consequence, however, the managed exchange rates cannot suﬃ-
ciently adjust to shield the EMEs fromexcessive capital ﬂows. Fromapolicy perspective,
emerging market economies should thus either drop their exchange rate objectives, or
implement capital controls as macroprudential policy tools. Thus, the question whether
to (re-)introduce capital controls – for instance through regulatory caps on foreign cre-
dit – is currently being vividly discussed in academia and policy circles alike (see, inter
alia: Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Farhi and Werning, 2012; Eichengreen and Rose, 2014;
International Monetary Fund, 2016; and Andreasen et al., 2017).
157
5. Transmission Channels of Unconventional Monetary Policies
158
6. Financial Market Effects of the ECB’s Asset
Purchase Program
6.1. The ECB’s Asset Purchase Program
The ECB’s asset purchase program (henceforth APP) started in October 2014 with the
purchase of euro-denominated covered bonds (CBPP3) and asset-backed securities (AB-
SPP) of the private sector.1 Until January 2015, average monthly purchases under the
CBPP3 accounted for aboute12 billion, and purchases under ABSPP for aboute1.5 bil-
lion per month.2 This changed on January 22, 2015, when the Governing Council in the
face of weak euro area inﬂation dynamics and signs of reductions in longer-term inﬂa-
tion expectations announced that the APP should be expanded to include a large-scale
public sector purchase program (PSPP). Consequently, the combined purchases of pri-
vate and public sector securities were increased to e60 billion per month, which were
intended to be carried out until September 2016. Therefore, markets could have inferred
that the overall size of the APP should be around e1.14 trillion.3
Since these e1.14 trillion equal about 11% of 2014 euro area GDP, the size of the ex-
tended APP was largely comparable to the ﬁrst rounds of QE in the US and the UK. In
contrast to the laĴer, however, the APP was announced under relatively calm ﬁnancial
market conditions. This point is also underlined in Figure 6.1, which depicts the spread
between the Merill Lynch index measuring the yields of BBB-rated US (euro area) cor-
porate bonds and the yields of essentially risk-free US (German) government bonds.
1As outlined above, the ECB had previously oﬀered a series of unconventional liquidity provisions (1y-3y
LTROs), as well as some small-scale asset purchase programs (SMP, ABSPP, CBPP1, CBPP2). However,
these programs were mainly geared towards stabilizing interbank markets, but did not directly aim at
stimulating economic activity or the inﬂation rate.
2The CBPP and ABSPP program had been announced on September 04, 2014. Yet purchases under the
CBPP did not start before October 24, 2014, and purchases under the ABSPP not before December 02,
2014.
3The APP announcement did not include a binding commitment to end the purchases at September 2016.
In fact, the APP was announced as an open-ended program the size and duration of which were made
conditional on the path of the euro area inﬂation rate, thus sharing some features of state-contingent
forward guidance for monetary policy rates.
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Figure 6.1.: US and EA BBB corporate bond spreads over government bonds
⋄ The vertical lines depict the announcements of the various asset purchase
programs (LSAP1 for theUS,OMTandAPP for the EA) ⋄ Source:Merill Lynch,
Datastream.
Thus, the spread measures the risk premium investors require to hold US (euro area)
corporate bonds. As an approximation, the quantity of credit risk reﬂected in the BBB
corporate bond spread is presumably constant, because bonds with deteriorating credit
ratings are removed from the index. Nevertheless, the spread shows considerable ﬂuc-
tuations over time. If, as can be fairly assumed, the risk aversion of investors is rather
constant, ﬂuctuations in the spread must ultimately be driven by changes in macroe-
conomic uncertainty (see also Figure 4.7). The left vertical line in Figure 6.1 shows that
the Fed launched its LSAP1 when uncertainty in credit markets was highly elevated.
To a lesser extent, this also true for the announcement of the ECB’s outright monetary
transactions (OMT), which was initiated in the midst of the euro area debt crisis. In con-
trast, the APP was announced at times when the euro area corporate bond spread had
already fallen below its historical average of about 1.73%, i.e. when bond risk premia
were already substantially compressed. In such an environment, however, the model of
the previous section predicts that central bank asset purchases have a smaller impact on
long-term interest rates than in times of heightened uncertainty. In particular, while the
duration channel and the credit risk channel for distressed euro area sovereigns might
still be eﬀective, we would expect the APP to have only a minor impact via the local
supply channel.
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6.2. Event Study Specification
To assess the overall eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s public sector purchase program, I use the
event study framework to measure if sovereign and corporate bond yields changed sig-
niﬁcantly on certain (important) announcement dates.4 Obviously, selecting the event
dates carefully is a prerequisite to be able to draw causal conclusions regarding the im-
pact of the program. In particular, focusing on the announcement and implementation
dates would be inappropriate in our case. The reason is that market participants increa-
singly expected the ECB’s operation before it was oﬃcially announced, not only because
LSAPs had been successfully implemented by other central banks, but also because the
likelihood of an asset purchase program has already been implicitly communicated to
the market in the course of the second half of 2014.5
Furthermore, after the implementation of the ﬁrst round of government bond purcha-
ses (March 09, 2015), I consider only press conferences as event dates that included at
least indirect newswith respect to asset purchases. The rational is thatmarket agents be-
came increasingly accustomed to the contingencies for potential APP adjustments, such
that inﬂation and output developments arguably became more important than oﬃcial
central bank communication.
In the following, I perform an extended event-study to estimate the overall APP’s ef-
fectiveness. Compared to existing event studies, like those by Altavilla et al. (2015) and
De Santis (2016), for instance, I use a wider andmore contemporary data set concerning
the APP event dates (Table 6.1 lists all event dates included in our baseline approach).
Therefore, I can account for the variations in the size and composition of the program
that were implemented in the period between March 2015 and December 2016. While
the results from the previous studies suggest that the APP successfully lowered yields
mainly at its beginning, I am able to draw conclusions regarding the overall eﬀective-
ness of the program.
4This section is based on joint work with my colleague Konstantin Kuck. I gratefully acknowledge access
to Datastream/Bloomberg etc. provided by DALAHO, University of Hohenheim.
5Thatmarkets expected asset purchase programs before theywere oﬃcially announced could also explain
why traditional event studies ﬁnd a lower yield impact for the second and third rounds of QE in the US
and the UK (Cahill et al., 2013; Martin and Milas, 2012).
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Date Event Description
Mar. 25, 2014 Draghi speech at the Science Po, Paris. First tentative indication of the possibility of
asset purchases (Draghi, 2014a).
Apr. 24, 2014 Draghi speech at the Conference De Nederlandsche Bank 200 years, Amsterdam. Furt-
her indication of asset purchase program contingent on deteriorating inﬂation (Draghi,
2014g).
Aug. 22, 2014 Draghi speech at Jackson Hole emphasizing a deteriorating outlook of inﬂation. Stron-
ger indication of upcoming asset purchases (Draghi, 2014j).
Sept. 04, 2014 ECB press conference: Announcement of ABS purchase program (ABSPP) and new
covered bond purchase program (CBPP3). Decision to lower main reﬁnancing rate by
10 basis points to 0.05% and deposit facility rate to -0.20% (ECB, 2014a).
Sept. 12, 2014 News conference following a meeting of Euro Area Finance Ministers in Milan.
Sept. 24, 2014 Draghi interview with Europe1 (Draghi, 2014d).
Sept. 25, 2014 Draghi interview with Lithuanian business daily Verslo Zinios (Draghi, 2014c).
Oct. 02, 2014 ECB press conference announcing operational details of ABSPP and CBPP3 (ECB,
2014b).
Oct. 10, 2014 Draghi statement at the annual IMF Meeting, Washington DC (Draghi, 2014i).
Oct. 24, 2014 Draghi speech at the Euro Area Summit, Brussels (Draghi, 2014b).
Nov. 06, 2014 ECB press conference: First time that introductory statement includes reference to the
ECB’s balance sheet. Further statement that Governing Council is unanimous in its
commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate (ECB,
2014c).
Nov. 17, 2014 Draghi introductory remarks at the Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs CommiĴee of the
European Parliament (Draghi, 2014e).
Nov. 21, 2014 Draghi speech at the Frankfurt European Banking Congress (Draghi, 2014h).
Nov. 27, 2014 Draghi introductory remarks at the Finish parliament and speech at the University of
Helsinki (Draghi, 2014f).
Dec. 04, 2014 ECB press conference: no change in policy measures but further hints of upcoming QE
(ECB, 2014d).
Jan. 02, 2015 Draghi interview with HandelsblaĴ (Draghi, 2015c).
Jan. 08, 2015 Draghi leĴer to European Parliament (Draghi, 2015d).
Jan. 14, 2015 Draghi interview with ’Die Zeit’ (Draghi, 2015b).
Jan. 22, 2015 ECB press conference. At 14:40 EST announcement to purchase Euro Area public and
private sector securities (PSPP) fore60 billion per month until Sept. 16. Information on
eligible maturities announced at 15:10 EST (ECB, 2015d).
Mar. 05, 2015 ECB press conference: announcement to start PSPP at Mar. 09, 2015 (ECB, 2015e).
Mar. 09, 2015 ECB starts with the implementation of QE.
Jul. 16, 2015 ECB press conference: tentative evidence of further QE (ECB, 2015f).
Sep. 03, 2015 ECB press conference: issuer limit for total asset purchases increased from 25% to 33%
(ECB, 2015g).
Oct. 22, 2015 ECB press conference: no change in policy measures but signal for further accommo-
dation by stating that “the asset purchase programme provides suﬃcient ﬂexibility in
terms of adjusting its size, composition and duration (ECB, 2015h).”
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Jan. 21, 2016 ECB press conference: strong indication that PSPPwill be enlarged inMarch 2016 given
the weak Euro Area inﬂation and growth rate (ECB, 2016d).
Mar. 10, 2016 ECB press conference: enlargement of purchase program to e80 billion per month at
least until March 2017. Announcement that asset purchases can also include corporate
bonds of the private sector (CSPP). Additional announcement to launch four targeted
long-term reﬁnancing operations (TLTRO2) with maturity of four years beginning in
June 2016. Decision to lower deposit facility rate to -0.40% and, in Q&A, the remark
that helicopter money is a very interesting concept (ECB, 2016c).
Jun. 02, 2016 ECB press conference: announcement to start CSPP on Jun. 08, 2016 and timing infor-
mation concerning TLTRO2 (ECB, 2016e).
Oct. 20, 2016 ECB press conference: indication the QE will be prolonged in December 2016 (ECB,
2016f).
Dec. 08, 2016 ECBpress conference: QE is extended beyondMarch 2017 andwill continue atmonthly
purchases of e60 billion at least until December 2017. Maturity range increased from
2-30 years to 1-30 years. Furthermore, bonds with yields below deposit facility rate are
made eligible for purchase (ECB, 2016g).
Table 6.1.: APP baseline event dates
I study the overall eﬀect of the ECB’s purchase program on the basis of a dummy
regressions of the form,
∆yt = α+ θ∆yt−1 +
k∑
j=1
βjDj,t +
k∑
j=1
γjDj,t−1 + ϵt, ⟨6.1⟩
where∆yt is the close-to-close (one-day) change in bond yields, or the (daily) return of
a given asset, α is a constant, andDj,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 at the
event date j and zero otherwise.6 The total estimated one-day (yield) eﬀect due to the
APP equals the sum of the βj coeﬃcients over all of the k event dates considered. The
overall eﬀect of the ECB’s purchase program, hence, is estimated as the cumulated yield
change around the identiﬁed policy events. Likewise, the two-day eﬀects are given by
the sum of the βj and γj coeﬃcients.7 To assess the statistical relevance of the estimated
eﬀect, I perform a Wald-type test to see whether the sum over all βj (or both βj and γj)
coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
6Note, if necessary, I included additional lags of the dependent variable in order to correctly specify
Equation 6.1.
7Estimating Equation 6.1 using a series of two-day changes resulted in strong (artiﬁcial) autocorrelation
issues in the error term, implying amodelmisspeciﬁcation. From an econometric perspective,measuring
two-day changes as cumulative sum of the coeﬃcients on both the dummies and the lagged dummies,
βj and γj , thus seemed more suitable.
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Beyond that, I follow Altavilla et al. (2015) and carry out a ‘controlled’ event study to
mitigate the risk that estimates are confounded by other factors aﬀecting the assets un-
der consideration. Speciﬁcally, I use a second speciﬁcation, where I include the change
in the Bloomberg News Index as control variable8:
∆yt = α+ θ∆yt−1 +
k∑
j=1
βjDj,t +
k∑
j=1
γjDj,t−1 + η1∆Newst + η2∆Newst−1 + ϵt, ⟨6.2⟩
This variable quantiﬁes in one measure the extent to which macroeconomic indicators
exceed or fall short of consensus estimates. By including this variable, I try to isolate
the eﬀect of the asset purchase program on our dependent variables. In the following, I
choose the controlled study as my baseline speciﬁcation.
6.2.1. Event Study Results
Effects on Sovereign Yields Table 6.2 summarizes the impact of the APP on sovereign
and corporate bond yields and the other assets under consideration. Panel (a) displays
the estimated one- and two-day changes in the government bond yields of the four big-
gest euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) as well as the GDP-weighted
change in yields of euro area government bonds. First, the results reveal a substantial
cross-country heterogeneity in the yield response of the selected euro area countries.
For instance, for one-day yield changes in the 10-year maturity bucket, the results range
from insigniﬁcant −35 basis points for German Bunds, to highly signiﬁcant −112 basis
points for Italian government bonds. Second, across all maturities, I observe the stron-
gest response in bond for Italy and Spain.Moreover, the estimated responses to the APP
are signiﬁcant for all countries and across maturities, except for German bonds when
looking at one-day changes.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that yield changes appear ampliﬁed and longer-term
yields generally declined more than short-term yields once a two-day event window is
considered. In fact, yields across all maturities show a substantially more pronounced
eﬀect in case of the two-day speciﬁcation. One possible explanation for these diﬀerences
with respect to the window length could be that more time was needed for the policy
events to feed through to longer durations. This may lend further support to the hypot-
8First diﬀerences are preferred since yield changes are stationary variables whereas the level of news
index rather seems to be I(1). Using the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the news index hence has the advantage that
all variables in Equation 6.2 exhibit the same order of integration.
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hesis that market participants needed some time to ‘digest’ the news about the APP
policy events.
This substantial cross-country heterogeneity has interesting implications with regard
to the transmission channels of the APP. Assuming that the Eurosystem buys roughly
the same maturity bucket for each eligible euro area country, the diﬀerent yield reacti-
ons should be largely aĴributable to the diﬀerent degrees of credit risk of the respective
sovereigns.
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Panel (a): Changes in sovereign bond yields
5-year maturity 10-year maturity 20-year maturity
Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain
1-day change −0.5056∗∗∗ −0.0796 −0.2086 −1.0280∗∗∗−0.6196∗∗ −0.5201∗∗ −0.3538 −0.5676∗∗∗−1.1212∗∗∗−0.8138∗∗∗ −0.4405∗ −0.2872 −0.5206∗∗ −0.9082∗∗∗−0.8164∗∗∗
2-day change −0.9520∗∗∗ −0.3648∗ −0.5931∗∗∗ −1.3041∗∗∗−1.1599∗∗∗ −1.0396∗∗∗ −0.6548∗∗ −1.0447∗∗∗−1.6167∗∗∗−1.3628∗∗∗ −1.0183∗∗∗ −0.8158∗∗ −1.0998∗∗∗−1.4168∗∗∗−1.4219∗∗∗
Panel (b): Changes in corporate bond yields
Non-ﬁnancial corporations, 5–10-year maturity Financial corporations, 5–10-year maturity
1-day change −0.3593∗∗ −0.3237∗∗
2-day change −0.8365∗∗∗ −0.7707∗∗∗
Panel (c): Changes in the stock market
EuroStoxx50 Germany France Italy Spain
13.70∗ 11.58 10.55 21.13∗∗ 15.58∗∗
Panel (d): Changes in inﬂation expectations
5-year inﬂation 10-year inﬂation 20-year inﬂation
0.3370∗ 0.0588 0.2423
Panel (e): Changes in euro overnight interest swaps
1-year 3-year 5-year
−0.0556 −0.0795 −0.1988
Panel (z): Changes in Euro-exchange rates
USD/EUR GBP/EUR CHF/EUR JPY/EUR NEER
−11.44∗∗∗ −7.76∗∗ −1.64 −10.29∗∗∗ −5.87∗∗∗
Panel (h): Changes in forward-looking stock market volatility
VSTOXX50 VIX
−18.53∗∗ −8.7837
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 6.2.: Asset price eﬀects around APP announcement dates (controlled event study)
6.2. Event Study Speciﬁcation
If I further assume that German Bunds represent the benchmark for non-defaultable
bonds, then the decrease in German yields should be a combination of the signaling
channel and the duration risk channel. Given that intermediate overnight-index swap ra-
tes (calculated as the average of 1 to 5-year OIS rates, cf. Table 6.2, Panel (e)), which I
interpret as a proxy for the signaling channel, declined by about 10 basis points, the
duration channel measured as the yield diﬀerence between two-day changes in 5-year
German Bunds and average OIS-rates accounts for approximately 36 − 11 = 25 basis
points of the overall reduction in yields.9
Hence, the yield spreads with respect to German Bunds reﬂect in large parts the
country-speciﬁc contributions of the credit risk channel (see also Altavilla et al., 2015).
The corresponding results are depicted in Table 6.3. As expected, the results highlight
that the governments of the relatively vulnerable countries (Italy, Spain) beneﬁted the
most from the ECB’s asset purchase program. Actually, the Italian spread declined bet-
ween 76 and 96 basis points depending on the maturity. I think this is a plausible result,
given the negative outlook for the Italian economy in the medium term.
5-year maturity 10-year maturity
EA France Italy Spain EA France Italy Spain
∆1-day 42.60 19.90 94.84 54 16.63 21.38 76.74 46
∆2-day 58.72 22.83 93.93 79.51 38.48 38.99 96.19 70.80
Table 6.3.: Cumulated government bond spreads (in basis points)
Overall, our results suggest that the APP had an economically meaningful impact
on yields, despite being implemented during comparatively tranquil times on ﬁnancial
markets. In accordance with these results, the Bundesbank estimates that the downturn
in average interest for euro area governments has yielded savings of almost e1 trillion
(about 9% of euro area GDP), despite generally increasing public debt ratios since 2008
(Bundesbank, 2017).
Spillover Effects to Other Asset Classes Since I have identiﬁed the duration and cre-
dit risk channel, which are both sub-channels of the portfolio balance channel, to be the
9In an OIS contract, swap partners exchange ﬁxed interest rate payments for variable rate payments over
the life of the contract. The variable rate is usually derived from the interbank overnight rate of the OIS
currency. Thus, OIS yields reﬂect market expectations about the future course of the short-term interest
rate. At maturity, the swap is seĴled by computing the diﬀerence between ﬁxed rate payments and the
average of the variable rate payments on the notional swap principal. Since swap partners only exchange
net interest diﬀerentials at maturity but no principal, OIS contracts carry neither default nor liquidity
risk.
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major transmission channels of the APP, I expect it to have signiﬁcant spillovers also to
other asset classes. In general, the mechanism behind the portfolio balance channel can
be described as follows: If the central bank purchases a particular security, it reduces the
amount of that security in the portfolios of private market participants, while simulta-
neously increasing the level of reserves. If private portfolios were in equilibrium before
the transaction, the central bank has to oﬀer a higher price for the purchased security in
order for private investors to be willing to sell it. As a consequence, central bank pur-
chases bid up the price of that particular security and lower its yield. These direct eﬀects
of the APP on euro area government bond yields have been illustrated in the previous
section.10
However, as investors rebalance their portfolios by buying broadly similar assets, the
yield eﬀects are transmiĴed also to securities that are not directly purchased by the cen-
tral bank. Accordingly, in our controlled event studywith two-day windows, I estimate
that the APP signiﬁcantly lowered the yields on BBB euro area non-ﬁnancial corporate
bonds with maturities between 5-10 years by about −84 basis points, while the corre-
sponding yields of euro area ﬁnancial corporates signiﬁcantly decreased by −77 basis
points (see Table 6.2, Panel (b)).11 Moreover, the prices of European (EuroStoxx50), Ita-
lian (FTSE MIB) and Spain (IBEX35) equities rose signiﬁcantly due to the APP, while
the value of the euro experienced a signiﬁcant depreciation with respect to the USD and
other major currencies (see Panel (c) and (g), respectively). This relatively large spillo-
ver eﬀect is consistent with the decline in overall market uncertainty as measured by
VSTOXX50 (respectively VIX), because, ceteris paribus, this fosters arbitrage and the-
reby increases the spillovers to other asset classes (Panel (h)). Finally, the cumulated
changes of the inﬂation swap rates suggest that the APP stabilized medium term inﬂa-
tion expectations, but these results are not statistically signiﬁcant (Panel (e)).12 Again,
these results lend support to the hypothesis that the portfolio balance channel was the
pre-eminent transmission channel for QE in the euro area
10For empirical evidence on the portfolio balance eﬀect in the US, see e.g. Gagnon et al. (2011b); Hamilton
and Wu (2012); Joyce and Tong (2012); D’Amico et al. (2012); Greenwood and Vayanos (2014).
11It should be noticed, however, that our sample also includes the beginning of the ECB’s corporate sector
purchase program (CSPP). Therefore, it is hard to disentangle the direct yield eﬀects of the CSPP from
the indirect spillover eﬀects. But as the volume of the CSPP is relatively small compared to the purchases
of government bonds, it seems plausible that signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects exist.
12In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as the inﬂation reanchoring channel (Andrade et al., 2016b).
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6.3. Robustness Checks
As a ﬁrst robustness check, I estimate the non-controlled regression model ⟨6.1⟩. While
the results, which are displayed in Table 6.4, are qualitatively similar, they are gene-
rally smaller than those of our baseline approach. This suggests that not controlling for
macroeconomic news would lead to an underestimation of the APP’s eﬀectiveness.
As a second robustness check, I vary the set of event dates. First, I include the ECB
press conference of December 3th, 2015. In this press conference, the Governing Council
announced a series of policy measures.
First, regarding the ECB’s key interest rates, the Governing Council decided to lower
the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to −0.30%, while the rates on
the main reﬁnancing operations and the marginal lending facility remained at 0.05%
and 0.30% respectively. Second, regarding the APP, the Governing Council announ-
ced its decision to extend the APP to March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, “and in any
case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inﬂation
consistent with its aim of achieving inﬂation rates below, but close to, 2% over the me-
dium term (ECB, 2015i).” Third, it was decided to reinvest the principal payments on
the maturing securities purchased under the APP “for as long as necessary.”With these
measures, however, the Governing Council disappointed high market expectations for
a more accommodative stance, especially after the ECB had for weeks stoked expecta-
tions of a major stimulus package (Koranyi and O’Donnell, 2015). As a consequence,
including this event decreases the estimated eﬀect of the APP on ﬁnancial markets (see
Table 6.5). Nevertheless, the net impact remains present – particularly for the high risk
countries Italy and Spain.
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Panel (a): Changes in sovereign bond yields
5-year maturity 10-year maturity 20-year maturity
Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain
1-day change −0.4783∗∗∗ −0.0595 −0.1936 −0.9911∗∗∗−0.5867∗∗ −0.4877∗∗ −0.3227 −0.5355∗∗ −1.0645∗∗∗−0.7674∗∗∗ −0.4038∗ −0.2515 −0.4776∗ −0.8590∗∗∗−0.7575∗∗
2-day change −0.9202∗∗∗ −0.3411∗ −0.5721∗∗∗ −1.2587∗∗∗−1.1278∗∗∗ −1.0042∗∗∗ −0.6190∗∗ −1.0075∗∗∗−1.5576∗∗∗−1.3147∗∗∗ −0.9794∗∗∗ −0.7773∗∗ −1.0542∗∗∗−1.3616∗∗∗−1.3628∗∗∗
Panel (b): Changes in corporate bond yields
Non-ﬁnancial corporations, 5–10-year maturity Financial corporations, 5–10-year maturity
1-day change −0.3401∗∗ −0.3079∗∗
2-day change −0.8126∗∗∗ −0.7527∗∗∗
Panel (c): Changes in the stock market
EuroStoxx50 Germany France Italy Spain
13.89∗ 11.65∗ 10.75 21.37∗∗ 16.04∗∗
Panel (d): Changes in inﬂation expectations
5-year inﬂation 10-year inﬂation 20-year inﬂation
0.3249∗ 0.0720 0.2304
Panel (e): Changes in euro overnight interest swaps
1-year 3-year 5-year
−0.0525 −0.0743 −0.1771
Panel (z): Changes in Euro-exchange rates
USD/EUR GBP/EUR CHF/EUR JPY/EUR NEER
−11.12∗∗∗ −8.05∗∗ −1.74 −9.98∗∗∗ −5.71∗∗∗
Panel (h): Changes in forward-looking stock market volatility
VSTOXX50 VIX
−19.55∗∗ −9.3681
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 6.4.: Asset price eﬀects around APP announcement dates (uncontrolled event study)
Panel (a): Changes in sovereign bond yields
5-year maturity 10-year maturity 20-year maturity
Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain
1-day change −0.3532∗∗ 0.1101 −0.0247 −0.8064∗∗∗−0.4230∗ −0.3688∗ −0.1431 −0.3426 −0.8711∗∗∗−0.5656∗ −0.3015 −0.1299 −0.3420 −0.6905∗∗ −0.5801∗
2-day change −0.7385∗∗∗ −0.1161 −0.3766∗ −1.0825∗∗∗−0.9434∗∗∗ −0.8221∗∗∗ −0.4103 −0.7986∗∗ −1.3379∗∗∗−1.0870∗∗∗ −0.8520∗∗ −0.6351∗ −0.9149∗∗ −1.2178∗∗∗−1.1806∗∗∗
Panel (b): Changes in corporate bond yields
Non-ﬁnancial corporations, 5–10-year maturity Financial corporations, 5–10-year maturity
1-day change −0.1888 −0.1724
2-day change −0.6284∗∗∗ −0.5841∗∗∗
Panel (c): Changes in the stock market
EuroStoxx50 Germany France Italy Spain
9.66 7.59 6.54 18.37∗ 12.86
Panel (d): Changes in inﬂation expectations
5-year inﬂation 10-year inﬂation 20-year inﬂation
0.2954 0.0360 0.1913
Panel (e): Changes in euro overnight interest swaps
1-year 3-year 5-year
0.0571 0.0625 −0.0040
Panel (z): Changes in Euro-exchange rates
USD/EUR GBP/EUR CHF/EUR JPY/EUR NEER
−8.6337∗∗∗ −5.8301∗ −1.2899 −7.8102∗∗ −5.2755∗∗∗
Panel (h): Changes in forward-looking stock market volatility
VSTOXX50 VIX
−18.50∗∗ −6.51
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 6.5.: Asset price eﬀects around APP announcement dates (including Dec 03, 2015, controlled event study)
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Figure 6.2.:Euro area yield curves at APP implementation date (Mar. 09, 2015)
⋄White squares (black diamonds) depict the closing yields one business day
before (after) the implementation date ⋄ Source: Datastream
In an alternative robustness check, I conﬁne our study to the ﬁrst oﬃcial announce-
ment and implementation dates (January 22, 2015 and March 09, 2015). In doing so, I
still get sizeable eﬀects on government bond yields, albeit they are substantially smaller
than the cumulated eﬀects of my baseline approach. Table 6.6 displays the regression
results. The ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant yield eﬀect around the implementation date is stri-
king (see also Figure 6.2), especially since all relevant market information on the APP
had been previously released on March 05, 2015 (ECB, 2015e). Concerning the trans-
mission channels, however, it is rather unlikely that the yield eﬀects around the im-
plementation date are evidence for the local supply channel, since no such eﬀects are
recorded for the purchases of subsequent days. Instead, Andrade et al. (2016b) argue
that the eﬀects recorded aroundMarch 09 are due to the diﬀusion of new information –
for instance on the exact maturity distribution of the purchases. Since such information
was previously unknown to market participants, this explanation is consistent with the
duration channel.
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Panel (a): Changes in sovereign bond yields
5-year maturity 10-year maturity 20-year maturity
Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain Euro Area Germany France Italy Spain
1-day change −0.0464 −0.0129 −0.0035 −0.1222∗ −0.0357 −0.0200 −0.1527∗∗∗−0.1755∗∗∗−0.1672∗∗ −0.0932 0.0135 −0.1786∗∗∗−0.1854∗∗∗−0.2375∗∗∗−0.1603∗∗
2-day change −0.1650∗∗∗ −0.0808 −0.1161∗∗ −0.1569∗ −0.1113 −0.2732∗∗∗ −0.3114∗∗∗−0.3203∗∗∗−0.2846∗∗∗−0.1983∗ −0.3392∗∗∗ −0.3780∗∗∗−0.3768∗∗∗−0.4876∗∗∗−0.4098∗∗∗
Panel (b): Changes in corporate bond yields
Non-ﬁnancial corporations, 5–10-year maturity Financial corporations, 5–10-year maturity
1-day change −0.0868∗∗ −0.0871∗∗
2-day change −0.1754∗∗∗ −0.1727∗∗∗
Panel (c): Changes in the stock market
EuroStoxx50 Germany France Italy Spain
1.39 1.51 0.92 3.15 3.15
Panel (d): Changes in inﬂation expectations
5-year inﬂation 10-year inﬂation 20-year inﬂation
0.0706 0.0746 0.0547
Panel (e): Changes in euro overnight interest swaps
1-year 3-year 5-year
−0.0140 −0.0166 −0.0459
Panel (z): Changes in Euro-exchange rates
USD/EUR GBP/EUR CHF/EUR JPY/EUR NEER
−1.5982∗ −1.4737∗ −1.1247∗∗ −0.9374 −0.3091
Panel (h): Changes in forward-looking stock market volatility
VSTOXX50 VIX
−2.65 −2.37
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 6.6.: Asset price eﬀects around January 22, and March 9, 2015 (controlled event study)
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Relation to the Literature In comparison, the econometric results of the present study
are somewhat larger than those found by Altavilla et al. (2015). For a one-day window,
the laĴer estimate the APP eﬀect on GDP-weighted euro area 10-year sovereign bonds
to be −29 basis points, and −47 basis points in case of a two-day window. The cor-
responding estimates of the present study are −33 basis points and −74 basis points,
respectively. Evidently, this diﬀerence results mainly from the larger event set of the
study at hand.
In contrast, Andrade et al. (2016a) conﬁne their event study only to the APP’s announ-
cement and implementation date (January 22 andMarch 09, 2015), and to control for QE
expectations prior to the announcement, they use survey information from Bloomberg
to capture the size shock of the announcement. As they document that prior to the an-
nouncement the median expectations for the size of the program were lying at about
e550 billion, their scaled estimates imply that eligible 10-year sovereign bonds decre-
ased by −45 basis points. Using a comparable time period in the event study above
means that euro area 10-year sovereign bonds declined by−53 basis points.13 Given the
fundamental diﬀerences in controlling for pre-announcement eﬀects, the close simila-
rity between both estimates can be seen as positive evidence for the robustness of my
results.
Thework byDe Santis (2016) oﬀers another interesting benchmark. By running amore
sophisticated error correction model, which, beyond APP events, accounts for macro
risk factors like liquidity risk, credit risk, and systematic risk, De Santis (2016) ﬁnds that
theAPP reduced theGDP-weighted 10-year euro area sovereign yield by 63 basis points.
In addition, he also ﬁnds that countries with a bad credit outlook (Italy−80 basis points,
Spain −75 basis points) experienced a larger drop in yields than countries with a beĴer
outlook (Germany, −43 basis points).14 In conclusion, this means that the econometric
results of the present study are broadly in line with the other empirical evidence in the
literature.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
Consistent with the predictions from a credit risk augmented preferred-habitat model,
I have documented that the ECB’s large-scale asset purchase program of euro area go-
13The cumulated two-day change for all events from March 25, 2014 until March 09, 2015.
14The econometric analysis be De Santis (2016) focuses on a time period between September 2014 and
October 2015.
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vernment bonds had a substantial eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets. In particular, my results
suggest that the distressed periphery countries beneﬁted more from the APP than the
euro area core countries. In this regard, the signiﬁcant heterogeneity across euro area
yields is likely governed by the diﬀerent degrees of credit risk of the respective sover-
eigns. In addition, the duration risk channel seems to have played an important role.
Apart frommoral hazard issues, my ﬁndings therefore suggest that in order to maxi-
mize the APP’s overall eﬀectiveness, asset purchases in the euro area should be geared
towards long duration bonds of the countries with the lowest credit quality. Since, ho-
wever, moral hazard issues play a key role in the current design of the euro area, it
might be a sound decision to keep the national purchase volumes conditional on the
ECB’s capital key. Moreover, from a legal standpoint, the ECB would get into great dif-
ﬁculties explaining why discretionary bond purchases of distressed sovereigns would
not fall into the realm of monetary ﬁnancing of member states.
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7. The Credit Channel of Asset Purchase Programs
So far, this analysis – as the vast majority of research on LSAPs in the literature – has fo-
cused on the capital market eﬀects of LSAPs, while any eﬀects on the credit channel have
received much less aĴention. This downplay of the credit view may reﬂect the fact that
policymakers expected LSAPs to work mainly through changes in asset prices, because
banks were forced to deleverage in the ﬁnancial crisis. The following excerpt from the
minutes of the Bank of England conﬁrms this assessment:
“A signiﬁcant programme of asset purchaseswas likely to be necessary in or-
der to make up this shortfall in nominal spending. The current strains in the
ﬁnancial system, and in particular the pressure on banks to reduce the size
of their balance sheets, meant bankswere less likely to increase their lending
substantially following an increase in their reserves […] The CommiĴee no-
ted that […] asset purchaseswere likely to bemost eﬀective if theywere pur-
chased from the domestic non-bank ﬁnancial sector rather than frombanks.”
(Bank of England, 2009, pp. 9-11)
To check whether this scepticism about the credit view is valid I am going to discuss
the theoretical foundations and the empirical evidence for the credit channel of uncon-
ventionalmonetary policies. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, the credit channel is usually split
into two sub-channels, the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.
Formally, the microfoundations of the credit view hinge on information asymmetries
between borrowers and lenders (see inter alia Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1990). As a consequence, certain borrowers are unable to tap capitalmarkets
but depend on bank loans as the only source of external ﬁnance.1 Thus, ﬁnancial fricti-
ons due to agency costs provide the rationale for the imperfect substitutability between
loans and bonds in this class of models. Another corollary of the credit view is that ex-
1Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Bolton and Freixas (2000), for instance, show that insuﬃcient capital
can constrain ﬁrms’ ability to raise funds on capital markets. Alternatively, Diamond (1991) argues that
ﬁrms lacking a certain reputation (or rating) face diﬃculties when they try to issue bonds on capital
markets.
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Figure 7.1.: The broad credit channel
ternal ﬁnance is more costly than internal ﬁnance, which gives rise to an external ﬁnance
premium violating the Modigliani-Miller assumptions (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988).
The credit view’s emphasis on the importance of bank loans contrasts with the money
view. In the laĴer, deposit creation can give rise to liquidity or real balance eﬀects, but
since the supply of deposits is supposed to be a stable function of the monetary base,
banks do not require much aĴention concerning the money view. In fact, bank loans are
pooled togetherwith other debt instruments in a generic bondmarket – rendering ﬁnan-
cial intermediation essentially irrelevant. In otherwords, whilst the implicit assumption
of the money view is that monetary policy can directly inﬂuence the stock of (broad) mo-
ney, the credit view deals with the impact of monetary policy on the ﬂow of credit.2 As
illustrated in Figure 7.1, the policy-induced eﬀects on the ﬁnancial strength of bank-
dependent borrowers are usually referred to as the balance sheet channel, whereas the
eﬀects on loan supply are subsumed under the bank lending channel. In what follows, I
will discuss both channels in more detail.
7.1. Balance Sheet Channel
In principle, loan commitments by a proﬁt maximizing bank should increase with bor-
rowers’ willingness to pay higher loan rates. However, Stigliĵ and Weiss (1981, 1992)
2Trautwein (2000) oﬀers an excellent literature review about the credit channel as well as a thorough
comparison with the money view.
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Figure 7.2.: Credit rationing
show that if higher loan rates aĴract only risky borrowers, information asymmetries
can lead to a classical adverse selection problem.3 As illustrated by point A in Figure 7.2,
banks’ credit supply starts to decrease at a certain level of the loan rate, and the resulting
rationing equilibrium [AB] reduces welfare, as it prevents the realization of positive net
present value projects (see inter alia Greenwald and Stigliĵ, 1986; Hubbard, 1995; Jimé-
nez et al., 2014; Cingano et al., 2016).4 Yet if banksmitigate the information asymmetries
between borrowers and lenders by improving their screening ormonitoring techniques,
this may lead to an outward shift in the loan supply (LS1 ) for any given level of the loan
rate (Diamond, 1984, 1991; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
In general, however, banks can only imperfectly control their borrowers’ risk taking
incentives. Therefore, banks demand collateral in order to be willing to grant loans. The
provision of collateral serves as a discipline device against borrowers’ excessive risk
taking, because banks can seize the collateral in case of default.5 The collateral requi-
rements now open up the balance sheet channel of monetary policy, because changes
in the policy stance have an inverse impact on the collateral values of potential borro-
3Other seminal contributions on the microeconomic consequences of asymmetric information on credit
markets include Jaﬀee and Russell (1976); Townsend (1979); and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
4Bester and Hellwig (1987) show that credit rationing can also occur as an ex post phenomenon, namely
if borrowers have an incentive to choose a risky investment after the loan has been granted. This is the
classic moral hazard argument.
5In a sense, posting collateral helps to internalize the negative externalities emanating from information
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, such that credit rationing can (principally) be avoided
(Barro, 1976; Bester, 1985, 1987).
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wers.6 Thismechanism, whereupon interest rate changes are ampliﬁed via the net wealth
of borrowers, is usually referred to as the ﬁnancial accelerator.
7.1.1. Simple Model of the Financial Accelerator
The main idea of the ﬁnancial accelerator and its implications for monetary policy can
be illustrated by a static version version of the Bernanke et al. (1996) model.7 The model
considers a ﬁrm with equity E that transforms input x into output f(x). For simplicity,
input and output prices are normalized to unity. Furthermore, the ﬁrm can raise a bank
loan L carrying an interest rate iL. The maximum amount of inputs the ﬁrm can aﬀord
is thus x = L+ E.
Money View Firstly consider the case without information asymmetries. In this fricti-
onless benchmark, the optimization problem reads
max
L
= f(L+ E)− (1 + iL)L ⟨7.1⟩
and the ﬁrst-order condition is
f ′(L+ E) = (1 + iL). ⟨7.2⟩
This frictionless result reﬂects the money view; without information asymmetries, the
ﬁrm can substitute any decrease in E with an equivalent increase in L, which implies
that the ﬁnancial accelerator shuts down completely. As a consequence, the ﬁrm’s net we-
alth neither aﬀects investment nor output and the interest rate channel suﬃces to describe
the transmission of monetary policy. Optimality requires that an increase in the (gross)
loan rate (1+ iL) has to be met by an increase in marginal productivity f ′(L+E). Since
with diminishing marginal returns of f(x) this can only be achieved by reducing inves-
tment in inputs, the optimality condition establishes the conventional inverse relation
between interest rates, investment and output.
6In this sense, expansionarymonetary policy could be another reason for the shift fromLS0 toLS1 in Figure
7.2.
7This simple model is laid out in Freixas and Rochet (2008, ch. 6). Another well-known model that analy-
zes the importance of collateral constraints for macroeconomic dynamics is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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Credit View Next, consider the case when information asymmetries between the ﬁrm
and its bank requires full collateralization of the loan.8 With this collateral constraint,
the repayment of the loan must be covered by the ﬁrm’s assetK multiplied by its price
q, such that the optimization problem becomes
max
L
f(L+ E)− (1 + iL)L ⟨7.3⟩
s.t. L ≤ qK1 + iL , ⟨7.4⟩
and the ﬁrst-order condition
f ′(L+ E) = 1 + iL + λ. ⟨7.5⟩
Here, λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. If the collateral constraint is binding, λ beco-
mes positive, which is tantamount to
f ′
(
qK
1 + iL
+ E
)
> (1 + iL). ⟨7.6⟩
Thus, the Langrangemultiplier λ represents the external ﬁnance premium that is critically
bound to the collateral value qK; a decrease in qK limits the borrowing capacity of the
ﬁrm,which leads to an endogenous increase in λ. Thereby,monetary policy aﬀects bank
lending, since changes in the policy rate inversely aﬀect the asset price q (not modeled
here). Once again, this should illustrate that monetary policy in the credit view exerts
an inﬂuence on investment beyond its pure eﬀect on user costs, because interest rate
changes are ampliﬁed by their inverse impact on the net wealth of potential borrowers
(the ﬁnancial accelerator).9
7.2. Bank Lending Channel
The literature on the bank lending channel basically shifts the focus from borrower’s
balance sheets to the balance sheet of banks. The key research question in this ﬁeld is
whether monetary policy can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the supply (or relative price) of bank
8Of course, full collateralization is rather uncommon in practice. In this exercise, however, it serves as a
benchmark to highlight the basic mechanism of the ﬁnancial accelerator.
9There is extensive literature on the empirical relevance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. Bernanke et al. (1996)
oﬀer a discussion and references.
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loans independently of borrower-related channels. A corollary of this argument is that
neither borrowers nor lenders should regard loans and bonds as perfect substitutes.
7.2.1. Deposit View
Earlier models of the bank lending channel assumed that monetary policy inﬂuenced
the supply of bank loans by restricting a bank’s access to loanable funds. Thiswasmostly
explained by the presence of minimum reserve requirements which enforced a quan-
titative constraint on bank balance sheets (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Kashyap and
Stein, 1994, 1995).
Suppose that banks minimum reserve requirements amount to τD. If we apply the
same variable classiﬁcation as above (Lt for loans, Bt for bonds, Rt for reserves, andDt
for deposits), but neglect equity as well as excess reserves, the bank balance sheet equals
Lt +Bt +Rt = Dt, ⟨7.7⟩
Since the minimum reserve requirement stipulates that Rt = τDt, equation ⟨7.7⟩ can be
rearranged to
Lt +Bt = (1− τ)Dt. ⟨7.8⟩
If monetary policy uses the level of reserves as its policy instrument, a contractionary
open market operation results in an overproportionate decline in deposits, since
∆Dt = ∆(Lt +Bt) =
1
τ
∆Rt. ⟨7.9⟩
As shown by the middle term of equation ⟨7.9⟩ – if loans and bonds are imperfect sub-
stitutes such that banks cannot just absorb deposit losses by selling bonds – the shortfall
of deposits force banks to cut down on their loan supply. Since this tightens the credit
conditions of bank-dependent borrowers, the reduction of economic activity is conse-
quently stronger than the one implied by a mere increase in capital market rates. In this
way, the bank lending channel acts as an additional ampliﬁer that works through the supply
side of the loan market.
Critique of the Deposit View Given the profound institutional and regulatory chan-
ges since the 1980s, the deposit view on the bank lending channel has been increasingly
criticized. For example, Romer and Romer (1990) argue that policy-induced reductions
in deposits must not entail any adjustment in loan supply, because banks could sim-
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ply substitute reserveable deposits with other, non-reservable sources of funding (such
as certiﬁcates of deposits, for instance). Thus, the Romer-Romer critique is based on a
Modigliani-Miller type of argument that assumes frictionless markets for banks’ who-
lesale funding.
However, a valid refutation against the Modigliani-Miller argument is that whole-
sale ﬁnancing is typically not covered by deposit insurance, such that any bank that
borrows on wholesale markets is subject to the same agency problems that restrict hou-
seholds and ﬁrms. Hence, the perfect substitutability between reserveable deposit and
non-reserveable wholesale ﬁnancing has been called into question. Stein (1998), for in-
stance, provides evidence that theModigliani-Miller logic underlying the Romer-Romer
critique fails to hold if there is asymmetric information concerning the value of a bank’s
assets. On the individual bank level, it has been shown that small, less liquid or weakly
capitalized banks are particularly responsive to monetary policy shocks, which is seen
as positive evidence for the bank lending channel.10
Notwithstanding this dispute about the Romer-Romer critique, there aremore funda-
mental objections against this deposit view on the bank lending channel.11 Most impor-
tantly, modern central banks do not use the quantity of reserves as a monetary policy
tool. Instead, they set the price of reserves and let its supply adjust endogenously. From
a macro perspective, the notion that ﬁnancial intermediation is constrained by an exo-
genous amount of loanable funds thus seems to be misguided (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015).
Indeed, precisely the opposite seems to be true. Banks createdeposits by extending credit
to households and ﬁrms, while the central bank satisﬁes any potentially arising reserve
needs along a perfectly elastic supply schedule (Disyatat, 2008). A corollary of this argu-
ment is that themoneymultiplier logic underlying the deposit view of the bank lending
channel is essentially reversed.
Under these circumstances the bank lending channel boils down to a price-theoretic
argument in bank funding markets. If the policy rate is raised above the rate on bank
deposits, a bank with reﬁnancing needs will try to aĴract deposits from other banks by
marginally increasing its deposit rate. Competition amongst banks will thus bid up the
10The size argument is put forward by Kashyap and Stein (1995); liquidity by Kashyap and Stein (2000),
whereas capital is emphasized by Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Van den Heuvel (2002), among others.
11Since restrictive monetary policy also weakens the collateral values of potential borrowers, a reduction
in loan supply is also consistent with the operation of the balance sheet channel. As a consequence, it
turned out to be extremely diﬃcult to empirically separate the bank lending channel from the balance
sheet channel, which further contributed to the dispute about its eﬀectiveness (Oliner and Rudebusch,
1995; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
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average deposit rate until it reaches the level of the policy rate. Since, however, banks’
maturity transformation implies a relatively sticky return on existing loans, rising reﬁ-
nancing costs result in a proﬁt squeeze for banks. The sole option to restore proﬁtability
is thus to substantially raise the rates on new lending, which is, however, bound to pro-
duce a persistent decline in the volume of credit (Spahn, 2014). Consistent with this
argument, Ehrmann et al. (2003) show that in the euro zone, variations in reﬁnancing
costs have a stronger eﬀect on bank proﬁtability than in the US, since euro area banks
hold a larger fraction of ﬁxed rate long-term loans relative to US banks.12
7.2.2. Capital View
As quantitative reserve constraints have ceased to limit the supply of bank loans in mo-
dern economies, capital remains the key quantitative constraint for bank lending (Peek
and Rosengren, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). In fact, this could be either due to re-
gulatory requirements (Adrian and Shin, 2014), or because of asymmetric information
on bank funding markets (Bernanke, 2007; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). If a bank lender
knows that the capital ratio of the bank determines its own stake and therefore its incen-
tive to monitor borrowers, a higher capital ratio improves the bank’s access to external
funding sources. In other words, since banks themselves act as borrowers, the logic of
the ﬁnancial accelerator applies equally well to them. For banks, however, this mecha-
nism is called the bank capital channel (Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Van den Heuvel, 2002,
2006).
To see the role ofmonetary policy in this context, consider the case of amonetary tigh-
tening. Firstly, as banks are exposed to interest rate risks, rising policy rates reduce bank
proﬁts. Unless banks can substantially rise the rates on new loans (or lower their divi-
dend payments), their capital will eventually be lower. Secondly, undermark-to-market
accounting, rising policy rates cause an adverse valuation eﬀect that directly increases
banks’ leverage ratios. Thirdly, if tighter monetary policy causes the default rates on
bank loans to go up, risk-sensitive capital requirements have to go up as well. Finally,
notice also that there is a potential feedback loop between the traditional bank lending
channel and the bank capital channel. If wholesale funding has to pay a “lemon premium”
because it is not covered by deposit insurance, those costs should be higher for banks
12It should be noted, however, that even prior to the crisis there has been a large heterogeneity in the
policy pass-through to lending rates in the euro zone (see e.g. Mojon, 2000 or Kok and Werner, 2006). A
plausible factor could be that the ratio between ﬁxed and variable rate loans varies substantially between
the members of the euro zone.
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with low capital ratios. Put diﬀerently, the level of capital can serve as a signal of banks’
creditworthiness. Banks with high capital ratios are thus less exposed to asymmetric in-
formation problems, which makes such banks more immune to policy induced funding
shocks (Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000). In line with this, Jiménez et al. (2012) ﬁnd that a
lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loans to ris-
kier ﬁrms, while Jiménez et al. (2012) document that for distressed commercial banks,
a tighter policy stance and worse economic conditions reduce lending substantially.
To sum up, the key characteristic of the bank capital channel is that monetary policy
aﬀects bank lending through its eﬀect on bank equity. In thisway, the bank capital channel
acts as another ampliﬁer to the standard interest rate channel.
7.2.3. Securitization and Bank Lending
Prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, the dramatic growth in securitization activities that started in
the late 1990s suggests that the eﬀectiveness of the bank lending channel has generally
decreased (see inter alia Ehrmann et al., 2003; Angeloni et al., 2003; Altunbas et al., 2004).
Firstly, since securitization allows banks to bundle together illiquid loans into tradable
Figure 7.3.: Europe securitization outstanding ⋄ ’Others’ include CDOs (Cre-
dit Default Obligations), SMEs (Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises), WBS
(Whole Business Securitization) ⋄ European securities are deﬁned as secu-
ritizations with collateral predominantly from the European continent, in-
cluding Turkey, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Iceland. ⋄ Source:
AFME/SIFMAMembers, Bloomberg, Dealogic, Thomson Reuters, prospectus
ﬁlings, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, S&P, AFME, SIFMA.
securities, it increases banks’ liquidity ratios. Secondly, securitization enables banks to
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remove credit risk from their balance sheet, which entails a regulatory capital relief and
a positive net eﬀect on loan supply (Altunbas et al., 2009). In this way, securitization
and a broader access to market-based funding sources helped banks to shield their loan
supply from monetary policy shocks (Angeloni et al., 2003; Ashcraft, 2006).13
But with the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis, securitization and interbank liquidity
markets experienced a drastic decline (see e.g. Heider et al., 2015; Frutos et al., 2016).
As unsecured holders of commercial paper refused to roll over their debt, while repo
lenders required more collateral to back up their loans, there was a run on liquidity
that led to a sudden decline in wholesale funding (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009).14
Unlike traditional bank-runs, which were triggered by uninsured depositors, this time
it was caused by short-term creditors and counterparties in interbank markets (Gorton
and Metrick, 2009).
In line with this development, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document that new len-
ding in theUS contracted substantially after the failure of LehmanBrothers.15Andwhile
this reduction in lending could simply reﬂect a drop in credit demand, they show that a
substantial part was driven by supply eﬀects. In particular, they ﬁnd that bank-speciﬁc
characteristics did play a large role in the credit squeeze: banks that were heavily reli-
ant on short-term debt cut their lending by more than did banks with beĴer access to
stable deposit funding. For Europe, this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the study of Gamba-
corta andMarques-Ibanez (2011), who demonstrate that banks with weaker core capital
positions and greater dependence on market funding experienced a sharper decline in
lending. Moreover, they ﬁnd that banks’ business models had a signiﬁcant impact on
their supply of credit. In particular, banks that were heavily involved in securitization
and non-interest income activities (e.g. investment banks) limited their loan supply to
a greater extent.
13Note that this observation essentially underscores the Romer and Romer (1990) critique. In contrast,
however, Jiménez et al. (2012) argue that empirical studies that rely on bank level data using only credit
aggregates (such as Angeloni et al., 2003; Ashcraft, 2006) systematically underestimate the bank lending
channel, because these studies are unable to capture the strong correlation between ﬁrm loan demand
and the balance sheet strength of banks. Thus, by analyzing a data set which includes information on
loan level application with granted loans, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant bank lending channel.
14Noteworthy, this paĴern also holds for more historical time-series. Jorda et al. (2017) document that
before a ﬁnancial crisis, banks are ﬁnancing their balance sheets increasinglywith non-deposit wholesale
ﬁnancing, while they increasingly turn to deposits as a source of funds after a crisis.
15Interestingly, the immediate increase in credit volumes right after Lehmanmainly reﬂected drawdowns
of existing credit lines.
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7.2.4. A Bank Lending Model of QE
The crisis experience of collapsing interbank markets spurred the interest in the eﬀects
of QE on bank lending. In this respect, remember from section 5.1.3 that LSAPs from
non-banks exert a dual liquidity eﬀect on bank balance sheets. Firstly, they lead to an
increase in reserve holdings. Secondly, they cause an increase in deposits (see Figure
5.11 for a graphical representation). Besides these direct eﬀects, those measures should
also improve the bank’s capital position, if asset purchases increase the mark-to-market
value of bank assets.16 It thus seems plausible that the policy-induced improvements
in banks’ liquidity and capital ratios could have helped banks to expand – or at least
avoid contracting – their loan supply. To illustrate these possible eﬀects via deposits and
bank capital, I will use a slightlymodiﬁed version of the two-period, partial equilibrium
model of Kashyap and Stein (1995).17
Suppose banks hold on their asset side illiquid loans (L), liquid short-term bonds (BS)
and reserves (R), but no long-term bonds.18 Their liabilities consist of equity (E), de-
posits (D), and non-deposit wholesale liabilities (WL). Hence, the representative bank
balance sheet reads
Lt +Bt,S +Rt = Et +Dt +WLt. ⟨7.10⟩
Suppose further that the short-term policy rate is at its zero lower bound. Since this im-
plies that short-term bonds and reserves become perfect substitutes, they can be combi-
ned to the variable St = Bt,S+Rt, which denotes perfectly liquid ’short-term securities’.
The above balance sheet identity can thus be wriĴen as
Lt + St = Et +Dt +WLt. ⟨7.11⟩
Another corollary of the zero lower bound is that the rate on deposits is zero, too.
Since loans cannot be liquidated in period 2, they have to pay a positive premium over
S andD, such that the return on loans (iL) is eﬀectively a spread that captures the bank
lending channel by measuring the monetary policy impact on bank returns.
16This mechanism in which central bank asset purchases redistribute net wealth towards ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries has recently been referred to as stealth recapitalization (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2014a).
17See Joyce and Spaltro (2014) and BuĴ et al. (2015) for similar approaches.
18The exclusion of long-term bonds is meant to highlight themechanism behind the bank lending channel.
As will be further discussed below, if banks only increase their bond holdings in response to monetary
policy shocks, then the bank lending channel shuts down.
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The deposit view on the bank lending channel is based on the assumption that mo-
netary policy inﬂuences bank lending by variations in the supply of reserves that have
a direct impact on aggregate deposits. It was argued above that nowadays this deposit
view has to be largely rejected, since reserves are endogenously created under conven-
tional monetary policy regimes. In this section, however, the focus rests on the eﬀects
of unconventional asset purchases which are implemented at the zero lower bound of
the short-term policy rate. In particular, it is assumed that assets are only purchased
from non-banks. Although this assumption is of course highly stylized, it ensures that
LSAPs lead to a one-on-one increase in deposits. In other words, at least for unconven-
tional asset purchases from non-banks, it seems justiﬁed to interpret monetary policy
as an exogenous shock to deposits. Since the main interest lies in the reaction of bank
loans, I simply consider an expansionary monetary policy shock (ϵM0 ) as higher than
average deposits in period 0, i.e.
D0 = D¯ + ϵM0 . ⟨7.12⟩
Once the monetary policy shock is realized in period 0, there might be a payment shock
in period 1 that that either adds or withdraws deposits from banks. Deposits in period
1 are thus given by
ρD0 + (1− ρ)D¯ + ϵP1 ⟨7.13⟩
where ρmeasures the persistence of deposits and ϵP1 ∼ N(0, σ2) represents the payment
shock.
Importantly, if banks suﬀer from a shock to deposits, they can reﬁnance the shortfall
by issuing non-deposit liabilities in both periods, while the level of loans is only de-
termined in period 0. Hence,WL0 denotes the amount of non-deposit liabilities issued
after the shock in period 0 (but before the shock in period 1), while WL1 denotes the
amount issued after the realization of the shock in period 1. Very importantly, the key
assumption of the model is that non-deposit ﬁnancing is subject to increasing marginal
costs given by
α0(WL0)2
2 and
α1(WL1)2
2 , ⟨7.14⟩
respectively. If α0 = α1 = 0, banks can raise external ﬁnance at a perfectly-elastic
supply schedule, implying that the bank lending channel shuts down completely. For
α1 > α0 > 0, however, these quadratic-cost terms reﬂect a generic version of the capital
market imperfections that explain a refutation of the Modigliani-Miller propositions.
Thus, there are two possible scenarios after the realization of deposit shock in period 1:
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Either
WL0 +D1 + E0 > L, ⟨7.15⟩
or
WL0 +D1 + E0 < L. ⟨7.16⟩
In the ﬁrst case, the bank’s funding constraint is non-binding such that it does not need
to cut down lending. In the second case, however, even after drawing down all of its
liquid securities (S), the bank is still short of funds. Therefore, it needs to issue external
funds (WL) to make up the shortage of funds. The net amount of wholesale liabilities
issued after the deposit shock in period 1 is thus
WL1 = max(0, L−WL0 −D1 − E0) ⟨7.17⟩
with the expected costs
α1
2 E(WL1)
2 = α12 E(max(0, L−WL0 −D1 − E0))
2. ⟨7.18⟩
Since a bank takes recourse to non-deposit wholesale ﬁnance only for adverse shocks to
deposits,D1 in the above equation can be substituted with the lower bound of equation
⟨7.13⟩. Furthermore, as the second moment of a uniform distribution over [a, b] equals
E(X2) = a2+b2+ab3 , while in this case we have a = 0 and b = L −WL0 − D1 − E0, it
follows that
α1
2 E(WL1)
2 = α16
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)2
⟨7.19⟩
With deposits carrying zero interest, bank proﬁtsΠ are generated from loans minus the
costs of wholesale ﬁnance, i.e.
Π = rL− α0(WL0)
2
2 −
α1E(WL1)2
2 ⟨7.20⟩
As derived in the Appendix B.5, banks optimal loan supply follows
L = 3
α1
r + r
α0
+ ρD0 + (1− ρ)D¯ − σ
2
2 + E0. ⟨7.21⟩
This loan supply function suggests that an increase in deposits due to LSAPs from non-
banks leads to an increase in bank lending. Moreover, it also highlights the potential of
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the bank capital channel. A higher value of bank equity E has a positive eﬀect on bank
lending, while higher agency costs (i.e. higher values of α1 and α2) dampen the eﬀect.
Assuming n banks and a simple loan demand function of the form
LD = Y − kr, ⟨7.22⟩
market clearing in the loan market requires that
Y − kr != nL, ⟨7.23⟩
which can be rearranged to get the equilibrium loan market rate, r, as
r = 13n
α1
+ nα0 + k
(
Y − n
(
ρD0 + (1− ρ)D¯ − σ
2
2 + E0
))
. ⟨7.24⟩
Finally, this expression can be diﬀerentiated with respect to D0 to get
∂r
∂D0
= 13n
α1
+ nα0 + k
(
∂Y
∂D0
− nρ
)
⟨7.25⟩
which means that a bank lending channel of QE exists if
∂r
∂D0
< 0. ⟨7.26⟩
As can be inferred from equation ⟨7.25⟩, this is only the case if variations in deposits
have a small impact on aggregate demand, because otherwise a rise in loan demand
would prevent a fall in the loan rate. Moreover, equations ⟨7.24⟩ and ⟨7.25⟩ show that
the interest rate response to a deposit shock increases with the costs of non-deposit
wholesale ﬁnancing, since both equations increase in α0 and α1.
Lastly, it should be noted that the model in this section is of course highly stylized. It
abstracts from the behavior of non-banks and models monetary policy only as exoge-
nous shocks to deposits. In particular, if assets are purchased fromnon-banks, banks are
not only granted an inﬂow of deposits, but they also experience an increase in reserve
holdings (see Figure 5.11). Now, in reality, the eﬀectiveness of the bank lending chan-
nel depends critically on the banking sector’s reaction to these improvements in their
liquidity and funding conditions. Only if banks use some of the additional liquidity to
increase their loan supply will LSAPs exert a positive impact on bank lending.
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7.3.1. Evidence for the UK
Contrary to the usual presumption of the bank lending channel, BuĴ et al. (2015) argue
that the instantaneous increase in deposits due to QE did not act as a stable funding
source for banks. Instead, they show that portfolio rebalancing by non-banks led to an
increase in the velocity of deposits within the banking sector. As a consequence, the
presumably tight link between reserves, (broad) money, and lending collapsed when
the Bank of England started to massively increase its reserve supply (see Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4.: UK money multiplier (lhs) and monthly average of outstanding
reserves (rhs) ⋄ Source: Bank of England
In the abovemodel, this mechanism can be explained by both the persistence parame-
ter ρ, and the variance of the payment shock σ2; a lower ρ and a higher σ2 increase the
’ﬂightiness’ of deposits relative to the baseline case. Therefore, individual banks may
decrease their loan supply, because the expected costs of wholesale ﬁnancing increase
when deposits are likely to quickly leave the bank (see equations ⟨7.19⟩ and ⟨7.21⟩, re-
spectively).
However, this argumentmight be subject to a fallacy of composition. Ultimately, asset
purchases from non-banks cause an aggregate increase in deposits.19 Therefore, even
if an individual bank is experiencing an outﬂow of deposits, it should either expect a
subsequent inﬂow of deposits, or it should know that another bank will have excess
deposits which it will lend out on the interbank market. In either case, even though
19As outlined above, for this condition to hold, money demand must remain constant.
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deposits may be quickly moving from one bank to another, aggregate funding conditions
will be improved, which should increase bank lending.
During a ﬁnancial crisis, however, there are at least two compelling arguments against
this presumption. Firstly, if banks’ liquidity preference rises, a bank facing a shortfall
of deposits might ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to borrow on the interbank market. Since
the tighter conditions on interbank markets involve higher expected costs of wholesale
funding, precautionary motives mitigate the probability that a bank would lend out
funds if it received ’ﬂighty’ deposits. A second reason why QE might have failed to
stimulate bank lending via deposit creation is that banks raised new capital (or issued
long-term debt), which eﬀectively drained deposits from the system (see Bridges and
Thomas, 2012 and BuĴ et al., 2012 for estimates of this eﬀect).
Against this background, most empirical papers for the UK cannot identify a mate-
rial impact of QE on bank lending in the UK (Goodhart and Ashworth, 2012; BuĴ et al.,
2015). Figure 7.5, which depicts an average annual loan growth of only 1.5% for the
period 2008-2017, generally supports this conjecture. However, simply looking on loan
Figure 7.5.: UK bank lending to the private sector ⋄ Adjusted for loan sales
and securitization ⋄ Source: Bank of England, Datastream.
growth as evidence for the bank lending channel is problematic, as it confuses supply
and demand eﬀects. Therefore, Joyce and Spaltro (2014) tackle this problem by showing
that QE has diﬀerent eﬀects on bank lending depending on a number of bank-speciﬁc
characteristics. Since such diﬀerences between banks in response to a monetary policy
shock can hardly be explained by changes in the demand for credit, they indicate a re-
action of the supply side consistent with the bank lending channel. In particular, Joyce
and Spaltro (2014) show that lending by small banks is more responsive to changes in
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deposits.20 Furthermore, they ﬁnd positive evidence that bank lending is positively re-
lated to banks’ capital ratio, suggesting that the eﬀect of QE on bank lendingmight have
been mitigated by the low level of capital during the crisis. Overall, these observations
justify the BoE’s intention to circumvent the banking sector. Moreover, they suggest
that the impact of QE on bank lending could have been ampliﬁed if policymakers had
accompanied asset purchases with direct equity injections into banks (He and Krishna-
murthy, 2013).
7.3.2. Evidence for the Euro Area
In contrast to the Bank of England whose unconventional measures mainly aimed at
re-activating private ﬁnancial market activity, the ECB’s program of “enhanced credit
support” was predominantly geared towards the malfunctioning European banking
sector. The reason for the diﬀerent response in part reﬂects the bank-based structure
of corporate ﬁnancing in the euro zone compared to US or UK standards (see Figure
7.6). Domestic bank credit as a percentage of non-ﬁnancial corporations’ total debt in
the US and the UK equals 29 percent, respectively 33 percent, while it accounts for over
42 percent in the euro area.21
Given this relative importance of bank credit ﬁnancing, the ECB had arguably liĴle al-
ternative to work through the banking system. For the ECB’s moneymarket operations,
the majority view is that they had a positive impact on bank lending by reducing the
crisis-elevated interest rate spreads. For instance, using a Bayesian VAR to estimate the
eﬀects of the ECB’s policy measures between November 2008 and August 2009, Lenza
et al. (2010) ﬁnd that they had a substantial positive eﬀect on euro area bank lending
(even though this positive impact was not strong enough to counteract a substantial
contraction in total credit supply, cf. Figure 7.7).22 In particular, the authors estimate
a peak positive impact on loans to households of about 1.5 percentage points, and a
maximum eﬀect on corporate loans of about 3 percentage points (relative to a no-policy
scenario). They conclude that the non-standard policymeasures played a quantitatively
20Notice that this size eﬀect is in accordancewith themodel of section 7.2.4, if we assume thatα in equation
⟨7.14⟩ is higher for smaller banks.
21Figure 7.6 also reveals a strong heterogeneity among euro area countries. While domestic bank credit
for Greek NFCs represents about 83 percent of total debt, it maĴers considerably less for French NFCs
(39 percent). Following an IMF classiﬁcation, if bank credit accounts for more (less) than 50 percent of
total debt, bank credit is perceived to have a high (low) importance for the respective jurisdiction (IMF,
2012; Bundesbank, 2014).
22The respective BVAR model for the euro area was developed by Giannone et al. (2012).
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Figure 7.6.: Domestic bank credit as a percentage of NFCs’ total debt ⋄ Bank
credit consists only of loans ⋄ Source: BIS, Eurostat, ECB, Federal Reserve Bo-
ard and Bundesbank calculations.
Figure 7.7.: Euro area bank lending to the private sector ⋄ Adjusted for loan
sales and securitization ⋄ Source: ECB, Datastream.
signiﬁcant role in stabilizing the ﬁnancial sector and the macroeconomic activity after
the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers, even if they were insuﬃcient to avoid the serious
fall in output, inﬂation and bank lending to the private sector (Figure 7.7).
The average loan growth of Figure 7.7 shows that loan developments began to stabi-
lize in the course of 2013, but conceals considerable country-speciﬁc diﬀerences between
euro area member countries. As displayed in Figure 7.8, Italian and Spanish lending ra-
tes for new business investment did not fall until 2014, while German and French rates
were beginning to decline already at the end of 2011. On the credit supply side, availa-
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Figure 7.8.: Average interest rates on corporate loans in euro area countries
⋄ Time-series are based on the ECB’s composite cost of borrowing for new
business ⋄ Source: ECB, Datastream
ble indicators suggest that bank-speciﬁc characteristics – especially a high ratio of non-
performing loans – were dragging on bank proﬁts and capital levels across the Italian
and Spanish banking system.23 As a result, Italian and Spanish banks increased their
lending mark-up to counter their earnings problems despite considerable monetary ea-
sing. On the demand side, the weak dynamics of Italian and particularly Spanish loan
markets seem to be driven by the need of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector to reduce
debt-overhangs built up before the crisis (Bundesbank, 2015b).While those factors dam-
pened loan dynamics in periphery countries especially during the years of the sovereign
debt crisis, their inﬂuence seems to abate recently.
An alternative approach to comprehend the eﬀects of unconventional monetary po-
licies on bank lending uses the monetary base as an empirical indicator. For a sample
period between 1999-2009, Peersman (2011) ﬁnds that the bank lending declines persis-
tently in response to an expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet. In particular, a 10 percent
increase in the monetary base is estimated to have the same eﬀect as a 25 basis point
cut in the short-term policy rate. Furthermore, the results of Peersman (2011) indicate
that when banks’ wholesale funding conditions deteriorated in the course of 2008, their
23By mid-2016, NPLs net of provisions on Italian banks’ balance sheets amount to e191 billion (about 11
percent of GDP). Although the moderate economic recovery since 2014 has contributed to the stabiliza-
tion of NPLs, further robust economic growth is needed to reduce this stock to a sustainable level. In
a recent study, the IMF estimates that the Italian economy has to grow at an annual rate of at least 1.2
percent in order to grow out of its NPL overhang (Mohaddes et al., 2017). However, given that the Ita-
lian economy grew above 1.2 percent only in 3 out of the last 10 years, the reality of this scenario seems
questionable.
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capacity to issue loans for a given amount of central bank money declined. This lends
support to the hypothesis that the expansion of central bank funding during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis had a positive impact on bank lending in the euro area. The papers by Gam-
bacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011); Hachula et al. (2016); or Carpinelli and Crosignani
(2017) generally support this conjecture.
Unfortunately, the above cited studies suﬀer from a number of caveats: ﬁrst and fo-
remost, they all use the outstanding credit stock – or the change thereof – as the bank
lending indicator. As this measure, besides new lending, also includes maturing loans,
repayments andwrite-oﬀs, itmay distort the estimates of the credit channel.24 Secondly,
the innovations in the monetary base could be demand-determined, which contradicts
the traditional interpretation of the bank lending channel. As a consequence, Behrendt
(2017) estimates a structural VAR in the spirit of Peersman (2011), but adopts a cre-
dit indicator based on newly issued loans. Furthermore, instead of the monetary base,
he applies changes in excess reserve as a proxy for unconventional monetary policies.
Using these variables, Behrendt (2017) has to reject the hypothesis that unconventio-
nal monetary policies had a signiﬁcant impact on euro area bank lending. Importantly,
however, itmust be noticed that empirical contributions that employ innovations in cen-
tral bank balance sheets, by construction, only capture the implementation, but not the
announcement eﬀects of unconventional monetary policies. Thereby, such studies risk to
underestimate the true impact of unconventional policies.
Albertazzi et al. (2016) avoid this problem by using as an indicator for unconventio-
nal policy the spread between the so-called shadow rate and the MRO rate. The shadow
rate is a statistical device to describe the stance of monetary policy when the short-term
policy rate is close to zero.25 Since the shadow rate can stay in negative territory even if
the policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), it provides a measure of
the expansionary eﬀects of unconventional policies that would prevail in the absence
of the ZLB. Moreover, since the shadow rate also summarizes the information about
the monetary policy stance included in the term structure of interest rates (Pericoli and
Taboga, 2015), it captures both the announcements and implementation eﬀects of un-
conventional policies.
Using a dataset for euro area bank-level interest rates on new loans for a period bet-
24Behrendt (2016) oﬀers a discussion on the issues involved with the use of credit stock measures in em-
pirical studies on the bank lending channel.
25The shadow rate concept for unconventional monetary policies was developed by Krippner (2013a,b).
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ween 2007-2015,26 Albertazzi et al. (2016) thus document that the eﬀect on bank lending
diﬀered between conventional and unconventional policy shocks. For conventional po-
licy shocks, they ﬁnd that the eﬀect on bank lending declines for beĴer capitalized and
more liquid banks, which conﬁrms the results of the older bank lending literature, emp-
hasizing the importance of asymmetric information issues. For unconventional policies,
however, the bank lending channel is stronger for beĴer capitalized andmore liquid banks.
Whilst this result seemingly contradicts the older bank lending literature, it supports
the notion that regulatory and economic constraints are the key determinants of bank
lending in times of crisis (see also Gambacorta andMarques-Ibanez, 2011). In particular,
Albertazzi et al. (2016) estimate that the Eurosystem’s unconventional policies caused
the average loan rate to non-ﬁnancial corporations to be about 40 basis points lower
relative to a no-policy scenario. Moreover, they ﬁnd that unconventional policies, by
ﬂaĴening the yield curve, exert an adverse eﬀect on bank proﬁtability, which tends to
aĴenuate the monetary policy transmission (reverse bank capital channel).27
On the other hand, lower interest rates also lead to valuation gains on bank balance
sheets (bank capital channel). Since the laĴer should be stronger for banks with large hol-
dings of distressed domestic government bonds, it seems that asset purchases of govern-
ment bonds (OMT and PSPP) had a positive impact on bank lending, as they addressed
potential mispricing in euro area sovereign debt markets (see also Cova and Ferrero,
2015 and Altavilla et al., 2016). Given the multitude of unconventional measures, ho-
wever, empirical studies increasingly encounter identiﬁcation problems, especially for
the more recent measures. Consequently, time series estimates of contemporary mea-
sures (CSPP, PSPP, TLTROs) increasingly run the risk of being distorted by previous
operations (e.g. 3y LTROs, SMT, OMT, CBPP1/2).
7.3.2.1. Euro Area Bank Lending Survey (BLS)
Luckily, however, the Eurosystem in its April 2015 bank lending survey (BLS) star-
ted to include three ad hoc questions to gauge the impact of the ECB’s expanded asset
26Controlling for credit demand by using country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and comparing the eﬀects of mo-
netary shocks for banks with diﬀerent balance sheet characteristics (size, liquidity, capital) allows Al-
bertazzi et al. (2016) to disentangle credit demand from credit supply eﬀects.
27Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) provide a thorough discussion of the dynamic negative eﬀects of low net
interest margins for bank proﬁtability. Their concept of the so-called reversal rate suggests that at some
point the level of interest rates can become so low that the detrimental eﬀects on bank proﬁtability out-
weigh the beneﬁcial eﬀects of lower rates. Interestingly, this concept has been acknowledged by Benoît
Coeuré, a member of the Executive Board of the ECB, as being a potential constraint at which further
rate cuts risk reversing the expansionary monetary policy stance (Coeuré, 2016).
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Figure 7.9.: Impact of the APP on euro area banks’ ﬁnancial situation ⋄ Note:
Net percentages are deﬁned as the the diﬀerence between the sum of the per-
centages of banks responding “increased/improved considerably” and “incre-
ased/improved somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks respon-
ding “decreased/deteriorated considerably” and “decreased/deteriorated so-
mewhat” ⋄ Source: Data obtained from the respective bank lending surveys
(ECB, 2015b,c, 2016a,b)
purchase program (APP). The APP encompassed the ongoing purchase programs for
asset-backed securities (ABSPP) and covered bonds (CBPP3), but was extended to in-
clude asset purchases of European public sector bonds (PSPP).28 Since then, banks in
the euro area are asked every six months to report the impact of the APP on their ﬁ-
nancial situation. Furthermore, they shall report the purposes for which they used the
additional liquidity arising from the APP and provide an assessment on their lending
conditions. The revised questionnaire of the BLS has therefore been able to capture cri-
sis phenomena and address and evaluate the ways in which monetary policy makers
responded.29
Figures 7.9-7.11 summarize the results: while the left panel of Figure 7.9 depicts that
increasing deposits were reported as themain source of liquidity by banks, the right pa-
nel reveals that the ECB’s expanded asset purchases had an increasingly adverse eﬀect
on banks’ proﬁtability. In particular, the persistently compressed net interest margins
weigh negatively on proﬁts, which cannot be compensated by the capital gains resulting
from asset sales.
In addition, Figure 7.10 depicts that the banks in the euro area used the additional li-
28In June 2016, the Eurosystem launched its corporate sector purchase program (CSPP). Accordingly, the
impact of the CSPP on banks’ ﬁnancial situation is ﬁrstly included in the BLS of 2016Q3.
29For a detailed description of the evolution of the BLS since the onset of the crisis, see Bundesbank (2016a).
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Figure 7.10.: Usage of liquidity from APP by euro area banks ⋄ Note: Average
percentages are deﬁned as the sumof the percentage for “has contributed con-
siderably to this purpose” and “has contributed somewhat for this purpose” ⋄
Source:Data obtained from the respective bank lending surveys (ECB, 2015b,c,
2016a,b)
Figure 7.11.: Impact of APP on bank lending conditions ⋄ Note:Net percenta-
ges are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the sum of the percentages for “tigh-
tened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percenta-
ges for “eased considerably” and “eased somewhat” ⋄ Source: Data obtained
from the respective bank lending surveys (ECB, 2015b,c, 2016a,b)
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quidity from the APP predominantly to grant loans, while asset purchases or the substi-
tution of alternative reﬁnancingwas less important. Consequently, this suggests that the
APP had a bigger impact through the bank lending than through the reserve-induced
portfolio eﬀect sketched out in section 5.1.3.
Finally, the negative values of Figure 7.11 indicate that the net percentage of banks
report an easing of credit standards due to the APP, even though positive inﬂuence
seems to vanish over time, especially for households. With respect to credit conditions,
on the other hand, still a substantial amount of euro area banks reports a net easing
impact of the APP. In line with the evidence displayed in Figure 7.10, the right panel of
Figure 7.11 shows that the APP had the largest impact on the credit conditions for loans
to non-ﬁnancial corporations.
To sumup, the empirical evidence generally suggests that up to now the ECB’s uncon-
ventional operations had a positive net eﬀect on the supply of bank loans in the euro
area. Speciﬁcally, as equity prices of banks holding a larger share of sovereign bonds
beneﬁted more from the increase in government bond prices following the ECB’s pur-
chases, it seems that one of the main impacts of the APP was to relieve banks’ capital
constraints through positive valuation eﬀects on bank assets (Andrade et al., 2016a).
Among other things, however, a protracted period of low lending rates will continue
to drag on banks’ proﬁtability, which points to a decreasing marginal eﬀect of additi-
onal unconventional measures. As the proﬁtability issues tend to increase when older,
higher yielding assets mature, policymakers in the future need to carefully balance the
risks and beneﬁts of persistently low interest rates.
7.3.3. Evidence for the US
A few related studies ﬁnd supportive evidence for the bank lending channel in the US.
Carpenter et al. (2015) analyze US ﬂow of funds data related to the Fed’s LSAP1 (from
November 2008 to June 2010); LSAP2 (from November 2010 to June 2011); and the rein-
vestment program for proceeds of the Fed’s maturingMBS holdings (fromAugust 2010
to December 2012). Although the direct counterparties of the Fed’s open-market ope-
rations are the primary dealers (a subset of banks), Carpenter et al. (2015) uncover that
the ultimate counterparts of the Fed’s treasury purchases were households (including
hedge funds), and to a lesser extent broker-dealers and insurance companies. This is
an important ﬁnding as it indicates that the Fed purchased ultimately from non-banks,
which is a crucial condition for the bank lending channel of unconventional policies.
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Interestingly, however, Figure 7.12 depicts that oﬃcial asset purchases and US depo-
sits net of interbank loans co-move only for LSAP2 and LSAP3, but diverge for LSAP1.
This suggests that the conditions for the deposit-induced bank lending channel were
Figure 7.12.: Fed asset purchases and US commercial bank liabilities net of
interbank loans ⋄ Fed asset purchases are calculated as monthly averages of
Fed holdings of MBS, Treasury and agency bonds. Changes in bank liabilities
are two-month moving averages. ⋄ Source: FED FRED, Datastream
met for LSAP2 and LSAP3, but not for LSAP1. As already discussed in section 7.2.4,
LSAP1 took place in a period of severe market stress. Therefore, this program likely
contributed to an orderly deleveraging of banks’ balance sheets, instead of promoting
additional bank lending.
The expansionary eﬀect of LSAP2 and LSAP3 on bank lending activity is conﬁrmed
by Kandrac and Schlusche (2016). Using a bank-level dataset in combination with an
instrument variable approach to account for the inherent endogeneity problem of bank
lending and reserve creation, the authors ﬁnd that banks which were experiencing an
inﬂow of reserves increased their loan supply signiﬁcantly.30 Moreover, they show that
higher reserves also induced increased risk-taking within banks’ credit portfolios. In
particular, their estimates imply that excess reserves caused annualized loan growth
30Kandrac and Schlusche (2016) use a regulatory change in the assessment of banks’ contribution to the
FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund to instrument for reserves. In essence, the regulatory change made re-
serve holdings more expensive for banks covered by deposit insurance, but not for uninsured banks
(since they are exempt from the FDIC fee). As the uninsured banks were exactly those who ended up
holding the reserves, the authors instrument “reserve expansion” with a dummy variable indicating if
a depository was exempt from the FDIC fee. Since a bank’s exemption status is very likely to be un-
correlated with a bank’s response to the monetary authority’s reserve injection, the exogeneity of this
instrument seems plausible.
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Figure 7.13.: US bank lending to the private sector ⋄ Adjusted for loan sales
and securitization ⋄ Source: Fed Fred, Datastream
rates to be about 5.5 percentage points higher during LSAP2 and LSAP3, but had no
signiﬁcant impact during LSAP1 (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2016, p. 18). The evolution
of US private sector loan growth displayed in Figure 7.13 broadly supports this re-
sult. Most of all, however, it should be noticed that the empirical study of Kandrac and
Schlusche (2016) captures only the reserve-induced eﬀect on bank’s lending supply.31
By construction, the study thus abstracts from any eﬀects related to the type of assets
being purchased. Based on economic theory, however, one hypothesis is that the type
of asset the central bank purchases plays a critical role for the eﬀectiveness of LSAPs.
In line with this hypothesis, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2016) ﬁnd that LSAP2
had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on bank lending, because it focused exclusively on Treasu-
ries, which, however, are only perfect substitutes for the newly issued reserves.32 This
contrasts with LSAP1 and LSAP3, which, besides Treasuries, also included signiﬁcant
amounts ofMBS purchases. In turn, banks with relatively largeMBS holdings increased
their loan supply more strongly in response to oﬃcial asset purchases than those with
relatively low holdings. More precisely, highly aﬀected banks are found to have incre-
ased lending supply by about 2-3 percent relative to their non-aﬀected counterparts.
Finally, two contemporary papers, Chakraborty et al. (2016) aswell as DiMaggio et al.
31The reserve-induced eﬀect of this section thus represents the logical counterpart to the reserve-induced
portfolio balance eﬀect of section 5.1.3, yet this time with respect to bank loans instead of government
bonds.
32Since the empirical strategy of Rodnyansky andDarmouni (2016) focuses only on the asset side of bank’s
balance sheets, their estimates do not capture the eﬀects that may arise from deposit inﬂows due to
Treasury purchases from non-banks.
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(2016), provide further supportive evidence for the bank lending channel of US uncon-
ventional policies. The former ﬁnds that banksmore active in theMBSmarket increased
their mortgage origination market share following LSAP1 and LSAP3, but showed no
signiﬁcant reaction to LSAP2.33 The laĴer documents that the yields of eligible MBS ex-
perienced a signiﬁcantly stronger decline than non-eligibleMBS. Speciﬁcally, they show
that average loan rates fell by about 100 basis points following LSAP1, while the rates of
non-eligible MBS fell by only 40-50 basis points. In contrast, mortgage rates following
LSAP2 and LSAP3 decreased by about 20-40 basis points, yet without any notable dif-
ferences between conforming and non-conforming segments. That LSAP1 and LSAP3,
which both involved MBS purchases, had such asymmetric eﬀects suggests that the
banking sector was much less healthy during LSAP1 than during LSAP3. Consistent
with the theoretical foundations presented above, this highlights how LSAPs can oﬀset
the decline in bank lending, especially when private ﬁnancial intermediation is facing
binding capital constraints (see also Gertler and Karadi, 2011, 2013).
7.3.4. Concluding Remarks
Overall, the empirical evidence on the bank lending channel of unconventional mone-
tary policies across three major central banks (the BoE, the Fed, and the ECB) suggests
the following conclusions: ﬁrstly, non-standard liquidity enhancements prior to the fai-
lure of Lehman Brothers seem to have had a positive impact on bank lending, as central
banks eﬀectively took over the role of disrupted interbank markets. With the ongoing
deterioration of bank capital and the persistent economic slump that followed the failure
of Lehman Brothers, the positive impact of additional liquidity injections increasingly
receded. Subsequently, any stimulating eﬀect of monetary policy on bank lending acted
mainly through the bank capital channel.
33In fact, credit easing in the MBS market was exactly what policymakers intended to achieve with the
MBS purchases. The reduction in secondary MBS yields should be passed through to the primary loan
rate, thereby stabilizing the US housing market (Bernanke, 2012a).
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8. A DSGE Model of the Portfolio Balance Effect
While the renewed interest in the portfolio balance eﬀect mainly emanates from the re-
cent rounds of QE, its main functioning has been discussed in academia already half a
century ago. In fact, the initial contributions to this eﬀect go back to the seminal work
of Modigliani and Sutch (1966), Tobin (1969), Brunner and Melĵer (1973), Friedman
and Schwarĵ (1982), and was lately famously restated by Bernanke (2012b). However,
neither of these authors examined the portfolio balance eﬀect in a micro-founded DSGE
framework. In this respect, the model by Andrés et al. (2004) is one of the ﬁrst contribu-
tions in the DSGE literature incorporating the portfolio balance eﬀect. Since the laĴer is
arguably one of the most important transmission channels of QE, the following section
starts with a thorough review of the model by Andrés et al. (2004) (ALSN-model).
The full-blown ALSN-model includes heterogeneous households and imperfect asset
substitutability. However, to highlight the essentialmechanisms atwork, I ﬁrst consider
a baseline version with homogeneous households (section 8.1). In the baseline model,
only unrestricted households exist for whom money and bonds serve as perfect sub-
stitutes. They are called unrestricted because they are free to invest in the entire asset
horizon. Then, in section 8.2, the model is extended to include imperfect asset substitu-
tability and heterogeneity among households. Technically, this is done by incorporating
liquidity frictions in the long-term bond market. Finally, in section 8.3.2, the model is
simulated subject to diﬀerent shock experiments.
8.1. Baseline Model with Perfect Asset Substitutability
8.1.1. Households
In the baseline model a representative household demands Ct units of a Dixit-Stigliĵ
aggregate consumption good. The consumption bundle Ct consists of a continuum of
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diﬀerentiated goods j,
Ct =
 1∫
0
Ct(j)
ϵ−1
ϵ

ϵ
ϵ−1
, ⟨8.1⟩
where ϵ denotes the household’s elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated
consumption goods. Transactions in the goods market are processed with money and
Mt/Pt denotes households’ end-of-period real money balances. To earn money for con-
sumption, each household suppliesNt hours of labor. Hence, the representative house-
hold seeks to maximize
max
Ct,Nt,Mt,Bt,BL,t
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
at
[
U
(
Ct
(Ct−1)h
)
+ V
(
Mt
etPt
)
− (Nt)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
−G(.)
}
⟨8.2⟩
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the stochastic discount factor, at stands for an intertemporal pre-
ference shock, and φ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The
sub-utility of consumption is given by
U(.) = 11− σ
(
Ct
(Ct−1)h
)1−σ
⟨8.3⟩
with σ > 0 determining the household’s relative risk aversion which equals the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Moreover, households display internal
habit formation measured by the size of h ∈ [0, 1]. Incorporating habit persistence
helps to explain the high serial correlation in the response of output to monetary policy
shocks – a phenomenon that is incompatible with purely forward looking behavior and
intertemporal separability of consumption (Fuhrer, 2000; Christiano et al., 2005).1 The
sub-utility function deﬁning real money balances is given by
V (.) = 11− δ
(
Mt
etPt
)1−δ
⟨8.4⟩
where δ is related to the interest elasticity of money demand and et represents an AR(1)
moneydemand shock. Finally, equation ⟨8.2⟩ includes portfolio adjustment costs,which
1Notice that if h equals zero, the standard result of time-separable utility would be obtained. On the other
hand, if h equals unity, only the ratio of current to previous period’s consumption would maĴer.
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are speciﬁed as2
G(.) = d2
{
exp
[
c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
+ exp
[
−c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
− 2
}
. ⟨8.5⟩
This kind of adjustment costs was ﬁrst introduced by Nelson (2002) and for non-trivial
results, d and c need to be strictly positive. Adjustment costs accrue each time house-
holds shift their portfolio allocation between money and bonds and serve as the ratio-
nale justifying the model’s money-in-the-utility speciﬁcation: Since money is needed
in every goods market transaction, the representative household demands a certain
amount of money as it tries to economize on the adjustment costs associated with plan-
ned consumption. That is, households demand real money balances even if there is a
positive opportunity cost of holding money. In other words, adjustment costs serve as
a means of modeling a liquidity premium on money.3 This constitutes a diﬀerence to
the the baseline NK model, where money carries no non-pecuniary return, so that in
equilibrium eitherMt equals zero (the cashless limit), or the nominal return on money
must equal the riskless rate (Woodford, 2003, pp. 69)
8.1.2. Bond Market
Another important extension to the baseline NK model is the presence of bonds with
diﬀerent maturities. Besides money, unrestricted households can either invest in short-
or long-term bonds (Bt and BL,t). Both bonds are modeled as zero-coupon bonds that
households buy at their nominal price Bt/it, respectively BL,t/(iL,t)L. Here, it and iL,t
are nominal gross returns and it holds that L > 1 (in quarters), implying that iL,t > it ≥
0. Following Svensson (2000), long-term bonds are modeled as zero-coupon bonds in
order to simplify the analysis by excluding coupon payments to households during the
bond holding period. Moreover, no secondary market for long-term bonds exists. This
2Equation ⟨8.5⟩ diﬀers slightly (by the location of the brackets) from the adjustment costs used in Andrés
et al. (2004, p. 669).
3An alternative assumption that generates a role for money is made by the so-called cash-in-advance con-
straint. CIA-models generally assume a certain timing structure between asset and goodsmarkets. In the
classical contribution of Lucas and Stokey (1987), agents are able to allocate their portfolios between cash
bonds at the start of each period at zero costs, but they are forced to do so prior to their consumption de-
cisions. Formally, this is modeled by including real money balances not directly in the utility function,
but adding them to an otherwise standard budget constraint, thereby forming a cash-in-advance con-
straint (Walsh, 2010, cf. Ch. 3). Similar to the MIU-framework, this CIA-constraint generates a demand
for money that is just suﬃcient to ﬁnance planned consumption, even if there is a positive opportu-
nity cost of holding money. Therefore, substituting the MIU-approach of the initial ALSN-model with a
CIA-constraint in the budget constraint would produce similar results.
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entails that long-term bonds must be held until maturity, implying that neither capital
gains nor losses are realized by trading in existing securities! This simpliﬁes the analysis
considerably. However, from an economic perspective, simply excluding a secondary
market for long-term bonds seems like an arbitrary assumption. As discussed in section
4.2, however, the theoretical foundation could be based on the preferred-habitat theory.
A more technical vindication for excluding secondary markets is that allowing for
long-term bonds to be traded and to yield coupon payments during the term tomaturity
would imply for a L-period bond that additional 2L terms would appear in the inter-
temporal budget constraint of both the household and the government (and thus also
in the optimality condition of long-term bonds). Especially for longer maturities, this
would imply a serious, potentially intractable complication. But since the key ﬁndings
of the model do not rely on whether long-term bonds yield coupons or capital gains
before maturity, I stick to this assumption mainly for mathematical convenience.
With this bond market structure, the household’s intertemporal budget constraint is
given by
Mt
Pt
+ Bt
itPt
+ BL,t(iL,t)LPt
+ Ct ≤ Mt−1
Pt
+ Bt−1
Pt
+ BL,t−L
Pt
+ WtNt
Pt
+ Tt
Pt
+ Dt
Pt
. ⟨8.6⟩
Households enter period twith money holdingsMt−1 and maturing one-period bonds
Bt−1. In addition, they receive income from labor (WtNt), transfers (Tt), dividends (Dt),
and from maturing long-term bonds BL,t−L they purchased in period t − L. Together,
these components constitute the income stream on the right-hand side of the budget
constraint. Households use the proceeds for consumption Ct, and allocate their remai-
ning wealth into money, short-term, and long-term bonds (left-hand side of the budget
constraint). Hence, the household’s constraint maximization problem yields the follo-
wing optimality conditions:4
at
(Ct)−σ
(Ct−1)h−σh
− βhat+1 (Ct+1)
1−σ
(Ct)1+h−σh
= Λt ⟨8.7⟩
Λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
= at(Nt)φ ⟨8.8⟩
Λt
1
Ptrt
= βEt
Λt+1
Pt+1
⟨8.9⟩
4See Appendix B.6 for details on the optimization calculus.
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Λt
1
Pt(iL,t)L
= βLEt
Λt+L
Pt+L
⟨8.10⟩
atVt,Mt − {Gt,Mt + βEt {Gt+1,Mt}} =
Λt
Pt
− βEtΛt+1
Pt+1
⟨8.11⟩
With habit persistence (h > 0) the optimality condition ⟨8.7⟩ links the marginal utility
of wealth (the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint) to the sum of the marginal
utility of current and future consumption. The intratemporal trade-oﬀ between con-
sumption and hours worked is expressed by equation ⟨8.8⟩, stating that the optimal
labour supply is determined by the the real wage times the marginal utility of wealth.
Since working yields disutility, it has to be rewarded with a higher real wage to yield
a marginal increase in consumption. Equations ⟨8.9⟩ and ⟨8.10⟩ are the Euler equati-
ons for short- and long-term bonds. Together with equation ⟨8.7⟩, they constitute the
two intertemporal optimality conditions, implying that the marginal disutility of sacri-
ﬁcing consumption today has to equal the marginal increase in consumption tomorrow
(in L-periods). Equation ⟨8.11⟩ is the Euler equation for real balances. It shows that the
household’s optimal demand for real balances is critically governed by marginal adjus-
tment costs (Gt,Mt) and marginal real balances (Vt,Mt). As shown in the Appendix B.6,
performing a log-linearization of equation ⟨8.7⟩ yields the aggregate Lagrange multi-
plier
Λˆt =
(σ − 1)h
1− βh yˆt−1 −
σ + (σ − 1)βh2 − βh
1− βh yˆt +
(σ − 1)βh
1− βh yˆt+1 +
1− βhρa
1− βh aˆt
⇔ Λˆt = ϕ1yˆt−1 − ϕ2yˆt + βϕ1yˆt+1 + 1− βhρa1− βh aˆt, ⟨8.12⟩
where
ϕ1 =
(σ − 1)h
1− βh , ϕ2 =
σ + (σ − 1)βh2 − βh
1− βh .
This gives a ﬁrst indication how habit persistence inﬂuences the demand equation: Besi-
des current output, previous as well as next period’s output maĴers for the households
intertemporal consumption decision.
Term Structure Log-linearizing equations ⟨8.9⟩ and ⟨8.10⟩ results in
Λˆt = rˆt + EtΛˆt+1, ⟨8.13⟩
Λˆt = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L, ⟨8.14⟩
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where the Fisher equations
rˆt = iˆt − Etpˆit+1 ⟨8.15⟩
rˆL,t = iˆL,t − 1
L
Et
L−1∑
j=0
pˆit+j+1 ⟨8.16⟩
were used to substitute the nominal with the real interest rates (rˆt, respectively rˆL,t).
Hence, equations ⟨8.13⟩ and ⟨8.14⟩ can be combined to approximate the common ex-
pectations theory of the term structure, which is given by
rˆL,t =
1
L
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j . ⟨8.17⟩
The fact that short- and long-term bonds are perfect substitutes in this baseline version
of the model gives rise to the standard arbitrage mechanism which ensures that the
long-term rate is equal to the average sequence of short-term rates. Finally, combining
the ﬁrst order conditions for short-termbonds andmoney yields the household’smoney
demand function
atVt,Mt − {Gt,Mt + βEt {Gt+1,Mt}} =
Λt
Pt
− Λt
itPt
= Λt
Pt
(
1− 1
it
)
= Λt
Pt
(
it − 1
it
)
⟨8.18⟩
which can be log-linearized to
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)− µ4iˆt + µ5eˆt. ⟨8.19⟩
The coeﬃcients in equation ⟨8.19⟩ are convolutions of parameters, i.e.
δ0 = dc2δ−1mδ−1, µ1 =
δ0
1 + δ0(1 + β)
, µ2 = βµ1,
µ3 =
1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
, µ4 =
1
δ(i− 1)(1 + δ0(1 + β)) , µ5 =
δ − 1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
.
As usual in this class of models, money demand is negatively related to the nominal
interest rate iˆt, whereas shocks to preferences aˆt and money demand shocks eˆt are exo-
genous and enter the equation with a positive sign. The fact that lagged and future real
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balances are part of equation ⟨8.19⟩ is due to the marginal adjustment costs that appear
in equation ⟨8.18⟩. To beĴer grasp the idea of how adjustment costs modify households’
money demand, notice how equation ⟨8.19⟩would look without them.Without any ad-
justment costs, i.e. with d = 0 and thusG(.) = 0, the parameter δ0 would equal zero, too.
As can be seen from the convolutions of parameters, this would entail that µ1 = µ2 = 0,
such that lagged and future real money balances would drop out of equation ⟨8.19⟩.
If households face positive adjustment costs, however, they compare the nominal in-
terest rate – the opportunity cost of real money balances –with the adjustment costs that
accrue when they shift their portfolio between money and bonds. Thus, if households
expect their real income to be higher next period, they know they will need higher real
balances to transact in the goodsmarket next period. As a consequence, householdswill
increase their money demand already today, if they are not discouraged by a suﬃcient
rise in the nominal interest rate iˆt. Notice that in this baseline version of the ALSN-
model, adjustment costs are the theoretical foundation that give rise to real balances in
the utility function. Besides habit persistence, they represent the only extension to an
otherwise standard NK model, as laid out in section 3.1.
8.2. Implications of Imperfect Asset Substitution
In this section, in order to demonstrate the portfolio balance channel of central bank
open market operations, two additional frictions are added to the baseline model. First,
it is assumed that transaction costs in the long-term bond market are subject to stochas-
tic shock process ςt with zero mean and ﬁnite variance. The main purpose of including
this shock is to account for time-varying exogenous movements in the term premium
that result either in an aggregate beneﬁt or loss for the household sector. Second, and
more signiﬁcantly, the assumption of perfect asset substitution will be abrogated. If
households do not have preferred habits for longer-term securities in general, purcha-
sing long-term bonds implies a loss of liquidity compared to investments in short-term
bonds, since long-term bonds must be held until their maturity date. As a consequence,
investments in long-term bonds carry a higher risk than nominally equivalent invest-
ments in short-term bonds, forcing households to hedge this (liquidity) risk by holding
some kind of self-imposed “reserve requirements” whenever they enter the long-term
bondmarket. Economically, the absence of a secondarymarket for long-term bonds has
the same eﬀect as a more sophisticated strategy of modelling long-term bonds subject
to time-varying interest rate risk. Compared to the laĴer, it represents a convenient way
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to account for an endogenous term premium in a still tractable DSGEmodel of the port-
folio balance eﬀect.
8.2.1. Households
Technically, imperfect asset substitution stems from a liquidity friction that takes the
form of an additional cost function in the household’s optimization problem. This cost
function depends on the relative holdings of imperfect substitutes,Mt and BL,t, and is
speciﬁed as
H(.) = υ2
[
Mt
BL,t
η − 1
]2
, ⟨8.20⟩
where υmeasures the relative strength of a household’s liquidity preference. The higher
the value of υ, the higher are the illiquidity costs associated with an investment in long-
term bonds. The parameter η depicts the inverse of the steady state level of the money
to long-term bond ratio. Specifying the cost function H(.) in this way ensures that its
steady state value is equal to zero. With this additional cost function, the household’s
optimization problem changes to
maxE
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
at
[
U
(
Ct
(Ct−1)h
)
+ V
(
Mt
etPt
)
− (Nt)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
−G(.)−H(.)
}
⟨8.21⟩
and the intertemporal budget constraint is given by
Mt
Pt
+ Bt
Ptit
+ (1 + ςt)BL,t
Pt(iL,t)L
+ Ct ≤ Mt−1
Pt
+ Bt−1
Pt
+ BL,t−L
Pt
+ WtNt
Pt
+ Tt
Pt
+ Dt
Pt
. ⟨8.22⟩
As only the endogenous variables Mt and BL,t appear in equation ⟨8.20⟩, only these
optimality conditions change relative to the baseline model. They are given by
∂L
∂Mt
= atVt,Mt − {Gt,Mt + βEtGt+1,Mt} −
υη
BL,t
[
Mt
BL,t
η − 1
]
= Λt
Pt
(
it − 1
it
)
, ⟨8.23⟩
∂L
∂BL,t
= −υηMt
B2L,t
[
Mt
BL,t
η − 1
]
+ 1 + ςt(iL,t)L
Λt
Pt
= βLEt
Λt+L
Pt+L
. ⟨8.24⟩
The innovationwith imperfect asset substitutability is now that an increase in the supply
of long-term bonds relative to money reduces the value of the cost term that reﬂects the
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imperfect substitutability between both assets. Notice that absent any friction
ςt =
υηMt
B2L,t
[
Mt
BL,t
η − 1
]
= 0, ⟨8.25⟩
such that both conditions would collapse into their baseline representation. With active
liquidity frictions, however, real money demand is modiﬁed to
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)
− µ4iˆt + µ5eˆt − υm
δ−1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
(mˆt − bˆL,t). ⟨8.26⟩
Except for the last term on the right hand side, equation ⟨8.26⟩ resembles its baseline
counterpart of equation ⟨8.19⟩. This illustrates that with imperfect substitutability a re-
lative increase in the supply of the more illiquid asset increases the money demand, and
vice versa. Those insights provide some important preliminary results: since the optima-
lity conditions for money and long-term bonds are a function of steady state deviations
from an optimal asset relation, monetary policy can exploit this fact by manipulating
the relative supply of money to long-term bonds using unconventional open-market
operations.
In a next step, this information will be used to derive the term structure of interest
rates under imperfect asset substitution. In principle, the term structure is obtained –
as in the benchmark case – by combining the optimality conditions for short- and long-
term bonds. Since the ﬁrst has not changedwith respect to the benchmark case, equation
⟨8.13⟩ still holds, which was given by
Λˆt = rˆt + EtΛˆt+1. ⟨8.13⟩
The second condition, however – the ﬁrst order condition for long-term bonds – has
changed due to the liquidity friction. The log-linearized version of equation ⟨8.24⟩
equals5
Λˆt = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L − ςt + τ(mˆt − bˆL,t) ⟨8.27⟩
with
τ = υ(iL)
L(i− 1)
ibLm−δ
⟨8.28⟩
5Again, for a detailed derivation of the linearization process, the reader may refer to Appendix B.6
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and bL as the the steady state value of real long-term bonds holdings.6 SeĴing equation
⟨8.13⟩ equal to ⟨8.27⟩ and solving for the long-term real rate, yields
rˆL,t =
1
L
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j +
1
L
(
ςt − τ(mˆt − bˆL,t)
)
. ⟨8.29⟩
This expression for the term structure deviates from its pure expectational form by a
term premium
tpt = LrˆL,t −
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j = (ςt − Φt) , ⟨8.30⟩
which consists of the exogenous transaction cost shock ςt and an endogenous compo-
nent, Φt = τ(mˆt − bˆL,t), representing log-deviations of money and long-term bond hol-
dings from steady state. The source of the endogenous component is the missing se-
condary market for long-term bonds and – as shown by equation ⟨8.28⟩ – the relative
strength of this friction is critically determined by the household’s liquidity preference
υ: The higher the liquidity preference, the higher will be the self-imposed liquidity buf-
fer that households choose to hold when they enter the long-term bondmarket. Finally,
the information from equation ⟨8.29⟩ can be used to substitute out mˆt and bˆL,t in the
money demand equation ⟨8.26⟩. Thereby, the laĴer can be transformed to
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)
− µ4iˆt + µ5eˆt + µ6
LrˆL,t − L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − ςt
 ⟨8.31⟩
with
µ6 =
i
i− 1
η
(iL)Lδ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
.
This represents a more generalized version of the standard money demand relations
that incorporate imperfect asset substitutability and portfolio adjustment costs.7 As out-
lined above, adjustment costs are the reason why leads and lags of real balances appear
in the money demand equation. The elimination of the relative asset quantities, howe-
ver, reveals that imperfect substitutability also implies that money demand is a function
of the present discounted value of short- and long-term interest rates. Only the exoge-
6A more thorough discussion of the meaning of the parameter τ is given below.
7The coeﬃcients µ5 and µ6 vary slightly from the ones in Andrés et al. (2004). But this diﬀerence has no
material impact on the model dynamics.
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nous component ςt of the term premium remains in the money demand equation, whe-
reas the endogenous part can be expressed in the form of interest rates.
8.2.2. Firms
The ﬁrms’ optimization problem follows the standard approach of the basic New Key-
nesian Model as laid out in section 3.1.2. Hence, the optimal price is set according to
equation ⟨3.21⟩, which is reprinted here for convenience:
P ∗t =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ
t+kMC
r
t+k|t
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ−1
t+k
⟨8.32⟩
8.2.3. Government
As usual in this class of models, the government sector is a consolidated entity compri-
sing the central bank and the Treasury. Government liabilities consist of non-interest
bearing money as well as interest-bearing short- and long-term debt. The government
uses the proceeds from debt issuance and seignorage revenues to ﬁnance real trans-
fers to households. Since the model’s main focus lies on the monetary policy issues it
abstracts – in line with the parsimony principle – from government consumption and
other forms of ﬁscal policy. Hence, the consolidated government’s budget constraint is
given by
Mt
Pt
+ Bt
itPt
+ BL,t(iL,t)LPt
−
(
Mt−1
Pt
+ Bt−1
Pt
+ BL,t−L
Pt
)
= Tt
Pt
. ⟨8.33⟩
Furthermore, risky long-term bonds are assumed to follow a simple AR(1)-process of
the form
BL,t
Pt
=
(
BL,t−1
Pt−1
)ρbL
exp(ϵBL,t) ⟨8.34⟩
where ρbL ∈ [0, 1] and ϵBL,t is an i.i.d. exogenous error process. With this kind of un-
certainty about the value of a given long-term bond in period t, the government adjusts
its short-term debt position such that its intertemporal budget constraint holds. In this
manner, real transfers are set according to
Tt
Pt
= −κBt−1
Pt−1
+ ϵt. ⟨8.35⟩
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This ﬁscal rule ensures that real transfers in period t react inversely to previous period’s
short-term debt level and positively to an i.i.d. exogenous disturbance ϵt.
8.2.4. Monetary Policy
The central bank’s policy instrument is the short-term nominal interest rate it. Based on
Ireland (2004), conventional interest rate policy follows an augmented Taylor rule of the
form
iˆt = ϕiiˆt−1 + (1− ϕi) (ϕpipˆit + ϕyyˆt + ϕµµˆt) + ϵit , ⟨8.36⟩
with
µˆt = mˆt − mˆt−1 + pˆit. ⟨8.37⟩
where ϕi is the interest-rate-smoothing parameter and ϕpi and ϕy are the weights at-
tached to inﬂation respectively output stabilization. Moreover, monetary policy also
reacts to steady state deviations of real balances – and the strength of that reaction is
governed by ϕµ.8 The presence of real balances in in the central bank’s reaction function
can be based on money growth variability in the central bank’s loss function, as sug-
gested by Rudebusch and Svensson (2002). An alternative and, in the context of this
model more suitable, rationalization could be the usefulness of monetary aggregates as
indicators of inﬂation.9
8.2.5. Equilibrium Analysis
Market clearing conditions in the labor market requires
Nt =
1∫
0
Nt(j)dj. ⟨8.38⟩
Simultaneously, for the goods market to clear, it must hold that
Yt = Ct. ⟨8.39⟩
8All parameters,ϕi,ϕpi ,ϕy , andϕµ are are assumed to be non-negative and the perturbation ϵit is assumed
to be normally distributed with a standard deviation of σit .
9However, the study of Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) indicates that the empirical justiﬁcation for mo-
netary policy reacting tomoney growth is ratherweak. Evenwith constantmoney demand, the inclusion
of monetary aggregates in the reaction function increases the variability of output and inﬂation compa-
red to the ﬁrst-best case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (with a zero weight aĴached to money).
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The supply side of the model is derived from log-linearizing equation ⟨8.32⟩. As
shown in detail in appendix B.2 this entails that inﬂation evolves according to
pˆit = βEt {p̂it+1}+ λ¯m̂crt ⟨8.40⟩
with λ¯ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ Θ =
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
1−α
1−α+αϵ . As in the baseline New Keynesian Phillips
Curve, current inﬂation is driven by future inﬂation and real marginal costs. As a result
of habit persistence, however, real marginal costs not only depend on current output
and technology shocks (zˆt), but also on lagged and future output, as well as on pre-
ference shocks (aˆt). Hence, the functional form of real marginal costs diﬀers from the
baseline NK model and is given by
m̂crt = (χ+ ϕ2)yˆt − ϕ1yˆt−1 − βϕ1Et {yˆt+1} −
βh(1− ρa)
1− βh aˆt − (1 + χ)zˆt, ⟨8.41⟩
with
χ = φ+ α1− α . ⟨8.42⟩
Since the returns to labor are marginally decreasing, the elasticity of labor with respect
to output (α) and the elasticity of the labor supply (φ) maĴer for the relation between
output and inﬂation through the parameter χ. Finally, the model is closed by assuming
that preference shocks, money demand shocks, technology shocks, and transaction cost
shocks follow univariate AR(1) processes:
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + ϵat , ⟨8.43⟩
eˆt = ρeeˆt−1 + ϵet , ⟨8.44⟩
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + ϵzt , ⟨8.45⟩
ςˆt = ρς ςˆt−1 + ϵςt ⟨8.46⟩
where the ϵ denotes white noise shocks with zero mean and ﬁnite variance. So far, liqui-
dity frictions in the long-term bond market cause an endogenous spread between the
short- and long-term interest rate. In itself, however, this spread is not suﬃcient to aﬀect
aggregate demand. The reason is that any unrestricted household could just bypass the
risky long-term bondmarket and enforce its consumption plan by trading in a sequence
of short-term bonds. As a consequence – despite the endogenous term premium – only
the expected path of short-term rates would maĴer for aggregate demand, leading to
the standard result of the New Keynesian benchmark case. Only if asset markets are
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at least partially segmented can there be a role for the long-term rate that goes beyond
the pure expectations theory of the term structure. This will be the topic of the next
section.
8.3. Implications of Heterogeneous Households
Asset market segmentation is achieved by spliĴing the household sector into two
groups: The ﬁrst group are the so-called unrestricted households similar to the ones dis-
cussed in the preceding section. These households are unrestricted in the sense that they
can freely allocate their funds within the entire asset horizon: money and long-term
bonds as well as short-term bonds. The size of this group is given by the parameter λ.
The second group are the restricted households. They put their funds either in money
or long-term bonds, but will never hold short-term bonds. Thus, restricted households
can be conceived as preferred-habitat investors with particular preferences for longer
maturities. Since investing in long-term bonds does not mean a liquidity loss to them,
they refuse to hold “voluntary reserve requirements” when they enter the long-term
bond market.
Hence, imperfect asset substitutability is applicable to unrestricted households only.
Apart from that, both households are similar. The practical consequence of this modiﬁ-
cation is that the long-term rate appears in the dynamic IS-equation in a manner diﬀe-
rent from the pure sequence of future short-term rates. In combination with imperfect
asset substitutability, this modiﬁcation opens a new transmission channel for monetary
policy. The central bank can now execute two eﬀects on aggregate demand. Firstly, it
can inﬂuence the path of current and future short-term real interest rates. And secondly,
it can aﬀect aggregate demand directly through its inﬂuence on the endogenous com-
ponent of term premium.
Since the unrestricted households’ decision problem is equivalent to the analysis per-
formed in the previous section, the optimality conditions for short- and long-term bond
holdings are simply given by
Λˆut = rˆt + EtΛˆut+1 ⟨8.47⟩
Λˆut = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆut+L − ςt +Φt ⟨8.48⟩
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where ⟨8.30⟩was used in ⟨8.27⟩ to account for the degree of imperfect asset substitution
between money and bonds.
The situation is diﬀerent for restricted households. Since they are unaﬀected by the
liquidity frictions in the long-term bonds market, their respective optimality condition
is just given by
Λˆrt = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆrt+L. ⟨8.49⟩
Accordingly, the aggregate Lagrange-multiplier for both types of households is given by
the sum
Λˆt = λΛˆut + (1− λ)Λˆrt , ⟨8.50⟩
where the weights λ and (1−λ) correspond to the respective group size. This deﬁnition
together with equations ⟨8.48⟩ and ⟨8.49⟩ results in
Λˆt = λ
(
LrˆL,t + EtΛˆut+L +Φut − ςt
)
+ LrˆL,t + EtΛˆrt+L − λ
(
LrˆL,t + EtΛˆrt+L
)
⇔ Λˆt = λ(Φut − ςt) + LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L, ⟨8.51⟩
where equation ⟨8.50⟩was iterated forward L-periods to substitute out Λˆut+L and Λˆrt+L,
respectively. Combining the above expression with equation ⟨8.30⟩, yields
Λˆt = λ
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j + (1− λ)LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L. ⟨8.52⟩
I use this expression for the aggregate Lagrange-multiplier to derive the aggregate dy-
namic IS-equation. Therefore, equation ⟨8.52⟩ is plugged into the consumption Euler
equation ⟨8.12⟩, which gives
ϕ1yˆt−1 − ϕ2yˆt + βϕ1yˆt+1 + 1− βhρa1− βh aˆt = λ
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j + (1− λ)LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L. ⟨8.53⟩
This can be further simpliﬁed, by substituting EtΛˆt+L with equation ⟨8.52⟩ iterated L-
periods ahead, to
ϕ1yˆt−1 − ϕ2yˆt + βϕ1Etyˆt+1 + 1− βhρa1− βh aˆt = λ
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j + (1− λ)LrˆL,t
+ ϕ1yˆt+L−1 − ϕ2yˆt+L + βϕ1Etyˆt+L+1 +
(1− βhρa
1− βh
)
ρLa aˆt. ⟨8.54⟩
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Finally, solving equation ⟨8.54⟩ for yt, and deﬁning F as the forward operator, results
in the dynamic IS-equation:
ϕ2(1− FL)yˆt = ϕ1(1− FL)yˆt−1 + βϕ1(1− FL)Etyˆt+1
− λ
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − (1− λ)LrˆL,t +
(1− βhρa
1− βh
)
(1− ρLa )aˆt. ⟨8.55⟩
As in the standard IS-equation with internal habit persistence, current output is a
function of previous as well as future output. Furthermore, current output depends
negatively on the sequence of real short-term rates and positively on the exogenous de-
mand shock aˆt. In a frictionless world with homogeneous agents, equation ⟨8.55⟩ could
be transformed into a second-order diﬀerence equation involving output and the real
interest rate only. With imperfect asset substitutability and household heterogeneity,
however, this is diﬀerent. In such an environment, the dynamic IS-equation incorpora-
tes two distinct interest rates aswell as future output inL-periods from now. The reason
for this more general speciﬁcation of the IS-equation is based on the liquidity frictions
that give rise to the endogenous term premium as well as on the assumed asset market
segmentation due to preferred-habitat investors.
Lastly, the aggregate money demand equation needs to be derived. From equations
⟨8.13⟩ and ⟨8.15⟩, it must hold that
iˆt = Λˆt + pˆit+1 − Λˆt+1. ⟨8.56⟩
Moreover, since i = β−1, one can show that
µ4 =
β
1− βµ3. ⟨8.57⟩
Equations ⟨8.56⟩ and ⟨8.57⟩ can be used to rewrite the unrestricted households’ money
demand equation as
mˆut = µ1mˆut−1 + µ2Etmˆut+1 +
µ3
1− β Λˆ
u
t − µ3aˆt −
βµ3
1− βEtΛˆ
u
t+1
+ βµ31− β pˆit+1 + µ5eˆt + µ6
LrˆL,t − L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − ςt
 . ⟨8.58⟩
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Except for the last term in equation ⟨8.58⟩ (which reﬂects the liquidity friction), restricted
households face the same money demand function. It equals
mˆrt = µ1mˆrt−1+ µ2Etmˆrt+1+
µ3
1− β Λˆ
r
t − µ3aˆt−
βµ3
1− βEtΛˆ
r
t+1+
βµ3
1− β pˆit+1+ µ5eˆt. ⟨8.59⟩
Aggregatemoney demand is thus calculated as
mˆt = λmˆut + (1− λ)mˆrt , ⟨8.60⟩
which is equal to
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2Etmˆt+1 +
µ3
1− β Λˆt − µ3aˆt −
βµ3
1− βEtΛˆt+1
+ βµ31− βEtpˆit+1 + µ5eˆt + λµ6
LrˆL,t − L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − ςt
 . ⟨8.61⟩
Without any liquidity friction or market segmentation, this money demand would col-
lapse into a static money demand equation including only current output and the cur-
rent short-term nominal interest rate. Equation ⟨8.61⟩ deviates from this baseline on
two grounds: ﬁrstly, portfolio adjustment costs imply that lagged and future output de-
termines current real balances; secondly, imperfect asset substitution causes long-term
rates distinct from the sequence of short-term rates to appear in the money demand
equation.
8.3.1. Monetary Policy Implications
Given risk-averse investors, the key message from section 8.2 was that the portfolio
balance eﬀect crucially depends on the existence of an endogenous term which presup-
poses the denial of the expectations theory of the term structure. As emphasized by Cox
et al. (1981) and Campbell et al. (1997), one should distinguish between the Pure Expec-
tations Hypothesis (PEH) and the Expectations Hypothesis (EH).10 The PEH states that no
expected excess returns (or term premia) exist, whereas the EH says that they might ex-
ist, but are non-zero and constant over time. Hence, the PEH is consistent only if interest
rates are non-stochastic and investors are risk-neutral. On the other hand, if investors
10The laĴer is sometimes also referred to as theWeak Expectations Hypothesis in the literature.
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are risk-averse, the no-arbitrage condition embedded in the EH requires that long-term
bonds carry a constant term premium over short-term bonds.11
Importantly, however, even if a constant term premium existed in the baseline ALSN
model (section 8.1), monetary policy had no direct control over it, since the term pre-
mium originates from policy-invariant deep parameters, i.e. household’s risk-aversion.
This implies that in both cases, with or without a risk correction for long-term bonds,
monetary policy cannot control the long-term rate independently of the short-term rate!
This basically summarizes the policy implications of the expectations theory of the term
structure – may it be based on the PEH or on the EH: by seĴing the path of future over-
night rates, the central bank can only indirectly determine the longer-term rate. Thus,
both the baseline ALSN and the baseline New Keynesian model are not immune to To-
bin’s critique of the traditional IS-LM model, where “all nonmonetary assets and debts
are. . . taken to be perfect substitutes at a common interest rate plus or minus exogenous
interest rate diﬀerentials” (Tobin, 1982, p. 179).
Themodel of Andrés et al. (2004) departs from this hypothetical benchmark on essen-
tially two modiﬁcations (which may, arguably, reﬂect a more realistic representation of
the world): asset market segmentation due to heterogeneous agents and imperfect asset
substitutability. Bothmodiﬁcations together predict an endogenouswedge between the
long-term rate and the path of future short-term rates that monetary policy can target
independently of the evolution of short-term rates. They oﬀer an additional channel for
monetary policy, where the long-term rate can be controlled independently of the short
rate. The mechanism through which this channel operates is the central bank’s impact
on relative asset quantities in private portfolios.
To see how this DSGE-representation of the portfolio balance channel hinges on the
key assumptions of imperfect substitutability and heterogeneous agents, I consider the
followingmodel variation: I assume that the asset market frictionmaĴers for both types
of households, not solely for the unrestricted, as above. Now, restricted and unrestricted
households value long-term bonds as imperfect substitutes for money. Technically, this
involves that both households’ ﬁrst-order conditions for long-term bond holdings look
identical and include the endogenous part of the term premium, Φt = τ(mˆt− bˆL,t). The
result for the aggregate Lagrange-multiplier is thus given by
Λˆt = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L − ςt +Φt ⟨8.62⟩
11Cf. Geiger (2011) for a thorough discussion on risk premia and their diﬀerent implications for the yield
curve.
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which, using equation ⟨8.29⟩, can be simpliﬁed to
Λˆt =
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j + EtΛˆt+L. ⟨8.63⟩
By combining the laĴer equationwith the consumption Euler equation ⟨8.12⟩, the single-
interest-rate IS equation is restored, such that aggregate demand depends on the path of
short-term interest rates, but neither on the long-term rate rˆL,t, nor on the risk premium
Φt. Therefore, the fundamental result that asset prices are a function of the relative asset
quantities remains intact, but this entails no further implications for the transmission
of monetary policy. This clearly shows that for the portfolio balance channel to work
in this model, heterogeneous agents with asymmetric aĴitudes towards risk must exist.
More precisely, restricted householdsmust have a lower risk aversion towards long-term
bonds (a lower value of υ) than the unrestricted households who trade in both markets.
Taken together, the three key modiﬁcations to an otherwise standard New Keynesian
DSGE-model are:
i. heterogeneous households
ii. imperfect asset substitutability for unrestricted households
iii. lower degree of imperfect asset substitutability for restricted households.
Formultiple channels of monetary policy, all three conditions have to be fulﬁlled simul-
taneously. If condition (i) or (ii) is violated, the model collapses into its single interest-
rate version with λ = 1. If condition (ii) is violated, there is an exogenous term spread
between the short- and the long-term rate, but monetary policy has no impact on this
spread. In general, the ALSN model captures three cases which illustrate diﬀerent im-
plications for monetary policy. I will shortly discuss them below:
Baseline two-asset model (λ = 1, Φut = 0) This version with homogeneous hou-
seholds and perfect asset substitutability was analysed in section 8.1. Here, monetary
policy only operates via the conventional interest-rate channel and long-rates are the
weighted sum of current and future short-rates. The aforementioned case with see-
mingly heterogeneous agents subject to identical costs in the long-term bond market
(λ = 1, Φut > 0) is essentially a sub-case of this baseline, as it implies a single interest-
rate channel as well.
Exogenous interest rate differential model (λ < 1, Φut = 0): This version involves
a violation of condition ii. Deviations of the long-term rate from the expectations the-
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ory of the term structure are only due to the stochastic cost shock ςt in the long-term
bonds market. Since this friction is unrelated to any other macroeconomic variable, mo-
netary policy is unable to aﬀect the wedge between long- and short-term rates indepen-
dently.
Multiple-channels model (λ < 1, Φut ̸= 0) In addition to the conventional interest rate
channel, a portfolio balance channel exists and relative asset quantities supplied by the
monetary authority maĴer for aggregate demand. With imperfect substitutability and
heterogeneous households, there is an endogenous term premium aĴached to longer
dated assets that monetary policy can aﬀect by means of large-scale asset purchases, for
instance.
In the last model, QE (an analogy to large-scale asset purchases) is eﬀective, because
liquidity frictions inhibit perfect arbitrage between short- and long-term assets. In com-
bination with the assumption of heterogeneous agents, this leads to the long-term rate
being a distinct part of the dynamic IS-equation. Thus, the term structure and the dy-
namic IS-relation are the key mechanisms through which QE and the portfolio balance
channel aﬀect economic activity. To see this more clearly, recall that the term structure
under imperfect asset substitution is given by
rˆL,t =
1
L
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j +
1
L
(
ςt − τ(mˆt − bˆL,t)
)
. ⟨8.64⟩
QEentails an open-market operation that reduces the supply of long-termbonds against
a simultaneous increase in reserves. With respect to the yield curve, mˆt > bˆL,t causes
the endogenous term premium to fall when asset prices adjust to rebalance private port-
folios (transaction costs ςt are exogenous and beyond the control of monetary policy).
Thus, a relative rise in the supply of the more liquid asset will lead to rising prices and
declining yields of the more illiquid asset. In other words, QE ﬂaĴens the yield curve.
Note that in this model economy only two types of government bonds exist. A more
realistic framework should also consider private debt – such as corporate bonds and
equities – as portfolio rebalancing tends to reduce the term premiumof all longer-dated,
risky securities in the economy. Rising asset prices and declining yields imply lower cre-
dit costs for ﬁrms and a positive wealth eﬀect for households. If households react to the
wealth eﬀect by increasing consumption, or if ﬁrms invest some of the extra funding
raised on capital markets, aggregate demand will increase. As mentioned above, howe-
ver, an important ingredient for the portfolio balance channel to work is the presence
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of heterogeneous agents. Here, this is achieved by incorporating restricted households
into the model. Since these households can only trade in long-term but not in short-
term bonds, their consumption Euler equation is governed by the real long-term rate
rˆL,t only. In the aggregate, this leads to a separate role of the real long-term rate (rˆL,t)
over and above the real short-term rate (rˆt+j) to play a part in the dynamic IS-equation.
From ⟨8.54⟩, the laĴer can be wriĴen as
yˆt = − λ
ϕ2
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − (1− λ)
ϕ2
LrˆL,t +
ϕ1
ϕ2
yˆt−1 +
βϕ1
ϕ2
Etyˆt+1
− ϕ1
ϕ2
Etyˆt+L−1 − βϕ1
ϕ2
Etyˆt+L+1 + yˆt+L +
(1− βhρa
1− βh
)
(1− ρLa )aˆt. ⟨8.65⟩
with
ϕ1 =
(σ − 1)h
1− βh , ϕ2 =
σ + (σ − 1)βh2 − βh
1− βh .
In addition to the parameter τ from equation ⟨8.64⟩, the eﬀectiveness of QE and the
portfolio balance eﬀect depends on the amount of restricted households (1− λ), the dis-
count factor β, the degree of habit persistence h, and on the household’s degree of risk
aversion σ.
Last but not least, it should be acknowledged that the conjecture of segmented as-
set markets breaks Ricardian equivalence in this model – although the ﬁscal rule ⟨8.35⟩
ensures that transfers react inversely to government debt. The violation of Ricardian
equivalence stands in marked contrast to the benchmark world, where a risk-averse re-
presentative agent with rational expectations and unlimited access to frictionless ﬁnan-
cial markets anticipates that higher reserves today need to be ﬁnanced by higher taxes
(lower transfers) tomorrow. A risk-averse agent who dislikes volatility in consumption
would thus not increase consumption today, since he would have to “pay” for this be-
havior by a lower level of consumption tomorrow. This intertemporal logic essentially
summarizes the reasoning behind the irrelevance proposition for open-market opera-
tions by Wallace (1981). With absence of any form of market segmentation, a policy
operation that changes the ratio between reserves and long-term bonds would aﬀect
the yield of long-term bonds but without any material eﬀect on the real economy: Un-
restricted households would engage in arbitrage activities such that relative equilibrium
asset prices do not change, thus preventing any change in households’ intertemporal
consumption proﬁle.
This is diﬀerent under asset market segmentation. A change in the yield of long-term
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bonds implies a diﬀerent expected portfolio return for the restricted households. This
leads to a change in the restricted households’ discount factor giving rise to an alternative
intertemporal consumption allocation. General equilibrium forces then also aﬀect the
consumption expenditures of unrestricted households as well as production capacities
of ﬁrms. In a nutshell, market segmentation leads to the non-neutrality of open-market
operations, implying that the irrelevance proposition of Wallace does not hold.
8.3.2. Simulations
The simulation exercises performed in this section analyse the model’s response to a
contractionary monetary policy shock, a negative demand shock, and a money supply
shock in case the central bank follows a simple money growth rule. The parameteriza-
tion and steady state values of key variables used in the simulations are listed in Table
8.1.
Symbol Parameter Description Value
α Output elasticity w.r.t. labour hours 1/3
β Discount Factor 0.995
σ Risk aversion 2
δ (Inverse) elasticity of money demand 4.36
φ (Inverse) Frisch elasticity 1.74
h Degree of habit persistence 0.7898
δ0 Elasticity of money demand w.r.t. adjustment costs 1.82
λ Fraction of unrestricted households 0.9322
τ Elasticity of long-term rate to portfolio mix 0.54
χ Eﬀect of habit persistence on real marginal costs 1.36
λ˜ Slope of the Phillips-Curve 0.014
ϕi Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.8556
ϕy Interest rate response to output gap 0.3295
ϕpi Interest rate response to inﬂation 1.6090
ϕµ Interest rate response to real money growth 1.38
ρa Persistence of intertemporal preference shock 0.89
ρe Persistence of money demand shock 0.99
ρz Persistence of technology shock 0.97
ρς Persistence of transaction cost shock to long-term bond 0.80
ρbL Persistence of value shock to long-term bond 0.5
i Steady state short-term nominal rate β−1
iLL Steady state long-term nominal rate β−L
Table 8.1.: Parameterization
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To calibrate their model, Andrés et al. (2004) performed a maximum likelihood es-
timation using time series data for quarterly US real GDP, the quarterly average of
the monetary base, quarterly average population, quarterly average seasonally adjus-
ted CPI, and the quarterly average of the nominal Federal Funds rate for a period from
1980-1999. Their estimation for the discount factor equals 0.991, which amounts to an
annualised steady state risk-free real rate of about 3.6%.12 Newer estimates, however,
point to a lower value of the annualized risk-free real rate.
The updated dataset of Laubach and Williams (2003) indicates an average real rate
for the same period of around 3.1% and their results (tentatively) suggest that the real
rate experienced a secular decline. Its average value declined to approximately 1.5%
between 1999-2015. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by Hamilton et al. (2015), who report a
time varying US steady state real rate that currently lies in a range of 1%-2%. Based on
this evidence, the discount factor is calibrated to 0.995, which is equivalent to an annual
steady state real rate of 2% as inﬂation equals zero in the steady state. Since no liquidity
friction is present in the steady state, the short-term nominal (real) rate equals the long-
term nominal (real) rate, such that the term premium is also zero in the steady state.
Moreover, Chen et al. (2012) constructed a model based on Andrés et al. (2004) in
order to measure the macroeconomic eﬀects of the Fed’s more recent large-scale asset
purchase program. In their empirical analysis, they estimate the model with Bayesian
methods using quarterly data for the US from the third quarter of 1997 to the third quar-
ter of 2009. Their estimation comprises seven time series including real GDP per capita,
real wages, labor hours worked, the price index of personal consumption expenditures
excluding food and energy, the nominal eﬀective Federal Funds rate, the 10-year Tre-
asury constant maturity yield (as a proxy for long-term debt), and the ratio between
long-term and short-term Treasury debt.13 When feasible, I adopt the updated para-
meter values of Chen et al. (2012). Hence, households are assumed to be relatively risk
averse (σ = 2) plus they show a rather strong degree of habit persistence (h = 0.7898).14
The eﬀect of habit persistence on real marginal costs, χ, is estimated to 1.36 and the out-
put elasticity to hours worked equals 1/3. According to equation ⟨8.42⟩, this implies a
value for the Frisch elasticity of 1.74. The estimated slope of the Phillips curve together
with the discount factor and the assumption of a 10% steady state mark-up implies a va-
12Smets and Wouters (2003) as well as Galí (2008) calibrate the discount factor to 0.99. This has been a
standard result in the literature, implying a slightly higher annual real rate of 4%.
13In contrast to the ALSN-model, Chen et al. (2012) assume the imperfect substitutability to take place not
between money and long-term bonds, but between long-term bonds and short-term bonds.
14In the initial ALSN-model, habit persistence was estimated to be even larger, i.e. 0.9.
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lue for θ of 0.74. This means that ﬁrms, on average, are able to readjust their prices every
four quarters. This is a standard result for nominal price rigidity in the New Keynesian
literature (Woodford, 2003, p. 212).
What is crucial for the eﬀectiveness of the portfolio balance eﬀect is the degree of
market segmentation, measured by λ, respectively (1− λ). Andrés et al. (2004) estimate
the group of unrestricted households to be 0.3, i.e. they ﬁnd a rather strong degree of
market segmentation. Chen et al. (2012), however, estimate the posterior mean of λ to
0.9322, which implies a comparativelymodest degree of market segmentation. A higher
value of λ, however, means that more agents are subject to the liquidity friction that gi-
ves rise to the imperfect asset substitutability being responsible for the portfolio balance
eﬀect. Therefore, as will be shown below, the portfolio balance eﬀect delivers substanti-
ally diﬀerent shock responses when compared to the baseline case with homogeneous
agents and perfect asset substitutability. The second important parameter that drives
this result is the positive value of τ , conﬁrming that the long-term rate reacts endoge-
nously to relative asset stocks.15Moreover, theAR(1) exogenous cost shock to long-term
bonds is relatively persistent (0.8). Both parameters cause substantial deviations from
the expectations theory of the term structure.
The estimates of the monetary policy parameters are fairly standard. According to
Chen et al. (2012), monetary policy performs a rather strong interest rate smoothing
(ϕi = 0.8556), reacts modestly to the output gap (ϕy = 0.3295), and obeys the Taylor
principle by responding overproportionally to inﬂation (ϕpi = 1.6090). Additionally,
monetary policy shows – as in the initial ALSN-model – a signiﬁcant reaction to real
money growth (ϕµ = 1.38).
Figure 8.1 displays the impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary po-
licy shock if the central bank follows the estimated interest rate rule given by equation
⟨8.36⟩. To illustrate the richer transmission mechanism for an active portfolio balance
eﬀect, Figure 8.1 compares the IRFs for both model versions presented above: the base-
line model with homogeneous agents and perfect asset substitutability (solid blue line);
and the model with heterogeneous agents and imperfect asset substitutability (dashed
red line).
Note that the model exhibits suﬃcient price stickiness, such that a liquidity eﬀect
emerges, which can be inferred from the inverse movement of both nominal and real
short-term rates compared to real balances. In addition to the interest rate shock, a dy-
15Since no directly comparable parameter to τ exists in the study of Chen et al. (2012), I stick with the
estimation of Andrés et al. (2004) for this parameter.
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Figure 8.1.:Monetary policy shock (interest rate rule)
namic response of relative asset quantities takes place. The reduction in real balances
relative to long-term bonds generates less liquid portfolios for unrestricted households,
as both assets represent imperfect substitutes. In order to compensate this liquidity loss,
both nominal and real long-term rates have to rise implying that the term premium also
rises. This generates a higher drop in output (about −0.9%) and a slightly higher drop
in inﬂation (about −0.25%), although the convergence back to the steady state happens
faster than in the baseline case. In the laĴer case, the peak responses of output and in-
ﬂation are −0.7% and −0.24%, respectively. The diﬀerence between the two models is
less pronounced for inﬂation. For the most part, this can be explained by the relatively
stronger decline of real balances in the baseline case. Moreover, since the baseline mo-
del is characterized by perfect asset substitutability, the expectations theory of the term
structure holds, implying that the term premium equals zero (lower left panel in Figure
8.1).
Figure 8.2 depicts the dynamic responses for a shock to households’ intertemporal
preferences (a negative demand shock). A negative demand shock causes output and
inﬂation to fall.Withmonetary policy following the Taylor rule of equation ⟨8.36⟩, nomi-
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Figure 8.2.: Negative demand shock (interest rate rule)
nal short rate should decrease. On the other hand, since real balances rise in response to a
negative demand shock (see the lower right panel in Figure 8.2), this calls for an increase
in the Taylor rate. Ex ante, the net eﬀect of those countervailing eﬀects is indeterminate.
But with the model calibration listed in Table 8.1, the central bank reacts to a negative
demand shock by loosening its monetary policy stance. Furthermore, note that under
imperfect asset substitutability, real balances rise less, contributing to a lower policy
rate compared to the baseline scenario. If assets are imperfect substitutes, the relatively
stronger stabilization is further ampliﬁed by a falling term premium (red dashed line in
lower left panel of Figure 8.2) which stimulates output and inﬂation beyond the eﬀects
generated by the pure expectations theory of the term structure.
Finally, Figure 8.3 shows the eﬀects of a positive money supply shock. The IRFs are
calculated under the conjecture that the monetary policy strategy is changed to a uni-
variate monetary growth rule,
∆Mt = ρM∆Mt−1 + ϵMt , ⟨8.66⟩
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Figure 8.3.:Monetary policy shock (money growth rule)
with ρM ∈ [0, 1) and ϵMt as a white noise monetary supply shock.16 Givenmt = Mt/Pt,
the identity
mt ≡ mt−1 − pit +∆Mt. ⟨8.67⟩
establishes a positive relation between real balances (mt) and nominal money growth
(∆Mt) and the sluggishness in the adjustment of prices (θ = 0.74) implies that, when
monetary policy boosts the money supply, real balances also rise. Equilibrium in the
money market thus requires that either output rises or the nominal interest rate falls.
Besides a liquidity eﬀect, Figure 8.3 reveals that the short-term real rate declines more
strongly than the nominal rate (due to increasing inﬂation expectations), which stimu-
lates aggregate demand. So far, the adjustment process to an expansionary monetary
growth shock does not vary from the baseline NK model. In addition, however, the si-
mulations replicate the portfolio balance channel of quantitative easing: The injection
of additional reserves induces the ratio of money to long-term bonds to rise. As this
cushions the costs associated with the liquidity friction in the long-term bond market,
16The persistence of the money supply shock was set to 0.5 in the simulations that produced Figure 8.3.
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the term premium declines, causing output and inﬂation to rise above the level of the
baseline model.
The money growth shock in Figure 8.3 serves as a proxy for QE but goes only half-
way in explaining all of the eﬀects taking place during “real world” large-scale asset
purchases. In the model’s analysis, monetary policy only injects reserves, but does not
reduce the stock of long-term bonds in the hands of the public. Allowing for the laĴer
would lead to an even larger increase in the money-bond ratio, which would further
amplify the portfolio balance eﬀect. But there are additional aspects of QE the model
conceals. If the policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound, for instance, the ef-
fectiveness of QE increases substantially. Furthermore, large-scale asset purchases may
serve as signaling device that can help to overcome time-inconsistency issues aĴached
to forward guidance. By constructing a richermodel that incorporates some of those ad-
ditional channels, one could reasonably suspect to ﬁnd a bigger impact of central bank
large-scale asset purchases. This will be done in the following section.
8.4. Model Extensions: ZLB and Financial Intermediaries
In response to the economic slump that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, cen-
tral banks around the globe lowered their short-term policy rates towards the ZLB.With
the interest rate policy thereby largely exhausted, central banks increasingly turned to-
wards large-scale asset purchases programs. Drawing in large parts on the model by
Harrison (2012), the following section thus analyzes the dynamics of such LSAPs by
including ﬁnancial intermediaries and the zero lower bound of the short-term policy
rate.
8.4.1. Key Aspects of the Model
In the model, ﬁnancial intermediaries issue demand deposits and hold government
bonds of diﬀerent maturities. Hence, ﬁnancial intermediaries perform maturity trans-
formation for the government, but they do not extend loans to private businesses. Alt-
hough this simpliﬁcation may disguise central aspects of ﬁnancial intermediaries, it
seems justiﬁed in this particular context, as it helps to highlight the key mechanism
of the portfolio balance eﬀect.
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Financial Intermediaries Thus, in this speciﬁc framework, a representative ﬁnancial
intermediary maximizes the proﬁt function
maxEt
itBt + iL,t+1BL,t −
iAt At + υ˜2
(
Bt
BL,t
η˜ − 1
)2
Pt
 ⟨8.68⟩
subject to the balance sheet constraint
Bt +BL,t ≡ At. ⟨8.69⟩
Proﬁts are equal to the diﬀerence between the returns on the respective bond holdings
(itBt + iL,t+1BL,t) and the returns paid to household deposits (iAt At) minus portfolio
adjustment costs. Short-term bonds (Bt) are one-period zero-coupon bonds with it as
their nominal return and long-term bonds are modeled as consols (BC,t).17 With Vt as
the price of consols, their value in period t is deﬁned as
BL,t = VtBC,t ⟨8.70⟩
and the ex post return iL,t is given by
iL,t =
1 + Vt
Vt−1
. ⟨8.71⟩
That is, ﬁnancial intermediaries aim at a proﬁt maximizing portfolio mix which is de-
termined by the relative returns on government bonds. Introducing portfolio adjust-
ment costs into ﬁnancial intermediaries’ proﬁt function implies that short- and long-
term bonds are imperfect substitutes – and that increasing the portfolio share of one
type of bond increases the value of the other. This assumption is based on the notion
that ﬁnancial intermediaries demand more relatively illiquid assets if they have ample
holdings of liquid assets (and vice versa). Although the functional form of the liquidity
friction (the squared term in equation ⟨8.68⟩) is similar to the ALSN model, note the
diﬀerence to the ALSN-model here: In the laĴer, adjustment costs accrue on the part
of households if they shift between money and long-term bonds, while in this model
they are based on the portfolio mix between short- and long-term bonds on the balance
17Modeling long-term bonds as consols has the convenient advantage that, although they can be traded
each period, their optimal portfolio share depends on their one-period return only. In the ALSN-model,
the exclusion of a secondarymarket for long-term bonds yields a similar result, but this assumptionmay
seem rather unrealistic.
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sheet of the ﬁnancial intermediary. Other than that, the parameters follow the logic of
the ALSN-model. The degree of imperfect asset substitutability depends on υ˜: greater
values of υ˜ imply higher costs if the portfolio mix deviates from its steady-state value
η˜.18 The result is that the expected market yield on long-term bonds is a function of the
short-term rate and the portfolio mix of ﬁnancial intermediaries19
iˆt = iˆL,t+1 +
βυ˜(1 + η˜)
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⟨8.72⟩
As a consequence, the return households receive on their banking deposits is aweighted
average of market yields on short- and long-term government bonds, i.e.
iˆAt =
1
1 + η˜ iˆt +
η˜
1 + η˜EtiˆL,t+1. ⟨8.73⟩
This is relevant, since households’ Euler equation includes the deposit rate iAt :
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
[ˆ
iAt − Etpˆit+1 − rnt
]
. ⟨8.74⟩
Hence, aggregate demand is negatively related to the deposit rate stemming from ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries’ optimization calculus. Ultimately, however, the deposit rate in
equation ⟨8.73⟩ just mirrors the combined eﬀects of a conventional, Taylor-type interest
rate policy
iˆt = ϕiiˆt−1 + (1− ϕi) (ϕpipˆit + ϕyyˆt) + ϵit , ⟨8.75⟩
together with the unconventional asset purchase policy,
bcbt = qtb
g
L,t, ⟨8.76⟩
where qt denotes the fraction of long-term government debt the central bank chooses to
hold. To simplify the analysis, the stock of long-term bonds (bC) is held ﬁxed, i.e.
bgL,t = b¯CVt, ⟨8.77⟩
such that the value of long-term bonds only varieswith the price Vt. Notice that the price
itself ultimately depends on developments in the economy. The bond market clearing
18With η˜ = BL/B, adjustments costs are zero in the steady-state.
19Lower case leĴers are nominal variables divided by the price index. See Appendix B.6.1 for a detailed
derivation
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condition is thus given by
bL,t = (1− qt)bgL,t = (1− qt)b¯CVt, ⟨8.78⟩
where bL,t is the amount of long-term bonds in the hands of the ﬁnancial intermediaries.
The short-end of the bond market on the other hand depends on the transfer payments
to households, which obey the rule
τ
b
τˆt = −θτ iˆt−1bˆt−1
β
. ⟨8.79⟩
Here, θτ measures the elasticity of transfer payments with respect to the ﬁnancing costs
of previously issued debt. As ﬁnancing costs rise, transfer payments are reduced. This
ensures the dynamic stability of government debt.20 In accordance with the recent ex-
perience of large-scale asset purchase programs, public asset purchases are ﬁnanced via
money creation and occur only in the long-term government debt market. The balance
sheet eﬀect for the central bank is thus given by
∆t = mt −mt−1 −
[
bcbt − iL,tbcbt−1
]
. ⟨8.80⟩
The above information can be used to construct the consolidated government budget con-
straint in terms of the one-period return on consols. As above, lower case leĴers denote
nominal variables deﬂated by the price index and τt = Tt/Pt. Therefore, the consolida-
ted government is subject to
bgL,t + bt − iL,tbgL,t−1 − it−1bt−1 +∆t = τt. ⟨8.81⟩
Real transfers are ﬁnanced either via bond issuance or via money creation by the central
bank.
Households and Firms As the the optimization of the household and ﬁrm sector fol-
lows the standard approach of the New Keynesian Model, the respective derivations
are moved to the appendix B.6.1.
Monetary Policy Implications What maĴers more in this context is that by extending
the ALSN-framework by a rudimentary banking sector, the present model is able to
drive a wedge between the long-term interest rate and the sequence of short-term rates,
20In the simulation below, the value of θτ is chosen accordingly.
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without having to assume limited participation or heterogeneous agents among hou-
seholds. To be precise, the relatively ad hoc friction of the ALSN-model – adjustment
costs in household’s utility function – is shifted to ﬁnancial intermediaries cost functi-
ons. In this vein, the model can explicitly account for two separate policy instruments at
the disposal of the central bank. Firstly, conventional monetary policy is implemented
by adjusting the short-term policy rate (it). Secondly, unconventionalmonetary policy is
conducted by varying the fraction of long-term bonds held on the central bank’s balance
sheet (qt).
8.4.2. Simulations
In the following, I discuss some model simulations using the parameterization presen-
ted in Table 8.2. By assumption, real money balances represent a small fraction of short-
Symbol Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.9925
σ Risk aversion 0.157
δ (Inverse) elasticity of money demand 6
κ Slope of the Phillips-Curve 0.024
ϕi Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.85
ϕy Interest rate response to output gap 0.5
ϕpi Interest rate response to inﬂation 1.5
ρa Persistence of intertemporal preference shock 0.5
ρq Persistence of asset purchase shock 0.95
m/b Steady-state ratio of money to short-term bonds 0.001
γ Steady-state ratio of long-term to short-term bonds 3
υ˜ Elasticity of long-term rate to portfolio mix 0.1
θτ Feedback parameter in transfer rule 0.025
Table 8.2.: Parameterization
term bonds (m/b = 0.001), but long-term bonds outweigh short-term bonds (γ) by a
factor of three in the steady-state (as estimated by KuĴner (2006) for US data). Follo-
wing Harrison (2012), the feedback parameter in the transfer rule is relatively small
(θτ = 0.025) in order to ensure that shocks to the level of short-term bonds are not im-
mediately oﬀset by adjustments in transfers. The coeﬃcients of the interest rate rule
follow the standard calibration of Taylor (1993). Furthermore, the baseline calibration
for the elasticity of long-term bond rates with respect to the portfolio mix of ﬁnancial
intermediaries (υ˜) is set to 0.1. This estimation lies in the middle between the value pro-
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posed by Andrés et al. (2004), which in this model corresponds to a value of around
0.045, and that of Bernanke et al. (2004), who suggest the elasticity to lie at around 0.25.
The value of the parameter for relative risk aversion (σ = 0.157) equals the benchmark
estimation of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), implying an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of around 6. Note that this value for interest-elasticity is relatively high
compared to the ALSN-calibration (see Table 8.1). However, as Levin et al. (2010) show,
interest-elasticity must be suﬃciently large (at least 6) for ’Great-Recession’-style de-
mand shocks to produce a binding ZLB within the canonical NK model.
Figure 8.4 depicts the IRFs for a negative demand shock (ϵ = −1) where the annual
natural rate drops by 2%.21 At ﬁrst, to highlight the eﬀects of the ZLB, it is assumed that
short- and long-term bonds are perfect substitutes (υ˜ = 0), that means QE ceases to play
any role in stabilizing the economy. With zero steady-state inﬂation, sticky prices and
an unbounded policy rate, monetary policy can only generate a fall in the short-term
real rate if the policy rate is lowered into negative territory (solid blue lines in Figure
8.4). If that is the case, annual inﬂation actually increases and output falls only mode-
stly, despite the relatively strong demand shock. Things look quite diﬀerent, however,
Figure 8.4.: Demand shock with binding ZLB ⋄ Red dashed lines depict IRFs
with binding ZLB; blue solid lines depict IRFs with unbounded policy rate
if the zero lower bound is imposed on the policy rate (red-dashed lines in Figure 8.4).
In the simulation exercise, the ZLB is assumed to bind for 10 periods.22 Without the ex-
pansionary interest-rate stimulus, the negative demand shock has a substantially bigger
21With ρa = 0.5, this shock is also quite persistent.
22The model is simulated with Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2014) and the algorithm for simulating the ZLB is
based on Holden and Paeĵ (2012) as well as Holden (2011). The codes are available upon request.
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impact on inﬂation and output. This simulation exercise underlines the potential of QE
as an additional monetary policy tool.
At the same time, however, it should be noted that the portfolio balance eﬀect redu-
ces the eﬀectiveness of conventional interest rate policy – especially when the short-term
policy rate is not bounded. The reason for this is simple: In a conventional open market
operation, a central bank buys short-term bonds in exchange for reserves. As a conse-
quence, aggregate liquidity increases and the entire yield curve shifts downwards. This
channel is active in the model under consideration. Alongside that mechanism, howe-
ver, is the portfolio balance eﬀect arising from desired portfolio mix between short- and
long-term bonds on ﬁnancial intermediaries’ balance sheets. A conventional open mar-
ket operation reduces the level of publicly available short-term bonds for two reasons:
First, because of the quantity eﬀect of a conventional open-market operation (described
above); and second, because of the supply eﬀect induced by the government’s budget
constraint. With a ﬁxed supply of long-term bonds, a lower policy rate leads to a re-
duction in debt ﬁnancing costs for the government. Other things equal, this will lead to
a lower issuance of short-term government debt. Thus, the portfolio allocation of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries shifts towards long-term bonds, which, according to equation ⟨8.72⟩,
implies that the premium on long-term bonds must rise. Overall, the net eﬀect of this
process is that average interest rate falls by less than the short-term policy rate.
Figure 8.5 illustrates this point for a conventional monetary policy shock under dif-
ferent degrees of the portfolio balance eﬀect (captured by diﬀerent values of υ˜): For
υ˜ = 0 (blue-solid lines), we are back in the standard NK model where bonds are per-
fect substitutes and no portfolio balance eﬀect is present. The IRFs for υ˜ = 0.1 (red-
dashed lines) depict the baseline case with a moderate portfolio balance eﬀect; whereas
the yellow-crossed lines show the responses if the portfolio balance eﬀect is most pro-
nounced (υ˜ = 0.3). Interestingly, the higher the degree of the portfolio balance eﬀect,
the sharper the decline in the policy rate (upper-left panel in Figure 8.5). But irrespective
of this relatively sharp (and persistent) decline in the policy rate, the ﬁve-year spot rate
falls by less, the higher the costs are associated with the imperfect substitutability be-
tween short-and long-term bonds. In fact, if the portfolio balance eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong (υ˜ = 0.3), the ﬁve-year spot rate actually increases after 3 periods. As a conse-
quence, the reaction of output and inﬂation to a conventional monetary policy shock is
inversely related to the degree of the portfolio balance eﬀect.
In the samemanner, Figure 8.6 shows themodel’s response to an asset purchase shock
under diﬀerent degrees of the portfolio balance eﬀect, given an unbounded policy rate.
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Figure 8.5.: Conventional monetary policy shock
Here, it is assumed that the central bank buys up 25% of the outstanding stock of long-
term government debt. This number is a rough estimate of the expanded public sector
asset purchase program undertaken by the ECB.23
As expected, central bank asset purchases have an expansionary eﬀect on output and
inﬂation that increases in υ˜.24 However, if monetary policy mechanically obeys to its
Taylor-Rule ⟨8.75⟩, the expansionary eﬀect on output and inﬂation is partially oﬀset
by a rising short-term rate (upper-central panel in Figure 8.6). Of course, increasing
the policy rate in parallel to an expansionary asset purchase program represents a self-
defeatingmeasure that is unlikely to happen in practice. Therefore, the simulated eﬀects
in Figure 8.6 are signiﬁcantly lower than most empirical studies of recent asset purcha-
ses suggest. Thus, Figure 8.7 depicts simulations (with υ˜ = 0.3) for both, the bounded
and non-bounded case. As shown by the red-dashed lines in Figure 8.7, the eﬀect of
large-scale asset purchases on output and inﬂation more than doubles if the policy rate
is bounded.
23It is also broadly in line with the scale of asset purchases undertaken by the BoE between 2009 and 2010.
According to Joyce et al. (2011a), the BoE’s total uptake of £200 billion amounts to approximately 30%
of total outstanding stock of eligible long-term sovereign debt.
24As noted above, for υ˜ = 0, asset purchases have no eﬀect on the economy since short- and long-term
bonds are perfect substitutes.
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Figure 8.6.: Asset purchase shock with unbounded policy rate
Figure 8.7.: Asset purchase shock with bounded policy rate
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8.4.3. Concluding Remarks
Given the prevalence of the portfolio balance eﬀect, this chapter provides a detailed dis-
cussion of this eﬀect in a modern DSGE set-up. By drawing on earlier insights from the
preferred-habitat theory (see section 4.2), the ALSN model highlights the macroecono-
mic implications of market segmentation and limits to arbitrage for the eﬀectiveness of
unconventional monetary policies.
Furthermore, the extended model of section 8.4 emphasizes the potential of large-
scale asset purchases as an additional tool for monetary policy; particularly if conven-
tional monetary policy is constrained by the zero-lower bound. Finally, the simulations
of this chapter should not be interpreted as exact quantitative evidence for the eﬀecti-
veness of outright monetary transactions. Instead, they serve as a mere qualitative va-
lidation for the theoretical predictions of their eﬀects. Hence, the next chapter provides
a detailed review about the macroeconomic eﬀects of unconventional policies.
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9. Empirical Evidence on Macroeconomic Effects
In comparison with the vast evidence on the ﬁnancial market eﬀects of large-scale asset
purchases, only a few studies have addressed the macroeconomic implications of the-
ses purchases. To a large extent, this reﬂects the greater diﬃculties of estimating these
eﬀects. In principle, however, three approaches are possible to capture the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of unconventional asset purchases by the central bank.1
9.1. Classification of Estimation Methods
9.1.1. VAR-based Methods
At one end of the spectrum, there are Vector Autoregression (VAR) models. These mo-
dels are essentially systems of simultaneous diﬀerence equations that impose no a priori
restrictions on the structure of endogenous variables. In the sphere of monetary policy,
VAR models are thus typically praised for providing a theory-free method to evaluate
economic relationships (see, e.g., Sims, 1980). With respect to unconventional monetary
policies, this means one could estimate for example how changes in size and/or com-
position of the central bank’s balance sheet aﬀect output and inﬂation. In fact, there
are a number of studies that applied VAR models and found positive evidence for the
eﬀectiveness of unconventional monetary in the desired direction (see Figure 9.1).
However, especially during crisis times, a crucial drawback of such studies is that the
relationships between the estimated variables are highly unstable or might even exhibit
structural breaks. For instance, once the money market becomes satiated with reserves,
the decoupling principle indicates that the previously established tight link between
the policy rate and the supply of reserves will vanish. VAR models with time-series
samples coveringpre-crisis periods are therefore particularly problematic for estimating
the eﬀects of unconventional balance sheet policies, because the paĴerns that could be
observed prior to the adoption of these policies are bound to change following their
1This classiﬁcation draws mainly on Borio and Zabai (2016) and Bundesbank (2016b).
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implementation.2 Thus, the results of such data-driven approaches must be interpreted
with great caution.
9.1.2. DSGE-based Methods
The other alternative to estimate the macroeconomic eﬀects of unconventional mone-
tary policies is to follow a more theory-based approach, mostly in the form simulating
DSGE models. In contrast to VAR-models, however, these type of models are not di-
rectly applied to the data. Instead, the model’s key parameters are calibrated based on
other information, as for example illustrated by the parameterization of the DSGE mo-
del in chapter 8. In this respect, however, it should be acknowledged that this calibration
or ’moments matching’ is typically tailored to match the stylized facts of the macro va-
riables of interest. Thus, at the current juncture, no general agreement has emerged on
how to estimate the macroeconomic eﬀects of asset purchase programs. Nevertheless,
the currently used theory-based approaches can be roughly divided into one-step and
two-step procedures.
9.1.2.1. One-Step Procedure
Models that follow the one-step procedure try to simultaneously estimate the eﬀects of
asset purchase programs on interest rates and the resulting macroeconomic develop-
ments. Besides the model in chapter 8, which assumed some kind of market segmenta-
tion to generate a non-neutral impact of asset purchases, generally two other approaches
are feasible. At the moment, a popular approach is to incorporate a principal agent pro-
blem between banks and households to motivate a role for the bank capital channel in
a modern DSGE framework. If a bank’s loan supply is restricted by its equity position,
the valuation eﬀect of asset purchases will boost bank equity and facilitate lending (see
section 7). Ceteris paribus, this will ultimately lead to higher aggregate demand and
inﬂation. A widely recognized study that follows this route is the one by Gertler and
Karadi (2013).
2To take account of this criticism, Gambacorta et al. (2014) estimate a cross-country panel VAR for a time-
series sample from January 2008 until June 2011 (the post-crisis period). Thus, for the economies of Ca-
nada, the euro area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Swiĵerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
they ﬁnd that the expansionary unconventional monetary policy shocks led to a signiﬁcant but tempo-
rary eﬀect on output and prices. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the output response is qualitatively similar to
those of conventional policy shocks (e.g. Christiano et al., 1999), while the inﬂation eﬀect seems to be
less persistent and weaker.
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An alternative approach to model the portfolio balance eﬀect is to assume that hou-
seholds are subject to funding restrictions. This may lead to additional feedback eﬀects
from asset purchases (see, e.g., Kühl, 2014; Carlstrom et al., 2014.)
Irrespective of themodeling strategy, however, due to themomentmatching of DSGE
models one has to admit that the results of the simulation exercises are primarily inten-
ded to shed light on the transmission channels of QE. They should not be taken as actual
quantitative evidence for the size of these eﬀects. Nevertheless, the one-step direct ap-
proach allows to study themacroeconomic eﬀects of asset purchases consistentlywithin
a single model. In that way, the qualitative simulation results can set the stage for more
reﬁned empirical work.
9.1.2.2. Two-Step Procedure
The two-step (indirect) procedure lies somewhere in between the purely data-driven
VAR approach and the one-step DSGE approach. With this procedure, the eﬀects of
asset purchases on ﬁnancial variables are initially estimated by the use of ’auxiliary’
econometric models. In a second step, these estimations are mapped into more traditio-
nal variables or shocks, which are then fed into a model (e.g. time series models, DSGE
models) to determine the eﬀects on the macroeconomy. Thus, when this procedure is
used, the interest rate eﬀects of unconventional monetary policies are not determined
within the model.3
For example, a number of recent studies have tried to measure the stance of monetary
policy at the ZLB by mapping unconventional balance sheet policies into a synthetic
’shadow’ policy rate (Bullard, 2012; Krippner, 2013a; Wu and Xia, 2016),4 but the esti-
mated shadow rates vary considerably across the diﬀerent models (see also Bauer et al.,
2012b; Christensen andRudebusch, 2014). Therefore, the reliability of themethod is cru-
cially dependent on the quality of the mapping. In particular, similar to the VAR-based
approach, the decoupling principle of the ﬂoor system largely undermines aĴempts to
infer a robust shadow rate from the size and/or composition of the central bank balance
sheet.
Based on these caveats, Borio and Zabai (2016, p. 24) conclude that estimates of the
macroeconomic impact of asset purchases “have to be taken with more than a pinch of
salt.” In a nutshell, the fundamental problem of the more data-dependent methods is
3See, e.g., Fuhrer and Olivei (2011) and Baumeister and Benati (2013).
4The shadow rate concept goes back to Black (1995).
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that they rely heavily on unreliable extrapolation from previous relationships, whereas
the more theory-based methods primarily illuminate the transmission mechanisms at
work.
9.2. Overview of the Empirical Evidence
The comparability of the existing empirical evidence is limited somewhat by the vari-
ety of methods used in the literature. Nevertheless, the present section assembles some
of this evidence, and although each individual estimate is still subject to considerable
uncertainty, such an overview should at least give a hint towards the macroeconomic
eﬀectiveness of asset purchase programs.
The size of the various LSAPs by the Fed equaled about 25% of US GDP (as of 2015).
To put that into perspective, the volume of asset purchases by the BoE equaled about
18% of UK GDP, whereas the ECB’s initial extended asset purchase program represen-
ted about 17% of euro area GDP in 2015. Based on these broadly similar volumes, it
seems surprising that the ECB’s purchase program had a signiﬁcantly smaller impact
on output and inﬂation than those in the UK and the US (see Figure 9.1).
9.2.1. Euro Area
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that QE in the euro area did have expansionary ef-
fects on output and inﬂation. In particular, the estimates for realGDP range fromaround
0.2 to 1.3 percentage points, while the impact on inﬂation is located in a corridor bet-
ween 0.36 and 1.45 percentage points (see the left panel in Figure 9.1). These ﬁgures
are calculated as the three-year average for the period between 2015-2017. While the
individual results display a substantial dispersion due to the diﬀerent estimation met-
hods, taking a simple average of output and inﬂation across all studies delivers a value
of about 0.8 and 0.7, respectively. Hence, this ’meta study’ suggests that the ECB’s as-
set purchase program as announced in January 2015 will increase euro area GDP and
inﬂation by 0.8% respectively 0.7% over the course of 2015-2017.
9.2.2. UK and USA
The estimated output and inﬂation eﬀects in the UK and the US are considerably larger
than the corresponding euro area estimates. To a great extent this might be explained
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Figure 9.1.: Macroeconometric evidence for asset purchase programs ⋄ Peak estima-
tes ⋄ Euro area studies take the announced purchase volume as of January 2015 ⋄ US
studies are scaled to $1 trillion; UK studies are scaled to £200 billion ⋄ Source: Own
illustration based on cited studies
by the diﬀerent timing of the asset purchases. While the BoE and the Fed initiated their
ﬁrst rounds of QE promptly after the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis (i.e. in 2008-09),
the ECB adopted QE only in 2015, that is under more normal market conditions (cf. the
discussion on the cyclical eﬀectiveness of QE in chapters 4 and 5).
For the Fed’s programs, the estimates lie in a range between 0.2%-4.1% for real GDP
and 0.1%-4.4% for inﬂation, while the corresponding estimates for the BoE’s asset pur-
chases point to a corridor of 1%-3% and 0.4%-4.2%, respectively. Again, taking themean
of the individual estimates suggests that QE in the US stimulated real GDP and inﬂation
by about 2.1% and 1.9%, which is quite similar to the UK experience (2.1% and 1.7%).
9.2.3. Concluding Remarks
Besides the diﬀerences in timing, the rather weak response of the euro area economy is
likely related to the speciﬁc problems of the currency union. While at the disaggregated
level most euro area countries beneﬁt from unconventional monetary policies, they do
so with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. Concerning the macroeconomic eﬀecti-
veness, it seems that euro area members with less fragile banking systems beneﬁt the
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most from unconventional monetary policies (Burriel and Galesi, 2016). This lends furt-
her support to the hypothesis that, ideally, unconventional monetary policies should be
accompanied by ﬁscal measures to stabilize the banking system (e.g. via equity injecti-
ons).
250
10. Exiting Unconventional Monetary Policies
At some point, the exit from current ultra expansionary monetary policies must take
place. On the one hand, because constantly supplanting private ﬁnancial markets with
central bank intermediation reduces welfare due to ineﬃcient resource allocation (Fur-
ﬁne, 2001; Hoerova andMonnet, 2016). On the other hand, because improving economic
conditions may ultimately warrant a tighter monetary policy stance to safeguard price
stability. Hence, the following section tries to shed some light on the question when
and how the US and the euro area should exit from unconventional monetary policies.
Then, the broad principles and the potential costs of exiting will be discussed.
10.1. Are We Ready Yet?
Key Aspects At the current juncture, policy makers are confronted with essentially
two deliberations, i.e., when to stop easing andwhen to start tightening. The ﬁrst involves
the decision to stop the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet by ’tapering’ its
periodic asset purchases.1 By contrast, tightening involves raising the short-term policy
rate and/or contracting the central bank balance sheet. And although both decisions
should be primarily dependent on economic and ﬁnancial conditions, the criteria for
’tapering’ and ’tightening’ might diﬀer to some extent (see, e.g., Kohn, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, balance sheet expansions should be tapered oﬀ only if the economic re-
covery has gained suﬃcient momentum such that the reversion of output and inﬂation
can be maintained without the extra policy stimulus. On the other hand, especially af-
ter deep recessions, monetary policy should be tightened only if without such an action,
output will overshoot potential and inﬂation will rise above its target on a sustained ba-
sis. In light of the subdued economic recovery that followed the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-
09 as well as the European debt crisis of 2011-13 central bankers should therefore rather
lean towards the risk of exiting too late instead of exiting too early – even if this entails a
1The Fed stopped itsmonthly large-scale bondpurchases inOctober 2014,while the ECB currently intends
to continue its purchases at least until December 2017.
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temporary overshoot in inﬂation. Strategically, this could be achieved by placing some
independent weight on the output objective in a monetary policy rule. In this seĴing,
the dual mandate of the Fed seems to be more suitable for a ﬂexible exit than the ECB’s
sole focus on price stability. Taken at face value, the laĴer requires the ECB to tighten its
monetary policy stance as soon as inﬂation in the euro area reaches two percent, even if
that entails that output and employment remain below their potentials for an extended
period of time.
More importantly, however, such an easing bias should not jeopardize ﬁnancial stabi-
lity. In fact, the unwinding of expansionary policies might be increasingly dependent
on ﬁnancial market conditions. In this context, the eﬀects of a late exit might be twofold:
on the one hand, it can contribute to the buildup of asset price bubbles, while, on the ot-
her hand, the protracted economic expansion can enhance the resilience of the ﬁnancial
system through higher capital buﬀers and lower credit risk.
The Situation in the US As depicted in the upper left panel of Figure 10.1, the unem-
ployment rate in the US has been on a steady downward path since 2010. In addition,
both the production index as well as real GDP show a persistent recovery of the US
economy. In contrast, the trajectory of US headline inﬂation ﬂuctuated rather strongly
around the Fed’s inﬂation target of 2% (see the lower left panel in Figure 10.1). As can
be inferred from the stable core inﬂation, this must have been mostly driven by vola-
tile food and energy prices. Since 2015, however, headline inﬂation has also ascended
towards its target level, while inﬂation expectations remained ﬁrmly anchored.
Consequently, the Fed terminated its large-scale asset purchases in October 2014, but
did not raise its target range for the federal funds rate to 0.25-0.50% before December
2015. Since then, the FOMC has initiated three more rate hikes and the target range
stands now at 1.00-1.25% (see the left panel in Figure 10.2). Note that, although the Fed
is still reinvesting the proceeds from maturing securities in order to keep its balance
sheet size constant, the shadow rate in Figure 10.2, which quantiﬁes the stance of mo-
netary policy at the zero lower bound, suggests that somemodest tightening took place
already in 2014.2 A possible explanation is that the Fed was running down other un-
conventional measures during this period. However, based on the Taylor prescription
2In the Wu-Xia model, similar to Black (1995), the short-term interest rate is the maximum of the shadow
federal funds rate and a lower bound calibrated to 0.25 basis points. This lower bound is chosen because it
equals the rate the Fed paid on both required and excess reserves during the period between December
2008 and December 2015, when the FOMC set the target range for the federal funds rate to 0-0.25%.
Therefore, the shadow rate is not displayed from December 2015 onwards, when the FOMC raised the
target range to 0.25-0.50%. In a nutshell, the shadow rate is assumed to be a linear function of three
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for the short-term policy rate, the Fed’s policy stance is still too expansionary, given the
current economic environment. In fact, according to the estimated Taylor rate in Figure
10.2, the FOMC should raise the eﬀective federal funds rate by about 95 basis points to
1.9%.
The Situation in the Euro Area Despite the recent uptake in average growth, the euro
area economy is still lagging behind the US recovery. This becomes most evident when
looking at the euro area unemployment rate in the upper right panel of Figure 10.1. Si-
milarly, headline inﬂation and especially core inﬂation as well as inﬂation expectations
are still trending below the ECB’s target level. At the current juncture, these indicators
suggest that an exit from unconventional monetary policies would be premature. In ac-
cordance, markets widely believe that in the fall of 2017, the ECB will announce some
modest tapering of itsmonthly asset purchases for the beginning of 2018.And in fact, the
shadow rate ploĴed in the right panel of Figure 10.2 still indicates a substantial degree
of monetary accommodation in the euro area. Thus, while the US economy appears to
be ready for a further interest rate step in 2017, in the euro area, raising policy rates and
an exit from unconventional policies should not be expected before the end of 2018.
latent variables called factors, which follow a VAR(1) process. The latent factors and the shadow rate are
estimated with the extended Kalman ﬁlter (for further details, see Wu and Xia, 2016).
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Figure 10.1.: Key macroeconomic indicators ⋄ The upper (lower) two panels
display real (nominal) variables in the US and the euro area ⋄ Inﬂation expec-
tations are measured as the 3y/3y inﬂation swap rate (market-based inﬂation
expectations) ⋄ Source: Eurostat, Fed Fred, ECB, Datastream
Figure 10.2.: Key policy rates, Taylor rates and shadow policy rates ⋄ Using
quarterly data, the Taylor rate is estimated according to it = 0.5it−1+0.5[rnt +
pi∗t +1.5(pit−pi∗t )+0.5(yt−y∗t )]with rnt = pi∗t = 2 ⋄Due to lack of data, the quar-
terly output gap for the euro area is interpolated from annual data ⋄ Source:
Wu and Xia (2016), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Fed Fred, Eurostat, ECB,
Datastream
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10.2. Principles of Exit Strategies
Tomitigatemarket uncertainty, central banks should communicate the broad principles
of exit strategies in a timely manner. This is particularly important since the sequence
of unwinding unconventional policies is not conditional on output and inﬂation alone,
butmight also be increasingly dependent on ﬁnancialmarket conditions. In this context,
generally three situations are feasible.
Firstly, the unwinding could occur in an environment of restored ﬁnancial markets,
which, of course, represents the most convenient scenario for an orderly exit. Secondly,
inﬂationary pressures could requiremore restrictivemonetary policy in an environment
of impaired ﬁnancial markets. Finally, to the other extreme, policy makers could be
forced to unwind stimulative measures to prevent an overheating of ﬁnancial markets
in light of weak output data and/or subdued inﬂation dynamics. In any case, prudential
policymakers should deﬁnitely try to avoid situationswhere they become trappedwith
ﬁnancial stability concerns (ﬁnancial dominance).
Decoupling of Rates and Quantities While the strong dependency on ﬁnancial mar-
ket conditions may pose serious constraints on actual policy-making, in principle, the
unwinding of liquidity support measures should not present a major challenge for cen-
tral banks. Due to central banks’ ability to pay interest on excess reserves (IOER), ba-
lance sheets must not necessarily shrink before interest rates rise. In fact, as outlined in
section 2.2.4, a main rationale for interest on reserves is that in a situation of large excess
reserves, the IOER rate can determine the overnight rate independently of the quantity
of reserves.3
Problems with Floor Systems In practice, however, running a ﬂoor system by paying
interest reserves might prove insuﬃcient to adequately control inﬂation if banks are
stuﬀed with a large stock of excess reserves. One reason is that for the IOER rate to be
eﬀective, it has to equal the banks’ marginal risk-adjusted lending rates. Since, however,
these rates can diﬀer substantially across banks, paying IOER might be more diﬃcult
to implement than commonly acknowledged. As a result, a ’one-rate-ﬁts-all’ approach
could provide a signiﬁcant subsidy to some banks, while failing to lock up the excess
reserves of others. Another concern is that with the IOER rate equal to the average risk-
3Initially, as part of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, the US Congress authorized the
Fed to pay interest on required and excess reserves beginning in October 2011. Then, however, as part
of the Fed’s response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the right to pay IOER was moved forward to October 2008.
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adjusted lending rate, a greater share of the central bank’s seignorage revenue will be
transferred to banks for the sole reason of holding idle reserves, instead of being remit-
ted to the Treasury (Thornton, 2013).
Apart from this general problem, there exists a peculiar problem with the IOER re-
gime in the United States. By accepting non-bank institutions (mostly GSEs) to hold
reserve accounts with the Fed, but not allowing them to earn IOER, policymakers esta-
blished some kind of legal market segmentation within the US reserve market. In com-
binationwith limits to arbitrage, this inconsistency in the policy framework resulted in a
persistent ’slippage’ of the eﬀective federal funds rate below the IOER rate, which com-
plicates the exit from the zero lower bound by using a ﬂoor system (Bech andKlee, 2011;
Marquez et al., 2013). Hence, a straightforward solution to ﬁx the interest on reserves
ﬂoor would be to pay the IOER rate to all institutions that hold reserve accounts with
the Fed (Goodfriend, 2015). This, however, would require an act of Congress. Therefore,
the Fed has to apply supplementary reserve-drainage operations to beĴer control the
eﬀective funds rate upon exit.
Temporary Reserve-Drainage Operations In an aĴempt to adjust to the institutional
deﬁciency of its IOER regime, the Fed established a ﬁxed-rate reverse repurchase faci-
lity (RRP), to which also the GSEs have access.4 In a reverse repo, the Fed sells a security
to an eligible counterparty and simultaneously agrees to buy the security back at a spe-
ciﬁed maturity date. Thus, RRP transaction does not aﬀect the size of the Fed’s balance
sheet, because securities sold temporarily under a repo continue to be shown as assets
held by the Fed. However, the transaction shifts some of the excess reserves into reverse
repos while the trade is outstanding (FOMC, 2015b). In that way, the oﬀering rate on
the RRP facility plays a similar role than the IOER rate. Counterparties that can use the
RRP facility would not accept an interest rate below the RRP rate, just like depository
institutions would be unwilling to accept a rate below the IOER rate.
Currently, the Fed oﬀers an overnight (ONRRP) aswell as a term reverse repo facility.
The amounts of both operations are limited only by the value of Treasuries held outright
on the Fed’s balance sheet that are available for these operations. Since some Treasuries
are needed for other monetary policy operations, the Fed estimates that about $2 tril-
lion of Treasuries are available for RRP transactions (FOMC, 2015a).5 In principle, this
4Besides primary dealers, GSEs and awide set of banks, moneymarket funds are eligible for participation
in the RRP operations, too. The whole list of reverse repo counterparties can be found on the homepage
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
5The Fed’s holdings of agency debt and MBS are currently not used in the RRP transactions.
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should be enough to temporarily drain a substantial amount of excess reserve from the
system. And in fact, the experience during the exit from the zero lower bound sugge-
sts that the RRP facility improved the Fed’s control over short-term interest rates (Frost
et al., 2015).
Reserve Requirements Apart from paying interest on reserves or temporary reserve-
drainage operations, another option to prevent an unacceptably large expansion of
the money supply would be to substantially increase reserve requirements. While this
might represent a feasible strategy for the ECB, the maximum required reserve ratio the
Fed can impose on banks has a statutory limit of 14 percent. With currently about $2.4
trillion in excess reserves, this limit is clearly insuﬃcient to counteract a sudden increase
in the money supply, because converting those excess reserves into required reserves
would require a reserve ratio of near 100 percent (Phelan, 2015).6 Of course, this statu-
tory limit could be repealed by Congress, which seems, however, highly unlikely in the
current political environment.
Asset Sales Finally, central banks can drain excess reserves either by selling securities
outright or by stopping the reinvestments of maturing assets on their balance sheets.
Prima facie, just allowing bonds to mature seems to be the easiest way to shrink central
banks’ balance sheets – since it avoids contentious decisions about actual sales – but this
would not necessarily be a neutral policy choice (Turner, 2014). One reason is that the
weighted average maturity (WAM) of the Fed’s portfolio increased from 3.7 years in the
pre-crisis era (1970-2007) to above 10 years in 2017 (Bukhari et al., 2013). In comparison,
theWAMof the ECB’s bond portfolio stands at about 8 years (as of June 2017), implying
an even higher increase in maturity relative to the pre-crisis period.7 Overall, this me-
ans that a passive strategy of just stopping the reinvestment of maturing bonds both
in the US and the euro area would result in elevated central bank balance sheets way
beyond 2025. Yet possibly even more important than maintaining large excess reserves
for an extended period of time is the fact that such a passive strategy would make the
timing of balance sheet contraction independent of future economic conditions. Given
the potentially large impact on ﬁnancial markets and the macroeconomy, this is clearly
an unfavorable outcome for policymakers. Hence, this calls for an active unwinding of
6The reserve limit on transaction deposits is established in Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act.
7Prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, the ECB held negligible amounts of bonds outright. Instead, its regular re-
ﬁnancing operations had a maximum maturity of 3 months, such that the WAM of the ECB’s balance
sheet, until the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, was signiﬁcantly lower than that of the Fed.
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central bank assets where the amount of sales is made conditional on the overall state
of the economy (Foerster, 2015).
Sequence of Events Against this background, the Fed noted in its Policy Normaliza-
tion Principles and Plans issued in September 2014 that it intended to increase the federal
funds rate primarily by adjusting the interest rate it pays on excess reserves. Secondly,
during normalization, the Fed announced that it would use ON RRP facility as a sup-
plementary tool to control the federal funds rate.
Regarding the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, the FOMC said it intended to reduce
the Fed’s securities holdings ’in a gradual and predictable manner primarily by ceasing
to reinvest repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA’ (FOMC, 2014). It
also noted that it expected phasing out reinvestments after it would begin raising the
federal funds rate. Finally, the FOMC stated that ’the Federal Reserve will, in the longer
run, hold no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy eﬃciently
and eﬀectively, and that it will hold primarily Treasury securities, thereby minimizing
the eﬀect of Federal Reserve holdings on the allocation of credit across sectors of the
economy.’ In an addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, published
in June 2017, the FOMC provided more details about its planned approach for the re-
duction of the Fed’s security holdings over time (see FOMC, 2017). In contrast, the ECB
has not yet provided detailed information about its intended exit strategy, but it seems
likely that it will adopt a more or less similar approach as the Fed. In any event, recent
experience – e.g. the bond market reaction to Mario Draghi’s speech in Sintra in June
2017, which evoked concerns of a Fed-style ’taper tantrum’ in the euro area – underli-
nes the importance of a consistent exit strategy. In this context, careful communication
is crucial. In particular, the ECB should use its communication policy and provide suf-
ﬁcient forward guidance about its intended exit steps.
10.3. Potential Exit Costs
10.3.1. Financial Stability Risks
Any assessment of the ﬁnancial stability risks emanating from the exit of unconventi-
onal monetary policies should diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of rising interest rates
and the eﬀects of outright asset sales (see IMF, 2013).
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Risks from Rising Interest Rates The speciﬁc risks associated with increasing interest
rates are the following: ﬁrst, rising interest rates will impose immediate capital losses
on ﬁxed-rate assets of banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries. These losses have to be
weighed against the higher net interest margins of banks, which tend to increase with
rising interest rates. While especially weakly capitalized banks will suﬀer, ﬁnancial in-
stitutions with long-term liabilities, e.g. insurance companies and pension funds, may
beneﬁt from rising interest rates. The reason is that the resulting decrease in the net
present value of their long-term liabilities may oﬀset the capital losses from lower asset
values. Second, rising interest rates may lead to higher credit default rates, especially
if the rate hike will be triggered by an increase in inﬂation instead of improving eco-
nomic conditions. Third, rising interest rates can lead to sudden and large swings in
international capital ﬂows, especially if the timing of tightening diﬀers across central
banks.
Risk from Asset Sales Besides interest rate risk, there are also some speciﬁc risks as-
sociated with asset sales (IMF, 2013). First, even small asset sales could lead to sudden
shifts in market sentiment. In turn, this would lead to large spikes in both long- and
short-term interest rates, with unintended consequences for the economy. In fact, even
the mere possibility of asset sales may increase the uncertainty about interest rate ex-
pectations. Under such circumstances, conventional monetary policy faces the risk of
losing the contact to market rates. Second, the impact of asset sales on prices is hard to
estimate in advance. While sales within well functioning markets should have essenti-
ally no eﬀect, dysfunctionalities could suddenly reemerge when assets are sold before
the underlying market vulnerabilities have been addressed. Therefore, a widely held
view is that central bank communication should focus on an interest rate path instead
of speciﬁed quantities of asset sales (IMF, 2013). Third, if central banks return to pre-
crises corridor systems, the resulting disintermediation of interbank liquidity has to be
compensated by a full restoration of private interbank markets. If this is not the case,
some banks will face funding constraints.
To address these risks and to safeguard monetary policy from ﬁnancial dominance,
a main task of regulatory authorities is to establish an adequately capitalized banking
system. In themeantime, ﬁscal authoritiesmight be required to recapitalize systemically
relevant institutions to prevent bank runs and ﬁnancial turbulence. To avoid exchange
rate misalignments, central bankers should also aim at some international coordination
of their exit policies (Bini Smaghi, 2015). Finally, it is of utmost importance to operate a
careful communication policy to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding asset sales.
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10.3.2. Central Bank Losses
As we have seen earlier, a crucial condition for the eﬀectiveness of unconventional mo-
netary policies is “the central bank’s willingness to accept substantial losses contingent
on its intervention being ineﬀective that allows it to move the market to a new trading
equilibrium where it does not make losses. Many interventions to infuse liquidity have
[thus] an implicit ﬁscal element to them […]” (Rajan, 2013, p. 8).
Regardless of this fact, however, higher interest rates and lower bond prices will, cete-
ris paribus, lead to immediate valuation losses on central bank balance sheets. In normal
times, the central bank would avoid to realize such losses by holding the bonds until
maturity. In the current situation of large excess reserves andmassive bond holdings on
central banks’ balance sheets, this might be diﬀerent, however. In particular when in-
ﬂation overshoots due to large excess reserves, a central bank might be forced to realize
losses by selling assets in an environment of rising interest rates. But even if no assets
are sold, rising IOER rates will diminish the central bank’s net interest income, and this
eﬀect increases with the maturities of low-yielding assets on the central bank’s balance
sheet.
Assuming a policy scenario where short-term rates rise by 400 basis points and long-
term rates by 225 basis points (a scenario similar to the Fed’s tightening cycle from No-
vember 1993 to February 1995), the IMF (2013) estimates that central bank losses would
amount to about 3% of domestic GDP in the US, and would exceed 4% of GDP in the
UK and Japan.8
If the governments had to come up for these losses by recapitalizing their central
banks (full ﬁscal-backing of the central bank balance sheet), they would have to cut
down on spending or increase their deﬁcits. However, the full ﬁscal-backing regime
may suﬀer from a time inconsistency problem. That is, in case of actual losses, it seems
questionable whether governments would really use taxpayer money to recapitalize
central banks, because, ultimately, central banks cannot go bankrupt. In fact, there exist
several examples in economic history where a central bank operated with a negative
equity position but was not recapitalized by its government. For instance, in the early
1970s, the Bundesbank recorded a series of substantial losses on its foreign exchange re-
serves, which ultimately ate up its entire equity (Bundesbank, 1973). In contrast to any
private institution, however, the Bundesbank was not insolvent, because it could just
print the money to honor its debts (Schlesinger, 2017).
8The estimations are based on the asset holdings at the end of 2013.
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Losses of the ECB In the event of direct loss incurred by the ECB, Article 33.2 of the
ESCB-Statue prescribes that the shortfall should be oﬀset against the general reserve
fund and the provisions of the ECB. If those funds prove to be insuﬃcient, then the
Governing Council can decide to draw on the monetary income of the NCBs to cover
the loss. For such a decision, however, the votes in the Governing Council are weighted
according to the national central banks’ shares in the subscribed capital of the ECB (cf.
Article 10.3 of the ESCB-Statute). Very importantly, while this could principally result in
zero net remiĴances to euro area governments, a further loss absorption through NCBs
is not envisioned in the legal framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, there exists
no legal obligation for NCBs to redeem an outright loss of the ECB.
Hence, in the (unlikely) event that possible ECB losses are not fully covered by the
above procedure, the ECB has to issue deferred assets and disclose a loss carry-forward
on its annual accounts, which will need to be redeemed through future proﬁts.
Losses of Euro Area NCBs In principle, the same procedure applies to the NCBs of
the Eurosystem. That is, if a NCB suﬀers a loss, the shortfall has to be oﬀset by the exis-
ting loss provision of the respective NCB. Only if the loss provision is depleted shall the
NCB issue deferred assets, which need to be run down by future proﬁts. Beyond that, no
legal obligation exists that forces the owners ofNCBs (i.e. governments) to redeem addi-
tional losses at short notice (Bundesbank, 2012). In summary, this suggests that possible
central bank losses should not pose a serious constraint on the exit of unconventional
monetary policies.9
9In this context, a striking example is the Bank of Chile, which had negative equity of close to 1% of GDP
for almost a decade since 1997, while this did not interfere with an impressive inﬂation performance
(Stella, 2005). For a comparative study of central bank losses in selected countries (Brazil, Chile, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Korea, Thailand), see Dalton and Dziobek, 2005.
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In the ﬁrst part of this thesis, I investigate how monetary policy has been implemented
since the outset of the ﬁnancial crisis. A key result of this part is that central banks’ swift
and pragmatic decision to act as a lender of last resort for temporarily illiquid banks con-
tributed to the stabilization of the ﬁnancial system and thereby averted greater damage
from the economy as a whole.
With the intensiﬁcation of the crisis, however, these ’passive’ lender of last resort ope-
rations were increasingly complemented by ’active’ unconventional monetary policies
involving a manipulation of central banks’ balance sheets. As the failure of Lehman
Brothers triggered severe turbulences on ﬁnancial markets and a sharp contraction in
economic activity and inﬂation, central banks inmost advanced economies signiﬁcantly
lowered their policy rates and started to massively expand their balance sheets – either
through outright monetary transactions (e.g., the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases of
MBS, agency debt and US Treasuries) or through supplementary reﬁnancing operati-
ons against a broad set of collateral (e.g., the ECB’s multiple non-standard long-term
reﬁnancing operations).
Interestingly, however, these operations were implemented in contradiction to the
pre-crisis consensus about the eﬃcacy of such measures. As outlined in chapter 3, the
reason is that standard DSGE models like the baseline NK model lack the conditions
for central bank asset purchases to have any eﬀect on ﬁnancial risk premia. Speciﬁcally,
monetary policy operations that alter the supply of an asset on ﬁnancial markets have
no immediate price eﬀect, except if they change the expectation about the path of future
policy rates (signaling channel). Nonetheless, most central bankers expected unconventi-
onal asset purchases towork primarily through changes in the asset allocation of private
portfolios, i.e. through the so-called portfolio balance eﬀect (see e.g. Bernanke, 2010).
Thus, one of my key research topics in this thesis is to present a coherent theoretical
framework that could capture such a supply-inducedportfolio balance eﬀect. Therefore,
in chapter 4.2, I delineate a term-structure model in which limits to arbitrage and asset
market segmentation produce a state-contingent portfolio balance eﬀect. In particular,
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in these types of models, shocks to asset quantities constitute a determinant of bond
yields in addition to current and future policy rates.
Based on the model implications, I then discuss the transmission channels of uncon-
ventional monetary policies. In general, the empirical evidence underscores the impor-
tance of the portfolio balance eﬀect in the US, the UK, and the euro area. In particular,
I ﬁnd that the ECB’s asset purchase program had the biggest impact on distressed pe-
riphery countries, which points to a portfolio balance eﬀect that runs primarily through
country-speciﬁc risk premia (see chapter 6.2). Moreover, I document that unconventio-
nal policies in most countries had large international eﬀects.
In part III, I analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of unconventional monetary policies.
In a ﬁrst step, I assess the impact of various unconventionalmeasures on the banking sy-
stem (see chapter 7).While the ample provision of central bankmoney initially triggered
a positive liquidity eﬀect, it appears that unconventional measures have been aﬀecting
banks primarily through positive wealth eﬀects since the end of 2008.
On the downside, unconventional monetary policies can also have negative conse-
quences for banks: for example, when a ﬂaĴening term structure weighs on the con-
tribution of maturity transformation on banks’ proﬁtability. Then, however, a trade-
oﬀ could emerge where declining bank proﬁts would require a steeper term structure,
while subdued inﬂation dynamics would call for further monetary easing. To prevent
such trade-oﬀs and to produce a more stable ﬁnancial system, macroprudential policies
should ensure that banks are suﬃciently capitalized. In the meantime, ﬁscal authorities
might need to recapitalize banks in order to avoid a situation in which monetary policy
becomes overburdened by ﬁnancial stability concerns (ﬁnancial dominance).
In chapter 8, I use a DSGEmodel to simulate the eﬀect of the portfolio balance channel
on output and inﬂation. Subsequently, I extend this model by a banking sector and
the zero lower bound on the short-term policy rate. Based on the model simulations, I
show that central bank asset purchases are particularly eﬀective in stabilizing output
and inﬂation when the zero lower bound is binding.
This qualitative evidence for the macroeconomic eﬀectiveness of QE is then compa-
red with the quantitative evidence from the empirical literature. Generally, the existing
empirical evidence suggests that the ECB’s asset purchase program had a signiﬁcantly
smaller eﬀect on output and inﬂation than those of the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England. For one thing, this could be due to the fact that the ECB implemented its
program at a later date, i.e. when ﬁnancial market conditions had already normalized,
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but on the other hand, the lacking economic performance of the euro area appears to be
driven to a large extent by the suboptimal structure of the currency union. Since these
fundamental deﬁciencies cannot be resolved by monetary policy, I conclude that the
degree of monetary accommodation in the euro area should be slowly reduced.
Finally, I discuss potential exit strategies from unconventional monetary policies.
Most importantly, when central banks start to shrink their balance sheets – either by
stopping the reinvestment of maturing bonds or by outright asset sales – a key chal-
lenge for policymakers is to avoid a disorderly spike in long-term interest rates, since
this could pose a serious threat to ﬁnancial stability. Once again, this underlines the
important relation between macroprudential and monetary policies.
Another crucial point is that with the ability to pay interest on reserves, central banks
are principally able towithstand inﬂationary pressures, even in an environment of large
excess reserves. Moreover, possible central bank losses should not keep policymakers
from exiting unconventional monetary policies at the right time.
Overall, the key lesson of this thesis is that unconventional monetary policies were
especially successful in restoring market functioning and impaired interbank interme-
diation in the early phase of the great ﬁnancial crisis. Later on,when policy rates reached
their eﬀective lower bound, unconventional monetary policies primarily aimed at lowe-
ring long-term rates. And although these policies had positive eﬀects on economic acti-
vity and inﬂation, continued policies of this type are associated with substantial risks:
e.g., complacency in the necessary reform agenda or increasing ﬁnancial instability.
265
11. Conclusion and Outlook
266
Part IV.
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A. Log-linearization Methods
A.1. Substitution Method
The log-deviation of a variable xt from its steady state value x is deﬁned as1
xˆt ≡ ln xt − ln x ⇔ ln xt = ln x+ xˆt. ⟨A.1⟩
Employing a Taylor approximation to the right hand side of equation ⟨A.1⟩, it can be
wriĴen as
ln
(
xt
x
)
= ln
(
1 + xt − x
x
)
≈ ln 1 + 1
x
(xt − x) = xt − x
x
. ⟨A.2⟩
PuĴing this together yields the basic results,
xˆt ≈ xt − x
x
= xt
x
− 1 ⟨A.3⟩
xt
x
≈ 1 + xˆt ⟨A.4⟩
xt ≈ x(1 + xˆt) ⟨A.5⟩
Amore general result for ⟨A.1⟩ is obtained by taking exponents,
xt = elnx+xˆt = elnxexˆt = xexˆt
⇔ xt
x
= exˆt ⟨A.6⟩
Again, approximating the right hand side of equation ⟨A.6⟩ by a ﬁrst-order Taylor po-
lynomial at the point xˆt = 0, yields
exˆt ≈ e0 + e0(xˆt − 0) = 1 + xˆt. ⟨A.7⟩
1This section draws in large parts on Zieĵ (2006) and McCandless (2008).
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Taking into account ⟨A.6⟩, this can be generalized to
xαt =
(
xexˆt
)α
= xαeαxˆt ≈ xα (1 + αxˆt) . ⟨A.8⟩
A.2. Taylor Series Approximation Method
The direct substitution method can be rather cumbersome for more complex or even
multivariate functions. In these cases, it is often more convenient to ﬁrstly use a Taylor
series approximation before applying the deﬁnitions for log-deviations from the steady
state. Consider a multivariate function with two endogenous variables like
xt = g(xt, yt), ⟨A.9⟩
which can be approximated by a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around the steady state
values xt = x and yt = y,
xt ≈ g(x, y) + g′x(x, y)(xt − x) + g′y(x, y)(yt − y). ⟨A.10⟩
With the steady state value x = g(x, y) the above equation can be transformed to
xt
x
≈ 1 + g′x(x, y)
(xt − x)
x
+ g′y(x, y)
y
x
(yt − y)
y
. ⟨A.11⟩
Using the equations ⟨A.3⟩ and ⟨A.4⟩ for log-deviations from the steady state, this can be
rearranged to the the following sequence of equations,
1 + xˆt ≈ 1 + g′x(x, y)xˆt + g′y(x, y)
y
x
yˆt
⇔ xˆt ≈ g′x(x, y)xˆt + g′y(x, y)
y
x
yˆt
⇔ xxˆt ≈ g′x(x, y)xxˆt + g′y(x, y)yyˆt ⟨A.12⟩
For most equations in complex DSGE-models, the best way to perform the log-
linearization process is to apply equation ⟨A.12⟩ directly.
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B.1. Corridor Model
To calculate the FOCs of the corridor model of section 2.2, notice that
∂
∂Ij
∫ RHj+Ij+RPj
Tj→−∞
(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj)f(Tj)dTj =
∫ RHj+Ij+RPj
Tj→−∞
f(Tj)dTj
+ ((RHj + Ij + Pj)− (RHj + Ij +RPj)) f(RHj + Ij +RPj)
= F (RHj + Ij +RPj), ⟨B.1⟩
while
∂
∂Ij
∫ Tj→∞
Tj=RHj+Ij+RPj
(RHj + Ij +RPj − Tj)f(Tj)dTj
= 1− F (RHj + Ij +RPj), ⟨B.2⟩
where F (Tj) denotes the distribution function of f(Tj). Using this information, the ﬁrst-
order condition reduces to
−i+ idF (RHj + Ij +RPj) + ib(1− F (RHj + Ij +RPj)) = 0. ⟨B.3⟩
This can be rearranged to
(ib − i)(1− F (RHj + Ij +RPj)) = (i− id)F (RHj + Ij +RPj), ⟨B.4⟩
which corresponds to equation ⟨2.10⟩ in the main text.
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B.2. Baseline NKM
Optimal Consumption Profile Household chooses consumption bundle that maximi-
zes total consumption
max
Cit
(∫ 1
0
C
ϵ−1
ϵ
it di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
⟨B.5⟩
subject to the expenditure constraint
Z¯t ≥
∫ 1
0
PitCitdi. ⟨B.6⟩
The Lagrangian to this problem reads
L =
(∫ 1
0
C
ϵ−1
ϵ
it di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
− λt
(∫ 1
0
PitCitdi− Z¯t
)
⟨B.7⟩
with the FOCs:
∂L
∂Cit
= C
1
ϵ
t C
− 1
ϵ
it = λtPit ⟨B.8⟩
∂L
∂Cjt
= C
1
ϵ
t C
− 1
ϵ
jt = λtPjt. ⟨B.9⟩
Dividing the two FOCs yields consumption demand for good i and j
Cit = Cjt
(
Pit
Pjt
)−ϵ
∀i, j. ⟨B.10⟩
The aggregate price index is given as
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit di
) 1
1−ϵ
. ⟨B.11⟩
Inserting consumption demand ⟨B.10⟩ and price index ⟨B.11⟩ into expenditure con-
straint ⟨B.6⟩ and solve for Cjt
Z¯t =
∫ 1
0
PitCitdi =
∫ 1
0
PitCjt
(
Pit
Pjt
)−ϵ
di =
∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit diP ϵjtCjt
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⇔ Z¯t =

(∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit di
) 1
1−ϵ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pt

1−ϵ
P ϵjtCjt = P 1−ϵt P ϵjtCjt = Pt
(
Pjt
Pt
)ϵ
Cjt ∀i, j
⇔ Cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ϵ Z¯t
Pt
∀i, j ⟨B.12⟩
Then, insert ⟨B.12⟩ into Dixit-Stigliĵ Aggregator ⟨3.4⟩ to get
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ϵ−1
ϵ
it di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
=
∫ 1
0
[(
Pit
Pt
)−ϵ Z¯t
Pt
] ϵ−1
ϵ
di

ϵ
ϵ−1
=
(∫ 1
0
[
P−ϵit Z¯tP
ϵ−1
t
] ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
= Z¯tP ϵ−1t
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
= Z¯tP ϵ−1t
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ϵit di
) 1
1−ϵ
−ϵ = Z¯tP ϵ−1−ϵt
⇔ Z¯t = PtCt. ⟨B.13⟩
Finally, insert ⟨B.13⟩ into ⟨B.12⟩ to get
Cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ϵ
Ct ∀i, j ⟨B.14⟩
which corresponds to equation ⟨3.5⟩ in the main text.
Optimal Allocation of Consumption and Labor For Tt = 0, the household faces the
optimization problem
L = Et
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu(Ct, Nt)− λt(PtCt +QtBt −Bt−1 −WtNt)
}
⟨B.15⟩
with FOCs
∂L
∂Ct
= C−σt − λtPt = 0 ⟨B.16⟩
∂L
∂Nt
= Nφt − λtWt = 0 ⟨B.17⟩
∂L
∂Bt
= −λtQt + βλt+1 = 0 ⟨B.18⟩
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Combining ⟨B.16⟩ and ⟨B.18⟩ while exploiting that λt+1 = C
−σ
t+1
Pt+1
(which follows from
forward iteration of ⟨B.16⟩), gives
C−σt
Pt
= βλt+1
Qt
=
βC−σt+1
QtPt+1
⇔ C−σt =
βC−σt+1
Qt
Pt
Pt+1
= βC−σt+1(1 + it)pi−1t+1 ⟨B.19⟩
With ln β = ln 11+ρ = ln 1− ln(1 + ρ) ≈ −ρ this can be log-linearized to
−σct = ln 1− ln(1 + ρ) + ln(1 + it)− σct+1 − pit+1 ≈ −ρ+ it − σct+1 − pit+1
⇔ ct = ct+1 − 1
σ
[it − pit+1 − ρ] ⟨B.20⟩
where the last line corresponds to the Euler equation ⟨3.13⟩ of the main text.
Firms’ Optimal Price Setting The ﬁrms’ optimization problem reads
max
P ∗t
L =
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
DiscountFactor
(
P ∗t
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenues
−Ψt+k
(( P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs
]
.
⟨B.21⟩
Taking the FOC delivers
∂L
∂P ∗t
=
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+k
)(
(1− ϵ)
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k
+Ψ′t+kϵ
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ−1
Ct+k
Pt+k
)]
= 0
⟨B.22⟩
Substituting back
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Ct+k ⟨B.23⟩
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and the stochastic discount factor
Qt+k ≡ βk(Ct+k
Ct
)−σ( Pt
Pt+k
) ⟨B.24⟩
yields
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt+k
(
(1− ϵ)Yt+k|t +Ψ
′
t+kϵYt+k|t
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−1 1
Pt+k
)]
= 0
⇔
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt+kYt+k|t
(
(1− ϵ) + Ψ′t+k
1
P ∗t
)]
= 0 ⟨B.25⟩
which can be simpliﬁed by multiplying both sides with P ∗t and 11−ϵ to end up with
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t −
ϵ
ϵ− 1Ψ
′
t+k
)]
= 0. ⟨B.26⟩
This corresponds to equation ⟨3.20⟩ of the main text. Solving this expression for P ∗t and
re-substituting ⟨B.23⟩ and ⟨B.24⟩ ﬁnally yields
P ∗t =
ϵ
ϵ− 1
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ
t+kMC
r
t+k|t
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβkC1−σt+k P
ϵ−1
t+k
⟨B.27⟩
Equilibrium Analysis From log-linearization of the production function ⟨3.14⟩ it fol-
lows that
yt = zt + (1− α)nt ⇔ nt = yt − zt1− α ⟨B.28⟩
Further, average marginal costs are given by
mcrt = (wt − pt)−mpnt = (wt − pt)− (zt − αnt)− ln(1− α) ⟨B.29⟩
Inserting ⟨B.28⟩ for nt gives
mcrt = (wt − pt)−
zt − αyt
1− α − ln(1− α). ⟨B.30⟩
Likewise, the marginal cost in t+ k for a ﬁrm i that set its optimal price in t is given by
mcrt+k|t = (wt+k − pt+k)−
zt+k − αyt+k|t
1− α − ln(1− α). ⟨B.31⟩
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From ⟨B.14⟩ and the goods market clearing condition Yt = Ct, it follows that
Yt+k|t =
(
Pt+k|t
Pt+k
)−ϵ
Yt+k ⟨B.32⟩
which can be log-linearized to
yt+k|t = −ϵ(pt+k|t − pt+k) + yt+k. ⟨B.33⟩
Thus, subtracting ⟨B.30⟩ from ⟨B.31⟩ and using the above expression gives
mcrt+k|t −mcrt+k =
[
(wt+k − pt+k)−
zt+k − αyt+k|t
1− α − ln(1− α)
]
−
[
(wt+k − pt+k)− zt+k − αyt+k1− α − ln(1− α)
]
= α1− α(yt+k|t − yt+k)
= α1− α
[
−ϵ(pt+k|t − pt+k) + yt+k + ϵ(pt+k − pt+k)− yt+k
]
= − ϵα1− α(p
∗
t − pt+k) ⟨B.34⟩
where in the last line it was used that pt+k|t = p∗t . Finally, this can be rearranged to
mcrt+k|t = mcrt+k −
αϵ
1− α(p
∗
t − pt+k) ⟨B.35⟩
which equals ⟨3.30⟩ of the main text. Using this expression in the optimal price seĴing
equation ⟨3.26⟩, which is re-wriĴen here as
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβk[mcrt+k|t −mcr + pt+k − pt−1] ⟨B.36⟩
yields
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβk[mcrt+k −
αϵ
1− α(p
∗
t − pt+k)−mcr + pt+k − pt−1]
which can be simpliﬁed to
p∗t −
1− α
1− α+ αϵpt−1 = −
1− α
1− α+ αϵpt−1
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+ (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
θkβk
( 1− α
1− α+ αϵm̂c
r
t+k + pt+k
)
. ⟨B.37⟩
DeﬁningΘ = 1−α1−α+αϵ and subtracting (1−Θ)pt−1 from both sides of the above equation
results in
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− θβ)ΘEt
∞∑
k=0
θkβkm̂crt+k +
∞∑
k=0
θkβkpit+k. ⟨B.38⟩
Taking out k = 0 from the summation operator yields the diﬀerence equation
p∗t − pt−1 = θβ
[
(1− θβ)ΘEt
∞∑
k=0
θkβkm̂crt+k+1 +
∞∑
k=0
θkβkpit+k+1
]
+ (1− θβ)Θm̂crt + pit = θβEt(p∗t+1 − pt) + (1− θβ)Θm̂crt + pit ⟨B.39⟩
where the term in brackets was substituted with ⟨B.38⟩ iterated one period forward.
Next, inserting the equation for aggregate inﬂation pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1) and solving
for p∗t − pt−1 ﬁnally yields
p∗t − pt−1 = θβEt(p∗t+1 − pt) + (1− θβ)Θm̂crt + (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1)
⇔ pit = βEt{pit+1}+ λ¯m̂crt ⟨B.40⟩
where λ¯ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ Θ =
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
1−α
1−α+αϵ has been deﬁned to ease the notation. This
is the expression for theNKPCas a function ofmarginal costs corresponding to equation
⟨3.31⟩ of the main text.
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B.3. Preferred-Habitat Model
The following calculations present the optimization problem of the risk-averse arbitra-
geurs in a discretized version of the Vayanos and Vila (2009) framework of section 4.2,
drawing in some parts on Altavilla et al. (2015), Hayashi (2016), and Hamilton and Wu
(2012).
First, notice that P (n)t is the price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity n in period t.
Thus, by convention, we set P (1)t = 1. The continuously compounded yield to maturity
y
(n)
t is therefore
y
(n)
t = −
logP (n)t
n
= −p
(n)
t
n
, ⟨B.41⟩
where p(n)t = logP
(n)
t . Combining ⟨4.3⟩with ⟨4.4⟩ yields
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t = a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1 (c+Φft)− a¯n − b¯′nft + b¯n−1ϵt+1 ⟨B.42⟩
The expectation of this function conditional on time t, is
Et
[
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
]
= a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1 (c+Φft)− a¯n − b¯′nft ⟨B.43⟩
and its variance is governed by the error term ϵt ∼ N(0,Ω), which is given by
V art
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
= b¯′n−1Ωb¯n−1. ⟨B.44⟩
Thus, the per-period bond price diﬀerence conditional on time t follows a normal distri-
butionwithmean and variance according to ⟨B.43⟩ respectively ⟨B.44⟩. This information
can be used to write
Et
P (n−1)t+1 − P (n)t
P
(n)
t
 = Et [exp (p(n−1)t+1 − p(n)t )]− 1
= exp
[
Et
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
+ 12V art
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)]
− 1
≈ Et
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
+ 12V art
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
⟨B.45⟩
In the second row the formula for a normally distributed random variable X was used,
i.e. Et[exp(X)] = exp[E(X) + 1/2V ar(X)], which is a valid transformation, since X =
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t is a normally distributed variable (as shown above). In the third row, the
278
B.3. Preferred-Habitat Model
approximation exp(x) ≈ 1 + x for x = Et
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
+ 12V art
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
was
applied.1 Substituting ⟨B.43⟩ and ⟨B.44⟩ into ⟨B.45⟩ yields the risky bond return, R(n)t+1,
as
R
(n)
t+1 = a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1(c+Φft)− a¯n − b¯′nft +
1
2 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1, ⟨B.46⟩
while the risk-free rate, rt, is deﬁned to be the same as the yield on the one-period bond,
y
(1)
t . Since this return is known with certainty at time t, its variance is zero, such that
rt = y(1)t = −a¯1 − b¯′1ft. ⟨B.47⟩
With z(n)t being the portfolio share of n-period bonds, the portfolio return of arbitra-
geurs is
Rpf,t+1 ≡
N∑
n=1
R
(n)
t+1z
(n)
t =
N∑
n=1
P
(n−1)
t+1 − P (n)t
P
(n)
t
z
(n)
t
=
N∑
n=1
[
exp
(
p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t
)
− 1
]
z
(n)
t
⟨B.48⟩
resulting in a maximization problem of
max
z
(n)
t
[
Et (Rpf,t+1)− σ2V art (Rpf,t+1)
]
⟨B.49⟩
subject to
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t = 1. ⟨B.50⟩
With
Et(Rpf,t+1) =
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
[
a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1 (c+Φft) +
1
2 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1 − a¯n − b¯′nft
]
=
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
[
a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1c+
(
b¯′n−1Φ− b¯′n
)
ft − a¯n + 12 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1
]
⟨B.51⟩
1Note that exp(x) ≈ 1 + x is a valid approximation only for x ≈ 0. Hence, for large ﬂuctuations of
per-period bond price diﬀerentials, this transformation delivers bad results.
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and
V art(Rpf,t+1) =
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
[
b¯′n−1Ω
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t b¯n−1
]
. ⟨B.52⟩
Equations ⟨B.49⟩, ⟨B.50⟩, ⟨B.51⟩, and ⟨B.52⟩ can be combined to yield the Lagrangian
L =
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
[
a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1c+
(
b¯′n−1Φ− b¯′n
)
ft − a¯n + 12 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1
]
− σ2
[
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
(
b¯′n−1Ω
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t b¯n−1
)]
− λt
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t ⟨B.53⟩
with the FOCs
∂L
∂z
(n)
t
=
[
a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1c+
(
b¯′n−1Φ− b¯′n
)
ft − a¯n + 12 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1
]
− σ2
(
b¯′n−1Ω
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t b¯n−1
)
− σ2
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
(
b¯′n−1Ωb¯t−1
)
− λt = 0 ⟨B.54⟩
and
∂L
∂z
(1)
t
= −a¯1 − b¯′1ft − λt = 0. ⟨B.55⟩
Combining the FOCs gives
[
a¯n−1 + b¯′n−1(c+Φft)− a¯n − b¯′nft +
1
2 b¯
′
n−1Ωb¯n−1
]
+
[
a¯1 + b¯′1ft
]
= σ
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t
(
b¯′n−1Ωb¯t−1
)
= b¯′n−1Ωσ
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t b¯n−1. ⟨B.56⟩
Using equations ⟨B.46⟩ and ⟨B.47⟩ on the left hand side of ⟨B.56⟩, and the market price
of risk,
φt = σ
N∑
n=1
z
(n)
t b¯n−1, ⟨B.57⟩
on the right hand side, gives the risk premium as
R
(n)
t+1 − rt = b¯′n−1Ωφt. ⟨B.58⟩
This expression corresponds to equation ⟨4.6⟩ of themain text. As stated above, it deﬁnes
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the risk premiumon long-term bonds as the product of the quantity of risk, b¯′n−1Ω, times
the market price of risk, φt.
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B.4. Reserve-Induced Portfolio Balance Model
This section illustrates how to derive equation ⟨5.36⟩ in the main text. The calculations
draw on the two asset model as presented in Christensen and Krogstrup (2016a, pp.
19-23).
The Central Bank Including short-term bonds (BS) changes the central bank’s ba-
lance sheet to
PSB
CB
S + PLBCBL = ECB +R ⟨B.59⟩
where it is assumed that BCBS is the central bank’s policy tool.
Non-Banks Accordingly, the balance sheet of the non-bank sector is given by
PSB
NB
S + PLBNBL +DNB = ENB. ⟨B.60⟩
Since the non-bank sector as a whole is granted with deposits whenever selling bonds,
it holds that
PSdBCBS + PLdBCBL = −dDNB, ⟨B.61⟩
thus, changes in non-banks’ equity derive from price changes in its bond holdings, i.e.
dENB = dPSBNBS + dPLBNBL . ⟨B.62⟩
The non-banks’ demand for short- and long-term bonds is a function of bond prices and
non-banks’ equity
BNBS = fNBS (PS , PL, ENB) ⟨B.63⟩
BNBL = fNBL (PS , PL, ENB) ⟨B.64⟩
with
∂fNBS (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PS
< 0 and ∂f
NB
L (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PL
< 0 ⟨B.65⟩
and
∂fNBS (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PL
> 0 and ∂f
NB
L (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PS
> 0 ⟨B.66⟩
where the negative cross-price elasticities express the imperfect substitutability between
short- and long-term bonds. As in the main text, it is assumed that non-banks do not
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react to changes in its equity value by changing their bond demand, such that
∂fNBS (PS , PL, ENB)
∂ENB
= ∂f
NB
L (PS , PL, ENB)
∂ENB
= 0. ⟨B.67⟩
Using this information in equations ⟨B.63⟩ and ⟨B.64⟩ yields
dBNBS =
∂fNBS (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PS
dPS +
∂fNBS (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PL
dPL, ⟨B.68⟩
dBNBL =
∂fNBL (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PS
dPS +
∂fNBL (PS , PL, ENB)
∂PL
dPL. ⟨B.69⟩
Finally, substituting ⟨B.68⟩ and ⟨B.69⟩ into ⟨B.61⟩ gives the change in deposits as a
function of the respective bond price changes,
dDNB = −PS
(
∂fNBS
∂PS
dPS +
∂fNBS
∂PL
dPL
)
− PL
(
∂fNBL
∂PS
dPS +
∂fNBL
∂PL
dPL
)
, ⟨B.70⟩
where the arguments of the demand functions have been dropped for notational sim-
plicity.
Banks The balance sheet identity of the banking sector is given by
R+ PSBBS + PLBBL = EB +DB ⟨B.71⟩
where
FB = EB +DB ⟨B.72⟩
denotes the funding of banks. As argued in the main text, reserves and deposits are
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Moreover, banks consider deposits as exogenous and
they cannot issue new equity or debt given the short-term nature of the model. Thus,
banks’ bond demand functions are given by
BBS = fBS (PS , PL, FB), ⟨B.73⟩
BBL = fBL (PS , PL, FB). ⟨B.74⟩
Since changes in equity valuations do not aﬀect the bond demand of banks, i.e.
∂fBS (PS , PL, FB)
∂FB
dEB = 0 and ∂f
B
L (PS , PL, FB)
∂FB
dEB = 0, ⟨B.75⟩
283
B. Selected Proofs and Derivations
the total derivatives of ⟨B.73⟩ and ⟨B.74⟩ reduce to
dBBS =
∂fBS
∂PS
dPS +
∂fBS
∂PL
dPL +
∂fBS
∂FB
dDB, ⟨B.76⟩
dBBL =
∂fBL
∂PS
dPS +
∂fBL
∂PL
dPL +
∂fBL
∂FB
dDB, ⟨B.77⟩
where, as above, the arguments of the demand functions have been dropped for no-
tational simplicity. A crucial feature for the existence of the reserve-induced portfolio
balance channel is that banks increase their bond demand in response to changes in
available funding, thus
0 < ∂f
B
S
∂FB
< 1 and 0 < ∂f
B
L
∂FB
< 1. ⟨B.78⟩
Equilibrium Analysis Since the model assumes a constant bond supply, bond market
clearing requires that changes in the bond holdings of non-banks, banks, and the central
bank sum up to zero, i.e.
dBNBS + dBBS + dBCBS = 0 ⟨B.79⟩
dBNBL + dBBL + dBCBL = 0. ⟨B.80⟩
Assuming that the central bank buys only short-term bonds implies dBCBS > 0 and
dBCBL = 0. Plugging the laĴer information as well as equations ⟨B.69⟩ and ⟨B.77⟩ into
⟨B.80⟩ yields the demand for long-term bonds as a function of the relative change in
asset prices
dBNBL + dBBL =
∂fNBL
∂PS
dPS +
∂fNBL
∂PL
dPL +
∂fBL
∂PS
dPS +
∂fBL
∂PL
dPL +
∂fBL
∂FB
dDB. ⟨B.81⟩
Given that aggregate changes in bank deposits reﬂect equivalent changes in the deposit
holdings of non-banks, i.e. dDB = dDNB , equation ⟨B.70⟩ can be used to substitute out
dDB in the expression above. After some rearrangements, this gives themarket clearing
condition for long-term bonds as
dPS
(
∂fNBL
∂PS
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PS
− ∂f
B
L
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PS
))
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+ dPL
(
∂fNBL
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PL
− ∂f
B
L
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PL
))
= 0. ⟨B.82⟩
The same manipulations can be applied to the bond market clearing condition of
short-term bonds. Using equations ⟨B.68⟩, ⟨B.76⟩, and ⟨B.70⟩ in equation ⟨B.79⟩ yields,
after some rearrangements,
dPS
(
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ ∂f
B
S
∂PS
− ∂f
B
S
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PS
))
+ dPL
(
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
S
∂PL
− ∂f
B
S
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PL
))
= −dBCBS ⟨B.83⟩
Since the goal is to ﬁnd the change in bond prices in response to central bank purcha-
ses of short-termbonds ( dPLdBCBS ,
dPS
dBCBS
), usingmatrix notation, the two clearing conditions
⟨B.82⟩ and ⟨B.83⟩ can be combined to get
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
] [
dPS
dPL
]
=
[
0
−dBCBS
]
⟨B.84⟩
where
a11 =
∂fNBL
∂PS
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PS
− ∂f
B
L
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PS
)
;
a12 =
∂fNBL
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PL
− ∂f
B
L
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PL
)
;
a21 =
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ ∂f
B
S
∂PS
− ∂f
B
S
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PS
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PS
)
;
a22 =
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
S
∂PL
− ∂f
B
S
∂FB
(
PS
∂fNBS
∂PL
+ PL
∂fNBL
∂PL
)
,
Premultiplying equation ⟨B.84⟩with the inverse of the coeﬃcient matrix gives,
[
dPS
dPL
]
= 1
a11a22 − a21a12
[
a22 −a12
−a21 a11
] [
0
−dBCBS
]
, ⟨B.85⟩
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with the general results of
dPS
dBCBS
= a12
a11a22 − a21a12 and
dPL
dBCBS
= − a11
a11a22 − a21a12 . ⟨B.86⟩
To highlight the intuition behind the reserve-induced channel, in the following it is as-
sumed that ∂f
NB
S
∂PS
→ ∞ and ∂fBS∂PS = 0, implying that the central bank buys short-term
bonds only from non-banks. Another implication of the perfect own-price elasticity of
short-term bonds is that dPS
BCBS
= 0. Furthermore, since reserves and short-term bonds
are perfect substitutes at the zero lower bound, banks with higher deposits will demand
only long-term bonds, thus, f
B
S
FB
= 0 and 0 < f
B
L
FB
< 1. Finally, the cross-price elasticities
of bonds are set to zero so that no substitution between short- and long-term bonds is
possible.2 Using all this information in equation ⟨B.86⟩ results in
dPL
dBCBS
=
−PS ∂f
B
L
FB
∂fNBL
∂PL
+ ∂f
B
L
∂PL
− PL ∂f
B
L
FB
∂fNBL
∂PL
⟨B.87⟩
which corresponds to equation ⟨5.36⟩ in the main text.
2This assumption is not necessary to obtain the result that central bank purchases of short-term bonds
increase the prices of long-term bonds. The necessary condition is only that the cross-price elasticities are
smaller than the direct own-price elasticities, which can be reasonably assumed for standard preferences
for bond demand.
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B.5. A Model of the Bank Lending Channel of LSAPs
Plugging the expected costs of wholesale ﬁnancing,
α1
2 E(WL1)
2 = α16
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)2
, ⟨B.88⟩
into banks’ proﬁt function ⟨7.20⟩,
Π = rL− α0(WL0)
2
2 −
α1E(WL1)2
2 , ⟨B.89⟩
yields
Π = rL− α0(WL0)
2
2 −
α1
6
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)2
. ⟨B.90⟩
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to loans (L) and wholesale liabilities (WL0)
gives
∂Π
∂L
= r − α13
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)
= 0, ⟨B.91⟩
∂Π
∂WL0
= −α0WL0 + α13
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)
= 0 ⟨B.92⟩
and these two FOCs can be combined to get
r − 2α13
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ
2
2 − E0
)
= −α0WL0. ⟨B.93⟩
Furthermore, since the optimality condition ⟨B.91⟩ implies that
r =
α1
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ22 − E=
)
3 ⟨B.94⟩
and ⟨B.92⟩ that
WL0 =
α1
(
L−WL0 − ρD0 − (1− ρ)D¯ + σ22 − E0
)
3α0
, ⟨B.95⟩
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substituting ⟨B.94⟩ into ⟨B.95⟩ gives
WL1 =
r
α1
. ⟨B.96⟩
Plugging this into ⟨B.93⟩ and solving for L yields
L = 3
α2
r + r
α1
+ ρD1 + (1− ρ)D − σ
2
2 + E1, ⟨B.97⟩
which corresponds to equation ⟨7.21⟩ in the main text.
In a next step, this loan supply function is plugged into equation ⟨7.23⟩, which gives
Y − kr = n
(
3
α2
r + r
α1
+ ρD1 + (1− ρ)D − σ
2
2 + E1
)
⟨B.98⟩
⇔ Y − n
(
ρD1 + (1− ρ)D − σ
2
2 + E1
)
=
(3n
α2
+ n
α1
+ k
)
r ⟨B.99⟩
⇔ r = 13n
α2
+ nα1 + k
(
Y − n
(
ρD1 + (1− ρ)D − σ
2
2 + E1
))
⟨B.100⟩
where the last line determining the equilibrium loan rate corresponds to equation ⟨7.24⟩
in the main text.
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B.6. DSGE-Model of the Portfolio Balance Effect
Optimization The optimality conditions ⟨8.7⟩, ⟨8.8⟩, ⟨8.9⟩, ⟨8.10⟩, and ⟨8.11⟩ of themain
text are derived by seĴing-up the Lagrangian
L = at
[
1
1− σ
(
Ct
(Ct−1)h
)1−σ
+ 11− δ
(
Mt
etPt
)1−δ
− (Nt)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
− d2
{
exp
[
c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
+ exp
[
−c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
− 2
}
+ Etβt
{
at+1
[
1
1− σ
(
Ct+1
(Ct)h
)1−σ
+ 11− δ
(
Mt+1
et+1Pt+1
)1−δ
− (Nt+1)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
−d2
{
exp
[
c
(
Mt+1/Pt+1
Mt/Pt
− 1
)]
+ exp
[
−c
(
Mt+1/Pt+1
Mt/Pt
− 1
)]
− 2
}}
− Λt
[
Mt
Pt
+ Bt
Ptit
+ BL,t
PtiLL,t
+ Ct − Mt−1 +Bt−1 +BL,t−L +WtNt + Tt +Dt
Pt
]
− EtβtΛt+1
[
Mt+1
Pt+1
+ Bt+1
Pt+1it+1
+ BL,t+1
Pt+1iLL,t+1
+ Ct
−Mt +Bt +BL,t−L+1 +Wt+1Nt+1 + Tt+1 +Dt+1
Pt+1
]
⟨B.101⟩
and taking the partial derivatives with respect to the choice variables:
∂L
∂Ct
= atUt,Ct + βEt {at+1Ut+1,Ct} − Λt = 0 ⟨B.102⟩
∂L
∂Nt
= −at(Nt)φ + Λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
= 0 ⟨B.103⟩
∂L
∂Bt
= −Λt 1
Ptit
+ βEt
Λt+1
Pt+1
= 0 ⟨B.104⟩
∂L
∂BL,t
= −Λt 1
Pt(iL,t)L
+ βLEt
Λt+L
Pt+L
= 0 ⟨B.105⟩
∂L
∂Mt
= atVt,Mt − {Gt,Mt + βEt {Gt+1,Mt}} −
Λt
Pt
+ βEt
Λt+1
Pt+1
= 0 ⟨B.106⟩
289
B. Selected Proofs and Derivations
where
Ut,Ct =
∂Ut
∂Ct
= (Ct)
−σ
(Ct−1)h−σh
, ⟨B.107⟩
Ut+1,Ct =
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
= −h (Ct+1)
1−σ
(Ct)1+h−σh
, ⟨B.108⟩
Vt,Mt =
∂Vt
∂Mt
= (Mt)
−δ
(etPt)1−δ
, ⟨B.109⟩
Gt,Mt =
∂Gt
∂Mt
= dc2PtMt−1/Pt−1
[
exp
[
c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
−exp
[
−c
(
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]] ⟨B.110⟩
Gt+1,Mt =
∂Gt+1
∂Mt
= −dc(Mt+1/Pt+1)2(Mt)2/Pt
[
exp
[
c
(
Mt+1/Pt+1
Mt/Pt
− 1
)]
−exp
[
−c
(
Mt+1/Pt+1
Mt/Pt
− 1
)]]
.
⟨B.111⟩
Linearisation Equation ⟨8.7⟩, the FOC for intertemporal consumption can be wriĴen
as
Λt = atC−σt C
−h(1−σ)
t−1 − βhC−h(1−σ)−1t Et
{
at+1C
1−σ
t+1
}
. ⟨B.112⟩
or, in functional form, as
G(Λt) = F (at, at+1, Ct−1, Ct, Ct+1) . ⟨B.113⟩
The steady state value thus equals
Λ = aC−σ−h(1−σ) − βhaC−σ−h(1−σ)
⇔ Λ = aC−σ−h(1−σ)(1− βh). ⟨B.114⟩
To employ the Taylor approximation method for multivariate functions, i.e. equation
⟨A.12⟩, I start with calculating the respective partials at the steady state:
FSSat = C
−σ−h(1−σ) ⟨B.115⟩
FSSat aaˆt = C
−σ−h(1−σ)aaˆt ⟨B.116⟩
FSSat+1 = −βhC−σ−h(1−σ) ⟨B.117⟩
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FSSat+1aaˆt+1 = −βhC−σ−h(1−σ)aaˆt+1 ⟨B.118⟩
FSSCt−1 = −h(1− σ)aC−h(1−σ)−1 ⟨B.119⟩
FSSCt−1Ccˆt−1 = −h(1− σ)aC−h(1−σ)cˆt−1 ⟨B.120⟩
FSSCt = −σaC−σ−1−h(1−σ) − βha(−h(1− σ)− 1)C−h(1−σ)−1−σ ⟨B.121⟩
FSSCt Ccˆt =
(
−σ + βh2(1− σ) + βh
)
aC−σ−h(1−σ)cˆt ⟨B.122⟩
FSSCt+1 = −βh(1− σ)C−σ−h(1−σ)−1 ⟨B.123⟩
FSSCt+1Ccˆt+1 = −βh(1− σ)C−σ−h(1−σ)cˆt+1 ⟨B.124⟩
GSSΛt ΛΛˆt = ΛΛˆt ⟨B.125⟩
Applying ⟨A.12⟩ yields
ΛΛˆt = C−σ−h(1−σ)aaˆt − βhC−σ−h(1−σ)aaˆt+1 − h(1− σ)aC−h(1−σ)cˆt−1
+
(
−σ + βh2(1− σ) + βh
)
aC−σ−h(1−σ)cˆt − βh(1− σ)C−σ−h(1−σ)cˆt+1. ⟨B.126⟩
Dividing through Λ = aC−σ−h(1−σ)(1 − βh) and using the market clearing condition
yˆt = cˆt simpliﬁes the above equation to
Λˆt =
(σ − 1)h
1− βh yˆt−1 −
σ + (σ − 1)βh2 − βh
1− βh yˆt +
(σ − 1)βh
1− βh yˆt+1 +
1− βhρa
1− βh aˆt
⇔ Λˆt = ϕ1yˆt−1 − ϕ2yˆt + βϕ1yˆt+1 + 1− βhρa1− βh aˆt, ⟨B.127⟩
with
ϕ1 =
(σ − 1)h
1− βh ϕ2 =
σ + (σ − 1)βh2 − βh
1− βh ,
where it was also used that the preference shock aˆt follows an AR(1)-process of
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1ϵat . ⟨B.128⟩
The FOC for short-term bonds, equation ⟨8.9⟩ in the main text, is a multiplicative
function only, which is linearised to
Λˆt = iˆt − Etpˆit+1 + EtΛˆt+1. ⟨B.129⟩
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With the Fisher equation
rˆt = iˆt − Etpˆit+1 ⟨B.130⟩
the nominal interest rate iˆt and inﬂation in equation ⟨B.129⟩ is substituted with the real
interest rate (rˆt), such that
Λˆt = rˆt + EtΛˆt+1. ⟨B.131⟩
Applying the same procedure to the FOC for long-term bond holdings – equation ⟨8.10⟩
in the main text – results in
Λˆt = Lr̂L,t − Etpˆit+L + EtΛˆt+L. ⟨B.132⟩
where
rˆL,t = iˆL,t − 1
L
Et
L−1∑
j=0
pˆit+j+1, ⟨B.133⟩
was used to get
Λˆt = LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L. ⟨B.134⟩
Combining equation ⟨B.131⟩ and ⟨B.134⟩ gives
LrˆL,t = rˆt + EtΛt+1 − EtΛt+L. ⟨B.135⟩
Finally, iterating forward equation ⟨B.131⟩ for L-periods and plugging this sequence
into the above equation, yields
rˆL,t =
1
L
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j ⟨B.136⟩
representing the expectations theory of the term structure, i.e. equation ⟨8.17⟩ in the
main text.
The linearisedmoney demand equation in the case of perfect asset substitutability but
with adjustment costs, i.e. equation ⟨8.19⟩ from the main text, is derived from
atVt,Mut −
{
Gt,Mut + βEt
{
Gt+1,Mut
}}
= Λ
u
t
Pt
− Λ
u
t
itPt
= Λt
Pt
(
1− 1
it
)
= Λt
Pt
(
it − 1
it
)
, ⟨B.137⟩
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or,
Λ
Pt
(
it − 1
it
)
= at
(Mut )−δ
(etPt)1−δ
− dc2PtMut−1/Pt−1
{
exp
[
c
(
Mut /Pt
Mut−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]
−exp
[
−c
(
Mut /Pt
Mut−1/Pt−1
− 1
)]}
+ βdc(M
u
t+1/Pt+1)
2(Mut )2/Pt{
exp
[
c
(
Mut+1/Pt+1
Mut /Pt
− 1
)]
− exp
[
−c
(
Mut+1/Pt+1
Mut /Pt
− 1
)]}
. ⟨B.138⟩
Multiplying with Pt and expressing the above equation in real terms yields
Λt − Λtr−1t = ateδ−1t m−δt
− d2cm
−1
t−1
{
exp
[
c
(
mtm
−1
t−1 − 1
)]
− exp
[
−c
(
mtm
−1
t−1 − 1
)]}
+ βd2cmt+1m
−1
t
{[
c
(
mt+1m
−1
t − 1
)]
− exp
[
−c
(
mt+1m
−1
t − 1
)]}
, ⟨B.139⟩
which, in functional form, is given by
G(Λt, it) = F (at, et,mt−1,mt,mt+1) . ⟨B.140⟩
Again, this multivariate expression is linearised by applying the Taylor approximation
method of equation ⟨A.2⟩. In a ﬁrst step, I compute the respective partials
GSSΛt ΛΛˆt = i
−1(i− 1)ΛΛˆt ⟨B.141⟩
GSSit iˆit = Λi
−1iˆt ⟨B.142⟩
FSSat aaˆt = m
−δaˆt ⟨B.143⟩
FSSet eeˆt = −(1− δ)m−δ eˆt ⟨B.144⟩
FSSmt−1mmˆt−1 = dc
2m−1mˆt−1 ⟨B.145⟩
FSSmt mmˆt = −
(
δm−δ + (1 + β)dc2m−1
)
mˆt ⟨B.146⟩
FSSmt+1mmˆt+1 = βdc
2m−1mˆt+1 ⟨B.147⟩
293
B. Selected Proofs and Derivations
which can be put together to get
i−1(i− 1)ΛΛˆt + Λi−1iˆt = m−δaˆt − (1− δ)m−δ eˆt + dc2m−1mˆt−1
−
(
δm−δ + (1 + β)dc2m−1
)
mˆt + βdc2m−1mˆt+1. ⟨B.148⟩
Using Λ = i
m−δ(i−1) and multiplying both sides with δ
−1 andmδ results in
δ−1mδi−1(i− 1)ΛΛˆt + δ−1mδΛi−1iˆt = δ−1aˆt − (1− δ)δ−1eˆt + dc2mδm−1δ−1mˆt−1
−
(
1 + (1 + β)dc2δ−1mδ−1
)
mˆt + βdc2δ−1mδ−1mˆt+1 ⟨B.149⟩
This can be simpliﬁed to
(1 + (1 + β)δ0) mˆt = δ−1aˆt + (δ − 1)δ−1eˆt
+ δ0mˆt−1 + βδ0mˆt+1 − δ−1Λˆt − δ−1(i− 1)−1iˆt ⟨B.150⟩
where
δ0 = dc2δ−1mδ−1.
The linearised money demand equation can thus be wriĴen as
mˆt =
δ0
1 + δ0(1 + β)
mˆt−1 +
βδ0
1 + δ0(1 + β)
− 1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
(Λˆt − aˆt)
− 1
δ(i− 1)(1 + δ0(1 + β)) iˆt +
δ − 1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
eˆt
= µ1mˆt−1 + βµ1mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)− µ4iˆt + µ5eˆt ⟨B.151⟩
which corresponds to equation ⟨8.19⟩ in the main text.
Under imperfect asset substitutability, real money demand – equation ⟨8.26⟩ of the
main text – is obtained by linearising equation ⟨8.23⟩ around the steady state. Rewriting
the laĴer in real terms yields
Λt − Λti−1t = ateδ−1t m−δt − υκb−1L,t
[
mtb
−1
L,tκ− 1
]
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− d2cm
−1
t−1
{
exp
[
c
(
mtm
−1
t−1 − 1
)]
− exp
[
−c
(
mtm
−1
t−1 − 1
)]}
+ βd2cmt+1m
−1
t
{[
c
(
mt+1m
−1
t − 1
)]
− exp
[
−c
(
mt+1m
−1
t − 1
)]}
⟨B.152⟩
The sole diﬀerence to the baseline case is that long-term bonds appear as an argument
in household’s real money demand. In functional, this is given by
G(Λt, it) = F (at, et,mt−1,mt,mt+1, bL,t) . ⟨B.153⟩
The partials are the same as in the baseline case as well, except for
FSSmt mmˆt = −
(
δm−δ + (1 + β)dc2m−1 + υm−1
)
mˆt ⟨B.154⟩
FSSbL,tbbˆL,t = υm
−1bˆL,t. ⟨B.155⟩
Using the linearisation formula ⟨A.12⟩ gives
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)− µ4iˆt
+ µ5eˆt − υm
δ−1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
(mˆt − bˆL,t) ⟨B.156⟩
with
δ0 = dc2δ−1mδ−1, µ1 =
δ0
1 + δ0(1 + β)
, µ2 = βµ1, µ3 =
1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
,
µ4 =
1
δ(i− 1)(1 + δ0(1 + β)) , µ5 =
δ − 1
δ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
,
which corresponds to equation ⟨8.26⟩ of the main text.3
Last but not least, the term structure under imperfect asset substitutability – equation
⟨8.29⟩ of the main text – is derived by ﬁrstly multiplying equation ⟨8.24⟩ with Pt and
writing it in real terms to get
−υηmtb−2L,t
[
mtb
−1
L,tη − 1
]
+ 1 + ςt(iL)L
Λt = βLEtΛt+L
(
Pt
Pt+L
)
= βLEtΛt+Lpi−1t+L. ⟨B.157⟩
3The coeﬃcient µ5 and the last coeﬃcient, υm
δ−1
δ(1+δ0(1+β)) , vary slightly from the ones in Andrés et al. (2004).
However,my calculations are conﬁrmed by Jones andKulish (2013), who also apply themodel of Andrés
et al. (2004).
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This can be rearranged to
(1 + ςt)Λt = Λ+ ςtΛ = (iL)LβLEtΛt+Lpi−1t+L + (iL)
Lυηmtb
−2
L,t
[
mtb
−1
L,tη − 1
]
. ⟨B.158⟩
Expressing the above equation in functional form
G(Λt, ςt) = F (iL,Λt+L, pit+L,mt, bL,t) ⟨B.159⟩
and applying the Taylor approximation ⟨A.12⟩, results in
GSSΛt ΛΛˆt = ΛΛˆt ⟨B.160⟩
GSSςt ςςˆt = Λςςˆt = Λςt since ςςˆt ≡ ςt ⟨B.161⟩
FSSΛt+LΛEtΛˆt+L = ΛEtΛˆt+L ⟨B.162⟩
FSSpit+LpiEtpˆit+L = −ΛEtpˆit+L ⟨B.163⟩
FSSmt mmˆt = (iL)
Lυb−1L mˆt ⟨B.164⟩
FSSbL,tbbˆL,t = −(iL)Lυb−1L bˆL,t. ⟨B.165⟩
Assembling the partials and simplifying the expression yields
Λˆt = LiˆL,t − Etpˆit+L + EtΛˆt+L − ςt + τ
(
mˆt − bˆL,t
)
= LrˆL,t + EtΛˆt+L − ςt + τ
(
mˆt − bˆL,t
)
⟨B.166⟩
where
τ = υ(iL)
L(i− 1)
bLm−δi
⟨B.167⟩
Equation ⟨8.13⟩
Λˆt = rˆt + EtΛˆt+1. ⟨B.168⟩
can be used to substitute out Λˆt (and subsequently Λˆt+j) in equation ⟨B.166⟩. Solving
this expression leads to
rˆL,t =
1
L
L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j +
1
L
(
ςt − τ(mˆt − bˆL,t)
)
⟨B.169⟩
which mirrors equation ⟨8.29⟩ of the main text. This expression can be further rearran-
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ged to
mˆt − bˆL,t = −υ(iL)
L(i− 1)
bLm−δi
LrˆL,t − L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − ςt
 , ⟨B.170⟩
which can be plugged into ⟨B.156⟩ to get equation ⟨8.31⟩ of the main text as
mˆt = µ1mˆt−1 + µ2mˆt+1 − µ3(Λˆt − aˆt)
− µ4iˆt + µ5eˆt + µ6
LrˆL,t − L−1∑
j=0
rˆt+j − ςt
 ⟨B.171⟩
with
µ6 =
i
i− 1
η
(iL)Lδ(1 + δ0(1 + β))
.
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B.6.1. ZLB and Financial Intermediaries
Household Optimization The optimization problem of the representative household
is
maxE
∞∑
t=0
βtat
[
(Ct)1−σ
1− σ +
1
1− δ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−δ
− (Nt)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
⟨B.172⟩
subject to
At +Mt + PtCt ≤ iAt−1At−1 +Mt−1 +WtNt + Tt +Dt ⟨B.173⟩
where iAt denote the interest rate that households receive on their bank deposits (At)
and the remaining variables are deﬁned as in section 8.1 of the main text. SeĴing up the
Lagrangian gives
L = at
[
(Ct)1−σ
1− σ +
1
1− δ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−δ
− (Nt)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
+ Etβtat+1
[
(Ct+1)1−σ
1− σ +
1
1− δ
(
Mt+1
Pt+1
)1−δ
− (Nt+1)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
− λt
[
At +Mt + PtCt − iAt−1At−1 −Mt−1 −WtNt − Tt −Dt
]
− Etβtλt+1
[
At+1 +Mt+1 + Pt+1Ct+1 − iAt At −Mt −Wt+1Nt+1 − Tt+1 −Dt+1
]
and taking the partial derivatives with respect to the choice variables:
∂L
∂Ct
= at(Ct)
−σ
Pt
= λt ⟨B.174⟩
∂L
∂Nt
= at(Nt)
φ
Wt
= λt ⟨B.175⟩
∂L
∂Mt
= at
Pt
Mt
Pt
−δ
+ βEtλt+1 = λt ⟨B.176⟩
∂L
∂At
= βiAt Etλt+1 = λt ⟨B.177⟩
Substituting λt (respectively λt+1) from equation ⟨B.174⟩ into ⟨B.176⟩ yields the Euler
equation for consumption:
βiAt Et
at+1(Ct+1)−σ
Pt+1
= at(Ct)
−σ
Pt
. ⟨B.178⟩
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Linearization With pit ≡ PtPt−1 , rnt ≡ −Et (aˆt+1 − aˆt), and the market clearing condition
cˆt = yˆt, this can be log-linearized to
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
(
iˆAt − Etpˆit+1 − rnt
)
, ⟨B.179⟩
is is similar to equation ⟨8.74⟩ in themain text. Combining equation ⟨B.174⟩with ⟨B.175⟩,
and noting thatwt = WtPt , the intratemporal labor supply condition can be log-linearized
to
wˆt = φnˆt + σcˆt. ⟨B.180⟩
Withmt = MtPt , real money demand follows from substituting equation ⟨B.174⟩ (and its
forward iteration for λt+1) into ⟨B.176⟩, which can be simpliﬁed to
(mt)−δ = (Ct)−σ − βEtpi−1t+1
at+1
at
C−σt+1. ⟨B.181⟩
Note from equation ⟨B.178⟩ that
βEtpi
−1
t+1
at+1
at
C−σt+1 =
(Ct)−σ
iAt
⟨B.182⟩
which can be used for the last term in equation ⟨B.181⟩, such that
(mt)−δ = (Ct)−σ
(
1− 1
iAt
)
. ⟨B.183⟩
With cˆt = yˆt this can be log-linearized to
mˆt =
σ
δ
yˆt − 1
δ
iˆAt ⟨B.184⟩
Firm Optimization Firms set prices subject to the Calvo pricing constraint. The opti-
mization is thus similar to the baseline NKmodel of section 3.1 such that the linearized
Phillips curve equals
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + κyˆt ⟨B.185⟩
Financial Intermediary Optimization As discussed in themain text, ﬁnancial interme-
diaries maximize
maxEt
itBt + iL,t+1BL,t −
iAt At + υ˜2
(
Bt
BL,t
η˜ − 1
)2
Pt
 ⟨B.186⟩
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subject to
At ≡ Bt +BL,t. ⟨B.187⟩
With lower case leĴers denoting real variables, the maximization problem can be repre-
sented as
maxEt
itbt + iL,t+1bL,t −
iAt (bt + bL,t) + υ˜2
(
bt
bL,t
η˜ − 1
)2 ⟨B.188⟩
and the FOCs are thus given by
∂(.)
∂bt
: it − iAt − υ˜
(
bt
bL,t
η˜ − 1
)
η˜
bL,t
= 0 ⟨B.189⟩
∂(.)
∂bL,t
: iL,t+1 − iAt + υ˜
(
bt
bL,t
η˜ − 1
)
btη˜
b2L,t
= 0 ⟨B.190⟩
Linearization The FOC for short-term bonds (long-term bonds) in functional form is
given by
F (it, iAt , bt, bL,t), ⟨B.191⟩
G(iL,t+1, iAt , bt, bL,t). ⟨B.192⟩
In line with the Taylor approximation method from equation ⟨A.12⟩, the partials, with
η˜ = bLb and i =
1
β , are computed as
FSSit iˆit = iˆit ⟨B.193⟩
FSSiAt
iˆiAt = iˆiAt ⟨B.194⟩
FSSbt bbˆt = −
υ˜
b
bˆt ⟨B.195⟩
FSSbL,tbbˆL,t =
υ˜
b
bˆL,t ⟨B.196⟩
which are put together to yield the linearized optimality condition for short-term bonds:
iˆAt = iˆt −
βυ˜
b
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⟨B.197⟩
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For long-term bonds, this is
GSSiL,t iˆiL,t+1 = iˆiL,t+1 ⟨B.198⟩
GSSiAt
iˆiAt = iˆiAt ⟨B.199⟩
GSSbt bbˆt =
υ˜
bL
bˆt ⟨B.200⟩
GSSbL,tbbˆL,t = −
υ˜
bL
bˆL,t, ⟨B.201⟩
respectively
iˆAt = iˆL,t+1 +
βυ˜
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
. ⟨B.202⟩
Expanding equation ⟨B.202⟩with η˜ results in
η˜iˆAt = η˜iˆL,t+1 +
η˜βυ˜
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
= η˜iˆL,t+1 +
βυ˜
b
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⟨B.203⟩
which can be combined with equation ⟨B.197⟩ to express the deposit rate as
iˆAt =
1
1 + η˜ iˆt +
η˜
1 + η˜ iˆL,t+1. ⟨B.204⟩
This corresponds to equation ⟨8.73⟩ of the main text. Finally, seĴing ⟨B.197⟩ equal to
equation ⟨B.202⟩ and solving for iˆt
iˆt − βυ˜
b
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
= iˆL,t+1 +
βυ˜
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⇔ iˆt = iˆL,t+1 + βυ˜
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
+ βυ˜
b
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⇔ iˆt = iˆL,t+1 +
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
) [βυ˜
bL
+ βυ˜
b
]
⇔ iˆt = iˆL,t+1 +
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
) [βυ˜
bL
+ βυ˜η˜
bL
]
⇔ iˆt = iˆL,t+1 + βυ˜(1 + η˜)
bL
(
bˆt − bˆL,t
)
⟨B.205⟩
yields equation ⟨8.72⟩ from the main text.
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Government The consolidated budget constraint of the government is given by
BgL,t +Bt −RL,tBL,t−1 −Rt−1Bt−1 +∆t
Pt
= Tt
Pt
⟨B.206⟩
with
∆t
Pt
= Mt −Mt−1
Pt
−
[
BCBt
Pt
− RL,tB
CB
t−1
Pt
]
⟨B.207⟩
and
BCBt = qtB
g
L,t. ⟨B.208⟩
Inserting equations and deﬁning lower case laĴer to be real variables (and τt = TtPt ),
yields
bt +mt + (1− qt)bgL,t =
[
mt−1 + it−1bt−1 + iL,t(1− qt−1)bgL,t−1
]
pi−1t + τt. ⟨B.209⟩
with the bond market clearing condition
bL,t = (1− qt)bgL,t = (1− qt)b¯CVt ⟨B.210⟩
Linearization The ﬁscal rule is deﬁned as
τ
b
τˆt = −κbˆt−1 − β−1iˆt−1 ⟨B.211⟩
and the linearized bond market condition equals
bˆL,t = −qt + Vˆt ⟨B.212⟩
where a linear rather than log-linear approximation is applied to qt since the steady state
value of q equals zero. With i = iL = β−1 a Taylor series approximation of equation
⟨B.209⟩ gives
bbˆt +mmˆt + bL(Vˆt − qt) = mmˆt−1 + b
β
iˆt−1 +
b
β
bˆt−1 +
bL
β
(Vˆt−1 − qt−1)
+ bL
β
iˆL,t −
[
m+ b
β
+ bL
β
]
pˆit − bκbˆt−1 − b
β
iˆt−1. ⟨B.213⟩
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For η˜ = bLb and
iL,t =
1 + Vt
Vt−1
⇔ V iˆiL,t + V iVˆt−1 = V Vˆt
⇔ iˆL,t = βVˆt − Vˆt−1 ⟨B.214⟩
this can be simpliﬁed to
bˆt +
m
b
mˆt − qtη˜ = m
b
mˆt−1 +
( 1
β
− κ
)
bˆt−1 − η˜
β
qt−1 −
(
m
b
+ 1 + η˜
β
)
pˆit ⟨B.215⟩
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